



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TWENTY YEARS  
OF THE  
REPUBLIC

1885-1905,

BY

HARRY THURSTON PECK, LL.D.

*WITH FRONTISPIECE*



LONDON  
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TO  
THE MEMORY  
OF  
MY FATHER

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# TWENTY YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC

## CHAPTER I

### THE RETURN OF THE DEMOCRACY

ON the fourth day of March, 1885, Grover Cleveland of New York took the oath prescribed by the Constitution and became, in doing so, the twenty-second President of the United States. As he paused for a moment, after pronouncing the solemn words, and looked out over the multitude which filled the vast expanse before the Capitol, he must have felt, unimaginative though he was, a thrill of irrepressible emotion. Three years before, his name had been unknown beyond the limits of the provincial city where he lived. Now, the tumultuous cheers that drowned even the thunder of saluting cannon, acclaimed him as the elected ruler of the mightiest republic upon earth. He had accomplished the impossible. He had succeeded where men of large experience and wide renown had ignominiously failed. He had led to victory a political party which seemed to have incurred the fate of perpetual banishment from power. And, in achieving this, he, a country lawyer with no especial knowledge of statecraft or of national policies, had defeated the most brilliant, the most resourceful, and the most passionately loved of all American party leaders.

Washington had never before seen so great a concourse assembled to witness the inauguration of a President. More than half a million people had poured into the city during the preceding week. They came from every State and Territory of the Union, eager to share in celebrating the return of the Democratic party, at last again triumphant. The military display was in itself a splendid spectacle. Not since the great reviews which marked the end of the Civil War had so many marching regiments swung down the noble boulevard which leads from the White House to the Capitol. Every arm of the regular establishment was represented,—cavalry, infantry, artillery, and engineers,—with detachments of blue-jackets and marines. A whole division of the National Guard of Pennsylvania was in line. A body of Southern soldiers, headed by General Fitzhugh Lee, and with the famous Fifth Maryland in the van, was there. Contingents from New York and Rhode Island in the East, and from Missouri in the West, marched close behind the regulars. There was also a battalion of coloured troops, whose fine appearance called forth hearty and prolonged applause. The civic organisations were still more numerous; and political clubs, with picturesque regalia and often in striking costume, completed the long line which later passed in review before the President to the music of a hundred military bands. The day was redolent of spring; and as the stream of bayonets flashed in the sunshine and the flags unfurled their folds in the soft west wind, the sight was inspiring in its animation and movement and vivid colour.

Yet the throng which lined the avenue was no less interesting in the variety of types which it exhibited. It was a different gathering from that which Washington had been wont to see at the inauguration of Republican presi-



dents. The men of the South were far more numerous, and there were many present who had long been strangers to the capital city. For them it was the dawning of a new era; and their mingled faith and triumph were almost touching to behold. There were, besides, not a few gaunt figures of an old-time quaintness, intense and half fanatical partisans from remote localities, displaying with a sort of pride the long white beards which, years before, they had vowed never to shave until a Democratic president should be inaugurated. A feeling of eager expectancy, of pleasurable excitement and frank exultation swayed the entire multitude; and even those who owed allegiance to the defeated party could not wholly resist the spell. It was, for the moment, an apotheosis of the Democracy.

When the new President entered the carriage which was to convey him to his official home, few gave any thought to a gentleman who had stood quietly beside him throughout the simple ceremonial, and who presently took friendly leave of him with a cordial clasp of the hand and a word or two of congratulation and good will. It was the familiar little scene that has been so frequently enacted in our country—when one who, for a few short years, has been the ruler of a nation and the peer of monarchs, goes back, at the stroke of the clock, into the obscurity of private citizenship, unheeded and unheralded amid the strident din that welcomes his successor. There is always something half pathetic in this sudden transformation, yet it is impressive too; for it symbolises American reverence for law. Ex-President Arthur, though unnoticed at the moment when he quietly slipped away from Washington, carried with him into private life the respect and confidence of all his countrymen, for he had governed well and wisely.

Yet no President had ever entered into office under circumstances of such perplexity and personal embarrassment. Mr. Arthur had been nominated for the Vice-Presidency on the ticket with General Garfield, in the hasty, almost reckless, fashion of our national conventions. He was chosen not because he was thought to be peculiarly fitted for the honour, but simply, as the politicians' slang expresses it, to "placate" the Stalwart or Conkling wing of the Republican Party, which had fought bitterly to secure the selection of General Grant, and which resented fiercely the nomination of General Garfield.

At that time the country knew very little of Mr. Arthur, and what it did know was not wholly favourable. He was regarded as a typical New York politician, an active member of the so-called "Custom-House gang," which parcelled out the local Federal appointments and dickered for the petty spoils of office. This estimate was not entirely unjust. Mr. Arthur had been by no means too fastidious in his political associations. He had kept some rather dubious company while acting as the lieutenant of the aggressive Conkling, whose intimate friend he was. But Mr. Arthur had another side of which the country was not then aware. He was one who drew a very sharp line between his public and his private life. Personally he was a gentleman of cultivated tastes, a university graduate, familiar with the usages of polite society, and having an easy adaptability which made him equally at home in a lady's drawing-room, in the *fumoir* of a club, or in the noisome atmosphere of a riotous ward primary. Intellectually he was well trained and disciplined. In the years preceding the Civil War he had attained to eminence in the practice of law. He conducted to a successful issue a case which affected the validity of the Fugitive Slave Law, and he

secured a decision which is still a classic in American politico-legal history.<sup>1</sup> Nor was he without experience of administrative responsibility. During the war he had at different times been Inspector-General and Quartermaster-General of the State of New York, and had won high commendation for his efficiency in organising and equipping the six hundred thousand troops with which that State met the requisitions of President Lincoln. Later, he had been Collector of the Port of ~~New York~~ under President Grant. But when he became Vice-President in 1881, the country at large knew him only as a local politician of no very high repute. He sided with Senator Conkling when that arrogant leader soon after declared open war on President Garfield for refusing to let the New York Senator dictate the Federal appointments in his State; and Mr. Arthur was loyal to Conkling throughout the bitter strife that followed. Then in the midst of it, the President was shot down by a crazed fanatic, Charles Guiteau, and lay for months fighting against death with splendid courage.

<sup>1</sup>This was the once famous Lemmon case. In 1852, a Virginian named Jonathan Lemmon had brought eight slaves from Norfolk to New York intending to re-ship them thence to a Texan port. On petition, a writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Superior Court of New York, requiring the persons in charge of the slaves to bring them before the court. After hearing argument, Mr. Justice Paine ordered the release of the slaves on the ground that the Fugitive Slave Law did not apply to them, inasmuch as they had been brought voluntarily by their owner to free soil and were therefore not fugitives. This decision practically freed all slaves sent or brought by their masters within the boundaries of a free State. An appeal was taken from Justice Paine's decision at the instance of the Legislature of Virginia. The New York Legislature authorised the Governor to appoint counsel, and Mr. Arthur with Mr. W. M. Evarts conducted the case. Justice Paine's decision was sustained by the Supreme Court and by the Court of Appeals.—See Smalley, *Life of Chester A. Arthur*, pp. 304-5, (New York, 1880).

With the first shock of grief and horror which stirred the nation when Garfield fell, there was mingled a feeling of deep resentment. It was held that indirectly the President was a victim of the Conkling faction, whose denunciations of him had worked upon the morbid mind of his assassin. Some, in their excess of feeling, went further still. Strange rumours flew about, and sinister accusations were made in private talk. Men even cherished a wild belief that a conspiracy had planned the murder of the President. In the first excited hours it was hinted that, either with or without his knowledge, a plot had been formed to place Mr. Arthur in the presidency, and in this way to deliver the administration into "Stalwart" hands. Few, even then, were willing to listen to so wild a charge; yet the feeling against Mr. Arthur for a time was very bitter. The newspapers, especially in the Eastern States, spoke of him in terms of rancour. They deplored the possibility that "this pot-house politician," as they called him, might take the place of Garfield, whom popular sympathy had already idealised as a martyr. Throughout these trying months, when the country hung upon the daily bulletins from Elberon, Mr. Arthur made no sign. Just what he suffered no man knew. But his dignified reserve was never broken; and when it was hinted that he might act as President during the period of Mr. Garfield's incapacity, he repelled the suggestion with indignant sternness. At last came the death of Garfield in September, 1881. Mr. Arthur assumed the office which thus came to him under circumstances so distressing. Before long the country learned to know the man as he really was. From the very outset he was the President of no faction, of no party, but of the entire people. Firm, wise, and vigilant, his administration was one of the very best in all

our history. To his former political allies he showed no undue favour. To his former enemies he manifested no unfairness, but stood between them and the anger of Conkling, whose vindictive spirit led him in consequence to break off all relations with the President. Garfield's appointees were retained in office. Even the request of General Grant could not secure the displacement of the Secretary of the Navy and the substitution of a Stalwart.

Many of those whom Mr. Arthur thus protected repaid his generosity with the blackest ingratitude. All through his administration, they and other friends of Garfield carried on an underhanded warfare against him, a warfare of pinpricks rather than of blows delivered in the open. Calling themselves "the Garfield Avengers," they tried in every way to belittle Mr. Arthur's public acts and even to discredit his private life. In this manner, between the frank reproaches of his former friends and the treacherous enmity of his former foes, President Arthur's term of office afforded him no very pleasurable experience. Yet, at least, he never gave his ill-wishers the satisfaction of seeing that he winced. He was not one who wore his heart upon his sleeve, but he went on his way with an outward serenity that did honour to his strength of character. His political courage was shown in some very striking acts. Although there is no doubt that he desired a second term of office, he never flinched from what he held to be his duty, however unpopular the discharge of it might be. Thus, he vetoed the Chinese Exclusion Bill of 1882 in the face of the unanimous and excited demands of the Far Western States for its enactment into law. In the same year he vetoed a foolishly extravagant River and Harbour Bill appropriating some \$19,000,000.

Again, although in former years he had himself been emphatically a spoilsman, as President he advocated and secured the passage in 1883 of an act reforming the Civil Service, and establishing an effective Civil Service Commission. He did all that was possible to secure the prosecution and conviction of those corrupt officials who had systematically robbed the Government through the notorious "Star-Route" contracts in the postal service. But his most enduring claim to honourable remembrance is found in his energetic efforts to build up an efficient navy in place of the grotesque collection of antiquated hulks on which the Grant administration had spent sums sufficient to have given the United States a modern fighting fleet. President Arthur was, in fact, the true creator of the new American navy, of which the first vessels—the *Chicago*, the *Atlanta*, the *Boston*, and the *Dolphin*—were laid down while he was President.

Upon its personal and social side his presidency was one to be long remembered. The honours of the White House were done with a graceful dignity, such as had never yet been known there. The President had lost his wife some years before; but his sister, Mrs. McElroy, an accomplished woman of great social charm, frequently presided at official functions. The diplomatic dinners were rescued from the smothered ridicule with which the foreign envoys had always viewed them; and the pungent epigram of Mr. Evarts, à propos of one of President Hayes's entertainments, suddenly lost its point.<sup>2</sup> As for the President himself, he must be regarded as the only man of the world, in the best sense of that term, who has ever occupied the

<sup>2</sup> To maintain the state which he regarded as necessary to the dignity of the presidential office, Mr. Arthur dipped deeply into his own private fortune.

White House. Jefferson might, perhaps, have been cited as another instance, were it not that, during his first term, he cultivated an ostentatious boorishness such as would have been impossible in a thoroughbred. President Arthur, however, was an ideal host both to his public and his private guests. Of a fine presence, courteous, witty, tactful, and possessing infinite *savoir vivre*, he was a living refutation of the taunt which Europeans sometimes level at us, to the effect that eminence in American politics is unattainable by one who is a gentleman at heart. Mr. Arthur kept the domestic side of his *ménage* a thing entirely apart from his official life. Coarse-minded, peeping correspondents, male and female, found scant material here for vulgar paragraphs of kitchen gossip. There were published no foolish, nauseating chronicles of the "daily doings" of the White House. The President's children were not photographed and paragraphed and made the subject of a thousand flat and fatuous stories. Beyond the veil of self-respecting privacy, which was drawn before the President's personal affairs, few ever penetrated. The only tale that reached the public was one that made even the Paul Prys of the press ashamed of their own curiosity. It became known that in one of the President's private apartments there was hung the portrait of a woman, before which every morning, by Mr. Arthur's personal order, great masses of cut flowers were heaped. Here was a rarely promising hint for the greedy journalist, eager to give his next despatch from Washington a touch of *sauce piquante*. With vast ingenuity and by bringing the resources of the press to bear, the secret was ferreted out at last, and the portrait was found to be that of the President's dead wife. It was very characteristic of the man who, to the world at large, was always the master of prac-

tical affairs with just a suggestion of the *viveur* about him, that he should in private have cherished this delicate sentiment which did him so much honour.

Perhaps it was precisely President Arthur's dignity and perfect taste that shut him out from the broader popularity which some other Presidents have enjoyed. Democracies prefer their idols to have feet of clay. Their ruler must not be too far above those whom he rules, and he must not show too markedly those finer traits which instinctively arouse the furtive suspicion and half dislike of the ignorant and unenlightened. The many-headed monster fawns only at the feet of those who flatter it by imitation, or who unconsciously partake of its uncouthness. The Orsons and Calibans of politics have an innate antipathy to a gentleman. It is not likely that even so great a man as Lincoln could have kept his powerful hold upon the masses had he not possessed some qualities which many of his truest friends deplored. His ultimate success was due, no doubt, before all else, to his sagacity, his perfect knowledge of human nature, and his infinite patience; yet much of it must surely be ascribed to the awkwardness of his appearance and the unconventionality of his manners. The Hoosiers and Suckers of the still untutored West could not rightly understand the consummate statecraft of which he was a master—his inborn genius for the task of government; but when they heard that he slapped his visitors upon the back and told indecent stories and received the ministers of foreign powers while sprawling in a wooden rocking chair, shoeless, and with his huge feet covered with blue yarn socks—then they felt that he was one of themselves, not President Lincoln, but "Good Old Abe." That which repelled a Sumner or an Adams gripped and held fast the hearts



of the men of Sangamon.<sup>3</sup> But Mr. Arthur had not been bred in such a school. His type was one that neither likes nor courts the familiarity of a mob's approval. He had no eccentricities, no traits that were either crude or whimsical, no suggestion of self-consciousness or pose. He was simply a dignified and courteous gentleman—*flos regum Arthurus*, as one of his admirers quoted of him. And looking back upon his brave and honourable bearing under the strain of incessant vexation and temptation, the American people have reason to be proud because the roll of their chief magistrates contains the name of Chester Alan Arthur.

At the time when Mr. Cleveland was inaugurated there had been no Democratic President for a full quarter of a century. A whole generation had been born and had grown to manhood and to womanhood without ever having lived under any but Republican rule. This long continuance in power of a single party had led many citizens to identify the interests of that party with the interests of the nation. The Democrats had been so invariably beaten at the polls as to make Republicans believe that the defeated party had no decent reason for existence, and that it was composed only of wilful obstructionists or of persons destitute of patriotism. On the other hand, the Republican party, identified as it was with success and with so much creditable achievement, was held by them to

<sup>3</sup> The story is told that when President Lincoln first met Senator Sumner, he called out: "Why, Sumner, you must be nearly as tall as I am! Come, back up, and let's measure!" The effect of such a proposal upon the glacial dignity of Sumner may be imagined.—Browne, *The Every-Day Life of Abraham Lincoln*, pp. 451-2 (New York, 1886).—For the unfavourable impression produced by Lincoln upon Adams, see Adams, *Life of Charles Francis Adams*, p. 146 (Boston, 1900).

monopolise all the political virtues of the American people. To criticise its leaders or to attack its policies seemed to many almost treasonable. To it were ascribed not only the successful conduct of a great war, the extinction of slavery, and the triumph of nationalism over the particularistic spirit of secession, but also the maintenance of the country's commercial credit and of its financial honour. Few remembered that without the support of loyal Democrats at the North, the Government must have yielded to the Confederacy. Few took the trouble to recall the fact that of the great Union commanders, Sherman, Sheridan, McClellan and Meade were Democrats, while Grant himself, though a resident of Lincoln's own State, had never voted for a Republican until after the war ended. Nor was it kept in mind that Stanton, the remarkable military administrator, and Chase, the great finance minister, had been Democrats; that Lincoln's second nomination to the presidency came to him not from the Republican party, but from a Union Convention composed of Republicans and Democrats alike. These things had been long forgotten. Partisan Republicans had come to look upon the existence of the Democratic party as a rather sorry joke, in the face of its long record of disaster and defeat. That it could ever return to power appeared to them not only an improbable, but even a ludicrous, assumption.

Among the ablest of the Republican leaders, however, a much saner view prevailed. These men were acutely conscious of certain facts of which their followers were ignorant. No political phenomenon, indeed, is more remarkable than the almost even balance between the two great parties from 1860 down to 1884. The large majorities which the Republican candidates had received in the Electoral College were utterly misleading as an indi-

cation of the comparative strength of the two parties throughout the country. A glance at the popular vote in each presidential election revealed a very interesting state of things, and showed that it was the distribution of the voters, rather than their numbers, which had given to the Republicans success. For example, in the election of 1860, as is well known, Mr. Lincoln, who had a clear majority of 57 electoral votes, was only a minority candidate in the popular vote; for had both wings of the Democracy been united, the ballots which they cast would have outnumbered those given to Mr. Lincoln by more than a quarter of a million. In the election of 1864, which took place at one of the most critical periods of the war, Mr. Lincoln had an electoral majority over General McClellan of 191 votes, and a popular majority of 407,000 votes; but in this election the eleven Southern States, being then outside the Union, took no part. At the election of 1868, out of a popular vote of nearly 6,000,000, General Grant, then at the very climax of his fame, received a popular majority of 305,000 votes, or almost one-quarter less than had been cast for Lincoln, while three Southern States were still unrepresented in the count.

In 1872, Grant's first administration had caused such widespread discontent that the Liberal Republican schism took place, headed by such well-known leaders as Senator Sumner, Carl Schurz, Charles Francis Adams, Horace Greeley, and Whitelaw Reid. Had the Democrats at this time made good use of the opportunity afforded them, they might have gained a signal victory. A candidate such as Charles Francis Adams, of high character and proved ability, could probably have won. But the nomination of Horace Greeley led to the lamentable fiasco which continued President Grant in office by

a popular majority of 762,000 votes. This proved, however, in the end to be a Pyrrhic victory. The very fulness of their triumph removed all feeling of restraint from the Republican leaders, and there followed four years of government tainted by public scandal of every description. The Secretary of War resigned to avoid impeachment for bribery. The Navy Department was honeycombed with jobbery. The revelations in connection with the Whiskey Ring startled and disgusted honest men throughout the country. The President's own relatives and intimate friends were proved to have traded on their influence with him.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Colfax, the Republican Speaker of the House and afterward Vice-President, several Senators and a number of Representatives, were smirched by their connection with the *Crédit Mobilier*. Moreover, the

<sup>4</sup> Senator Hoar of Massachusetts said, in speaking on the proposed impeachment of Grant's Secretary of War, Belknap: "My own public life has been a very brief and insignificant one, extending little beyond the duration of a single term of senatorial office. But in this brief period, I have seen five judges of a high court of the United States driven from office by threats of impeachment for corruption or maladministration. I have seen the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs in the House rise in his place and demand the expulsion of four of his associates for making sale of their official privilege of selecting the youths to be educated at our great military school. When the greatest railroad of the world, binding together the continent and uniting the two great seas which wash our shores, was finished, I have seen our national triumph and exultation turned to bitterness and shame by the unanimous reports of three committees of Congress—two of the House and one here,—that every step of that mighty enterprise had been taken in fraud. I have heard in the highest places the shameless doctrine avowed, by men grown old in public office, that the true way by which power should be gained in the Republic is to bribe the people with the offices created for their service, and the true end for which it should be used when gained is the promotion of selfish ambition and the gratification of personal revenge. I have heard that suspicion haunts the footsteps of the trusted companions of the President."—*Speech of May 6, 1876.*

use of Federal troops in sustaining the iniquities of "carpet-bag" government in the South had become more and more distasteful to the people of the North. The dissatisfaction of the country over such a state of things was shown at the election of 1876, when on the face of the returns the Democratic candidate, Mr. Tilden, had a clear majority of the electoral vote. This result was disputed, and the Electoral Commission created by Congress canvassed the returns in such a way as to give the Presidency to Mr. Hayes by a majority of one vote,—185 to 184,—Mr. Tilden having a popular majority of 250,000 votes.<sup>5</sup> This election seemed to the more astute Republican leaders like the handwriting on the wall, presaging an end of Republican supremacy. The administration of President Hayes, however, considerably strengthened the party to which he belonged. A man of very moderate ability, he was, nevertheless, precisely the President that the country needed at the time. Henry Ward Beecher once described his administration as "a bread poultice"; and the description, though not wholly complimentary, was fairly just. Party feuds were healed. Governmental scandals came to an end. Federal troops were withdrawn from the South. Under the able management of Secretary Sherman, the Treasury resumed specie payments.<sup>6</sup> Hence, at the next election—that of 1880—the Republicans were again successful, and General Garfield had an electoral majority of 59 votes. Yet the record of the popular vote was exceedingly significant. Nearly 9,000,000 ballots had been cast, and out of these 9,000,000 ballots Garfield's majority over Hancock was only 815.<sup>7</sup> The numerical difference,

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 116-117.

<sup>6</sup> January 1, 1879.

<sup>7</sup> The figures are those given in Johnston, *American Politics* (New York, 1900).

therefore, between the Republican and Democratic parties at this time was equal only to the population of an insignificant village. So extraordinary close a division had never before been known. It was obvious that Republican success at the next election hung, as it were, by a very slender thread.

It was while the political scales were in this state of almost perfect equipoise that the Republican Convention met in Chicago on June 3d, 1884, to nominate its candidates for President and Vice-President respectively. President Arthur hoped for a nomination, and on the first ballot he received 278 votes; but even at the outset he was outstripped by James G. Blaine of Maine, who led with  $334\frac{1}{2}$  votes. This lead was steadily maintained in spite of the opposition of many distinguished Republican leaders; and on the fifth ballot Mr. Blaine received 541 votes, and was declared the nominee amid a scene of tumultuous enthusiasm. General John A. Logan of Illinois was nominated for the Vice-Presidency. The Democratic Convention, meeting in St. Louis on July 8th, took but two ballots. In the first of these, Grover Cleveland of New York led with 392 votes as against 170, cast for Mr. Bayard of Delaware; and on the second ballot he secured the nomination by 683 votes to  $145\frac{1}{2}$  cast for Mr. Thomas A. Hendricks of Indiana. As soon as Mr. Cleveland had been nominated as the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, Mr. Hendricks was unanimously named for the office of Vice-President.

The nomination of Mr. Blaine produced an indescribable sensation throughout the length and breadth of the United States. No American statesman had ever had more ardent and intensely loyal friends than he, as none had ever had more virulent and bitter enemies. The

former hailed his candidacy with intense enthusiasm; the latter began at once moving heaven and earth to compass his defeat. Mr. Blaine had already enjoyed a remarkable career. Born in Pennsylvania of Scotch-Irish parentage, he had been by turns a teacher and an editor, having taken up in 1854 his residence in Maine. In 1858 he had entered the State Legislature, where for two years he served as Speaker. In 1862, he was sent to Congress, and at once made his mark by his readiness in debate, his quick grasp upon political principles, and his exceptional fertility in resource. He had the impetuosity of the Celt and the clear reasoning brain of the Anglo-Saxon, besides that indescribable quality which, for want of a better name, is known as magnetism. His personal charm was indeed remarkable, and it was to this as much as to his other gifts that he owed the extraordinary devotion of his followers and friends. Early in his political life he had been compared to Henry Clay, to whose career his own was to exhibit a striking parallel. At first he was better known to his associates in Congress than to the country as a whole; but when, in 1869, he was elected Speaker of the House, he rose at once to the rank of a great party leader. It was not, however, until 1876 that he reached the climax of his parliamentary fame. Early in that year, owing to the approach of the centenary of national independence, it was felt that the time had come to hasten the growth of the kindly feeling which already was slowly uniting the sections of the country that had faced each other in the Civil War. To further this object, Mr. Randall of Pennsylvania, a distinguished Democrat, introduced in the House of Representatives a bill to relieve all persons in the United States from any disability imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Mr. Blaine was

at once upon his feet to offer a substitute. It excepted from this amnesty Jefferson Davis, "late President of the so-called Confederate States." After some parliamentary fencing, an exciting debate began. Mr. Blaine, fluent and impassioned, set forth his reasons for excepting Mr. Davis from the amnesty offered by the Randall bill. His words were chosen with consummate art if it was his purpose to stir again the embers of sectional strife into a blaze, and to exasperate the Southern Democrats whom he confronted on the floor.

"In my amendment I have excepted Jefferson Davis from amnesty. I do not place his exclusion on the ground that Mr. Davis was; as he has been commonly called, the head and front of the Rebellion, because on that ground I do not think the exception would be tenable. Mr. Davis was in that respect as guilty, no more so, no less so, than thousands of others who have already received the benefit and grace of amnesty. Probably he was far less efficient as an enemy of the United States, probably he was far more useful as a disturber of the councils of the Confederacy, than many who have already received amnesty. It is not because of any particular and special damage that he above others did to the Union, or because he was personally or especially of consequence, that I except him. But I except him on this ground: that he was the author, knowingly, deliberately, guiltily, and wilfully, of the gigantic murders and crimes at Andersonville."

Mr. Blaine then proceeded to describe in vivid language the sufferings of the Union soldiers confined in the prison-pen at Andersonville. He dwelt with all the power of a consummate orator upon the horrors of that loathsome place. He pictured the miseries of starvation and disease, the insults and ingenious cruelty of the jailer Wirz; and he stirred the indignation of his Northern hearers by paint-



ing the dreadful man-hunts in which savage bloodhounds had been set upon the track of escaping prisoners. He excepted from his condemnation the people of the South, and directly charged the crimes of Andersonville upon Jefferson Davis.

“The poor victim, Wirz, deserved his death for brutal treatment and the murder of many victims; but it was a weak policy on the part of our Government to allow Jefferson Davis to go at large and hang Wirz. Wirz was nothing in the world but a mere subordinate, and there was no special reason for singling him out for death. I do not say he did not deserve it. He deserved no mercy; but his execution seemed like skipping over the president, superintendent, and board of directors in the case of a great railroad accident and hanging the brakeman of the rear car. . . .

“It is often said that we shall lift Mr. Davis again into great consequence by refusing him amnesty. This is not for me to consider. I only see before me, when his name is presented, a man who, by a wave of his hand, by a nod of his head, could have put an end to the atrocious cruelties at Andersonville. Some of us had kinsmen there, most of us had friends there, all of us had countrymen there. In the name of those kinsmen, friends, and countrymen, I here protest, and shall with my vote protest, against calling back and crowning with the honours of full American citizenship the man who organised that murder.”

Mr. Hill of Georgia replied to Mr. Blaine in a very able, temperate, and (as one reads it over now) convincing speech, so far as the complicity of Mr. Davis was concerned; but he and his associates from the South made the serious tactical mistake of charging that Confederate prisoners had been ill-treated in the North. This gave Mr. Blaine another chance; and, amid a scene of indescribable excitement, he returned to the attack, as brilliant and even more exasperating than before. The debate

continued for several days, during which the House at times became a bear-garden. But through all the tumult Mr. Blaine was the one conspicuous figure. The whole country was stirred as it had not been for many years. The passions of the war revived and flamed up as fiercely as in the early sixties. The name of "Blaine of Maine" was in all men's mouths, and the North gloried in his victory, which was the victory of a partisan, but which was, nevertheless, magnificent. The feeling of his admirers was well expressed a few weeks later by Colonel Robert Ingersoll,<sup>8</sup> who with florid yet effective eloquence paid this tribute to his leader:

"Like an armed warrior, like a plumed knight, James G. Blaine marched down the halls of the American Congress and threw his shining lance full and fair against the brazen forehead of every traitor to his country."

From the moment of this spectacular exhibition, Mr. Blaine was an inevitable candidate for the presidency. But the fierce white light which beats upon a throne is no more fierce than that which beats upon a presidential aspirant. It was turned at once upon Mr. Blaine's whole past career. Every incident and every act of his were now subjected to minute investigation by his enemies and rivals. It was not long before a cloud was cast upon his personal integrity. Like a dank mist which rises at nightfall over marshy ground, there rose a vague, impalpable belief that in his public life he had not had a due regard for his own honour. Beginning with mere hints and ending with public accusations, a dozen stories grew until they filled

<sup>8</sup> In nominating Mr. Blaine at the Republican National Convention in Cincinnati, June 16, 1876.

the minds of everyone about him. It was said that Mr. Blaine had pledged a number of worthless railroad bonds to the Union Pacific Railway Company in return for a loan of \$64,000 which had never been repaid. It was also charged that without consideration he had received bonds of the Little Rock and Fort Smith Railroad. Still another rumour said that while Speaker of the House he had left the chair and asked one of the members to make a point of order which would be sustained by him, and which would be favourable to a railway company in which Mr. Blaine was interested. Among a very few it began to be whispered confidentially that there existed letters written by Mr. Blaine to a business associate, which, if found, would prove that the ex-Speaker had had corrupt transactions with the Northern Pacific Company.

These reports obtained so widespread a currency that Mr. Blaine was forced to rise in his place and bring the matter to the attention of the House. He read a letter from the treasurer of the Union Pacific and from Colonel Thomas A. Scott, the president of that railway, denying the story of the worthless bonds. He read another letter from Morton, Bliss and Company, who were alleged to have cashed the draft for \$64,000, mentioned in the story, but who now declared that no such draft had been presented to them. Mr. Blaine went on to say that he had never owned the Little Rock and Fort Smith bonds which he was said to have received without any consideration. Apparently his name was cleared. He was, of course, extremely anxious to avoid investigation at the hands of Congress. The time for the National Republican Convention was drawing near. Many States had already instructed their delegates to support his candidacy. That he should be the subject of an investigation for corrupt

transactions while his name was before the Convention would be fatal to his chances; and he desired above all things to stave it off. Nevertheless, the House, which was strongly Democratic, ordered its Judiciary Committee to make such an investigation, though in the resolution ordering it, Mr. Blaine was not specifically named. This was on May 2d; and at the first sessions of the Committee the evidence was corroborative of Mr. Blaine's assertions. On May 31st, however, a very curious incident occurred. There was brought before the Committee a man named James Mulligan. Mulligan had at one time been a clerk for Mr. Jacob Stanwood (the brother of Mrs. Blaine), and later a bookkeeper for Warren Fisher, Jr., a business man of Boston, who had had close relations with the management of the Little Rock and Fort Smith Railroad. While Mr. Mulligan was testifying, he chanced to mention very quietly that he had in his possession certain letters written by Mr. Blaine to Warren Fisher, Jr. At once it was observed that Mr. Blaine grew pale and gave every evidence of great excitement. A moment later, in a whisper, he asked a friend on the Committee to move an immediate adjournment. The gentleman in question did so on the plea of illness, and the Committee rose, to meet again the following morning. When it so met it listened to a most extraordinary story.

During the brief respite given by the adjournment of the Committee, Mr. Blaine had flashed his mind over all the possibilities of the situation. He knew that Mulligan had letters, which, if made public by Mulligan himself, would be interpreted by everyone in a sense extremely unfavourable to Mr. Blaine. He knew that these letters would surely be asked for by the Committee so soon as it should reconvene in the morning. To prevent this and to

gain time he must act at once. He therefore went to the Riggs House, where Mulligan was staying, and met Mulligan, Fisher and one Atkins in a private room. There he first asked to see the letters which Mulligan had with him. When this request was refused, he pleaded with all the earnestness of a man whose future was at stake, that the letters might not be given to the Committee. Mulligan declined to surrender them. He said that he had no wish to injure Mr. Blaine, but that he must keep the letters in order to protect himself in case his testimony were impeached. Mr. Blaine asked to read the letters, promising on his word of honour to return them after reading. Mulligan then handed the letters to Mr. Blaine, who read them very carefully, put them into his pocket and carried them away with him.

Such was the story which Mulligan under oath told to the Committee when it met on the following morning.<sup>9</sup> Meanwhile, Mr. Blaine had secured advice from eminent

<sup>9</sup> Mulligan's story as told in his own words before the sub-committee was as follows: "After my examination here yesterday, Mr. Blaine came up to the hotel, the Riggs House, and there had a conference with Mr. Atkins, Mr. Fisher, and myself. He wanted to see those letters that I had. I declined to let him see them. He prayed, almost went on his knees—I would say on his knees—and implored me to think of his six children and his wife, that if the Committee should get hold of this communication, it would sink him immediately and ruin him forever. I told him I should not give them to him. He asked me if I would let him read them. I said I would if he would promise me on the word of a gentleman that he would return them to me. I did let him read them over. He read them over once and called for them again and read them over again. He still importuned me to give those papers up. I declined to do it. I retired to my own room and he followed me up, and went over the same history about his family and his children, and implored me to give them up to him, and even contemplated suicide. He asked me again if I wanted to see his children left in that state, and he then asked me again if I would not let him look over these papers consecutively (I had them

counsel (Senator Matthew H. Carpenter and Judge Jeremiah Black), to the effect that he was not bound to return the letters. He therefore refused to do so at the request of the Committee, and the matter for the moment rested there. The case, however, looked very black for Mr. Blaine. He had possession of the letters, to be sure, yet his conduct was everywhere interpreted as giving evidence of guilt. Great excitement prevailed throughout the country, and the friends of Mr. Blaine were everywhere dismayed. It soon appeared, however, that what he had done was only part of a well-conceived plan which did credit to his resourcefulness and audacity. On June 5th, Mr. Blaine rose in the House and claimed the floor on a question of privilege. He at once proceeded to recite the events which had led up to the incident just narrated, and then, referring to Mulligan, he spoke as follows:

“This man had selected, out of correspondence running over a great many years, letters which he thought would be peculiarly damaging to me. He came here loaded with them. He came here for a sensation. He came here primed. He came here on that particular errand. I was advised of it, and I obtained those letters under circumstances which have been notoriously scattered throughout the United States and are known to everybody. . . . I claim I have the entire right to those letters, not only by natural right, but upon all the precedents and principles of law, as the numbered). I told him I would, if he would return them to me. He took the papers, read them all over, and among them I had a memorandum that I had made by way of synopsis of the letters, and referring to the number of the letters—a synopsis containing the points of the letters. I had made that memorandum so as to be able to refer here when questioned. He asked me to let him read the letters and I showed him this statement too. After he had read them, he asked me what I wanted to do with those papers; if I wanted to use them. I told him I never wanted to use the papers, nor would I show them to the Committee unless called upon to do so. . . . Blaine has got them, and would not give them up to me.”

man who held those letters in possession held them wrongfully. The Committee that attempted to take those letters from that man for use against me proceeded wrongfully. They proceeded in all boldness to a most defiant violation of the ordinary private and personal rights which belong to every American citizen. . . . Then there went forth everywhere the idea and impression that because I would not permit that man, or any man whom I could prevent, from holding as a menace over my head my private correspondence, there must be something in it most deadly and destructive to my reputation. . . . Now, Mr. Speaker, I say that I have defied the power of the House to compel me to produce those letters. I speak with all respect to this House. I know its powers and I trust that I respect them. But I say this House has no more power to order what shall be done or not done with my private correspondence than it has with what I shall do in the nurture and education of my children—not a particle. The right is as sacred in the one case as it is in the other. . . . I am ready for any extremity of contest or conflict in behalf of so sacred a right.”

Throughout this animated and even fiery justification of his right, the crowded House had listened in breathless silence, and with a tension of feeling which could almost be felt. There was abundant sympathy with Mr. Blaine. Even his adversaries were sorry for him. He seemed like a man driven into a corner and fighting for his very life. Yet the suppression of the letters looked only the more utterly damning. But at this moment, after a brief pause, Mr. Blaine dealt a master-stroke which he had planned with consummate art, and which he now delivered with a dramatic power that was thrilling. Raising his voice and holding up a packet, he went on:

“And while I am so, I am not afraid to show the letters. Thank God Almighty, I am not afraid to show them! There they are.

There is the very original package. And, with some sense of humiliation, with a mortification that I do not pretend to conceal, with a sense of outrage which I think any man in my position would feel, I invite the confidence of forty-four millions of my countrymen while I read those letters from this desk."

The tension was broken. The whole assembly burst out into frantic and prolonged applause. Then Mr. Blaine read the letters, one by one, with comments and explanations of his own. Having done so, he faced one of the Democratic members of the Committee, Mr. Proctor Knott, and in the course of a rapid dialogue brought out the fact that Mr. Knott had received a cablegram from a Mr. Caldwell, whose knowledge of the whole affair was very intimate, and that Mr. Knott had apparently suppressed it. The scene at the end of this exciting parliamentary duel baffled all description. The House went mad; and for fifteen minutes there reigned a pandemonium amid which the Speaker was helpless in his efforts to restore even a semblance of order. Mr. Blaine, for the moment, had won a brilliant triumph. He had restored and strengthened the faith of all his followers and had turned apparently inevitable disaster into victory.

He had not, however, laid the ghost of the railway scandals. Reading over the so-called Mulligan letters in cold type, a great number of Mr. Blaine's own party associates found in them evidence, if not of actual corruption, at least of so blunted a sense of official propriety as to make Mr. Blaine no longer seem a fitting candidate for the highest office in the land. From that time he had to face not only the opposition of the Democratic party, but the mistrust of thousands of Republicans, among whom were men of the highest character and influence.



The Mulligan letters showed that Mr. Blaine, in the years when they were written, had been suffering from what he called "very pressing and painful" pecuniary embarrassment. Writing to Mr. Fisher, he described himself as "left helpless and hopeless," and as "crippled and deranged in all my finances." A complicated series of financial transactions stood revealed, and also a willingness on the part of Mr. Blaine to secure especial consideration on the ground of his influence as an officer of the Government. The following letters are the two which were afterwards most often quoted. The first was dated June 29, 1869.

"MY DEAR MR. FISHER: Your offer to admit me to a participation in the new railway enterprise is in every respect as generous as I could expect or desire. I thank you very sincerely for it, and in this connection I wish to make a suggestion of a somewhat selfish character. It is this: You spoke of Mr. Caldwell disposing of a share of his interest to me. If he really designs to do so, I wish he would make the proposition definite, so that I could know just what to depend on. Perhaps if he waits till the full development of the enterprise, he might grow reluctant to part with the shares; and I do not by this mean any distrust of him.

"I do not feel that I shall prove a deadhead in the enterprise if I once embark in it. I see various channels in which I know I can be useful.

"Very hastily and sincerely your friend,

"J. G. BLAINE."

The second letter was marked "Confidential," and was dated at Washington, April 16, 1876.

"MY DEAR MR. FISHER: You can do me a very great favour, and I know it will give you pleasure to do so—just as I would do

for you under similar circumstances. Certain persons and papers are trying to throw mud at me to injure my candidacy before the Cincinnati Convention, and you may observe they are trying it in connection with the Little Rock and Fort Smith matter.

“ I want you to send me a letter such as the inclosed draft. You will receive this to-morrow (Monday) evening, and it will be a favour I shall never forget if you will at once write me the letter and mail it the same evening.

“ The letter is strictly true, and is honourable to you and to me, and will stop the mouths of slanderers at once.

“ Regard this letter as strictly confidential. Do not show it to any one. The draft is in the hands of my clerk, who is as trustworthy as any man can be. If you can't get the letter written in season for the 9 o'clock mail to New York, please be sure to mail it during the night so that it will start first mail Tuesday morning; *but, if possible, I pray you to get it in the 9 o'clock mail Monday evening.* Kind regards to Mrs. Fisher.

“ Sincerely,

“ *Burn this letter.*

“ J. G. B.”

A third letter, dated October 4, 1869, made it evident that Mr. Blaine, while Speaker of the House, had sent his page to General Logan, suggesting a point of order, which, if made, would block a scheme unfriendly to a land grant in which Mr. Blaine's financial associates were interested.

Such, in brief, is the history of the famous Mulligan letters which sufficed to prevent Mr. Blaine's nomination for the Presidency in 1876 and 1880, and which now, in 1884, from the outset of his candidacy, were printed and scattered broadcast over the country by his political opponents.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> In addition to the letters read by Mr. Blaine before the House, a number of others were made public by Messrs. Fisher and Mulligan, who deposited them with their lawyers in Boston. The authenticity of these letters was not denied by Mr. Blaine.

The Democratic candidate against whom Mr. Blaine had now to make his fight was a man of a wholly antithetical type. Mr. Cleveland was in no respect a brilliant man. The son of a clergyman, and early left to make his own way in the world, he had, like his rival, been a teacher, and had later taken up the practice of the law in Buffalo. There he had held some minor public offices. In 1863 he was Assistant District Attorney for the county, and from 1870 to 1873 he had served as Sheriff. He first attracted attention outside of his own city when, in 1881, he was elected Mayor of Buffalo by a combination of Democrats and Independents. In this office he instituted reforms and defeated various corrupt combinations, while his liberal use of the veto power maintained a wise economy. In 1882 he had received the Democratic nomination for the governorship of New York, and had been elected by the remarkable plurality of 192,000 votes.<sup>11</sup>

Mr. Cleveland was a type of man such as had not before come to the front as a presidential possibility. He represented the practical, every-day, usual citizen of moderate means and no very marked ambitions—a combination of the business man and the unimportant professional person, blunt, hardheaded, brusque, and unimaginative, and with a readiness to take a hand in whatever might be going on. His education was of the simplest, his general

<sup>11</sup> The size of this plurality was mainly due to the abstention from the polls of many discontented Republicans. At the Republican Convention held in Saratoga, Judge Folger, then Secretary of the Treasury, was nominated as Mr. Cleveland's opponent. It was felt that President Arthur had practically dictated this nomination in order to strengthen his own hold upon his party machinery in New York. Certain delegates were charged with having used forged proxies. Finally, the friends of Mr. A. B. Cornell, who was then Governor of the State, were indignant because he had not been re-nominated.

information presumably not very large; and his interest in life was almost wholly bounded by the limits of his own locality. As a practising lawyer he was well thought of; yet his reputation had not gone much beyond the local circuit. A bachelor, he had no need of a large income. His spare time was spent with companions of his own tastes. His ideal of recreation was satisfied by a quiet game of pinochle in the back-room of a respectable beer-garden; and perhaps this circumstance in itself is sufficient to give a fair notion of his general environment. He was, indeed, emphatically a man's man—*homo inter homines*—careless of mere forms, blunt of speech, and somewhat primitive in his tastes. But he had all the virile attributes of a Puritan ancestry. His will was inflexible. His force of character was extraordinary. He hated shams, believed that a thing was either right or wrong, and when he had made up his mind to any course of action, he carried it through without so much as a moment's wavering. So great was the confidence which his character inspired, that when a committee of the independent voters of Buffalo called upon him for the purpose of urging him to stand for the mayoralty, they asked him for no written pledges, but accepted his simple statement as an adequate guarantee. "Cleveland says that if elected he will do so-and-so," they told the people. And the people elected him, because they knew his word to be inviolable.

As Governor, Mr. Cleveland entered upon a wider field and one that must have seemed at first a place of limitless exactions. But his lack of imagination stood him in good stead. He bent his back to the burden and did each day's work as it came. A stranger to large responsibilities, and retaining much of the narrowness of the provincial busi-

ness man, he viewed all questions as equally important, attending personally to all his correspondence, looking for himself into every item and detail of executive business, and giving hours of time each day to minutæ which the merest clerk could have cared for with quite as much efficiency. This, however, was only one manifestation of the conscientiousness that showed itself far more commendably in higher matters. The rough, blunt, independence of the man made him indifferent to the insidious influences that rise like a malarial mist about the possessor of high political office. Subtleties of suggestion were lost on this brusque novice, and anything more pointed than suggestion roused in him a cross-grained spirit that brooked no guidance or control. He forged ahead in his own way with a sort of bull-necked stubbornness, but with a power and energy which smoother politicians were compelled to recognise as very real. He cared nothing for popularity. He vetoed a bill requiring the street railways to reduce their fares, thereby offending thousands. He followed it up by a veto of another bill which granted public money to sectarian schools; and in consequence he estranged great masses of his Catholic supporters. He defied the Tammany leaders in the Legislature, and made still more powerful enemies. But when the people at large had come to understand him, they admired his independence and applauded this burly, obstinate, tactless, but intensely earnest man. They were pleased when the professional politicians were trampled on; and even the labour representatives, to whose dictation Mr. Cleveland had sturdily refused to bow, at heart respected him for his firmness and his honesty. In the end, his record as Governor of New York secured for him the nomination for the Presidency. Against the brilliant, subtle and magnetic

Blaine was pitted the plodding, incorruptible, courageous Cleveland.

The campaign opened immediately after the two candidates had been nominated. Those Republicans who were opposed to Mr. Blaine formed an organisation at a conference held in New York on July 22d, and prepared an address which was issued on the 30th by the so-called National Committee of Republicans and Independents, of which George William Curtis was the chairman, and George Walton Green the secretary. At once the movement assumed formidable proportions, and it was seen that thousands of Republicans were rallying to Cleveland, not because they had given up their party, but because they could not tolerate their party's candidate. Among them were men who had been identified with the Republican party from its earliest years—Henry Ward Beecher, William Everett, George Ticknor Curtis, Carl Schurz, and James Freeman Clarke. These Independents received the popular name of "Mugwumps," a word which, having been first employed in a semi-political sense by the Indianapolis *Sentinel* in 1872, gained its popular currency through the New York *Sun*, which began using it on March 23, 1884. These "Mugwumps," or political purists, had been described by Mr. Blaine four years earlier in a letter to General Garfield, in which he said: "They are noisy but not numerous; pharisaical but not practical; ambitious but not wise; pretentious but not powerful." This sentence was extremely characteristic of the man who wrote it.

Mr. Blaine was an old campaigner. He knew that his record would be violently assailed. He felt, however, that he had drawn all the enemy's fire in 1876 and 1880, and

that in consequence their ammunition had been practically exhausted. He had no intention of conducting a defensive battle. With all his natural aggressiveness, therefore, he began to carry the war into the enemy's country. At first he trusted to the old sectional issue which had won so many elections for his party. The memories of the Civil War were again invoked. The perils of the "Solid South" and of "the South once more in the saddle" were pictured by a thousand party orators. But somehow or other this issue had, in sporting parlance, gone stale. The new generation which had grown up since the war cared little for these things, and the older generation had grown weary of them. Mr. Cleveland was sneered at because he had not enlisted in the army but had sent a substitute. To this it was answered that he was then the sole support of a widowed mother, and that neither had Mr. Blaine himself enlisted nor sent a substitute. A feeling of dismay affected the Republican managers when it was discovered that the war issue was no longer powerful. The tariff question was then taken up and hammered at industriously. This had proved sufficient to pull Mr. Garfield through in 1880, and much was hoped from it by Mr. Blaine. The Democratic platform, however, had been very wisely drawn, and its tariff plank decidedly appealed to the common sense of the American people. It said:

"Knowing full well that legislation affecting the occupations of the people should be cautious and conservative in method, not in advance of public opinion but responsive to its demands, the Democratic Party is pledged to revise the tariff in a spirit of fairness to all interests. But in making reductions in taxes, it is not proposed to injure any domestic industries, but rather to promote their healthy growth. . . . The necessary reduction in taxation

can and must be effected without depriving American labour of the ability to compete successfully with foreign labour, and without imposing lower rates of duty than will be ample to cover any increased cost of production which may exist in consequence of the higher rate of wages prevailing in this country. Sufficient revenue to pay all the expenses of the Federal Government can be got under our present system of taxation, from custom-house taxes on fewer imported articles, bearing heaviest on articles of luxury, and bearing lightest on articles of necessity."

In this there was no suggestion of the favourite Republican bogey of Free Trade. It was instead a lucid definition of Protection as Protection had been understood by Lincoln and by the Republican financiers of his administration. Hence the tariff issue was another weapon which bent and broke in the hands of those who tried to wield it.

Seeing the futility of their efforts to rekindle the war spirit or to frighten the manufacturing interests, the Republican managers, in their desperation, descended to the lower plane of personal abuse, justifying themselves by citing the attacks which Democrats and Independents were making upon Mr. Blaine. From that moment the contest became shameful and indecent to an almost incredible degree. No such campaign of slander had ever before been waged. One is justified in thinking that no such campaign will ever again be known in American political history. To recall quite briefly some of its details may act as a deterrent in the future. Mr. Cleveland was then a bachelor, and so the Republican *condottieri* felt no such scruples as they might have entertained toward one who had a family to suffer. They thought him a fair target for every missile. An episode in his past and one that had been long since ended, was now revived, and made the basis for a charge of repulsive and habitual immorality.



When the story was first published, its substance was telegraphed to Mr. Cleveland, who immediately replied with the characteristic message, "Tell the truth." But the truth would not have been sufficient for the purposes of his opponents, and therefore the incident referred to was exaggerated and became the nucleus of a shameful structure of foul invention and filthy innuendo. It was charged that Mr. Cleveland had abducted a woman and imprisoned her in an asylum in order to suppress her story, and that he had kidnapped and secretly immured a child which claimed him as its father. Mr. Cleveland had made himself hated by the baser elements in Buffalo through his fearlessness in suppressing vice while he was Mayor; and now from every drinking-den and brothel there was sent forth a swarm of vile and slanderous stories which the partisans of Mr. Blaine greedily caught up and scattered recklessly throughout the land. It was a debauch of slander, and for a moment the Independents were staggered. But a brief investigation showed that, with the exception of a single incident, this prurient mass had oozed from the lewd imagination of the stews. It all resolved itself into the exaggeration of one episode in Mr. Cleveland's life, which had occurred years before and which long since had been atoned for by the rectitude of his after conduct. The following paragraph from a letter written by the Rev. Dr. Kinsley Twining, an eminent clergyman of Buffalo, who was conversant with all the facts, sets forth with sufficient clearness the truth which Mr. Cleveland desired to have told. This letter was indorsed by the most prominent citizens of Buffalo, and it was printed and circulated throughout the United States.

"The kernel of truth in the various charges against Mr. Cleveland is this, that when he was younger than he is now, he was

guilty of an illicit connection; but the charge, as brought against him, lacks the elements of truth in these substantial points: There was no seduction, no adultery, no breach of promise, no obligation of marriage; but there was at that time a culpable irregularity of life, living as he was, a bachelor, for which it was proper and is proper that he should suffer. After the primary offence, which is not to be palliated in the circle for which I write, his conduct was singularly honourable, showing no attempt to evade responsibility, and doing all he could to meet the duties involved, of which marriage was certainly not one. Everything here was eminently to his credit under circumstances which would have seemed to many men of the world to justify him in other conduct than that which he accepted as his duty. There was no abduction, only proper legal action under circumstances which demanded it."

It is now believed by many that Mr. Cleveland chivalrously took upon himself the blame of this transaction in order to shield a personal friend who was himself the wrongdoer, but who had a family which would have suffered had the facts been brought to light. This belief suggested to the late Paul Leicester Ford a dramatic chapter in his political novel *The Honourable Peter Stirling*,<sup>12</sup> of which many incidents are understood to have been drawn from the life of Mr. Cleveland. Certain it is that there was no truth in the other stories. They were repeated on the stump with hideous unctuousness by an itinerant preacher who had been hired to proclaim them; but a move toward prosecuting him for slander brought him instantly to his knees. The wretched creature ate his words and grovelled and begged abjectly for forgiveness. He denied having any authority for what he had said, and confessed that he had simply repeated the loose stories which he had picked up in the street.

The opinion of the independent voters was very well

<sup>12</sup> New York, 1886. See chapter xxxiv.

expressed by the New York *Evening Post*. Taunted with its enmity to Blaine, who had been accused only of official dereliction, and with its support of one who had been confessedly unchaste, the *Post* replied that while an isolated instance of unchastity might affect the social reputation of a man, it had no relation whatever to his civic virtues; whereas the charges against Mr. Blaine, if true, disqualified him wholly for high office, since they were such as undermine the foundation of all civic honour.

As the campaign proceeded, its tone became almost frantic. Those who clung loyally to Mr. Blaine did so with a passionate intensity that made them quite incapable of reasoning. The attacks on Mr. Cleveland had filled his followers with the bitterest resentment. It was known that the scandalous stories about him had been published with Mr. Blaine's consent, and that in fact Mr. Blaine had sent the original copy of them to the Republican National Committee.<sup>13</sup> Therefore when certain industrious and not over-nice partisans unearthed a similar private scandal relating to Mr. Blaine, it was carried to Mr. Cleveland in the confident expectation that he would sanction its use in the campaign. To their surprise, he sternly forbade any such action, and notified the managers of his canvass to have nothing to do with it. This was early in the summer. A newspaper owner in the West, who had no such scruples as influenced Mr. Cleveland, resolved, on his own responsibility, to make the matter public. On August 8th, the Indianapolis *Sentinel* printed the story with sensational headlines. It asserted that the inscription on a headstone in the cemetery at Augusta, Maine, showed that a child had been born to Mr. and Mrs. Blaine within three months

<sup>13</sup> The authority for this statement is a well known Republican, Col. A. K. McClure.—See McClure, *Our Presidents*, p. 312 (New York, 1905).

after the date of their marriage. Upon this circumstance, the *Sentinel* made a series of editorial comments such as it is unnecessary to reprint, but which were insufferably frank and brutally explicit.

Mr. Blaine was stung to the quick by this shocking reflection upon his own honour and the virtue of his wife. He at once telegraphed to an eminent legal firm in Indiana, directing that a suit for criminal libel be brought at once against the *Sentinel*. On September 6th, he wrote a personal letter of explanation to Mr. William Walter Phelps, who gave it to the press. The essential portions of this letter may be quoted:

“ At Georgetown, Ky., in the spring of 1848, when I was but eighteen years of age, I first met the lady who for more than thirty-four years has been my wife. Our acquaintance resulted, at the end of six months, in an engagement, which, without the prospect of speedy marriage, we naturally sought to keep to ourselves. Two years later, in the spring of 1850, when I was maturing plans to leave my profession in Kentucky and establish myself elsewhere, I was suddenly summoned to Pennsylvania by the death of my father. It being very doubtful if I could return to Kentucky, I was threatened with indefinite separation from her who possessed my entire devotion. My one wish was to secure her to myself by an indissoluble tie against every possible contingency in life; and on the 30th day of June, 1850, just prior to my departure from Kentucky, we were, in the presence of chosen and trusted friends, united by what I knew was, in my native State of Pennsylvania, a perfectly legal form of marriage.”

He then stated that this marriage subsequently appeared to have been technically irregular, inasmuch as, through ignorance of the Kentucky law, he had not secured the proper form of license. Therefore, he had gone through

a second marriage ceremony in Pennsylvania on March 25, 1851,—a date which had usually been accepted as that of his marriage to Miss Stanwood. He concluded:

“ At the mature age of fifty-four I do not defend the wisdom or prudence of a secret marriage suggested by the ardour and the inexperience of youth; but its honour and its purity were inviolate, as I believe, in the sight of God, and can not be made to appear otherwise by the wicked devices of men. It brought to me a companionship which has been my chief happiness from boyhood’s years to this hour, and has crowned me with whatever of success I have attained in life.”

To the discredit of human nature, this perfectly frank and truthful explanation had no effect upon many of Mr. Blaine’s enemies; and up to the day of the election, disgusting innuendoes regarding the affair continued to be heard upon the stump.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> After the election, Mr. Blaine withdrew his suit against the *Sentinel*, publishing on December 10th, a letter to his counsel which contained the following passages:

“ When I visited Indiana in October, I was repeatedly advised that six Democrats could not be found in the State who in a political suit would give a verdict against their leading party organ. I am perfectly able to fight the *Sentinel* newspaper in the Indiana court, but I would stand no chance whatever against the consolidated venom of the Democratic party of the State. With these surroundings and with this prospect, it is idle for me to go through the trouble and annoyance of a trial. . . . Except from three members of the Democratic party of that State I have never heard that a word of dissent or disapproval was spoken; while the great mass of the Democratic speakers repeated the libel from every stump in Indiana with vituperative rancour, with gibes and ribald jest.

“ As a candidate for the presidency I knew that I should encounter many forms of calumny and personal defamation, but I confess that I did not expect to be called upon to defend the name of a beloved and honoured wife, who is a mother and a grandmother, nor did I expect that the grave of my little child would be cruelly desecrated.

“ Against such gross forms of wrong the law gives no adequate redress,

Political discussion, indeed, rapidly degenerated into personal abuse. Even the cartoonists of the different parties showed none of the humour which is usually to be found in the pictorial history of a campaign. Some of the caricatures were frightful in their malignity. It was at this time that Gillam drew his hideous pictures of Mr. Blaine as the Tattooed Man, which produced so painful an impression upon Mr. Blaine himself that his friends could with difficulty restrain him from instituting a criminal prosecution. On the other hand, the pages of *Judge* showed an almost equally offensive representation of the Democratic candidates. Many persons at that time had a very poor opinion of Mr. Cleveland's intellectual abilities and regarded Mr. Hendricks as much the abler man. Hence a cartoonist drew the Democratic ticket as a kangaroo with an extremely small head, but with an enormous, leech-like tail. The head, of course, was Cleveland, and the tail was Hendricks, whose face appeared upon it; and this conception, varied in a hundred different ways and published in crude colours, was worked out in a fashion that was most repulsive, as were also scores of other coarse cartoons, which to-day would be suppressed by the police.

Late in October it became evident that the vote of New York would decide the result of the election; and both parties concentrated upon that State their intensest energies. Mr. Cleveland as Governor had, as already described, offended the labour vote, the Roman Catholics, and Tammany Hall—three immensely powerful elements. Mr. Blaine, on the other hand, because of his Irish de-

and I know that in the end my most effective appeal against the unspeakable outrages which I resist must be to the noble manhood and the noble womanhood of America."

scent, his Catholic mother, and his professed sympathies with the cause of Ireland and the so-called Irish "patriots," was strong precisely where Cleveland was known to be most vulnerable. Yet in New York Mr. Blaine had made one venomous and implacable enemy. This was Roscoe Conkling, with whom, so far back as 1866, there had been established something like a personal feud. The two men had always been temperamentally antipathetic. Conkling was overbearing, proud of his personal appearance, and bore himself with a swagger which impressed the galleries of the House, but which was offensive even to many of his own party associates. In 1866, in the course of a debate, Blaine and Conkling came into parliamentary collision, and the former was goaded into a withering blaze of scorn. Turning upon Conkling, he said in measured tones and with an air of indescribable disdain:

"As to the gentleman's cruel sarcasm, I hope he will not be too severe. The contempt of that large-minded gentleman is so wilting, his haughty disdain, his grandiloquent swell, his majestic, supereminent, overpowering, turkey-gobbler strut, has been so crushing to myself and all the members of this House, that I know it was an act of the greatest temerity for me to venture upon a controversy with him."

Then, referring to a comparison which had been made of Mr. Conkling to Henry Winter Davis, he went on:

"The gentleman took it seriously, and it has given his strut additional pomposity. The resemblance is great; it is striking. Hyperion to a Satyr, Thersites to Hercules, mud to marble, dung-hill to diamond, a singed cat to a Bengal tiger, a whining puppy to a roaring lion!"

This shock to his vanity Conkling never forgave, the less so as the cartoonists ever afterward depicted him as a turkey-gobbler. From that day the two men were enemies for life. It was Conkling who aided in preventing Blaine's nomination in 1876 and in 1880. It was Blaine who, as Garfield's Secretary of State, urged the President to defy the New York Senator and indirectly to secure his retirement into private life. Now it was Conkling's turn again, and he meant to feed his resentment to the full. His power in New York was great, and the Republican managers could do nothing with him. A political friend sought him out for the purpose of persuading him to make at least one speech in defence of Mr. Blaine. Conkling, who was sitting in his law office at the time of the interview, listened impassively to the earnest plea until the last word had been spoken. Then he looked up with a sardonic smile.

"Thank you," he said; "but you know I don't engage in criminal practice."

Blaine, therefore, took the stump himself and went about speaking to great crowds, and endeavouring to win them by that eloquence and charm of manner which had made him famous. He was, however, no longer the indomitable political gladiator of past years. The strain of the conflict had told on him severely. Though he let it be known to few, he was acutely sensitive to the attacks that were made upon him so unscrupulously and often so brutally. He suffered even when he seemed externally serene. Moreover, his fellow-candidate, General Logan, was not at all the associate whom Mr. Blaine would personally have chosen. Logan represented the opposing or "Stalwart" faction of the Republican party, and was in sympathy with Conkling and his friends. He was, besides



a coarse-grained, illiterate sort of person, the precise antithesis of Mr. Blaine. Before the campaign had ended, a very marked coolness came to exist between the two men—a circumstance that inspired the following bit of doggerel, the syntax of which was supposed to represent General Logan's style of English:

“ We never speak as we pass by,  
Me to Jim Blaine nor him to I.”

Mr. Blaine had also well-nigh reached the point of physical exhaustion. His health was already undermined. His vitality was failing. As he was dragged about from place to place, stared at by mobs, having always to appear affable and interested while haunted by a premonition of disaster, he almost experienced physical collapse. The acuteness of his mind must likewise have been somewhat dulled; for when, on October 29th, a few days before the election, he received at the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York City a number of clergymen, he failed to notice a remark of one of them who made a brief address. This clergyman was the Rev. Dr. Samuel D. Burchard, who closed his speech with the following sentences:

“ We expect to vote for you next Tuesday. We have a higher expectation, which is that you will be the President of the United States, and that you will do honour to your name, to the United States, and to the high office you will occupy. We are Republicans, and we do not propose to leave our party and identify ourselves with the party of Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion!”

These last words, so blazingly indiscreet when publicly addressed to a candidate who hoped to carry the pivotal State of New York by the aid of Catholic voters, were

heard by Mr. Blaine, but their significance was not instantly appreciated. As he afterwards told his friends in private conversation, he was at the moment preoccupied in thinking over the answer which he was to make. He therefore took no notice of Dr. Burchard's peroration, though it must have been personally offensive to him as the son of a Catholic mother. He had, besides, himself just returned from visiting his sister, who was the Mother Superior of a convent in Indiana. Yet it was only after the delegation had withdrawn that he fully realised the serious blunder that he had made. He took immediate steps to suppress the word "Romanism" in the reports that were to appear in friendly newspapers. But it was too late. The Horatian maxim, *Volat irrevocabile verbum*, was to find a striking illustration of its truth. In less than twenty-four hours, every Democratic paper in the country had spread before its readers the Burchard alliteration. Every Catholic voter in the State had read it upon handbills, and had been told that Mr. Blaine had allowed a slur upon his own mother's faith to pass unrebuked.

Still another political mistake was made by the Republican candidate on the evening of the same day. He attended a dinner given in his honour at Delmonico's by a number of prominent New York gentlemen. The list of guests was a remarkably representative one, containing the names of men prominent in every walk of life. But, unluckily for Mr. Blaine, there were many present there who to the popular imagination were associated only with great wealth or with wealth used for oppression. Such, for example, were Messrs. Jay Gould, H. H. Rogers of the Standard Oil Company, Cyrus W. Field, Russell Sage, and H. D. Armour, afterwards of the Beef Trust. As may be imagined, Mr. Blaine's enemies were not slow in using this

so-called "Millionaires' Dinner" as a proof that Mr. Blaine was the chosen candidate of the rich, and therefore devoid of sympathy with the poor and needy. Some extracts from the *New York World* of the following day, may be cited as typical, however absurd they may now appear.

"Yesterday was Black Wednesday for Mr. James G. Blaine. He will remember it with sorrow. . . . The Millionaires and Monopolists banquet favourite candidates, but the People elect Presidents, thank God! . . . Is there a workingman now who believes that James G. Blaine is sincere when he pretends to be the friend of labour? If so, why does he receive the homage of Gould, Cyrus Field, and the millionaire enemies of the workingmen?"

"While Blaine and his millionaire admirers were feasting at Delmonico's last night, thousands of children in this great city, whose fathers labour twelve hours a day, went to bed hungry and many of them supperless. It was a Black Wednesday for James G. Blaine. . . . Mr. Blaine was at home in the midst of the Monopolists and Millionaires last night. He loves them and they admire him. But the people witnessed the shameless exhibition, and they will not elect to the presidency the defender of Jay Gould's schemes and the partner of Cyrus Field.

"From Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion at the Fifth Avenue Hotel, Mr. Blaine proceeded to the merry banquet of the Millionaires at Delmonico's, where champagne frothed and brandy sparkled in glasses that glittered like jewels. The clergymen would have been proud of Mr. Blaine, no doubt, if they had seen him in the midst of the mighty wine-bibbers. It was Mr. Blaine's Black Wednesday.

"Beaten by the people, hopeless of an honest election, Blaine's appeal at the banquet of the millionaires was for a corruption fund large enough to buy up New Jersey, Connecticut, and Indiana, and to defraud the people of their free choice for President. . . .

Every dollar subscribed at this late stage of the campaign, when all legitimate expenses have ceased, was given solely to purchase votes, to facilitate frauds, and to rob the people of a fair election. Every subscriber is an enemy of the Republic."

Still, the result seemed doubtful. Tammany Hall had not yet been won over. Its leader was John Kelly, a rough and ready politician, but an honest man, according to his lights. He had opposed Mr. Cleveland's nomination, pronouncing him no Democrat, and declaring that if elected he would prove a traitor to the party. Kelly held in his control the vote of Tammany Hall; and, as a last resort, Mr. Hendricks was summoned from Indiana to exert his influence. He made the journey of a thousand miles and conferred with Kelly until a late hour of the night. Hendricks was a party man of the strictest type, an old-time Democrat of the Middle West. He carried his point, and Kelly promised that for Hendricks's sake the Tammany vote should be cast for the party ticket.

Then came the day of the election on November 4th. Early on the following morning it was known that Cleveland had carried all the Southern States, besides New Jersey, Connecticut and Indiana. New York was still in doubt, but it seemed to have gone Democratic. The New York *Sun*, which had supported the farcical Greenback candidacy of General B. F. Butler, and which was bitterly opposed to Cleveland, conceded his election. The *Tribune*, on the other hand, kept its flag still flying, and declared that Blaine had won. It was evident that the result depended upon a few hundred votes in the outlying counties of New York. A very ugly feeling was manifested among the Democrats. They suspected that a plot was on foot to cheat them of their rights and to repeat the discreditable

history of 1876. This suspicion was intensified when the Republican National Committee issued the following bulletin:

“There is no ground for doubt that the honest vote of this State has been given to the Republican candidate; and though the defeated candidate for the presidency is at the head of the election machinery in this State, the Democratic party, which has notoriously been the party of frauds in elections for years, will not be permitted to overthrow the will of the people.”

Mobs filled the streets in the vicinity of the newspaper offices, watching intently every bulletin that was posted, and from time to time breaking out into savage cheers or groans. Violence was attempted in several cities, and bodies of men marched up and down as they had done at the outbreak of the Civil War. The excitement was most intense in the city of New York, where it was believed that Jay Gould, who controlled the Western Union Telegraph Company, was leagued with the more unscrupulous of the Republican managers to tamper with the delayed returns. Gould was one of the most sinister figures that have ever flitted, bat-like, across the vision of the American people. Merciless, cold-blooded, secretive, apparently without one redeeming trait, this man for many years had been the incarnation of unscrupulous greed. A railway-wrecker, a corrupter of the judiciary, a partner of the notorious Fisk, the author of the dreadful panic of Black Friday in 1873, when he drove hundreds of victims to ruin, to self-murder or to shame, Jay Gould, even at the present day, typifies so vividly all that is base and foul, as to cause even the mention of his name to induce the shudderings of moral nausea. No sooner was his repulsive personality associated with the belief that the election returns were being altered,

than popular indignation broke loose from all restraint. An angry mob marched to the Western Union Building with shouts of "Hang Jay Gould!" Gould added to his other despicable traits the quality of cowardice. Fearing for his life, he besought police protection; and then from some inner hiding place he despatched a telegram to Mr. Cleveland, conceding his election and effusively congratulating him upon it.<sup>15</sup>

On the evening of the 18th of November, the official count was ended; and then the country knew that a plurality of 1149 votes in the State of New York had given the presidency to Mr. Cleveland. On that same night, Mr. Blaine appeared at the door of his house in Augusta, Maine, and said to a sombre, sullen crowd which had assembled there: "Friends and neighbours, the national contest is over, and by the narrowest of margins we have lost."

The election of Mr. Cleveland marks an epoch in our national history, the importance of which can only now be fully understood. It meant that, with the exception of the negro question, the issues springing from the Civil War had been definitely settled. It meant the beginning of a true re-union of all States and sections. It meant that the nation had turned its back upon the past, and was about to move forward with confidence and courage to a future of material prosperity, and to a greatness of which no one at that time could form an adequate conception. And it meant, although none then surmised it, that, as a result of new conditions, there was ultimately to be effected a momentous change in the whole social and political structure of the American Republic.

<sup>15</sup> See Breen, *Thirty Years of New York Politics*, pp. 695-697 (New York, 1899).

## CHAPTER II

### TWO YEARS OF PRESIDENT CLEVELAND

PRESIDENT CLEVELAND, from the very outset of his administration, was destined to confound the predictions of his political adversaries. The misrepresentations concerning him with which the country had been flooded during the campaign of 1884 had found lodgment in the minds of millions. Now that he was actually in office, a shiver of nervous apprehension ran through those Republicans who honestly believed that a Democratic administration meant ruin and disaster. They had been told that Mr. Cleveland was a man of limited intelligence, of low tastes, and of disreputable associations. Partisan newspapers had prophesied that his Cabinet would be made up of bar-room politicians and old-time party hacks. It was said, for instance, that John Kelly would be appointed Secretary of the Treasury in return for the support which Tammany Hall had reluctantly given to Mr. Cleveland. Editorial writers let their imaginations run riot in suggesting other like appointments as not only possible but probable. At the North there were many who feared lest the results of the Civil War should be undone and lest the government of the United States should be given into the hands of "rebels." The negroes in the South were told that a Democratic President might seek to re-enslave them. Not a few timorous souls all over the country looked for immediate commercial panic and financial ruin.

In this respect, history was only repeating itself. Just

as the Federalists in 1801 had raised the cry that President Jefferson was an atheist, a satyr, a Jacobin, and an enemy to law and to the rights of property, and just as the Whigs,<sup>1</sup> in 1829 had thought to alarm the country by describing President Jackson as a gambler, murderer, and border ruffian, so Mr. Cleveland's accession to the presidency was declared to be the beginning of a political saturnalia. His brief inaugural address, however, surprised those persons who had thought of him as dull and as capable of nothing more than platitude. Not only was it dignified and wholly worthy of the occasion, but it contained more than one passage of grave and almost stately eloquence. The following sentences embody a spirit which will be found to have animated Mr. Cleveland's whole career of public service. It expresses the ideal principle of true democracy:

“But he who takes the oath to-day to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States only assumes the solemn obligation which every patriotic citizen—on the farm, in the workshop, in the marts of trade, and everywhere—should share with him. The Constitution which prescribes his oath, my countrymen, is yours; the Government you have chosen him to administer for a time is yours; the suffrage which executes the will of freemen is yours; the laws and the entire scheme of our civil rule, from the town-meeting to the State capitals and the national capital, are yours. Your every voter, as surely as your Chief Magistrate, under the same high sanction, though in a different sphere, exercises a public trust. Nor is this all. Every citizen owes to the country a vigilant watch and close scrutiny of its public servants and a fair and reasonable estimate of their fidelity and usefulness. Thus is the people's will impressed upon the whole frame-work of

<sup>1</sup> The name “Whig” had not, however, yet come into general use by the party opposed to Jackson.



our civil polity—municipal, State, and Federal; and this is the price of our liberty and the inspiration of our faith in the Republic.”<sup>2</sup>

At the close of the inaugural ceremonies, President Cleveland transmitted to the Senate the names of the men whom he had chosen to constitute his Cabinet. For Secretary of State he had selected Senator Thomas Francis Bayard of Delaware, a portly gentleman, who bore a name justly famous in American political history, since for five generations some member of the Bayard family had represented the State of Delaware in the national Senate, of which body Mr. Bayard himself had been temporary president in 1881. The new Secretary of War was Mr. William Crowninshield Endicott of Massachusetts, a very Brahmin of the Brahmins, being a descendant of John Endecott, who was one of the six gentlemen to whom the first royal patent for the Massachusetts Bay territory had been granted in 1628; and who was Colonial Governor in 1630 and 1664, and President of the United Colonies of New England in 1658. Mr. Endicott was a Harvard graduate, a lawyer of ability, and had served for ten years as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. He had taken an active part in political life and was an earnest advocate of reform in the Civil Service. For Secretary of the Navy, the President nominated Mr. William C. Whitney of New York. Mr. Whitney was sprung from old New England stock. Educated at Yale and Harvard, he had engaged in the practice of the law, and in 1871 had done effective work in destroying the Tweed Ring. Mr. Whitney was a man of wealth, an enthusiastic sportsman, possessed of a winning personality, generous, popular, and

<sup>2</sup> Quotations from presidential messages, inaugural addresses, and proclamations follow the text given in *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, officially compiled by J. D. Richardson, 10 vols. (Washington, 1900).

widely known. He was also a most astute politician and had conducted Mr. Cleveland's campaign in New York with consummate skill.

Mr. Daniel Manning, of New York, received the Treasury portfolio, although usage was against giving two Cabinet offices to citizens of the same State. Mr. Manning had been better known as an active party manager than as a financier. He had been Mr. Tilden's trusted lieutenant, and had shown himself to be adroit and full of resource. He was the head of an important bank in Albany, and was soon to prove himself no less able in dealing with large financial problems than he had been fertile in political strategy. For Secretary of the Interior, the President named Senator L. Q. C. Lamar of Mississippi. Senator Lamar had drafted the ordinance of secession at the Mississippi Convention of 1861, and had served in the Confederate army for two years, and as Judge Advocate for a few months. He had, however, accepted the results of the war with frankness and sincerity, and was known to be as liberal-minded and patriotic as he was liked and respected.<sup>3</sup> Senator Lamar had the tastes of a scholar. He was fond of books and of philosophical researches, and was an admirable type of the

<sup>3</sup> An instance of his political liberality is to be found in the address made by Mr. Lamar in the Senate of the United States upon the occasion of Senator Sumner's death in 1874. Sumner was still an object of general detestation in the South, yet Senator Lamar had the courage to say of him:

"It was my misfortune, perhaps my fault personally, never to have known this eminent philanthropist and statesman. The impulse was often strong upon me to go to him and offer him my hand, and my heart with it, and to express to him my thanks for his kind and considerate course toward the people with whom I am identified. If I did not yield to that impulse, it was because the thought occurred that other days were coming in which such a demonstration might be more opportune and less

cultivated Southern gentleman. The new Attorney-General was Senator Augustus H. Garland of Arkansas, who had opposed secession in 1861, though subsequently he had been a member of the Confederate Congress, and later, after the war ended, Governor of Arkansas. President Cleveland chose for the office of Postmaster-General, Colonel William F. Vilas of Wisconsin, a Union soldier who had fought under Grant at Vicksburg. During the campaign he had served as chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

Altogether, the new Cabinet was one against which no reasonable criticism could be brought. More than that, it was a very remarkable body of administrators. For personal distinction it had had few, if any, superiors in the whole history of the Government. For ability it had not been equalled since the days of President Lincoln. Those deluded partisans who expected the new President to surround himself with a group of henchmen, unknown or only too well known, were put to silence. Those who had looked for a government of ex-Confederates had naught to say. There was even some significance in the fact that President Cleveland's first official act after making his Cabinet nominations, was to sign the commission of Ulysses S. Grant, restoring that illustrious but now impoverished soldier to the retired list of the army with the rank and pay of General.

Fortune soon gave the President a chance to show that in dealing with the foreign relations of the United States he could act with admirable energy and decision. Only a

liable to misconstruction. Suddenly and without premonition, a day has come at last to which, for such a purpose, there is no to-morrow. My regret is therefore intensified by the thought that I failed to speak to him out of the fulness of my heart while there was yet time."

few days after his inauguration, a revolt broke out upon the Isthmus of Panama, headed by a local incendiary named Pedro Prestan. Prestan raised a motley force, proclaimed a revolutionary government, took the City of Aspinwall (now Colon), levied contributions on the merchants, both native and foreign, and threatened to take possession of the Isthmian railway. Growing bolder, he seized an American steamship, the *Colon*, and imprisoned her officers. The United States Consul, who protested, was thrown into a dungeon (March 31). President Cleveland took instant action. Five vessels of war were ordered to the Isthmus. A strong body of marines, with Gatling guns and a battery of light artillery, were landed; and the armed forces of the United States soon held the whole line of the Panama railway. The *Colon* was taken from Prestan under the guns of the cruiser *Galena*, and his prisoners were rescued. The revolt collapsed. Colombian troops retook the city of Aspinwall, and Prestan himself was promptly hanged as a common malefactor. Not long after the South American republic of Ecuador received a needed lesson. The government of that country had imprisoned one Julio Santos, an American citizen, and had refused either to release him or to bring him to trial. President Arthur's Secretary of State had again and again protested, but in vain. President Cleveland took up the case with a sharp decisiveness which gave the Ecuadorians a shock. A man-of-war, the *Iroquois*, appeared at Guayaquil. A peremptory demand was made; and Mr. Santos was promptly set at liberty.

The country viewed with interest still another proof of the administration's capacity for action. In 1882, Congress had passed the so-called Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Bill, aimed against the plural marriages of Mormonism.

The enforcement of this law had greatly irritated the leaders of the Mormon Church, who had always secretly regarded Utah as outside the jurisdiction of the nation's laws. Perhaps they now accepted the Republican estimate of President Cleveland, and fancied that he would prove to be a second Buchanan, nerveless and irresolute. At any rate, the Mormons in Salt Lake City began to show a spirit of insolence and insubordination. Armed companies of them were formed and drilled by night. On the Fourth of July, the national flag was half-masted in derision by a Mormon officer. Threats were made that all Gentiles were to be forcibly expelled from Salt Lake City in defiance of the national Government. If such a *coup* had actually been planned, it was speedily made impossible. By orders from Washington, two batteries of United States artillery and a regiment of infantry were stationed at Fort Douglas, which dominated the city; and in the Military Department which included Utah, two thousand regular troops were held in readiness for instant service. Whatever plans for a Mormon outbreak had existed were crushed before they reached a head.

All these circumstances attending the early days of Mr. Cleveland's administration gave the country at large an entirely new conception of the President and of his capacity for government. Moderate Republicans recognised the fact that he well deserved the full measure of their respect. Partisans who hoped that he would justify the unfavourable pictures which they had diligently painted, were compelled to wait in sullen silence for some future opportunity of censure. The governmental departments were most efficiently conducted.<sup>4</sup> The country remained

<sup>4</sup>The only serious attempt by the Opposition to discredit a member of the Cabinet was directed against Attorney-General Garland in the matter

as prosperous as ever. The awful panic which had been predicted proved to be only another fiction of the campaign orators. Moreover, Republicans who had occasion to make the new President's acquaintance came away with nothing but pleasant words for his easy, unaffected and good-humoured ways. It was not many weeks, indeed, before Mr. Blaine himself appeared at the White House, to make a friendly call upon his late opponent. He was received with the greatest courtesy, and the two men chatted pleasantly together in the President's library. One of the unwritten laws of American public life permits a defeated candidate for the presidency to ask a political favour of his successful competitor, and Mr. Blaine desired to avail himself of this gracious little privilege. He requested the President not to remove from office Mr. Joseph H. Manley, who was postmaster at Augusta, Mr. Blaine's home city. Mr. Manley was an old friend and earnest supporter of Mr. Blaine, and the President very cordially granted the request, after which the interview terminated with every evidence of personal good feeling.<sup>5</sup> Some time after, a visiting delegation at the White House was found to

of the so-called Pan-Electric Scandal. Mr. Garland held stock in the Pan-Electric Company which owned a patent of which the Bell telephone was alleged to be an infringement. If this claim were sustained, the value of the Pan-Electric stock would be very great. Mr. Garland permitted the Solicitor-General to institute proceedings impugning the validity of the Bell patent. The Republicans charged Mr. Garland with an attempt to enrich himself by using the resources of his department for personal ends; though the decision of the case rested, of course, with the court and not with Mr. Garland or his Solicitor-General. A congressional committee afterwards exonerated both these gentlemen.

<sup>5</sup> President Cleveland showed another and more marked instance of courtesy to Mr. Blaine. A Democrat who had been appointed postmaster at Copiah, Mississippi, was found to have published a particularly offensive personal attack upon Mr. Blaine. When the facts became known to President Cleveland, he dismissed the man from office.

include among its members the redoubtable Dr. Burchard himself; and a smothered cheer went up, with not a little laughter, when the alliterative clergyman shook the President's hand and expressed his pleasure at finding him in such good health. Altogether, these days afforded as near an approach to an era of good feeling as Mr. Cleveland ever enjoyed throughout his years of public office. They represented the lull in political warfare that always follows an election in which passion has for the time exhausted itself and kindly feeling has resumed its normal sway. Americans are proverbially the best-natured people in the world; and in the case of a new President, they always feel disposed to let him orient himself before the din of party strife begins again.

Few Presidents have ever lived so completely under the microscope as did Mr. Cleveland during his first two years of office. That his countrymen should feel an intense curiosity regarding him was only natural. He had come so suddenly into prominence that, at the time of the election, he was scarcely known outside of his own State. To millions of those who had voted for him he was only a name and not a definite personality, as was Mr. Blaine, who had been conspicuous in public life for more than twenty years. Again, the very violence of the attacks that had been made upon him excited a lively interest in his ways and manners. Finally, he was a Democratic President, and no Democratic President had been seen for a quarter of a century. No wonder, then, that the Washington newspaper correspondents filled their letters with gossip about his goings and comings, his appearance, his opinions, and his daily acts. The slightest scrap of information regarding him was eagerly caught up and told and retold to in-

terested listeners. In this universal curiosity, there was almost no unfriendliness. It was the expression of a very human wish to know just what manner of man it was who had so suddenly and unexpectedly come into the very highest office in the land.

Mr. Cleveland at this time was forty-seven years of age and in the full vigour of life. Somewhat over the middle height, he was powerful of frame, inclined to corpulency, and of a sanguineous temperament. Contrary to the unfriendly descriptions that had been widely circulated, his head was large and was well set upon a sturdy neck. A broad forehead projected slightly over a pair of deep-set clear blue eyes. His nose and chin were both indicative of a strong will, as were the firm lines of his mouth, which was partly covered by a drooping blond moustache. His complexion was ruddy with health, his broad shoulders were always vigorously squared, and he looked like one whom no amount of hard, exacting work could daunt. In his movements he was slow and almost sluggish, but the alertness of his mind impressed all who met him. His manner was one of perfect naturalness and simplicity. Now and then, in talking, a humorous gleam came into his eyes; and then one might expect some droll though dry remark, made more effective by the quiet manner of its delivery. His voice was of a tenor quality, not resonant or sonorous, yet one which had remarkable carrying power, so that in public speaking he could be clearly heard at a considerable distance. Those who made their first acquaintance with him at this time were almost always pleased, and were perhaps surprised to find that they were pleased. One of these visitors:<sup>6</sup> who afterwards became a strenuous opponent of the President's policies, wrote of him:

<sup>6</sup> Mr. Henry Watterson.



“There is more to the President than even his friends are wont to allow; and he gains rather than loses on acquaintance. He has a deal of craft of the wiser and better sort, and needs only a little more training to foot it with the shrewdest of the politicians whom he affects to despise. He is a good listener and a good talker. His most obvious characteristics are straightforwardness and simplicity, both in speech and bearing. He seems to be extraordinarily frank. But to a close observer these appear to be outer aspects merely. He is not a man of confidences or effusions, is uncommonly self-possessed and self-contained, and emits on occasion a tough, dry humour, ready, relevant and illustrative.”

Mr. Cleveland had a colossal capacity for work. He rose early and was at his desk by nine o'clock. He gave a close personal attention to details, wrote a good part of his correspondence with his own hand, and never spared himself in his endeavour to get at the bottom of every subject which came before him. He took nothing for granted, but delved into reports, documents and letters until he satisfied himself that he had mastered the case, as a lawyer masters a brief. The observer who has just been quoted wrote: “He is a wondrous worker. He has the poor man's love of work and trust in work. He wants to earn his day's wages; and there are some things which a President must do and ought to do which go against the grain, because they seem frivolous, belonging rather to play than to work.” A keen but not unfriendly Republican critic<sup>7</sup> made some further interesting notes:

“Cleveland gets his power from his resoluteness. He is a self-contained, honest man, with strong indignations. He hates a liar and will not let down his attitude of self-respect to please somebody whom he does not like. His intellectual repulsions are de-

<sup>7</sup> G. A. Townsend in the *Cincinnati Enquirer*, March 25, 1885.

cided and irrevocable. The President gives more time to his office than is due to it, and he exacts of the subordinates that they give at least official hours to their tasks. Consequently, the Government at present carries less time-killers and triflers than formerly. His greatest happiness he probably derives from his own rough self-assertion and from his luck in reaching high stations in politics without much labour. . . . He comes of a fortunate stock. The old blood of Connecticut is about the best blood for government uses that we possess. Cleveland's personal composition is this old Connecticut basis somewhat flavoured by free living. He belongs to that class of preachers' sons who, for a period of time, fly the track and violate their parents' ethics, yet at bottom have a certain ethical truth, and are slightly harsh with infractions and infractors of rights. He observed that the Germans of Buffalo were, on the whole, about the best citizens; and he was happy sitting on a sanded floor with an old German landlady to refill his glass. Something of Martin Luther, therefore, became involved with the character of Jonathan Trumbull. . . . Nothing that has come from him seems to show that he is an adept in society, or art, or law, or literature. He is a pretty good writer as Presidents go, and makes his points concisely and impressively. Of imagination he seems to have none. But he is a good, stout, rough man-of-all-work who puts the establishment in running order and is as good as a watch-dog at the gate."

The domestic side of the White House was directed by the President's sister, Miss Rose Elizabeth Cleveland, whose personality interested the country almost as much as did that of the President himself. Miss Cleveland was then a lady of some thirty-nine years of age, who had been a teacher and a public lecturer on literary and historical subjects. She was a type of the *intellectuelle*, very carefully educated, very widely read, and a good deal of a personage in her way. She wore her hair cropped like a man's and had a touch of masculine decision in her bearing.

During her stay at the White House, she published a volume of criticism entitled *George Eliot's Poetry and Other Studies*,<sup>8</sup> that had a good deal of vogue, which it deserved on its own merits, for it was written in a crisp, nervous style and showed a good deal of intellectual acuteness.<sup>9</sup> Miss Cleveland did the social honours of the White House in a very satisfactory way, though her own tastes and ambitions were not social. She talked well, and very much as she wrote. In fact, her conversation must have seemed rather unusual to many of those who heard it, for it was decidedly allusive and was interspersed with classical quotations that were probably Greek indeed to the politicians who attended the President's receptions with their families. One can imagine with what feelings a group of typical Congressmen's wives would hear Miss Cleveland casually remark: "I wish that I could observe Washington life in its political phase; but I suppose I am too near the

<sup>8</sup> New York, 1886.

<sup>9</sup> The book went through twelve editions within a year, and Miss Cleveland was said to have received more than \$25,000 in royalties. An English reviewer in the London *Times* wrote of it as follows:

"Miss Cleveland is far from being a deep and subtle thinker, but her sketches prove that she possesses the love of letters and history as well as an average power of expressing her views thereon. If there is now and then a feminine positiveness in her judgments we must condone it on the ground of her enthusiasm. The essays furnish pleasant reading enough, but scarcely anything more. Miss Cleveland is extremely fond of quotations from the poets, but that is no reason why, in a comparatively small volume, a quotation from Longfellow should appear three times, with a serious difference between two of the versions. The inaccuracy of one passage quoted from Shakespeare is almost heartrending. The author gives it as follows: 'All the world's a stage, *and men and women are the actors.*' As though Shakespeare could have written the halting and unpoetical phrase printed in italics! There are several fairly interesting historical essays—studies in the Middle Ages—but Miss Cleveland's style is not one which would be appreciated by everybody."

centre to get an accurate perspective on that. Those who live on Mount Athos do not see Mount Athos.”<sup>10</sup>

The first annoyance which the President was forced to suffer came, not from his political opponents, but from his own followers. The Democrats, no less than the Republicans, had found many of their expectations unfulfilled. There were two reasons for this, with one of which the President had nothing at all to do. Ever since the disputed election of 1876, a sinister belief had taken a firm hold upon the masses of the party. The desperation with which, in the year just named, the Republicans had fought to keep the presidency in their own hands had inspired a suspicion that something more than the mere spoils of office was at stake. Men then said that there were secrets which, if known, would show a frightful condition of affairs in the great departments of the Government, and especially in connection with the Treasury. It was whispered that the Republican party stood ready to initiate even a civil war rather than allow a Democratic President to be seated, with the power of bringing to light a mass of infamous transactions by which untold millions had been stolen. One of the documents most widely circulated by the Democrats in the Blaine-Cleveland contest was a pamphlet bearing on its cover in huge letters the words, “OPEN THE BOOKS!” It charged that the financial records of the Government had been falsified; that in the ledgers of the Registrar of the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury more than 2500 erasures and alterations had been fraudulently made; and that the official reports for two years alone (1870 and 1871) showed a discrepancy amounting to nearly a quarter of a billion dollars. A list of alleged defalcations was appended—affecting

<sup>10</sup> Poore, *Reminiscences of Sixty Years*, ii. p. 502 (Philadelphia 1886).

specifically the Pension Office, the Navy Department, the Post Office Department, and the Treasury. These charges were in part supported by extracts from the testimony taken by investigating committees of the House of Representatives in 1878, and by citations from official letters and reports. Mr. Hendricks, on July 12, 1884, addressing a large gathering in Indianapolis, had said with significant emphasis: "We want to have the books in the government offices opened for examination."

Among the ignorant stories still more extraordinary were rife. The Garfield-Hancock campaign of 1880 had been marked by a lavish use of money on the part of the Republicans, especially in Indiana. This money had, for the most part, come from the employés of the government departments, who had practically been forced to contribute through fear of dismissal.<sup>11</sup> But the rumour spread that the great sums spent in the purchase of venal voters had in reality come out of the United States Treasury. There were men who declared that the government printing-presses had, in 1880, been run all night, printing off sheets of treasury-notes of low denominations, and that the paper money thus fraudulently and secretly made had been turned over to the Republican campaign committee. It is odd that so absurd a tale should have been told, and still more strange that thousands should have implicitly believed it. But the fact serves to indicate how thoroughly convinced were the masses of the Democratic party that the new administration would at once unearth evi-

<sup>11</sup> Mr. Garfield himself, while a candidate, had written a note to Mr. J. C. Hubbell, who was chairman of the Republican National Committee, in which he said, among other things: "Please tell me how the departments generally are doing." This letter, which is known as the "My Dear Hubbell letter," was published later by one Brady who was implicated in the Star Route postal frauds.

dence of stupendous crimes committed during the long Republican régime.

Of course, in this they were speedily undeceived. No one who really understands the manner in which the Government is conducted could ever credit such impossible assertions. The party in power does not try to conceal its public acts from the leaders of the Opposition; and the committees of Congress, made up of members of both parties, are thoroughly informed of whatever happens. Indeed, the old and experienced party leaders in both House and Senate work harmoniously enough together in matters of administrative detail. They battle fiercely in view of the galleries; but in the committee-rooms they arrange matters with an eye to the general needs of the public service, and with the sensible purpose of seeing the Government properly carried on. Whenever a zealous but inexperienced young member tries to make a stir upon his own account, and to attack those measures which have been arranged by his seniors, he is quietly suppressed by the chiefs of his own party, and the business of the Government goes on unvexed.

And therefore, naturally enough, the so-called discrepancies in the Treasury reports were found to be due simply to varying modes of book-keeping; the awful revelations that had been looked for were never made; and with a single exception, there was no real ground for an attack upon the manner in which the Republicans had discharged their trust. Even the figures published by the Democrats themselves showed that the public service had been steadily improving in honesty and efficiency for many years. Thus, during the first term of President Grant (1869-1873), when the loose and careless methods of the Civil War still partially prevailed, the Government had lost by

defalcations and in other irregular ways the sum of \$8,875,483. During his second term (1873-1877), however, this loss showed a diminution of nearly 50 per cent., being \$4,547,247. Under President Hayes (1877-1881) the amount had fallen to \$1,775,996, and under Presidents Garfield and Arthur (1881-1885), to \$1,569,733. The Democrats found nothing here to justify their dark suspicions and provide them with weapons for party use.

One department alone had been disgracefully mismanaged, though of the fact the whole nation had long been unpleasantly aware. This was the Navy Department. Under President Grant, the Secretary of the Navy from 1869 to 1877, had been the notorious George M. Robeson of New Jersey, a man whose inefficiency and gross neglect—to use no harsher term—had practically destroyed the fleets which at the close of the Civil War had been the most formidable in the world. Robeson had spent millions upon what he called “repairs”—these repairs sometimes costing more than the original value of the ships repaired, and even then serving only to perpetuate types of vessels which had become obsolete and worthless in the face of naval progress in other countries. Secretary Whitney’s first report summed the matter up with terse impressiveness:

“The country has expended since July 1, 1868—more than three years subsequent to the close of the late Civil War—over \$75,000,000 of money on the construction, repair, equipment, and ordnance of vessels, which sum, with a very slight exception, has been substantially thrown away; the exception being a few ships now in process of construction. I do not overlook the sloops constructed in 1874, and costing \$3,000,000 or \$4,000,000, and to avoid discussion they may be excepted also. The fact still remains that for about seventy of the seventy-five millions of dollars which

have been expended by the Department for the creation of a navy, we have practically nothing to show. It is questionable whether we have a single naval vessel finished and afloat at the present time that could be trusted to encounter the ships of any important Power—a single vessel that has either the necessary armour for protection, speed for escape, or weapons for defence.”

This, however, was an old scandal and related more especially to the days when Grant was President. Under President Arthur, there had been instituted a better order of things, and, consequently, political capital was not to be found in the condition of the navy.

The really serious grievance which many Democrats began to entertain arose from President Cleveland's position regarding the distribution of the public offices. At the time of his inauguration there were 52,609 ordinary postmasterships, 2379 so-called “presidential” postmasterships, 111 collectorships of customs, 224 places in the local land-offices, and 34 important diplomatic posts, besides scores of consulships, appraiserships, Indian agencies, pension agencies, territorial governorships and judgeships, positions in the revenue service, surveyorships, and superintendencies, many having attached to them a certain amount of petty patronage. Almost every one of these offices, some 110,000 in all, was occupied by a Republican. To secure them and to enjoy their emoluments was the hope of thousands upon thousands of Democratic party “workers,” who now swarmed like locusts in the streets of Washington and besieged the governmental bureaus and the portals of the White House. Even when a Republican President had succeeded one of his own party, an invasion of office-seekers had invariably followed. New Congressmen always demanded changes in their districts;



members of the President's own faction always asked for removals and new appointments; party rivals had always to be propitiated. But if this had been true in the case of an ordinary change of administration, it can be imagined how enormous was the pressure for recognition now that not only had the administration been changed, but that a party which had been out of power for a quarter of a century had resumed control. President Cleveland, in fact, was in the same position as that occupied by Mr. Lincoln in 1861, when a critical observer, after visiting Washington, thus wrote home: "The nation is going to pieces; States are seceding; utter ruin is at hand; and here is Lincoln thinking of nothing except who shall be appointed postmaster in some little town, or gauger in some little port."

Every successive President had felt the annoyance of a system such as this, and would have been infinitely relieved could the burden of it have been lightened. A practical remedy was the institution of such a reform in the appointment system as would protect the President from incessant importunity. In 1867, a report had been made to the House of Representatives<sup>12</sup> recommending that a large class of appointments should be regarded as non-political and hence to be made upon the basis of competitive examinations and with fixity of tenure conditioned upon meritorious service. In 1871, Congress authorised the President to appoint a Civil Service Commission and to approve such rules as it might make for admission to government employ. This measure had the support of President Grant, who appointed the first Commission, of which Mr. George William Curtis was Chairman. But public sentiment, or at any rate party sentiment, was not yet ripe for a reform like this. All the influential party

<sup>12</sup> By Mr. Jenckes of Rhode Island.

leaders on both sides despised it, and it was contemptuously spoken of as "snivel-service reform." From 1872 to 1875, the rules made by the first Commission remained in force; but President Grant could not withstand the pressure brought to bear upon him; and so, somewhat reluctantly, he suspended their operation. After the assassination of President Garfield by a disappointed office-seeker in 1882, both houses of Congress enacted a law, usually known as the Pendleton Law,<sup>13</sup> which thoroughly satisfied the civil service reformers. This empowered the President to prescribe by executive order what classes of the public service should come under the operation of the merit system as framed by a new Civil Service Commission. Under President Arthur, some 14,000 government employ es were brought within the so-called classified service.<sup>14</sup>

Mr. Cleveland was thoroughly in sympathy with the principle of this reform. In his letter of acceptance, (August 19, 1884) he had said:

"The selection and retention of subordinates in government employment should depend upon their ascertained fitness and the value of their work, and they should be neither expected nor allowed to do questionable party service."

This and other like declarations had done much to attract independent voters to Mr. Cleveland's side. After his election and before his inauguration, a number of these Independents addressed to him a letter asking his inten-

<sup>13</sup> From Senator George H. Pendleton of Ohio, a Democrat, who introduced it in the Senate.

<sup>14</sup> For an account of the movement for a reform of the Civil Service of the United States, see the Reports of the American Civil Service Reform Association.

tions with regard to Civil Service Reform. Replying to them (December 20, 1884), Mr. Cleveland wrote some very significant sentences, in which may be found an explanation of his subsequent course. They give evidence that he had already formulated very carefully a definite policy. After reiterating his former promise to uphold the Civil Service Law, he went on to say:

“I regard myself pledged to this because my conception of true Democratic faith and public duty requires that this and all other statutes should be, in good faith and without evasion, enforced, and because, in many utterances made prior to my election as President, approved by the party to which I belong and which I have no disposition to disclaim, I have in effect promised the people that this should be done.”

Another paragraph shows that he did not underrate the difficulty of carrying out his pledge.

“I am not unmindful of the fact to which you refer, that many of our citizens fear that the recent party change in the national Executive may demonstrate that the abuses which have grown up in the Civil Service are ineradicable. I know that they are deeply rooted, and that the spoils system has been supposed to be intimately related to success in the maintenance of party organisation; and I am not sure that all those who profess to be the friends of this reform will stand firmly among its advocates when they find it obstructing their way to patronage and place.”

A very important sentence, in the light of what afterwards happened, is the following:

“There is a class of government positions which are not within the letter of the civil service statute, but which are so disconnected with the policy of an administration that the removal therefrom

of present incumbents, in my opinion, should not be made during the terms for which they were appointed, solely on partisan grounds, and for the purpose of putting in their places those who are in political accord with the appointing power; but many men holding such positions have forfeited all just claim to retention because they have used their places for party purposes in disregard of their duty to the people, and because, instead of being decent public servants, they have proved themselves offensive partisans and unscrupulous manipulators of local party management.”

One sentence was obviously meant for Democratic perusal:

“While Democrats may expect a proper consideration, selections for office not embraced within the Civil Service rules will be based upon sufficient inquiry as to fitness, rather than upon persistent importunity or self-solicited recommendations on behalf of candidates for appointment.”

One may add to these utterances a passage from a letter of his (September 11, 1885) to Mr. Dorman B. Eaton, a conspicuous civil service reformer:

“A reasonable toleration for old prejudices, a graceful recognition of every aid, a sensible utilisation of every instrumentality that promises assistance, and a constant effort to demonstrate the advantages of the new order of things, are the means by which this reform movement will in the future be further advanced.”

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By putting all these statements together, President Cleveland's policy in regard to appointments was clear enough for any one to understand. In the first place, he did not intend to reform the Civil Service over night, as some of the Independent doctrinaires expected him to do. In the

second place, he did not intend to sweep all Republicans out of office before the expiration of their terms and without regard to the merit of the service which they had rendered. What he did mean to do was gradually to extend the operation of the Civil Service rules; and in the meantime, in filling vacancies with Democrats, to exact from them a reasonable standard of character and efficiency. This was a very sensible and very practical programme. It was certain, however, to subject him to a three-cornered attack—first, from the advanced reformers, who were impatient of all delay; second, from the Democrats, who had expected immediately to monopolise all the offices in the President's gift; and third, from his Republican adversaries, who were bound to find fault with him, whatever he might do.

Mr. Cleveland had a vigorous contempt for professional office-seekers,<sup>15</sup> and he had no mind to be subjected to their importunities. When approached by them he could make himself extremely disagreeable. He had two separate and distinct manners of showing his displeasure, either one of which was quite effectual. At times he would become ab-

<sup>15</sup> In 1885, while Governor, he had written to a young man a letter which contained the following sentences: "I judge from what you write that you now have a situation in a reputable business house. I can not urge you too strongly to give up all idea of employment in a public office, and to determine to win advancement and promotion where you are.

"There are no persons so forlorn and so much to be pitied as those who have learned, in early life, to look to public positions for a livelihood. It unfits a man or boy for any other business, and is apt to make a kind of respectable vagrant of him. If you do well in other occupations, and thus become valuable to the people, they will find you out when they want a good man for public service. I never sought an office of any kind in my life; and, if you live and follow my advice, I am certain that you will thank me for it some day."—Parker, *Writings and Speeches of Grover Cleveland*, pp. 337, 338 (New York, 1892).

solutely glacial. At other times his face would flush and he would pound the table with his clenched fist and give voice, with vigorous expletives, to an expression of his inflexible purpose. Some of his visitors who came on political errands found him anything but tractable. A somewhat rueful anecdote, ascribed to Mr. Henry Watterson,<sup>16</sup> may be cited as wholly characteristic of both men:

“We chatted and joked and laughed and were on terms of the most agreeable comradeship. I don’t know what the President thought of me, but I marked him in my mental tablet as a splendid companion and a very jolly good fellow. After an hour pleasantly spent in the personal enjoyment of each other, and when the laughter had subsided that followed a story by the President, I thought it would be a good time to mention a little matter in which I felt interested. As soon as I began the recital, I could see the process of congelation; and before I had half finished my story, the President was a monumental icicle. I became so thoroughly chilled that I broke off, took up my hat and said, ‘Good-night, Mr. President.’ That’s the kind of a good fellow Cleveland is.”

Mr. Joaquin Miller, the poet, also had a little interview with the President, of which he subsequently published an account in the *Chicago Times*:

Here is my first interview, which I dotted down a few minutes after: “Mr. President, I—I—I want Captain Hoxie to be returned to Washington so as to complete our water-works.” “Captain Hoxie,” answered the President instantly, “is subject to the orders of the Secretary of War”—and he looked at me as if to say, “And you know it.” Yes, I knew I had come to the wrong place and was boring the President and bothering for nothing, much as I had the matter at heart. So I gave up that subject and started on another equally important. “Mr. President, one thing more. I hear you are going to remove Commis-

<sup>16</sup> Philadelphia *Ledger*.

sioner Edmunds, the head of our Commissioners for Washington, and I—I——” The President looked hard at me and said promptly: “You have heard that! Well, I have not heard of it, and as I shall have to hear of it before he is removed, you can rest easy on that score for the present.” By this time I felt that I had not the slightest business with the President, and so fell in with the band of shorn sheep that was passing on and out of the corral by another door.

Naturally, the expectant Democrats could not all at once believe that Mr. Cleveland really meant to carry out his pledges. The cynical assumption that political promises are made only to be broken, and that Jove laughs at statesmen's vows no less good-naturedly than at those of lovers, was firmly fixed in all their minds. Of course, the President had a little fad in the matter of the Civil Service. Of course, he really meant what he had said. But equally, of course, he would give way and thus make things more easy for himself. All other Presidents had done so. It was merely a question of bringing enough pressure to bear upon him. And so, thousands of place-hunters lingered in Washington, wasting their time, and depleting their resources, while they waited for the necessary “pressure” to be applied. But as the weeks slipped away, it gradually dawned upon them that here was a President who could not be coaxed or driven or coerced. His Cabinet officers were beset by Congressmen and local leaders from all over the country; but they were just as helpless as the rest. The one great hope of the famished Democrats rested in Vice-President Hendricks. He was a Western politician of the older type—a thorough partisan, narrow, intense, not squeamish about reforms, but a firm believer in Marcy's doctrine that in politics, as in war, the spoils belong of

right to the victorious. Urged on by the almost frantic appeals that were made to him each hour of the day, Mr. Hendricks had a protracted interview with the President. Just what took place between them no one knows; but Mr. Hendricks came away with a long face; and the word was quickly passed that even he had failed.

All this soon placed the President in a new light before the country. It is rather remarkable that the lesson of his firmness while Governor of New York had made no real impression elsewhere. After his election to the Presidency and before he entered upon the duties of his office, speculation had been rife as to who would control the new administration. A writer whose identity was kept secret, but who aspired to be a second Junius, had addressed to the President-elect a series of very bitter letters which were afterward collected and published in a book.<sup>17</sup>

These letters are very curious reading now; for they show how little Mr. Cleveland's character was understood at the time when they were written. They take it for granted that the President will be "a pigmy among giants." "It must move the heart of your most malevolent enemy to note with what a beggarly stock in trade you will open business in the White House." "You know that you have nothing to expect after the term which will so soon begin. You would like to float through its four years, softly and easily." "You are well aware that in your political career, you have been a pawn in the hands of stronger men." This was only what many persons had thought; but Mr. Cleveland had not been in office a week before his absolute mastery began to be understood. After his first Cabinet meeting had adjourned, a leading politician asked one of the Secretaries:

<sup>17</sup> Siva, *A Man of Destiny* (Chicago, 1885).



“Well, who is running things?” To which the reply was made with a significant shrug:

“Where MacGregor sits, there is the head of the table. You may be sure of that!”

It was, in fact, the same in Washington as it had been in Albany. There was no divided responsibility, no kitchen cabinet. Whatever blame and whatever praise the administration might receive, the President was entitled to them both. Mr. Watterson wrote of him: “We have at this moment as personal a government as we had under Grant.”

That Mr. Cleveland had some of the defects of his qualities began also to appear. It was not sufficient for him to exercise the power which he possessed. He seemed almost morbidly desirous of impressing upon every one the fact that he alone was exercising it. Because it had been said that he would be a puppet, he thought it necessary to deal inconsiderately with those who were supposed to manage him. In this there was at times a touch of quite unnecessary arrogance. Thus, because Vice-President Hendricks had been credited with ability superior to the President's, Mr. Cleveland was never cordial to him. Because Secretary Manning was one of the men who had helped to make Mr. Cleveland both Governor and President, he found a personal enemy appointed postmaster in his home city of Albany. Mr. Tilden, who might have had the nomination in 1884 had he not declined it in advance, wrote to the President and asked for the appointment of Mr. Smith M. Weed as Collector for the Port of New York. He was met with a flat refusal. Mr. Cleveland's enemies called this sort of thing a jealousy of greater men; a fairer judgment would perhaps call it a jealousy of his own independence. But in any case, it caused

bad feeling and added to the dissatisfaction excited by his failure to appoint more Democrats to office. Party discontent became outspoken. Men recalled the saying of John Kelly to Mr. Hendricks before the election: "Cleveland is no Democrat. If elected, he will prove a traitor to his party." Mr. Hendricks himself observed: "I had hoped that Mr. Cleveland would put the Democratic party into power in fact as well as in name." Senator Vance of North Carolina declared: "The President is not of my school of Democracy. We differ as widely as it is possible for two persons belonging to the same political party to differ." Senator Pugh of Alabama denounced the President's course in terms both metaphorical and profane. The newspapers, especially in the South and West, began openly to attack the President. Some of them advocated reading him out of the party altogether. "Brand President Cleveland traitor and kick him out of the party!" cried an Alabama editor. The rage of the disappointed office-hunters even found expression in verse. One hitherto mute, inglorious poet of the West got a wide hearing through some lines whose sincerity of feeling was more obvious than their elegance of diction:

"A Democrat fool who serves as a tool  
 The men of his party to beat,  
 Deserves to be thrashed and have his head mashed,  
 And kicked out into the street.

"'Tis better to vote for some billy goat,  
 That butts for his corn and his hay,  
 Than to vote for a man that has not the sand  
 To stand by his party a day!"

Of course it was inevitable that the President should have many offices to fill. The terms of thousands of Republican incumbents expired, and the places were given to Democratic successors. Other Republicans were summarily removed, presumably because, in Mr. Cleveland's famous phrases, they had shown themselves to be "offensive partisans" and guilty of "pernicious activity" while holding public office. Within a year, some 8000 fourth-class postmasterships had been allotted to Democrats. Yet these changes seemed infrequent and slow to the army of those whom Mr. G. W. Curtis had styled "a hungry horde." The President, perhaps, moved a little more cautiously than he would otherwise have done had he not discovered that in many instances his confidence had been abused. Members of Congress, in whose judgment he had trusted, induced him to appoint men who soon turned out to be utterly unfit. Some of them had most unsavoury records. A few had even worn prison stripes. This was the sort of thing which a President of Mr. Cleveland's temper could not forgive, and he became suspicious of all persons who urged the claims of friends. Toward those who had deceived him, his attitude became brusque to a degree.

On one occasion, a prominent politician signed a request for the appointment of a certain individual to a judgeship in one of the Pacific States. The appointment was made and the new judge was almost immediately seen to be absolutely unfitted for the office. The politician wrote to Mr. Cleveland explaining that he had signed the petition "not for one moment believing the appointment was possible." In answer to this frank confession the President wrote the following letter,<sup>18</sup> which must have made its recipient writhe:

<sup>18</sup> Parker, *op. cit.*

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

*Washington, August 1, 1885.*

DEAR SIR:

I have read your letter with amazement and indignation. There is one—but one—mitigation to the perfidy which your letter discloses, and that is found in the fact you confess your share in it. The idea that this administration, pledged to give the people better officers and engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with the bad elements of both parties, should be betrayed by those who ought to be worthy of implicit trust, is atrocious, and such treason to the people and to the party ought to be punished by imprisonment.

Your confession comes too late to be of immediate use to the public service, and I can only say that, while this is not the first time I have been deceived and misled by lying and treacherous representations, you are the first one that has so frankly owned his grievous fault. If any comfort is to be extracted from this assurance you are welcome to it.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

A certain Senator on another occasion came to him to complain about his policy regarding appointments.

“What do you want me to do?” asked the President, interrupting him.

“Why, Mr. President, I should like to see you move more expeditiously in advancing the principles of the Democracy.”

“Ah,” said the President, with a flash of the eye, “I suppose you mean that I should appoint two horse-thieves a day instead of one.”

The extreme advocates of civil service reform, on the other hand, complained because so many changes had been made. One act of the Executive exasperated them beyond all measure. This was the designation of Mr. Eugene Higgins of Maryland to be Appointment Clerk in the

Treasury Department. Mr. Higgins was the *bête noire* of all reformers. He was a protégé of Senator Gorman, and was known to be a spoilsman of the purest water. The Maryland Civil Service Association at once protested in vigorous terms against his appointment and asked for his immediate removal. This protest was taken up by the Independents all over the country, and Mr. Higgins was denounced in terms of extravagant abuse. It was said that this one act of Mr. Cleveland's had destroyed all confidence in his professions. He was declared to have broken his pledges, to have betrayed the cause of civil service reform, and to have gone over wholly to the enemy. Mr. Higgins, however, was not removed, and the clamour of the Mugwumps continued unabated.

Meanwhile, the Republicans had remained quiescent. It amused them to see the new President so roundly berated by his own supporters. The Republican party leaders were biding their time, and were making a very careful study of the man whom they were presently to confront. Looking over the situation, the shrewdest of them thought it best to let things take their course. It seemed good policy for them not to play an obstructive part when Congress should assemble. They decided that a resort to promiscuous filibustering would prove in the end unpopular with the country. They were confident, however, that in time the President would make some serious mistake of which they might take immediate advantage. When Congress met in December, the watchword was passed along the Republican ranks: "Just wait awhile and then put Cleveland in a hole!"

A fortnight or so before the opening of the session the Vice-President, Mr. Hendricks, died at Indianapolis.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>20</sup> December 8th, 1885.

As Congress was not sitting, and as, in consequence, there was no President of the Senate, there existed no constitutional successor to the presidency should Mr. Cleveland die during the interval before Congress met. Therefore, he felt that he ought not to take the long journey necessary to attend the funeral at Indianapolis. Malicious persons saw in his absence on that occasion a confirmation of his alleged unfriendliness toward the deceased Vice-President; but the country in general commended his refusal to run even the slightest risk of bringing about a condition which would leave the Government without a head.

President Cleveland's first message to Congress<sup>20</sup> was a long and carefully written document, which was received with general approval, both in this country and abroad.<sup>21</sup> The recommendations which attracted most attention had to do with (1) the development of the Navy, which in its existing condition Mr. Cleveland characterised as merely "a shabby ornament to the Government"; (2) a reform of the land laws, which should prevent immense tracts of territory from being acquired by single individuals or great corporations; (3) a reduction of tariff duties upon "the imported necessaries of life"; and (4) an extension of the reform of the Civil Service. In making this last

<sup>19</sup> November 25, 1885.

<sup>21</sup> The London *Standard* (December 9th) said: "The message is temperate and dignified and goes far to justify Mr. Cleveland's election." The *Daily News* remarked: "President Cleveland's message seems to place him in true succession to the greater men who have occupied the Presidential chair, rather than to the late Democratic line. It is conceived in a most just and friendly spirit towards all foreign powers and contains no word to tickle the ears of American Jingoës. The message expresses a sentiment of international good will. It is equally wise and prudent on all domestic topics."

recommendation, however, there were a few lines intended as a rebuke to some of the President's over-zealous critics. He wrote:

“Civil service reform does not . . . require that those who in subordinate positions should fail in yielding their best service, or who are incompetent, should be retained simply because they are in place. The whining of a clerk discharged for indolence or incompetency, who, though he gained his place by the worst possible operations of the spoils system, suddenly discovers that he is entitled to protection under the sanction of civil service reform, represents an ideal no less absurd than the clamour of the applicant who claims the vacant position as his compensation for the most questionable party work.”

But there was something else in the message which, though it attracted little general attention at the time, possessed, in view of what happened in succeeding years, an extraordinary significance. More than five pages of the message were devoted to the question of silver. By the so-called Bland-Allison Law, enacted February 28, 1878, it had been provided that the coinage of the silver dollar of  $412\frac{1}{2}$  grains should be resumed. This dollar was made a legal tender for public and private debts, and a provision directed its compulsory coinage at the rate of not less than \$2,000,000 or more than \$4,000,000 per month. The Bland-Allison Bill was passed by a Democratic House and a Republican Senate. President Hayes vetoed it, and it was at once passed over his veto by heavy majorities. The message which Mr. Cleveland now sent to Congress asked earnest attention to the working of this law. He pointed out that silver had steadily fallen in intrinsic value; that a so-called bimetallic conference with European nations, for the purpose of establishing inter-

nationally a common ratio between gold and silver had failed; and that if the coinage of silver should be continued under the Bland-Allison Act, the hoarding of gold would presently begin. The following sentences from this portion of the message are well worth recalling:

“The desire to utilise the silver product of the country should not lead to a misuse or the perversion of this power. . . . Up to the present time only about 50,000,000 of the silver dollars so coined have actually found their way into circulation, leaving more than 165,000,000 in the possession of the Government. . . . Every month, two millions of gold in the public Treasury are paid out for two millions or more of silver dollars to be added to the idle mass already accumulated. If continued long enough, this operation will result in the substitution of silver for all the gold the Government owns applicable to its general purposes. . . . The nearer the period approaches when it [the Government] will be obliged to offer silver in payment of its obligations, the greater inducement there will be to hoard gold against depreciation in the value of silver, or for the purpose of speculating. This hoarding of gold has already begun. When the time comes that gold has been withdrawn from circulation, then will be apparent the difference between the real value of the silver dollar and a dollar in gold, and the two coins will part company. Gold . . . will be at a premium over silver; banks which have substituted gold for the deposits of their customers may pay them with silver bought with such gold, thus making a handsome profit; rich speculators will sell their hoarded gold to their neighbours who need it to liquidate their foreign debts, at a ruinous premium over silver, and the labouring men and women of the land, most defenseless of all, will find that the dollar received for the wage of their toil has sadly shrunk in its purchasing power.”

Mr. Cleveland quoted the words uttered by Daniel Webster in the Senate in 1834:



“The very man of all others who has the deepest interest in a sound currency and who suffers most by mischievous legislation in money matters, is the man who earns his daily bread by his daily toil.”

He then proceeded to recommend that the compulsory coinage of silver dollars directed by the Bland Act be suspended.

These striking sentences received but scant attention at the time. Far greater interest was felt in the possibility of a conflict between the Democratic President and the Republican Senate which now elected Senator John Sherman to be its President *pro tempore*, and which had a Republican majority of 6. The House was Democratic by a majority of 42. With this division of power, it was obvious that no party measures pure and simple could be enacted. The field, therefore, was left clear for party skirmishing. It was not long before the Republican majority in the Senate made its first move toward “putting Cleveland in a hole.” As has already been explained, the President had removed or suspended a number of Republican officials, and had appointed Democrats in their stead. In so doing, he had not made public his reasons for removal or suspension, other than in the general statement that this action was for the good of the public service. The Republican Senators sought now to bring him to an explicit and detailed accounting. Whether he refused or whether he acceded to their wish, they hoped to have it appear that he had removed Republicans solely from partisan motives. In this way his professed regard for civil service reform would be discredited; his Independent supporters would be es-

tranged; and the President himself would appear somewhat in the light of a hypocrite.

The case of Mr. George M. Duskin was selected as a suitable one upon which to make the fight. Mr. Duskin had been United States District Attorney for the Southern District of Alabama. On July 17th he had been suspended by Executive order and Mr. John D. Burnett had been designated to perform the duties of the office in Duskin's place. When Congress met, the President nominated Mr. Burnett for appointment as Duskin's successor. The Senate passed a resolution requiring the Attorney-General to send to it all the papers relating to Mr. Duskin's suspension. The Attorney-General, by order of the President, informed the Senate that it was not considered that the public interests would be promoted by so transmitting these papers and other documents. Thereupon the Judiciary Committee of the Senate passed a resolution censuring the Attorney-General and, by inference, the President. It was evidently intended to make a formal demand upon the President himself for these papers. Senators of the United States have an exalted opinion of their own dignity. They are fond of calling the Chamber to which they belong "the most august deliberative body in the world." They claimed, moreover, in 1886, that inasmuch as the assent of the Senate was required to confirm the appointment of certain officers, these officers were not subject to removal by the President without the Senate's permission. This claim was based upon the so-called Tenure of Office Act, passed in 1867 during the conflict between Congress and President Johnson. To be sure, the more stringent features of the Act had been stricken out in 1869, when General Grant assumed the Presidency. Nevertheless, the Senate felt that, between its own over-

powering greatness and its somewhat tenuous legal right, it could overawe a new and inexperienced President.

Mr. Cleveland, however, did not wait for the issue to be fully joined between the Executive and the Senate. Like a good general, he attacked boldly, before his opponents had fully matured their plans. On March 1, 1886, he sent a message to the Senate in which he took high ground. "It is by no means conceded," wrote he, "that the Senate has the right in any case to review the act of the Executive in removing or suspending a public officer." Then he declared that the Attorney-General had acted solely under Executive direction. He said that the papers relating to the Duskin case were not public documents.

"I regard the papers and documents withheld and addressed to me or intended for my use and action, purely unofficial and private . . . and having reference to the performance of a duty exclusively mine. . . . If I desired to take them into my custody I might do so with entire propriety, and if I saw fit to destroy them no one could complain.

"The requests and demands which by the score have for nearly three months been presented to the different Departments of the Government, whatever may be their form, have but one complexion. They assume the right of the Senate to sit in judgment upon the exercise of my exclusive discretion and executive function, for which I am solely responsible to the people from whom I have so lately received the sacred trust of office. My oath to support and defend the Constitution, my duty to the people who have chosen me to execute the powers of their great office and not to relinquish them, and my duty to the Chief Magistracy, which I must preserve unimpaired in all its dignity and vigour, compel me to refuse compliance with these demands."

The message ended with the following haughty sentence:

“Neither the discontent of party friends, nor the allurements constantly offered of confirmations of appointees conditioned upon the avowal that suspensions have been made on party grounds alone, nor the threat proposed in the resolutions now before the Senate that no confirmations will be made unless the demands of that body be complied with, are sufficient to discourage or deter me from following in the way which I am convinced leads to better government for the people.”

The boldness and vigour with which the President thus asserted his prerogative, astounded the Republican Senators. They found themselves in the very “hole” into which they had gleefully expected to put Mr. Cleveland. Just what to do they did not know. They had no means of coercing the President of the United States; and his calm indifference to the senatorial dignity was as unpleasant as it was novel in their experience. They argued and debated; but finally, in a sheepish, shamefaced way, they came to the conclusion that nothing whatsoever could be done but swallow the medicine which the President had administered.<sup>22</sup>

One of their number, however, took an oratorical revenge. This was Senator Ingalls of Kansas. Mr. Ingalls was a very brilliant, fluent speaker, possessing a voluminous vocabulary of bitterness. A tall, thin, cynical-looking man, with a power of emitting words which scorched like drops of vitriol, he never failed to command the attention of his colleagues and of the public. He let it be known that he was about to scarify the Administration with regard to its pretensions to reform. When he arose in his place on March 28th, both the floor

<sup>22</sup> See Cleveland, *Presidential Problems*, pp. 3-76 (New York, 1904).

of the Senate and the galleries were crowded. Speaking slowly, in order that every shaft might surely find its mark, he delivered an address which was a masterpiece of studied malice. First of all, he spoke of the attitude of his own party:

“They believe and I believe that for the past quarter of a century upon every vital issue before the American people, secession, slavery, coercion, the public credit, honest elections, universal freedom, and the protection of American labour, they have always been right and that their opponents have always been wrong; and, while they concede unreservedly patriotism and sincerity to their adversaries, temporary repulse has not convinced them that they were in error. There is neither defection nor dismay in their columns. They are ready, they are impatient to renew the battle. Animated by such impulses, it is not singular that they should feel that no Republican can hold an appointive office under a Democratic administration without either sacrificing his convictions or forfeiting his self-respect.

“Accordingly, sir, when a little more than a year ago a Democratic administration was inaugurated, those who were in public station began with one consent to make excuse to retire to private life. They did not stand upon the order of their going; they trampled upon each other in a tumultuous and somewhat indecent haste to get out of office. There was no craven cry for mercy; no mercenary camp-follower fled for shelter to the bomb-proofs of the Tenure of Office Act, no sutler crawled behind the fragile breastworks of civil service reform for protection. They lost their baggage, but they retained their colours, their arms, their ammunition, and their camp equipage, and marched off the field with the honours of war. If at the expiration of one year a few yet remain in office, *rari nantes in gurgite vasto*, it is because the victors have been unable to agree among themselves or been unable to discover among their own number competent and qualified successors.”

Speaking of the President, he said:

“ Sir, I am not disposed to impugn the good faith, the patriotism, the sincerity, the many unusual traits and faculties of the President of the United States. He is the sphinx of American politics. It is said that he is a fatalist; that he regards himself as the child of fate—the man of destiny, and that he places devout and implicit reliance upon the guiding influence of his ‘star.’ Certainly, whether he be a very great man or a very small man, he is a very extraordinary man. His career forbids any other conclusion.”

Then he paid his respects to the advocates of reform. In his sentences were concentrated the hatred and contempt which the vindictive partisan feels for all who exercise an independent judgment in politics:

“ Mr. President, the neuter gender is not popular either in nature or society. ‘Male and female created He them.’ But there is a third sex, if sex that can be called which sex has none, resulting sometimes from a cruel caprice of nature, at others from accident or malevolent design, possessing the vices of both and the virtues of neither; effeminate without being masculine or feminine; unable either to beget or to bear; possessing neither fecundity nor virility; endowed with the contempt of men and the derision of women, and doomed to sterility, isolation, and extinction. But they have two recognised functions. They sing falsetto, and they are usually selected as the guardians of the seraglios of Oriental despots. Geology teaches us that in the process of being, upward from the protoplasmic cell, through one form of existence to another, there are intermediary and connecting stages, in which the creature bears some resemblance to the state from which it has emerged and some to the state to which he is proceeding. History is stratified politics; every stratum is fossiliferous; and I am inclined to think that the political geologist of the future in his antiquarian researches between the triassic series of 1880 and the

cretaceous series of 1888, as he inspects the jurassic Democratic strata of 1884, will find some curious illustrations of the doctrine of political evolution.

“ In the transition from the fish to the bird there is an anomalous animal, long since extinct, named by the geologist the pterodactyl, or winged reptile, a lizard with feathers upon its paws and plumes upon its tail. A political system which illustrates in its practical operations the appointment by the same administration of Eugene Higgins and Dorman B. Eaton can properly be regarded as in the transition epoch and characterised as the pterodactyl of politics. It is, like that animal, equally adapted to waddling and dabbling in the slime and mud of partisan politics, and soaring aloft with discordant cries into the glittering and opalescent empyrean of civil service reform.<sup>23</sup>

A sufficient answer to the gibes of Mr. Ingalls was given a few days later by the organisation of the new Civil Service Commission which, aided by the President in every way, now entered upon its work. A definite plan for promotion was perfected. Rigorous investigations were conducted, and these unearthed many violations of the law. A Republican was appointed chief examiner. The bitter discussion in the Senate had served to rivet public attention upon this important question, and sentiment in favour of the reform was strengthened and extended every day.

Much feeling was excited in the spring of 1886 by the President's attitude toward private pension bills. That the military pension system had been grossly abused was perfectly well known to every one. Neither party, however, possessed the courage to eradicate these abuses. The Republicans had always officially posed as the friends of the veteran. The Democrats knew that if they took unfavourable action upon pension bills they would be accused

<sup>23</sup> *Congressional Record*, March 28, 1886.

of disloyalty and of hatred to the soldiers of the Union. The result was that disbursements for pensions had increased with startling rapidity. Thus, in 1866, the number of pensioners was 126,722, and the amount paid to them annually was \$15,450,550. In 1875, there were 234,821 pensioners receiving annually \$29,270,407. At that time, General Garfield declared in the House of Representatives that the expenditures for pensions had reached their maximum and thereafter might be expected to decrease. Congress, however, passed a so-called Arrears of Pension Act, giving to each pensioner "back-pay" from the time when his disability had been first incurred. At once the expenditures were almost doubled. In 1885, the pensioners numbered 345,125, and the annual sum paid them was \$65,171,937. The Pension Bureau was administered in a spirit of extravagant liberality. Pensions were granted to individuals whose claims were ludicrous and at times outrageous. Men who had been dishonourably discharged were on the pension-list; others who had met with injuries from accidents while drunk were likewise favoured. Pensions had actually been bestowed upon malingerers who had shot off their own fingers in order to escape from service in the army. Yet even the Pension Bureau had felt that somewhere it must draw the line; and therefore many applications were rejected. Unsuccessful claimants, therefore, got into the habit of embodying their claims in private bills which were sent to Congress for special action. These bills were hastily rushed through both Houses without the slightest reference to their merits. It is recorded that on a single day the Senate once passed 500 private pension bills at a sitting. President Cleveland made up his mind that this sort of thing must stop.



He began to make a careful study of each private pension bill that came before him, going into all the evidence with the scrupulous care of a trained lawyer. It became at once apparent that many claimants for pensions were no better than swindlers; and therefore, on May 8th, he sent to Congress the first of a series of veto messages—a series which was continued throughout that session. These messages were brief, pungent, and often tinged with sarcasm, and when collected they made very interesting reading as throwing light upon the fraudulent character of many pension claims. “We are dealing,” wrote Mr. Cleveland, “with pensions, not with gratuities”; and even had it been a question of gratuities, there was little reason for favourable action upon many of the bills. Some of the claimants were shown to have deserted from the army. One had fallen while getting over a fence, but had absolutely no trace of any injury upon his person. Another asked for a pension because he had hurt his ankle while *intending* to enlist. Another based his application upon the fact that, sixteen years after the conclusion of the war, he had fallen from a ladder and fractured his skull. Still another had broken his leg in a ditch while gathering dandelions, long after the war. A widow asked for a pension because her husband had died of heart disease in 1881—a circumstance which she ascribed to a wound in the ankle received in 1863. Absurd as were these and many other claims, the fact that the President rejected them was made the basis of a charge of hostility to the veterans of the Civil War. The merits of each case had little weight with those opponents who cared nothing for the truth, but who sought to bring discredit on the President. As a matter of fact, many of his vetoes were in the interest of the very persons whose claims he set aside. In

several instances, widows of soldiers had carelessly sought relief through a pension bill, when the granting of such relief would have cut them off from a far more liberal treatment through the regular channels of the Pension Bureau.<sup>24</sup> The President, therefore, by his vigilance, not only detected and exposed dishonesty, but he performed a real service to many worthy persons. In all, he vetoed one pension bill in every seven, or about one hundred in the aggregate; and only one of these bills was ever passed over the President's veto.

Early in 1886, the rumour went abroad that Mr. Cleveland was about to end his bachelorhood. This rumour naturally excited widespread interest and caused a temporary cessation of party strife. Only one President had ever been married during his term of office,<sup>25</sup> and never had the wedding of a President taken place in the White House. Before long it became known that the report was true, and that an engagement existed between Mr. Cleveland and Miss Frances Folsom, the daughter of his former law partner. At the time when the engagement was announced, Miss Folsom was in Europe; but she presently returned and became the object of an immense amount of friendly curiosity. Mr. Cleveland had been her guardian after her father's death and it was said that the two had begun to take a sentimental interest in one another after certain gossips had spread a premature and quite unfounded story of their betrothal. Miss Folsom at this time was twenty-two years of age. She was a tall and

<sup>24</sup> See, for instance, the veto messages of July 9, 1886; February 3, 1887; February 21, 1887; and February 23, 1887.

<sup>25</sup> President Tyler was married in New York toward the end of his administration.

graceful girl, with manners that were at once dignified and winning. Her cordiality was sincere, and she was always tactful; and from the day when she first became known to the American people she remained deservedly a universal favourite. Following the usage which prevails with rulers of nations, the President was married in his official residence rather than at the house of his bride. The wedding took place on the evening of the second of June, in the Blue Room, in the presence of a small but distinguished company, including most of the members of the Cabinet. The ceremony was carried out with perfect taste; and the only incidents which suggested an official wedding were the presidential salute of twenty-one guns fired from the Arsenal, and a message of congratulation from the Queen of Great Britain, which was received just as the President and his bride were taking their departure.

They went by special train to a cottage which had been placed at their disposal at Deer Park in the mountains of Maryland. Public interest in the marriage was so great that the press of the country went far beyond the limits of what was permissible. On the following morning, the President was astonished to find that a pavilion had been reared directly opposite his cottage, and that a throng of newspaper correspondents were collected there, provided with field glasses, so as not to lose even the slightest detail which a bold-eyed curiosity could discover. This annoying espionage continued for several days, and fully justified some biting sentences which were written with regard to the editors who permitted such a breach of elemental courtesy.

“ They have used the enormous power of the modern newspaper to perpetrate and disseminate a colossal impertinence, and have

done it, not as professional gossips and tattlers, but as the guides and instructors of the public in conduct and morals. And they have done it, not to a private citizen, but to the President of the United States, thereby lifting their offence into the gaze of the whole world, and doing their utmost to make American journalism contemptible in the estimation of people of good breeding everywhere." 26

Congress adjourned on August 5, 1886. It had of necessity enacted no measure regarding which there was a difference of opinion between the two parties. A tariff bill had been prepared by the Democrats of the House, but no action had been taken upon it. On the other hand, the question of the presidential succession had at last been definitely settled by a law which named the Vice-President, and the Secretaries of the Departments in the order of their establishment, to succeed in the event of the disability or death of those preceding them. Another bill, providing for an increase of the navy, passed both Houses and received the signature of the President. This Naval Appropriation Act was long afterwards pronounced "historic" by a Republican Secretary of the Navy.<sup>27</sup> It authorised the building of a battleship, the *Texas*, an armoured cruiser, the *Maine*, a protected cruiser, the *Baltimore*, a dynamite cruiser, the *Vesuvius*, and a torpedo boat, the *Cushing*. In this way, new and wholly modern types of warships were introduced into the American Navy; and of these vessels every one was destined to be remembered in the nation's history.

President Cleveland had by this time become thoroughly well known to all his countrymen. In some ways he had

<sup>26</sup> New York *Evening Post*, June 4, 1886.

<sup>27</sup> Long, *The New American Navy*, i., p. 41 (New York, 1904).

disappointed a section of his party. He had not altogether satisfied the expectations of the independent voters. But he had made no serious mistakes, and he had given to his followers a positive and definite policy to take the place of a purely negative, critical attitude which for twenty years had brought them nothing but disaster. Both as a man and as a statesman his fame had grown. Few doubted his sincerity of purpose, his integrity of character, or his indomitable courage.

In November, 1886, Harvard University celebrated the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of its foundation. President Cleveland accepted an invitation to attend the ceremonies as a guest of the University and of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Accompanied by the Governor and escorted by a body of lancers, he proceeded to Cambridge, where he was received at the Sanders Theatre by President Eliot.<sup>28</sup> No such gathering had hitherto been seen upon this Continent, representing, as it did, all that was most distinguished in American art and literature, in statesmanship, in science, and in learning. In the presence of this brilliant assemblage, James Russell Lowell, the greatest of American men of letters then living, delivered an address which for its tone of rare distinction still remains a masterpiece, starred with felicitous allusions and pregnant with suggestive thought. Toward the close he spoke a few graceful words of welcome to the guests of the University, and then, at the last, turning to the most illustrious guest of all, he said:

“There is also one other name of which it would be indecorous not to make exception. You all know that I can mean only the President of our Republic. His presence is a signal honour to us all, and to us all I may say a personal gratification. We have no politics here; but

the sons of Harvard all belong to the party which admires courage, strength of purpose, and fidelity to duty, and which respects, wherever he may be found, the

“ ‘Iustum et tenacem propositi virum,’

who knows how to withstand the

“ ‘Civium ardor prava iubentium.’

He has left the helm of State to be with us here; and so long as it is entrusted to his hands we are sure that, should the storm come, he will say with Seneca's pilot, ‘O Neptune, you may sink me if you will, you may save me if you will, but whatever happen I shall keep my rudder true!’ ”<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Winsor, *Record of the Celebration of the 250th Anniversary of the Founding of Harvard College* (Boston, 1887).

## CHAPTER III

### MEMORIES OF THE PAST

How rapidly old issues and old causes were fading into political obscurity was impressed upon the mind of the American people by the passing away, early in President Cleveland's administration, of many men whose names evoked innumerable memories, but whose careers already had receded into history. In 1885, died George B. McClellan and Ulysses S. Grant; in 1886, Chester Alan Arthur, Winfield S. Hancock, Horatio Seymour, and Samuel J. Tilden. Of these distinguished men, two—General Grant and Mr. Arthur—had been Presidents of the United States. Three—General McClellan, General Hancock, and Mr. Seymour—had been unsuccessful candidates for the Presidency. One—Mr. Tilden—will probably remain unique in American history as having been prevented by political intrigue from taking possession of the chief magistracy to which his countrymen had called him.

The names of General McClellan and General Grant are linked indissolubly with the annals of the Civil War. The history of the one not only supplements the history of the other, but affords a striking contrast. It was McClellan's fortune to begin the task which Grant completed. McClellan rests to-day beneath the shadow of imputed failure; Grant wears in history the laurels of supreme success. The final judgment of posterity is a judgment from which appeal is hopeless; yet in this one thing it is seldom wholly just. It takes no heed of circumstances or condi-

tions. It makes no reservations. It exacts unqualified acceptance. It stands, with a stolidity that is almost brutal, upon the bed-rock foundation of bare results.

In 1861, McClellan, then an ex-captain of Engineers, came to Washington to assume command of the nation's military forces in succession to the infirm and aged Scott. A few successful skirmishes in West Virginia, which popular inexperience magnified into mighty battles, had won for him this swift promotion. He found the capital in a state of chaos. The rout at Bull Run had demoralised alike the army and the Government. Raw levies from the North were encamped about the city, ignorant of the very rudiments of military training, and officered by no less ignorant civilians—tradesmen, lawyers, and politicians. As an army, it was preposterous; as the raw material of an army, there was no better in the world. But to convert this mob-like mass into a great fighting machine, to give it discipline, coherence, confidence, endurance and enthusiasm, was a problem to appall the genius of a Carnot. Yet this McClellan did, and he did it most superbly. The impatient North, smarting under defeat and fatuously expecting from a single campaign the conquest of an entire people of English stock, fretted at each moment of delay. President Lincoln and the bullying lawyer whom he had made his Secretary of War were little less unreasonable. McClellan had the infinite misfortune to take command when the nation was still childish in its hero-worship and as yet unsobered by the stern realities of war. Men called the new commanding general "the young Napoleon"; but not Napoleon himself could have satisfied the expectations of the Northern editors and war-mad orators. Moreover, McClellan was charged with nursing political ambitions, because of the foolish speeches of some of his party



friends.<sup>1</sup> He became an object of suspicion to members of the Cabinet—first to Stanton, then to Chase—and a network of petty intrigue was woven around him to hamper and exasperate him. The President believed in him, yet never gave him a free hand in anything. A morbid fear lest the Confederates should make a sudden dash on Washington came over Lincoln from time to time, and still more strongly over Stanton, and paralysed the operations in the field. The command was divided between Halleck and McClellan; and divided command naturally brought divided counsels. The army fought and fought heroically, for it loved McClellan. No other general in that war ever so completely won the devotion of his soldiers. An intelligent private, who afterward published his recollections, wrote: "Soldiers' eyes would brighten when they talked of him. Their hard, lean, browned faces would soften and light up with affection when they spoke of him."<sup>2</sup> Defeat or victory, it was all the same. He never lost his hold upon the men who followed him.

That McClellan was an able soldier and that his campaigns were ably planned, is an assertion which rests upon the highest military authority. General Lee, five years after the war, when asked whom he regarded as the greatest of the Northern generals, answered emphatically, "McClellan, by all odds."<sup>3</sup> Von Moltke in 1874, said that McClellan was the one scientific general on the Northern side, and that Grant's final campaign was worked out successfully on the strategic lines which McClellan had laid

<sup>1</sup> "My friends have injured me a thousand times more than my enemies," McClellan is said to have remarked to a brother-officer.—Richardson.

<sup>2</sup> Wilkeson, *Recollections of a Private Soldier*, p. 192 (New York, 1887). Wilkeson afterwards held a lieutenant's commission in the army.

<sup>3</sup> Lee, *Recollections and Letters of General Lee*, p. 166 (New York, 1904).

down. In 1862, McClellan pushed the Union forces to within four miles of Richmond. After the Seven Days' Battle, he was superseded by the boastful and incompetent Pope, under whom the Army of the Potomac was shattered at Manassas and driven in panic flight to Washington. Called in this dire emergency to command once more, McClellan restored as if by magic the morale of the army, which greeted his return with frantic cheers; and he soon after led it to the bloody field of Antietam, where he won a strategic victory over Lee. That he was presently sent into retirement and that his name no more appears in military annals, must be ascribed to several circumstances. The country had not yet learned that the conquest of the South was utterly impossible until it should have been drained to the last drop of its resources—in Bismarck's ghastly but expressive phrase, *saigné à blanc*. Single victories were expected to crush the Confederacy, though the Confederacy was still in the early years of its existence, amply supplied with men and with munitions, not intolerably pinched for money, and flushed with the brilliancy of its initial victories. President Lincoln had not yet nerved himself to the point of contemplating bloodshed with a feeling that it was inevitable. Stanton and the Radicals hated that general who, if successful, might prove to be a dangerous political opponent. In consequence, McClellan fought, as it were, with a rope about his neck. The delays, the repulses, the loss of life, the inconclusive battles—such as were afterwards so readily excused in Grant—were held to be unpardonable in McClellan. His twenty days' successful siege of Yorktown seemed to Mr. Lincoln a waste of time quite unendurable; whereas the months which Grant devoted to the siege of Petersburg brought on him no official criticism. McClellan's Pen-

insula campaign was rendered fruitless by the sudden withdrawal of McDowell's force of forty thousand men just at the psychological moment; while Grant's army was never weakened by executive interference. The knowledge that his enemies in the Government were as active against him as his enemies in the field, intensified in McClellan a certain caution of which undoubtedly he already had too much. He exaggerated both the numbers and the equipment of the Confederates. After a battle he could never quite understand that while his own troops were shaken, the enemy's army must be shaken quite as much. He seemed not to realise that what the foe could do, his men could also do if urged. And so he balked at obstacles of which Lee made small account; he waited for supplies of food and clothing, while the Confederates marched hungry and in rags; and therefore he failed to follow up successes, when prompt action might possibly have dealt a crushing blow. Judgment is given against McClellan because of the sequel to the battle of Antietam. Speaking of this, President Lincoln said to Mr. Albert D. Richardson:<sup>4</sup>

“ I adhered to him [McClellan] after all my Cabinet advisers lost faith in him. But do you want to know when I gave him up? It was after the battle of Antietam. The Blue Ridge was then between our army and Lee's. We enjoyed the great advantage over them which they usually had over us. We had the short line and they the long one to the rebel capital. I directed McClellan peremptorily to move on Richmond. It was eleven days before he crossed his first man over the Potomac; it was eleven days after that before he crossed his last man. Thus, he was twenty-two days in passing the river at a much easier and more practicable

<sup>4</sup> Richardson, *The Field, the Dungeon, and the Escape*, p. 324 (Hartford, 1865).

ford than that where Lee crossed his entire army between dark one night and daylight the next morning. That was the last grain of sand which broke the camel's back. I retired McClellan at once."

There is really no answer to be made to this. Yet it must be noted that when precisely the same thing occurred after Gettysburg, no official censure was passed on Meade, who let Lee slip away, although the Southern army was badly broken, and although the Potomac in the rear of the Confederates was swollen by a flood and for a time was practically unfordable. In that case, however, Lincoln merely wrote to Meade a "fatherly letter," and even then refrained from sending it.<sup>5</sup> McClellan, in fact, received one kind of treatment, while Meade and Grant received a very different one.

What confirmed and fixed the unfavourable opinion of General McClellan which many Americans now entertain, was the book which, after his death, was published under the editorship of Mr. W. C. Prime.<sup>6</sup> McClellan had left in manuscript, for the private reading of his children, his own account of his military career. This was put into the hands of Mr. Prime, together with all the letters which McClellan while at the front had dashed off to his wife from day to day. Mr. Prime most injudiciously gave to the public not merely the manuscript, but also the private letters. These letters were the confidences of a fond husband to an adoring wife, and they were never meant for any eye but hers. They are the hasty and unpremeditated expressions of a man labouring under immense responsibility, and with every nerve strained to the highest pitch,

<sup>5</sup> Of Meade's mistake, Lincoln said to General Howard: "He expended all the skill and toil and blood up to the ripe harvest and then let the crop go to waste." See Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, vii. p. 278 (New York, 1890).

<sup>6</sup> *McClellan's Own Story*, edited by W. C. Prime (New York, 1887).

and they reflect accurately the moment's mood. Read fairly, seven-tenths of what they contain should be eliminated in passing judgment on the writer of them. The outbursts of impatience, the unreserved freedom of criticism, the blunt comments upon men and things, are of no more real significance than the casual ejaculations and careless words of any one who finds that it relieves his mind to speak without restraint to a wholly sympathetic listener. Knowing that she to whom he wrote would rejoice in the honours that were paid him, he tells her many things of which no man would ever speak, save to a loving woman, and then for her delight and not for his. Yet all these little confidences, these tokens of affectionate intimacy, were set forth in cold type, and they have been made to justify a condemnation of McClellan. Even so sensible and fair-minded an historian as Mr. J. F. Rhodes speaks of McClellan's "puerile vanity"; while upon the public mind there has been left a painful and quite false impression of fretfulness, and pettiness, and egotism. All this is due to the mistaken zeal of Mr. Prime, who in discharging the duties of a literary executor dealt a cruel blow at the reputation of a gallant soldier. For with all his military defects—and these he shared with many others whose fame is now secure—McClellan was a brave, unselfish lover of his country, which, in the hour of its black despair, he served both faithfully and well.

Whenever a pure democracy undertakes a great and bloody war, some of those who serve it are certain to be sacrificed as the price of its education into an understanding of just what is needed for success. In the American Civil War, it was McClellan who was sacrificed. By the time when Grant was ordered from the West and pitted against Lee, the North had fully learned the lesson over

which it had so badly bungled for three melancholy years. All the bluster had been knocked out of it. Even the dullest minds perceived that a hostile army could not be routed by flag-raising and florid oratory. That very Chinese mode of waging war was at an end, and men now buckled down to grim realities. Sentimentalism had no more place. Soldiers were now food for powder and they were nothing else. Money was not to be saved and counted, but must flow like water—must be wasted even, rather than withheld. Military amateurs to the rear, professional soldiers to the front. Even law was silent amid the clash of arms. Citizens in the North who criticised the Government were seized by armed men and hurried into fortresses. Newspaper offices were entered and their presses stopped. The courts were open, but their writs no longer ran. A telegram from Washington could send any man to Fort Lafayette. A few lines scribbled by a general officer served to annul an order of the Chief Justice of the United States. Everything was forced to yield to the supreme exigency of war. Democracy for a time gave way to military despotism. And so when Grant was called to Washington, he was invested with a power which none of his predecessors had possessed.<sup>7</sup> There was no check upon his authority in the field. He was freed from Stanton's interference. Even the President forbore to meddle and

<sup>7</sup> Stanton once demanded in his imperious manner, an explanation of an order given by Grant.

"I think I rank you in this matter, Mr. Secretary," was the quiet answer.

"We shall have to see Mr. Lincoln about that," the Secretary replied.

"All right," said the Lieutenant-General. "Mr. Lincoln ranks us both." They went to the White House.

"Won't you state your case, General Grant?" said Stanton.

Grant replied: "I have no case to state; I am satisfied as it is."

Mr. Stanton stated his case. Then Lincoln answered:

"You and I, Mr. Stanton, have been trying to boss this job, and we

direct. And the Treasury poured out three millions of money every day to replace the regiments as fast as they were slaughtered. Grant was a tactician as McClellan was a strategist. As a soldier he resembled a lump of clay in which are embedded grains of gold. His normal mediocrity was at times lighted up by gleams of genius. He had moments of stolidity so dense as to be almost dullness; and again he would rise to heights of magnificent efficiency. The moral-military qualities of courage, responsibility, and self-confidence, he possessed in a rare degree; and these were reinforced by a strong good sense which often served him as an admirable substitute for theoretical knowledge. For his own technical deficiencies he once made a sort of *apologia* in the following shrewd sentences:

“Some of our generals failed because they worked out everything by rule. They knew what Frederick did at one place, and Napoleon at another. They were always thinking about what Napoleon would do. Unfortunately for their plans, the rebels would be thinking about something else. I don't underrate the value of military knowledge, but if men make war in slavish observance of rules, they will fail. No rules will apply to conditions of war so different as those which exist in Europe and in America. Consequently, while our generals were working out problems of an ideal character . . . practical facts were neglected. To that extent I consider remembrances of old campaigns a disadvantage.”

Yet Grant's two signal triumphs—Donelson and Vicksburg—were won by a close adherence to the established

have not succeeded very well with it. We have sent across the mountains for Mr. Grant, as Mrs. Grant calls him, to relieve us, and I think we had better leave him alone to do as he pleases.”—Church, *Ulysses S. Grant*, p. 249 (New York, 1897).

rules of warfare. The operations about Donelson have been compared with Napoleon's at Ulm; and at Vicksburg his well-executed plan of crushing the enemy in detail was essentially Napoleonic. It was, indeed, at Vicksburg that Grant's military powers rose to a climax. Never again did he show so admirable a combination of strategic and tactical capacity, so much skilful planning and so much energy of execution. He seems himself to have understood this, for he said long after: "I don't think there is any one of my campaigns with which I have not some fault to find, and which, as I see it now, I could not have improved, except perhaps Vicksburg." Certainly he never again rose to the same height. Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the difference in military skill between his two opponents, Pemberton and Lee. Placed at the head of the Army of the Potomac, he fought the useless and bloody battle of the Wilderness—that name of horror—from which he was forced back with a loss of twenty thousand men. At Spottsylvania he made three desperate frontal attacks upon a strongly fortified position, with no result except a lavish loss of life. Then came the crowning blunder of Cold Harbour, where again the Confederate intrenchments were assaulted from the front and where within an hour twelve thousand Union soldiers fell. It was here that Grant, unmoved by the frightful loss of life, ordered a third charge, and the army remained motionless, refusing to obey.<sup>8</sup> Had McClellan or Hooker or Meade been guilty of so terrible a failure, the whole nation would have demanded his disgrace. Even Grant himself in after years spoke of Cold Harbour with remorse.<sup>9</sup> In this one campaign, which earned for him the title of "the Butcher,"

<sup>8</sup> Wilkeson, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

<sup>9</sup> Grant, *Memoirs*, ii. p. 276 (New York, 1886).



he lost more men than Lee had in his entire army. But Lincoln said, as he had said after Shiloh: "I cannot spare this man. He fights." Here lay, indeed, the secret of Grant's ultimate success. He had grasped the one great central fact that his true objective was not Richmond, but Lee's army. To grapple with that army at any time or any place and at whatever cost in soldiers' lives, sums up the plan to which Grant held inflexibly. Lee could no longer be reinforced. His war-worn troops could with the greatest difficulty be fed and furnished with munitions. Back of Grant there was always an unlimited supply of men, of money, and of all that money can procure. Hence, in the end, Lee must succumb to the process of attrition involved in constant fighting. There was no genius in this plan. It bore the same relation to military science which slogging bears to scientific boxing. But it was certain to succeed when carried out by one who had alike the authority to pursue it and the iron nerve to look unmoved on fields of slaughter. When Lee finally surrendered, there was nothing but a fragment of his army left, half-starved and ragged, and at the very limit of what flesh and blood can bear.

The character of General Grant is usually held to be an easy one to read, and yet its curious contrasts indicate a singular complexity. There were in it elements of undoubted greatness, though few men have lacked so utterly the external marks of greatness. A keen observer,<sup>10</sup> who saw him for the first time in 1864, described him as short, round-shouldered, utterly devoid of presence, rough, and with a rather scrubby look,—one who neither marched nor walked, but "pitched along as though his next step would bring him on his nose." "He had a cigar in his mouth

<sup>10</sup> R. H. Dana. See Adams, *Life of R. H. Dana*, ii. p. 277 (Boston, 1890).

and rather the look of a man who did, or once did, take a little too much to drink." The only softening of this description is found in the mention of a clear blue eye and a look of resolution as of one who could not be trifled with. General Horace Porter gives an almost pathetic picture of Grant, in the midst of the Wilderness campaign, clothed in a shabby, tarnished uniform, and whittling a stick, with hands encased in brown thread gloves, through the frayed finger-ends of which his nails protruded.<sup>11</sup> At the surrender of Lee, the Confederate commander came to the interview, as courtesy required, in complete uniform and wearing at his side a jewelled sword. Grant came clothed in the garb of a private soldier, spattered with mud, swordless, and with no sign of rank save the stars of a general stitched upon his faded blouse. He carried this excessive simplicity into everything. Bred as a soldier, he had no liking whatsoever for military pomp. When he visited Berlin in 1877, the Emperor offered for his entertainment the spectacle of a military review, only to be met by the remark: "A military review is a thing which I hope never to see again." He could not even bear the sound of martial music.

It was, indeed, no less as a civilian than as a soldier that Grant secured the liking of his countrymen. In many respects he exemplified the average American, and he possessed in a high degree those homely virtues which the average American admires and respects. He was a man of singular purity, both in word and deed. No one ever heard him use an oath; and the strongest ejaculation that he is recorded as having uttered was the mysteriously bucolic expletive, "I jings!" General Wilson tells an anecdote that is very characteristic. One evening at din-

<sup>11</sup> Porter, *Campaigning with Grant*, p. 65 (New York, 1900).

ner, an officer of high rank who was noted for his repertoire of indecent stories, remarked, after glancing about the table:

“ I will tell a little anecdote, as I see there are no ladies present.”

“ Ah,” said Grant quietly, with an unmistakable intonation, “ but there are gentlemen present.”<sup>12</sup>

His nature had a strong domestic side. When he was in camp at City Point, Mrs. Grant would sometimes spend a few days at headquarters; and to the amusement of the immediate staff, she and the General would sit at dusk in an obscure corner of his tent, “ holding hands ” like a pair of rustic lovers, both of them greatly perturbed if some heedless person inadvertently approached them. After death and when his body was being prepared for burial, there was found about Grant’s neck a long tress of hair which had been sent him by his young wife thirty-two years before, when he was a captain assigned to duty in the Far West. Under an undemonstrative exterior, he felt for his children an equal warmth of strong affection. During his presidency, his only daughter was married in the White House to an English gentleman with whom, of course, her home was to be made thereafter in a distant land. Throughout the ceremonies, Grant was gravely cordial, a courteous host to all the company; but after the young couple had said farewell, the President was discovered to be missing. After a time his wife sent to recall him; and in his daughter’s room, with his face buried in his hands, this iron soldier, whom the horrors of the battle-field had never shaken, was found sobbing like a child.

The contradictions in his character are difficult of explanation. Considerate, tender-hearted, and as merciful

<sup>12</sup> Wilson, *General Grant*, p. 378 (New York, 1897).

as Lincoln himself, he could yet order the sacrifice of thousands and look upon their slaughter with a perfectly impassive face. Shrewd and practical in military administration, he failed to make even a comfortable living in civil life; and when the war broke out, he, at the age of thirty-nine, was a debt-ridden clerk in a country "store," with an annual salary of \$800. Incorruptibly honest, he was, nevertheless, surrounded throughout his presidency by stock-jobbers, money-sharks, ringsters, and blacklegs of every sort, whose baseness he could not be made to see, so that he stood by them to the end with a loyalty which was at once sublime and pitiful. His last years were clouded by the shadow of disgrace which came upon him from his business association with a common swindler, by whom Grant himself was ruined, together with hundreds of unfortunate persons who had been lured to beggary by the misuse of an illustrious name. In any other man, such trustfulness, such blindness to the truth, would have been little less than imbecility. In Grant it was only one of the many paradoxes in a character which in its depths must always be inscrutable. When he died, his countrymen, moved by the pathos of his end, forgot the sordid drama of his presidency, and remembered only the days of his true greatness, his courage and tenacity, and his noble magnanimity to a conquered foe. Throughout the future, when his name is spoken, it will inevitably recall the picture of a silent man on horseback, unmoved, unflinching, undismayed—one whom the mists of time have already blurred into a figure of heroic mould.

Horatio Seymour was the ablest, the sanest, and the most wisely patriotic of all those Democratic statesmen who, throughout the period of the Civil War, maintained

on constitutional grounds an opposition to the administration of President Lincoln. The year 1862 was marked by one of those widespread waves of depression and discontent which from time to time swept over the people of the North, and made the Union cause seem almost hopeless. From the armies in the field there came no cheering news of victory. From Washington there was poured forth an endless tale of mismanagement, of peculation, and of jobbery, such as sickened the moral sense of the whole nation. The edict of Emancipation was for the moment unpopular with the country. The suspension of the habeas corpus act, the frequent military arrests of private citizens, and the seeming incapacity of Congress and the President, drove thousands of patriotic citizens into the ranks of the opposition. Hence, at the autumn elections, six States,<sup>13</sup> which two years before had voted solidly for Mr. Lincoln, now left the Republican column and elected Democratic Governors. Even the President's own State declared against him. It was, however, the defection of New York which caused Mr. Lincoln the most serious concern; for this was the richest and most populous of all the States, and Mr. Seymour, who now became its chief executive, was a political opponent to be reckoned with. He had been described by Republican speakers as hostile to the cause of union, and as one who sympathised with treason. That he should have been chosen Governor of New York seemed a misfortune almost comparable with disaster in the field.

But those who thus misrepresented Mr. Seymour had little knowledge of his character and principles. Not Lincoln himself was a purer patriot nor more devoted to the cause of national unity. His public utterances were wholly admirable. "At this moment," he had said in October,

<sup>13</sup> New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin.

“the destinies, the honour, and the glory of our country hang poised upon the conflict in the battle-field. . . . We tender to the Government no conditional support.” He spoke of “this wicked and mighty rebellion,” and he called God to witness that “I would count my life as nothing if I could save the nation’s life.” Of the President he always spoke with courtesy, at a time when many others styled him “the Illinois baboon.” His opposition was not personal at all, nor was it directed against the efficient conduct of the war. What Mr. Seymour criticised, and what thousands of Republicans also criticised,<sup>14</sup> was the arbitrary conduct of Secretary Stanton, the waste and corruption which honeycombed the administration of the army, and the suspension by military order of those personal rights which are guaranteed by the Constitution to every American. But as Governor of New York, Mr. Seymour was as energetic in giving military support to the President as had been his Republican predecessor. When Lee invaded Pennsylvania in 1863, Seymour telegraphed to Secretary Stanton: “I will spare no effort to send you troops at once;” and at the battle of Gettysburg there were present nineteen New York regiments which had been hurried to the front by Seymour’s orders. In two despatches, Secretary Stanton, by the personal direction of the President, telegraphed his thanks to Governor Seymour for his “energy, activity, and patriotism.”<sup>15</sup> When the draft riots broke out in New York City just after Gettysburg, Gov-

<sup>14</sup> Among them were Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania, ex-Justice B. R. Curtis, formerly of the Supreme Court, and even Mr. (afterwards Senator) John Sherman, who wrote to his brother of “the wanton and unnecessary use of power to arrest without trial.”—*The Sherman Letters*, p. 167 (New York, 1894).

<sup>15</sup> *Public Record of Horatio Seymour*, p. 117 (New York, 1868); *Official Records of the War*, vol. xxvii., part ii., p. 214.

ernor Seymour was hastily summoned. The greater part of the town was already in the hands of a furious mob. The police had been routed. Houses had been sacked and burned, negroes had been hanged, beaten to death, and even burned. The city was stripped of troops, and there was no physical force at hand to quell disorder. Governor Seymour addressed the rioters from the steps of the City Hall, and endeavoured by persuasion and by promises to stay the work of devastation. He began his speech with the words, "My friends"; and for years his employment of these words to a crowd of rioters was flung at him as a bitter taunt. "Such," said his opponents, "are Governor Seymour's friends." But of course the words were a mere form of speech. Had he addressed the rioters as "Gentlemen" he would undoubtedly have been far less criticised; yet the ruffians whom he fearlessly confronted were no more his friends than they were gentlemen. A sufficient answer to his enemies is to be found in the fact that, within a year, the Republican Legislature of the State passed resolutions highly commending Governor Seymour for his action at that critical time.

There are some who hold that any opposition to the national Government in a time of civil war is both unwise and unpatriotic. A careful study of the years from 1862 until 1864 will surely not sustain this view. An opposition such as that of Seymour was in the highest degree salutary and even necessary to the Union cause. For that cause had been seriously compromised by those acts of the Administration which Mr. Seymour most urgently opposed. Nothing so estranged Mr. Lincoln's loyal following at the North as did the series of military arrests in parts of the country that were wholly peaceful and where the courts were open. There is no evidence that the President him-

self ever personally ordered any one of these arrests, and it is known that he often disapproved of them. Yet, of course, he was officially responsible for them, and they proved in the end to be in the highest degree impolitic and useless. It shocked the Anglo-Saxon respect for the orderly processes of law to witness old men of seventy dragged from their beds at midnight and hurried to prison by squads of soldiers under circumstances of inexcusable brutality. The arrest of children for the offense of selling newspapers of which some military commander disapproved, was even more obnoxious. In fact, had not Congress taken the matter in hand and limited the exercise of this arbitrary power, the violence which had already broken out in the Republican States of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Illinois would have kindled at the North a back-fire so formidable as to paralyse all military operations at the front.

Mr. Seymour's opposition, therefore, was justified both in reason and from the standpoint of the national welfare. It led the President and Congress to abstain from continuing a course of conduct which would have imperilled the cause of union. The task of one who acts in opposition is inevitably a thankless task, since it is always certain to be misunderstood and to be made the subject of the cruelest reproach. All the more honour then, to those who, like Seymour, have the high moral courage to perform that duty, as he has performed it, without expectation of reward, and in a way that leaves after the lapse of years no trace of bitterness behind.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> President Lincoln's broadly tolerant mind could thoroughly appreciate the attitude of Seymour. In 1863 he wrote to him a letter expressing the hope that they might both become better acquainted and that their good understanding might be directed to maintaining the nation's life and its integrity.—Letter of March 23, 1863, cited by Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, vii., p. 10 (New York, 1890).



Mr. Tilden was, in a sense, Governor Seymour's political successor. He is the supreme illustration in American political history of sheer intellect unrelieved by any of those human qualities which win men's love as well as their respect. Born with a body so frail that he never knew a day of perfect health, he had no boyhood; but, even as a child, his mind was given wholly to the mastery of government and politics. In his father's house he heard political discussions between some of the most adroit and wily party managers of that day. By the time when he was fifteen years of age, he was as well informed in American political history and in the manœuvres of political strife as any one of those whose revelations he had listened to so eagerly. He studied law and soon rose to high rank in that profession. With its pursuit he blended political ambition; and both in law and politics he brought to bear all the resources of a cold, calculating nature, unmoved by passion or by prejudice, able to bide its time, to temporise, to dissemble, and to scheme, not merely for the present, but for the distant future. He knew that money was a power in political life, and he accumulated a large fortune as a railroad lawyer, making political prominence also a source of gain, though, as a matter of far-seeing wisdom, setting his face against political corruption. At the time when Tweed and his vulgar bandits began their sway in the city of New York, Tilden made no sign of opposition. He even used this tawdry despot for his own ends, until the moment came when he could strike with deadly certainty; and then the Ring was smashed, and its servile judges, Barnard, Cardoza, and McCunn, were driven from the bench. Elected Governor of New York in 1874, he ruled the State with such intelligent integrity as to win for himself in 1876 the Democratic nomination

for the presidency. The nation at large, wearied by the scandals and corruption of Grant's second term, saw in Tilden the very leader demanded by the hour, a true reformer fit to cleanse and purify the departmental sewers at Washington. In the election he received not only a majority of the popular vote, but likewise a majority of twenty votes in the Electoral College. To destroy this majority it was necessary for his opponents to alter the result in the States of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, and Oregon. This was accomplished by the superb political management of the Republicans, who received their cue from Mr. Chandler's famous telegram: "Claim everything." Through the Electoral Commission, voting always on strictly party lines—8 to 7—the four doubtful States were given to Hayes, who was declared elected by a majority of a single vote. The announcement was made only two days before the new President was sworn in.

There can be little doubt that Mr. Tilden was rightfully elected. Such was apparently the view of President Grant himself, if we may credit the statement of his intimate friend, Mr. G. W. Childs. Every Democrat in the country was convinced of it, and not a few Republicans. Had Mr. Tilden been a different sort of man, he would, perhaps, have said the word to precipitate a civil war. But he was not the one to seek his ends by force; and so he accepted a result which he and all his friends believed to be a triumph of injustice. It must be said, however, that the Electoral Commission was not invented as a partisan device, but as a means of securing an honest decision. In Congress, the bill creating it was passed in each House by a combination of Republicans and Democrats. Had the Democrats voted solidly against it, the Commission could not have been established. It is not

unfair to say that the Commission was more truly a Democratic than a Republican measure, for it was the Republicans who at first feared that it would give the presidency to Tilden. Therefore Tilden's party was logically bound to accept the final verdict, even though it believed that the majority of the Commission had acted not as judges but as partisans.

Mr. Tilden was never so highly honoured by his countrymen as in the hour of his defeat. Unfortunately for him, the scandal of the so-called "cipher telegrams" robbed him to a great degree of the respect and sympathy which until then had been so freely given him. In January, 1877, a number of telegrams relating to the election of the previous year were delivered to a committee of the House of Representatives, of which the chairman was a Democrat. More than thirty thousand other telegrams were furnished to a committee of the Senate, of which a Republican was chairman. Mr. William H. Orton, the president of the Western Union Telegraph Company, a thick-and-thin Republican, had first allowed certain members of his own party to examine these despatches and to abstract such ones as they required. Many of the telegrams were written in cipher; and in a mysterious manner they found their way to the office of the *New York Tribune*, where some ingenious person worked out the key to their decipherment. On October 8, 1878, that paper published the translation of a number of telegrams concerning the disputed Florida election; and on the 16th of the same month it gave the translation of another batch of telegrams relating to the canvass in South Carolina. From these it appeared that offers had been made in behalf of the returning boards in Florida and South Carolina to cast the electoral votes of those States for Mr. Tilden in

return for a large sum of money. It subsequently became known that like offers had been made to Mr. A. S. Hewitt by persons representing the Louisiana returning board. Some of the cipher despatches had been addressed to Mr. Tilden's residence in New York City, and had been delivered to his nephew, Colonel Pelton. The Republicans at once charged that Tilden had endeavoured to secure the presidency by bribery, or at any rate, that he had been in negotiation with scoundrels concerning such a plan.

Mr. Tilden wrote to the chairman of the congressional sub-committee, then sitting in New York, and asked to be heard as to the inquiry which it was making. He appeared before it on February 9, 1879, and was subjected to a rigid examination by Mr. Thomas B. Reed, a Republican member of the committee. Tilden was in a state verging upon physical collapse. Partly paralysed, and with limbs contracted, he dragged himself haltingly to his seat, and gave his answers in a voice so feeble and so hoarse as to be almost inaudible. As the probe was relentlessly applied, his pallid face became mottled with excitement, his lips twitched, and his hands trembled, until the sight of him was painful.<sup>17</sup> If one were to base a final judgment upon the record of this examination, it could scarcely be in Mr. Tilden's favour. He answered clearly with regard to every circumstance which helped his case; but at times he seemed afflicted with a most extraordinary lapse of memory, and many of his answers were vague, evasive and unsatisfactory. He seemed to avoid all categorical replies. "I presume I did," "I do not remember," "I guess not," "I may have done so," "I do not believe so," "I think I did not, so far as I remember," "I think not," "I may have seen it"—this is the way in

<sup>17</sup> *New York Herald and Tribune* for February 10, 1879.

which Mr. Tilden again and again made answer. The effect of his examination upon public opinion was distinctly bad. It lost him the sympathy of thousands of Republicans; and, to some extent, it led his own followers to qualify the confidence which they had had in him. He seemed for the time no longer the stern reformer and high-minded patriot, but rather the sly and foxy politician, stooping at least to contemplate dishonour. That Mr. Tilden was actually unaware of what was going on in 1877, and that he knew nothing at all of the telegrams which were received in his own house by a near relative, and in a matter of such vital interest to him, is very difficult to believe. That he had any corrupt purpose, however, is quite incredible. He may have hoped to lay a trap for his opponents, or to secure evidence to discredit the venal canvassers of the doubtful Southern States. This is, at any rate, a reasonable theory. The facts undoubtedly acquit him of anything more serious. These facts are very convincingly summed up by Mr. Tilden's biographer, Mr. Bigelow: Only one electoral vote was required to elect Tilden. The votes of three States were in the market and at a price which Tilden could easily have paid. Tilden did not get that vote. Hayes needed all the votes of three States. All were for sale. Hayes got them all and was elected, and within six months after his inauguration every person known to have been concerned in securing or in giving those votes, from the highest to the lowest, received an office, or the offer of one, from Mr. Hayes.

Tilden as a politician was a combination of Jefferson and Van Buren. His hold upon his party was stronger than that of any other leader since Jackson's time. An admirer wrote of him:

“His qualities were of the solid and reflective type that are slowly recognised by the masses, but when once perceived, constitute the strongest claim upon public attention and yield to their possessor the largest influence with his fellows. . . . The secret of Mr. Tilden’s success in life as a lawyer, a man of business, and a statesman, was the thorough way with which he did everything that he attempted to do. He never took anything for granted. He never went into court with a case until he had searched every nook and cranny of the law. He never made an investment until he had personally studied the last details of the business. He never went into a political campaign without looking out after every individual voter. In the campaign of 1876, he took everything into account up to the closing of the ballot boxes, and he beat his opponents according to the rules of the game. If the election laws of the whole country had been like those of New York, he would have been President of the United States.”

As a man, he was one to be respected, but hardly to be liked. His whole life was given up to his ambition. He had a lust for power, and to this all else was sacrificed. His feeble health contributed to isolate him from the great mass of humanity. He was all intellect, and this intellect was dominated always by the spirit of calculation. Frugal, cautious, cold-blooded, he was absolutely destitute of the emotions and the passions which are felt by normal men. His friendships, such as they were, never led him into any warmth of feeling. He treated his friends as though at some time they might become his enemies. In all the years of his life he never loved a woman. The very naïve biography of Mr. Tilden, written by his friend and literary executor, says of him: “Tilden never married, only because he never felt the need of a wife. . . . Women were, so far as he could see, so unimportant to

his success in any of the enterprises upon which his heart was set, that marriage never became a subject of leading interest." <sup>18</sup> When he became widely known as a candidate for the presidency, many foolish women addressed him in letters of mawkish sentimentality, some of them perhaps through a sort of hero-worship, and others for the reason that he was very rich and still remained unmarried. It was not a very amiable trait in Mr. Tilden that he carefully preserved these letters and left them to his biographer and literary executor, who in his turn saw fit to publish extracts from them. Yet perhaps this circumstance affords the most convincing of all evidence to show how far was Mr. Tilden from entertaining any romantic or chivalrous regard for women.

Just as, when a boy, he had had no part in sports and games, "never whittled a stick, tossed a ball, climbed a tree, ran a race, or pulled an oar," so in his maturer years he had few pleasures such as render the mind elastic and cultivate the taste. He knew little or nothing about art. Music he never cared for. He read much, but solely because he sought the power which knowledge gives. Physical exertion was distasteful and he enjoyed massage because it gave him exercise without exertion. Such was Mr. Tilden—less a man than a highly intelligent machine, a machine which worked with absolute precision, but in which the only thing to be admired was the perfection of its mechanism.

Winfield Scott Hancock was the knightliest figure in all the hosts which the North sent forth to battle in the days of the Civil War. Bred at West Point, he had served under Scott during the Mexican campaign, where

<sup>18</sup> Bigelow, *Life of Tilden*, ii. p. 374 (New York, 1895).

in the desperate assault on Molino del Rey, and in the fierce fighting at Contreras and Cherubusco, he won instant recognition for his intrepid courage. Hancock was, indeed, born to the profession of war. He was thoroughly a soldier to the very deepest recesses of his nature. Unlike Grant, he loved the stir, and even the outward pomp, of martial life. The drum-beat and the bugle-call were music to his ears; the battle-smoke was as incense to his nostrils. When the cannon sounded their tremendous diapason, when the field was swept by shell and musketry, when ranks were shattered, and columns were split into chaos, when the enemy pressed most fiercely upon front and flank, and when mere holiday soldiers became dazed and panic-stricken, then Hancock rose to the full height of his splendid powers. The shock of battle cleared his brain and gave to him a joyous confidence.<sup>19</sup> And he had the instinct of authority. He loved command and he exercised it with the majesty and the finality which are the essence of a great military leader's influence. He was an inspiring, virile figure, fully six feet in height, handsome, with the mien of a conqueror, gracious and highbred, and of a winning courtesy which he exhibited no less to his foes than to his chosen comrades.

When the Civil War broke out, no serious tasks at first were given him; but ere long, in the indecisive fight at Williamsburg,<sup>20</sup> he had a chance to show his mettle. At the head of a brigade which he had drilled into a splendid fighting force, he turned the tide of battle, defeated the two able Confederate leaders, Hill and Early, and by a combination

<sup>19</sup> "The stir, the clash, the collision, the fierce encounter, the intense excitement of battle, suited his ardent, aggressive, martial temperament."—Walker, *General Hancock*, p. 21 (New York, 1895).

<sup>20</sup> May 5th, 1862.



of audacity and cool judgment, prevented a grave disaster to the Union arms. It was of this action that McClellan telegraphed his famous comment: "Hancock was superb." Promoted to the command of a division, he was present on the field of Antietam. He fought like a hero of chivalry at Fredericksburg, where Burnside's blunder hurled a whole army against the flaming slopes of Marye's Hill with death blazing out from every inch of parapet. Finally, at the head of the Second Corps—that gallant host which in losing fifteen thousand men in battle had never lost a colour or a gun<sup>21</sup>—he rode into the first day's clash at Gettysburg, having been set for the moment by Meade over the head of seniors such as Howard and Sickles. The selection was an ideal one; and it showed Meade's skilful estimate of his generals. Hancock found the troops shattered and demoralised by the first impetuous onset of the Southern army. Broken regiments, panic-stricken, were streaming to the rear amid an inextricable tangle of horses, wagons, ambulances, and artillery-trains. The Confederates already held Seminary Ridge and the town of Gettysburg itself; while great masses of their infantry could be descried, sweeping ominously forward in what appeared to be an illimitable host. To meet them there were in line only the broken remnants of the brave First Corps, and a division of Buford's cavalry.

It was at this critical moment that Hancock, hurrying to the front, arrived and took command. Never was the magic of martial genius more instantly perceptible. On the instant a change, lightning-like, was wrought in that grim scene of panic and despair. The rout was checked, the broken regiments were reformed, the drifting guns were swept up and massed in batteries, and so skilful a dis-

<sup>21</sup> Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

position was made of the now heartened troops as to stay for the time the Confederate advance.<sup>22</sup> Amid this scene Hancock bestrode his horse, "cool, calm, self-possessed, the master of himself and of his place." The captain of a Maine battery<sup>23</sup> afterwards wrote: "I shall never forget the inspiration of his commanding, controlling presence, or the fresh courage he imparted, his whole atmosphere strong and invigorating." It was Hancock who, upon his own responsibility, altered the plan of battle that had been arranged by Meade. He selected the now historic Cemetery Ridge as the key to the Union position, planted cannon on its crest, and strengthened the force already stationed there.

It was upon the summit of this hill that Hancock reached the climax of his fame. On the third and final day of the great battle, the Confederate artillery began the appalling cannonade which was the prelude to Pickett's heroic charge. One hundred and fifteen guns hurled in an appalling and infernal crash a cyclone of projectiles against the Union lines which were soon to meet the breaking of a human storm. It was a scene to terrify the stoutest heart; and some of the regiments which lay upon the ground amid the exploding shells, had never been under fire before. Then in the midst of this roaring hell, Hancock, sitting his great black charger, with the corps flag borne beside him, and followed by his staff, rode slowly up and down the lines, as calm and even joyous as though upon a holiday parade. The sight was indescribably thrilling; and the men who saw him not

<sup>22</sup> "Though not a man besides Hancock and his staff had come upon the field, Lee hesitated to attack positions, naturally strong, which appeared to have been suddenly occupied by fresh troops. . . . That delay saved the field of Gettysburg to the Union arms."—Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

<sup>23</sup> Captain E. N. Whittier.

only held their ground, but forgot the storm of bursting shells in their admiration for their leader. Later, when Longstreet's fourteen brigades were hurled against the Ridge, Hancock met them at the head of the defenders. And then, at the very moment when the charging columns wavered and recoiled, Hancock was stricken down. Yet still he would not leave his place; and when a Vermont regiment swung to the front, Hancock, with his blood spurting in great jets from a ghastly wound, cried out to the commander joyously: "Go in, Colonel, and give it to them on the flank!" When they bore him from the field, it was amid a burst of tremendous cheering which told that the crucial struggle of the war had been won by the soldiers of the Union. In the following year, though his wound was far from healed, he served with the same intrepidity and efficiency under Grant, whose praise he won in the Wilderness and amid the carnage at the Salient.

Hancock's patriotism was as unalloyed as was his courage. When McClellan was summarily removed from the command of the army after Antietam, many of his brother officers were so indignant as to make remarks which verged on open mutiny; but though Hancock loved McClellan, he made but one reply: "We are serving our country and not any man." When after the war, he was made Military Governor of a part of Louisiana and Texas he showed himself to be no satrap, but one who felt profound respect for civil law. He did all within his power to discourage trial by military commission instead of before the courts. He believed that the re-union of all sections of the country would be most speedily effected by treating the intelligent and patriotic men of the South in a spirit of confidence and of generosity rather than of harshness and distrust.

Hancock was the only trained soldier of equal eminence and achievement who, during the Civil War, never rose above the rank of corps-commander. It was not his fortune to direct the operations of an army in the field. The chance which gave this opportunity to Burnside, Pope, and Hooker, passed Hancock by. It may be that, like them, he would have failed; yet what he actually did accomplish makes the contrary seem probable. He is perhaps the only officer of conspicuous rank of whom it could be said, as Grant declared of him, that his name was never mentioned in despatches as having committed a single military error.<sup>24</sup> Whatever was given him to do, he did with the precision and perfection of an accomplished soldier. He was, perhaps, too purely martial a spirit to be rightly appreciated in a peace-loving Republic such as ours; since, with all its latent capacity for defense, our nation, like the English nation, sets the victories of peace above the victories of war. Yet it is to the honour of the Republic that in its hour of need it could summon forth to battle this soldier of heroic mould,—a type belonging to the high ideals of chivalry.

<sup>24</sup> Grant, *Memoirs*, ii. p. 539 (New York, 1886).

## CHAPTER IV

### THE REPUBLICAN RALLY

THE year 1886 was marked by serious disturbances arising from strikes and other labour movements, which recalled the events of 1877, when the industries of the country were paralysed, and when, at the great centres of traffic in twelve States, conditions existed that seemed to threaten civil war. In 1886, there was less violence, yet the social unrest was so widespread as to be at once significant and ominous. From the shipyards in Maine to the railways in Texas and the Far West, there was continual disorder in nearly every branch of industry. In New York City, the employés of the street-car lines began a strike on February 3d, which was ended on the 18th by a victory for the strikers. The disturbances, however, broke out again on March 2d and continued intermittently until September 1st, when the managers of the roads once more gave way. On one day, every line in New York and Brooklyn was "tied up" completely. In June, the elevated railways had a similar, though much more brief, experience. The mania for striking seemed to be in the very air; and on April 20th, in Boston, even the children in two of the public schools struck for a continuous session, and adopted all the approved methods of the conventional strike, stationing pickets, attacking such children as refused to join them, and causing a small riot which had to be put down by the police.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A nearly complete list of the strikes of this year will be found in *Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia* for 1887.

The storm centres of labour agitation were in St. Louis and Chicago. In St. Louis a demand was made by the employés of the Texas Pacific Railway for the reinstatement of a foreman who had been discharged. The receiver refused the demand, and a strike took place which very soon extended to the Missouri Pacific, and, in fact, to all the roads constituting the Gould system. Traffic throughout the whole Southwest was practically suspended, and before long the strike took on the form of riot and incendiarism. United States troops were sent to maintain order,<sup>2</sup> but their numbers were insufficient, and the rioters cared nothing for the special deputies who had been sworn in to keep the peace. A squad of these deputies fired upon a crowd, killing or wounding a number of persons (April 7th). This act inflamed the mob, which armed itself, and for a time was master of the city. The torch was applied to railroad property, factories were closed, and great losses were inflicted, not only upon the railways, but upon the entire population. The leader in these depredations was a Scotchman named Martin Irons, a typical specimen of the ignorant fanatic, exactly the sort of man who comes to the front whenever the populace is inflamed by passion and bent on violence. Sly, ignorant, and half an animal, he nevertheless was able to play upon the prejudices of his fellows, and to stimulate their class-hatred so artfully as to make them deaf to the counsels of their saner leaders. For a time he had his way; yet in the end this strike collapsed after those who shared in it had forfeited hundreds of thousands of dollars in wages, and after the railroads had incurred an even heavier loss.

In Chicago, the men in the Pullman works began a

<sup>2</sup> The Missouri Pacific was in the hands of a receiver appointed by one of the Federal Courts.

strike in May; and before long nearly fifty thousand labourers were out. In a conflict with the police a number of workingmen were shot. Chicago had for some time been the headquarters of a small but very active group of Anarchists, nearly all of whom were foreigners. The strikers had no sympathy with Anarchists, nor any affiliation with them. Nevertheless, the Anarchists believed that the proper moment had now come for them to strike a blow, and they hoped thereby to win to their support new followers from the ranks of the discontented. There were published in Chicago two newspapers, one in English (the *Alarm*), conducted by a man named Parsons, and the other in German (the *Arbeiter Zeitung*), conducted by one August Spies, both of them devoted to the anarchistic propaganda. About the time when the strike began, there appeared in the *Alarm* a most inflammatory article, of which the following is a part:

“DYNAMITE! Of all the good stuff this is the stuff. Stuff several pounds of this sublime stuff into an inch pipe, plug up both ends, insert a cap with a fuse attached, place this in the immediate neighbourhood of a lot of rich loafers who live by the sweat of other people’s brows, and light the fuse. . . . The dear stuff can be carried around in the pocket without danger; while it is a formidable weapon against any force of militia, police or detectives that may want to stifle the cry for justice that goes forth from the plundered slaves.”

On May 4th, a mass meeting of workingmen was held in the Haymarket Square to protest against the acts of the police. Late at night, after some rather tame addresses had been delivered, an Anarchist leader, an Englishman named Samuel Fielden, broke forth into a violent harangue. He denounced all government in the most sav-

age terms, yelling out, "The law is your enemy! We are rebels against it!" Word had been sent to police headquarters; and while Fielden was in the midst of his wild talk, a battalion of nearly two hundred policemen marched into the Square. Their captain commanded the gathering to disperse. Fielden replied, "We are peaceable." He was, however, arrested. A moment later, a pistol was fired, apparently as a signal, and at once a bomb was hurled into the ranks of the police. It exploded with terrible effect. Nearly fifty policemen were thrown to the ground, and seven of them were so badly wounded that they died soon after. With splendid discipline, the ranks were at once closed up and a charge was made upon the mob which scattered hastily in flight. Of the Anarchists arrested for this outrage, seven were sentenced to death by Judge Gary. Of these seven, four—Engel, Spies, Parsons and Fischer—were hanged; one—Lingg—committed suicide; and two—Schwab and Fielden—had their sentences commuted to imprisonment for life. Eight years afterward, a Governor of Illinois, Mr. John P. Altgeld, moved partly by the appeals of sentimentalists, and partly by his own instinctive sympathy with lawlessness, gave a free pardon to such Anarchists as had been imprisoned.

In June, 1886, in New York, the disturbed conditions were reflected in political agitation, though here, also, the Anarchists showed their heads. They were, however, dealt with before they could do mischief. One of their leaders, named Johann Most, and three of his companions, were imprisoned on the charge of inciting to riot. Most was a foul creature, at once murderous and cowardly. When arrested, he was found hiding under the bed of his mistress, and was taken away whimpering in abject terror. With him and with his kind, the workingmen of New York



had no affinity, but sought to redress their grievances at the polls. In this year Mr. Henry George<sup>3</sup> was nominated as the Labour candidate for the mayoralty of New York City against Mr. A. S. Hewitt, the Democratic candidate, and Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, the candidate of the Republicans. Although Mr. Hewitt was elected, it was only by a plurality. He received some 90,000 votes against 68,000 votes given to Mr. George; while Mr. Roosevelt stood at the bottom of the poll with a little more than 60,000 votes.

Wherever throughout the country the labour element had shown its discontent, the name of the Knights of Labour was, in one way or another, pretty certain to be heard. This organisation was one whose origin and evolution are of great significance in the social and economic history of the United States. Prior to 1866, such organisations of workingmen as existed were either societies for general purposes, not necessarily connected with labour questions, or else they were trade unions in the narrowest sense, confining their membership to men and women engaged in particular and special industries. In 1866, however, there was formed the National Labour Union, of which the purpose was to promote the solidarity, not only of skilled workmen, but of the masses in general, with a view to the amelioration of their condition. This body, unfortunately, almost from the first, fell into the hands of politicians, and in 1870 it died a natural death. Its aims, however, were adopted by a number of garment-cutters in Philadelphia, in 1869, who at first formed a secret order—secrecy being adopted because of the hostility of employers to labour organisations. This was the origin of the Knights of Labour, who admitted to membership in their

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 733-4.

body all persons above the age of sixteen, except saloon-keepers, gamblers, bankers, and lawyers. In 1882, it ceased to be a secret order; and thereafter it rapidly increased in membership until, in 1886, it was said to number more than seven hundred thousand persons. The principles which the order officially professed were distinctly socialistic. It advocated equal rights for women, the common ownership of land, and the acquisition by the Government of public utilities, such as railroads, telegraphs and telephones. It is here that we first find in the United States a large and influential body of men pledged to the support of what was in reality a system of State Socialism.<sup>4</sup>

In order to understand the significance of this movement, and to explain the rapid propagation of socialistic principles, it is necessary to recall a few important facts relating to American economic history of the preceding thirty years. One effect of the Civil War had been the rapid acquisition of great fortunes by individuals, and the growth of powerful corporations. Conspicuous among the latter were the railway companies. The period succeeding the war had been a period of railway building. Between 1860 and 1880, more than sixty thousand miles of railway had been constructed and put into operation. They represented an enormous amount of capital, and this capital represented an enormous amount of influence, both political and social. How much the nation owed to its railway system was very obvious. The easy distribution of its products brought prosperity to every section. Population was extended over new areas. Great cities sprang up in the remotest prairies at the magic touch of the railway builder. Moreover, in one sense, the unity of the Republic

<sup>4</sup> See Ely, *The Labour Movement in the United States* (New York, 1886).

itself was the work of the railway, which proved to be a great assimilator, annihilating distance, bringing one section into easy communication with another, and thereby creating not only common interests, but a common understanding. On the other hand, a moment's thought will make it clear that railways were essentially monopolies, and that their growth lodged in the hands of their owners the right to tax at will the people from whom they had received their charters, and whose interests they were supposed to serve. In 1870, when there were only 53,000 miles of railroad in the United States, the revenue collected by the railway companies from the public amounted to \$450,000,000, representing a transportation tax which the owners of the roads imposed at their own discretion, and without the intervention or consent of any other authority. At that time Mr. Charles Francis Adams wrote:

“Certain private individuals, responsible to no authority and subject to no supervision, but looking solely to their own interests or to those of their immediate constituency, yearly levy upon the internal movement of the American people a tax . . . equal to about one-half of the expenses of the United States Government—army, navy, civil-list, and interest, upon the national debt included.”<sup>5</sup>

Even if the individuals to whom this irresponsible power was entrusted had been always wise, unselfish and public-spirited, the unregulated right of taxation would have been an anomaly in a free State. But as they were very human, serving their own interests, and naturally seeking their own enrichment, abuses, and very gross ones, were inevitable. Still, no hostile sentiment would have been

<sup>5</sup> Adams, *The Railroad System*, included in *Chapters of Erie and Other Essays*, p. 361 (Boston, 1871).

aroused against them had they levied their transportation tax equitably upon all and without discrimination. That they did not do so, and that in consequence they began, about 1870, to create and foster other still more gigantic combinations inimical to the public welfare, are facts which serve to explain the prevalence throughout the country of great social discontent, beginning in 1870 and growing deeper and more intense with each succeeding year. An instance—the most striking of all instances—of an abuse of corporate power by the railways, is found in the history of the Standard Oil Company.

In 1862, a partnership for the refining of petroleum was formed between John D. Rockefeller, his brother William Rockefeller, and an English mechanic named Samuel Andrews. This partnership grew into a corporation which, after 1870, became known to the country as the Standard Oil Company. From 1860 to 1868, the oil-wells in Pennsylvania and West Virginia had enriched the people of several States and had added very largely to the wealth of the entire country. By the year 1870, the production of oil had increased to such an extent that the United States exported to Europe not less than one hundred million gallons a year. A hundred new wells were drilled every month. The people of the oil region had in ten years created a new industry at the cost of patience, self-sacrifice and labour, supplemented by invention. New cities and towns had sprung up, humming with life, and full of hope and confidence in the future. Churches, schools, libraries, banks, and all the machinery of prosperity had been established, and these were supported by the oil wells and refineries. Presently, in some mysterious way, all this activity was checked. It was found that certain shippers of oil were obtaining from the railroads rates

so low as to enable them, by underselling other oil producers, to drive their competitors out of business. These favoured shippers turned out to be a body of thirteen men, among whom were the two Rockefellers,<sup>6</sup> who were thus gaining a complete monopoly of the oil business. They were united in what was known as the South Improvement Company; and with the South Improvement Company the oil-carrying railroads<sup>7</sup> made a secret contract which provided (1) that the freight rates should be doubled to all other shippers; (2) that the increase collected from competing shippers should be turned over to the South Improvement Company; (3) that any other changes in the freight tariff necessary to crush out competition should be made; and (4) that the railroads should inform the South Improvement Company of all the details of its rival's business. The result, of course, was the ruin of the oil producers. They were faced with the alternative of selling out to the South Improvement Company at a merely nominal figure, or else of giving up their business altogether. Some of them went to the officials of the Erie and the New York Central roads in order to expostulate. They were told, "You had better sell out. There is no help for it." Many did sell out to the oil monopolists at fifty cents on the dollar. One refinery, which produced annually an average profit of

<sup>6</sup> Before an investigating committee of the New York Senate (February 28, 1888), Mr. J. D. Rockefeller stated under oath that he had not been a member of the South Improvement Company. On April 30th of the same year, he admitted (also under oath) to a Congressional committee that he and his brother had had an interest in that company.—Tarbell, *History of the Standard Oil Company*, i., p. 138 (New York, 1904).

<sup>7</sup> These were the Erie, the Pennsylvania, and the New York Central and Hudson River. The contract was signed on behalf of the railroads, by Jay Gould, Thomas A. Scott, and William H. Vanderbilt.

\$40,000 and which represented an investment of \$150,000, was abandoned to the monopoly for the sum of \$45,000. The owner (Mr. Robert Hanna) said: "I would not have sold out if I could have got a fair show with the railroads."<sup>8</sup> The blow fell alike upon producer and refiner. Within two days after the secret contract went into effect, the prosperity of the oil region was at an end.

"The entire business of the oil regions became paralysed. Oil went down to a point seventy cents below the cost of production. The boring of new wells is suspended; existing wells are shut down. The business in Cleveland has stopped almost altogether. Thousands of men are thrown out of work."<sup>9</sup>

The annals of this time show a black record of ruin, despair and suicide. Naturally so great a wrong was not accepted with meekness. The law was tested in a great number of suits, some of them brought by individuals, and some of them technically in the name of the State of Pennsylvania. Indictments against the Rockefellers for criminal conspiracy were found by a Grand Jury, but with no result. The State officials seemed strangely unwilling to push these cases. Officers of the law became of a sudden wonderfully listless. Governor Hoyt of Pennsylvania refused to issue an order for the extradition of the Rockefellers. The highest court in Pennsylvania interfered to stay proceedings in the lower courts. The oil monopolists boasted with cool confidence that the case against them would never come to trial. Law having failed, a political agitation was begun, ac-

<sup>8</sup> Report of the Hepburn Committee, New York Assembly (1879), p. 2525.

<sup>9</sup> Titusville (Pennsylvania) *Herald*, March 20, 1872.

accompanied by outbreaks of disorder. Railway tracks were torn up; oil-tanks were destroyed. Popular sentiment justified an appeal to physical force against trickery and fraud. This state of things led to the calling of a Constitutional Convention in 1873. A very able lawyer, Mr. Samuel C. T. Dodd, addressing this Convention, used the following forcible language:

“In spite of the law we well know that almost every railroad in this State is to-day in the habit of granting special privileges to individuals, to companies in which the directors of such railroads are interested, to particular businesses, and to particular localities. We well know that it is their habit to break down certain localities, and to build up others, to break down certain men in business and to build up others, to monopolise certain business themselves by means of the numerous corporations which they own and control, and all this in spite of the law, and in defiance of the law. . . .

“The railroads took one of those charters which they got from the Legislature, and by means of that they struck a deadly blow at one of the greatest interests of the State. Their scheme was contrary to law; but before the legal remedy could have been applied, the oil business would have lain prostrate at their feet, had it not been prevented by an uprising of the people, by the threatenings of a mob, if you please, by threatening to destroy property, and by actually commencing to destroy the property of the railroad companies; and had the companies not cancelled the contract which Scott and Vanderbilt and others had entered into, I venture to say there would not have been one mile of railroad track left in the county of Venango—the people had come to that pitch of desperation. . . . Unless we can give the people a remedy for this evil, they will sooner or later take the remedy into their own hands.”<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Pennsylvania (1873), iii., p. 522.

As this subject will be more fully discussed hereafter, it need not, for the present, be treated in detail. Suffice it to say that the secret contract between the South Improvement Company and the railways was ostensibly cancelled. Yet the freight discriminations continued just the same. Furthermore, the example set by this one monopoly was copied and improved upon by other corporations in all parts of the country; and the railways lent their aid unscrupulously to combinations of all kinds in restraint of trade, and in discouragement of individual enterprise. In 1882, the same Mr. Dodd who had so bitterly denounced both the oil monopoly and the railways, but who soon after accepted a large salary as general counsel to the Standard Oil Company, invented a form of trust agreement under which the Standard Oil Company was reorganised in such a way as to provide that the stockholders of each of the companies composing it should assign their stock to a few trustees, thus giving them a permanent and irrevocable power of attorney. In return for the stock so assigned, the trustees distributed trust certificates to the stockholders of the separate companies. On these trust certificates the profits were divided.<sup>11</sup> This trust agreement was finally pronounced illegal by the courts; but for several years it was a favourite form of organisation with the great corporations, so that in popular language the word "Trust" came to be applied to every combination of capital which had a monopolistic tendency.

The long struggle between the Trusts and their less powerful competitors brought out very clearly one great central fact. The backbone of monopoly was to be found

<sup>11</sup> The full text of the Standard Oil Trust Agreement is given in E. von Halle, *Trusts . . . in the United States*, pp. 153-169 (New York, 1895).



in an abuse of the power which the railways of the country were exercising so oppressively. Unless, in some way, this power could be checked and regulated, the individual citizen was at the mercy of a comparatively few men whose command of money made them indifferent, because superior, to the ordinary processes of law. Popular sentiment then became so hostile to the railway interests as almost to justify the violence which had been shown in the strikes of 1886. It was during President Cleveland's first administration that Congress made a vigorous attempt to grapple with this subject.

The President's very long message of December 6, 1886, did not touch directly on the connection of the railroads with social discontent, though some passages spoke of the relation of capital to labour and to the public interests. The events of the preceding summer, however, were fresh in the minds of all; and, therefore, early in the session, a bill was reported in both Houses, intended to regulate and control the railways, under that clause of the Constitution (Article i. 8, §3), which gives Congress the right to regulate commerce among the several States of the Union.<sup>12</sup> This was not the first time that such an attempt had been made. Ten years earlier, a flood of petitions had poured in upon Congress, together with copies of resolutions passed by public meetings, chambers of commerce, and boards of trade. On May 16, 1876, Mr. Hopkins of Pennsylvania had asked unanimous consent of the House to introduce a resolution providing for a committee to investigate the charges against the railroads, and to report a bill

<sup>12</sup> During the preceding session, the Senate had proposed a mild sort of bill looking to the same end. The House framed a similar measure, known as the Reagan Bill. Upon the basis of these two bills, a conference committee drafted the document which was now reported.

for the regulation of interstate commerce. Immediately, Mr. Henry B. Payne of Ohio rose and made objection—an objection which he refused to withdraw at the request of other members. Mr. Payne subsequently went to Mr. Hopkins and explained that his objection was based upon considerations of economy. A special committee would be too great an expense, he said. He begged Mr. Hopkins to re-introduce his resolution and ask that it be referred to the Committee on Commerce. This was done. When the Committee on Commerce met to consider it, a representative of the Standard Oil Company (Mr. J. N. Camden) took his seat beside the Chairman, whispering suggestions in his ear and practically presiding. The treasurer of the Standard Oil Company, Mr. O. H. Payne, and Mr. Cassatt, the vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, were summoned to testify. Both of them refused to answer questions. The Committee adjourned, ostensibly to consider means for compelling these witnesses to answer. It never again took up the subject; it never recalled the witnesses; it never made any report. When Mr. Hopkins afterwards asked to see the record of the testimony that had been taken, he found that it had been stolen.

The bill which was now reported by a conference committee, was much more stringent than either the Senate bill or the Reagan substitute of the preceding session. It provided for the appointment of a Commission of five members, to whom authority was given to inspect the books and other papers of all railways engaged in interstate commerce, and to summon witnesses and compel them to answer any questions relating to the railway management. It forbade discrimination in rates, and also the "pooling" of freight revenues by competing railways, or the division of such revenues between them. It forbade

also a greater charge for a "short haul" than for a "long haul" over the same line and in the same direction. The Commission might appeal to the United States courts to enforce its mandates, either by injunction or by attachment, and the courts might impose a penalty of \$500 for each offence, and a fine of \$500 per day during such time as an offending railroad remained in contumacy. This bill was opposed by railway attorneys, both outside and inside of Congress. No one ventured frankly to defend the past conduct of the railways; but a vast amount of concern was expressed lest the proposed act might be unconstitutional. Congress, however, did not dare to reject the measure. The problem of the Trusts had already become a leading political issue, so that both parties were anxious to make a satisfactory record. A conference committee reported the bill to the Senate on December 15th, 1886, and it was passed by a vote of 43 to 15, fourteen Senators being absent or not voting. It was reported to the House and was passed (January 21, 1887) by a vote of 219 to 41, fifty-eight members being absent or not voting. The Interstate Commerce Act became law on February 4th, on which day it was signed by President Cleveland.

As will appear later, this law did not by any means attain the object sought by its framers.<sup>13</sup> It established, however, an important precedent, and marked a long step forward in the direction of a complete national control of railway management. The President appointed to membership in the first Commission, Thomas M. Cooley, of Michigan, a very eminent jurist, with William R. Morrison of Illinois, August Schoonmaker of New York, Aldace F. Wheeler of Vermont, and Walter A. Bragg of Alabama.

<sup>13</sup> See pp. 184-5.

This session of Congress was unusually fruitful in other salutary legislation. Very important was the Electoral Count Act, which definitely ended the possibility of such a dispute as that which followed upon the Hayes-Tilden contest of 1876-7. By the bill which now became law (February 3, 1887), each State must, through its own tribunals, determine the result of a disputed election. Only when it fails to do so, does Congress have jurisdiction, and even then no electoral vote shall be rejected except by the concurrent vote of both Houses. In the case of a disagreement between the Senate and the House, "the votes of the electors whose appointment shall have been certified by the Executive of the State, under the seal thereof, shall be counted." A stringent Anti-Polygamy Act was also passed, making polygamy a criminal offence. It became law without the President's signature. Other non-partisan measures which were passed provided for the withdrawal of the "trade-dollar" from circulation, for the extension of the free delivery system of the Post Office Department, for the reference of private claims to a Court of Claims, and for the granting of land in severalty to the Indians. Finally the Tenure of Office Act with which the Senate had attempted, as already told, to hamper the President's freedom in making removals from office, was repealed. The repealing bill was introduced in the Senate by a Republican, Mr. Hoar of Massachusetts. He very shrewdly perceived that in the contest between the Senate and President Cleveland, popular sympathy had been with the President. "The people, both Republicans and Democrats, expected that the political control of the most important offices would be changed when a new party came into power."<sup>14</sup> Senator Hoar's action irritated many of his Republican colleagues, especially Senator John

<sup>14</sup> Hoar, *Autobiography*, ii., p. 143 (New York, 1903).

Sherman, and only three of them voted with him; but with the solid support of the Democratic Senators, the repeal was carried, as it was also in the House; and thus was blotted out a law which, as the President observed had properly fallen into "innocuous desuetude."<sup>15</sup>

During this session, Mr. Cleveland continued to veto private pension bills, accompanying his vetoes, as before, with caustic words. Had he done nothing more in this direction, he would have continued to receive, from the country at large more gratitude than criticism. But on February 11, 1887, he returned without his approval a bill known as the Dependent Pension Bill, which granted a pension of twelve dollars monthly to every honourably discharged veteran of the war, who had served three months and who was dependent upon his own labour or upon others for his support. It gave a like relief to the dependent parents of all deceased veterans. This was, in effect, a general service pension, and the President vetoed it, saying in his message, among other things:

"I cannot but remember that the soldiers of our Civil War, in their pay and bounty, received such compensation for military service as has never been received by soldiers before, since mankind first went to war; that never before on behalf of any soldiery have so many and such generous laws been passed to relieve against the incidents of war . . . and that never before, in the history of the country, has it been proposed to render government aid toward the support of any of its soldiers, based alone upon a military service so recent and where age and circumstances appeared so little to demand such aid."

The veto of the Dependent Pension Bill and the terms which the President had employed in expressing his disapproval, brought upon him the loudly-voiced enmity of the

<sup>15</sup> Message of March 1, 1886.

Grand Army of the Republic. This organisation, established in 1868, was composed of veterans of the Civil War, and in 1887 it had a membership of more than four hundred thousand persons. Ostensibly non-political, it had always taken a keen interest in pension legislation; and the fear of its influence had been very powerful, alike with Congress and with the officials of the Pension Bureau; for, directly and indirectly, the "veterans" were believed to control not less than a million votes. The Grand Army men were now unrestrained in their abuse of the President. They called him an "enemy of veterans," and a friend of the Confederacy; and they asserted that his action on the pension bill had been taken to please his supporters, "the rebel brigadiers." Their wrath was not allayed by the comments which were published in the newspapers that defended Mr. Cleveland's veto. These journals pointed to the long list of pension frauds in the past, the extravagance of the Pension Bureau, and the tricks of the attorneys who made a specialty of pushing shady pension claims. It did not soothe the anger of the members of the Grand Army to be characterised as "blood-suckers," "coffee-boilers," "pension-leeches" and "bums." A very bitter feeling was engendered and was still intense when President Cleveland perpetrated a colossal blunder. There were stored in the custody of the War Department a number of Union flags captured by the Confederates during the Civil War and afterward recaptured by the Northern troops, and also a number of Confederate flags taken by the Union armies. On April 30th, after Congress had adjourned, Adjutant-General R. C. Drum addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, suggesting that all these flags, Union and Confederate alike, be returned to the respective States in which the regiments bearing the flags had been organised. Sec-

retary Endicott submitted this letter to the President, and it was approved by him (May 26th), whereupon the Adjutant-General drafted letters to the governors of the different States, offering to return the flags in the name of the President.

No sooner had this action become known than a cry of indignation arose throughout the North and West. The "Rebel Flag Order" as it was called, was denounced in the most violent language and by men of every shade of political belief. Naturally, the Union veterans were the most deeply moved. Scores of Grand Army posts met and passed indignant resolutions. General Sherman in a letter said: "I know Drum. He has no sympathy with the army which fought. He was a non-combatant. He never captured a flag, and values it only at its commercial value. He did not think of the blood and torture of battle; nor can Endicott, the Secretary of War, or Mr. Cleveland."<sup>16</sup> Others pointed out that the President had exceeded his authority in approving such an order. These flags, they said, were the property of the nation, and could not be disposed of in any way except by the authority of Congress. Looking into the matter more carefully, Mr. Cleveland found that such was indeed the case; and so he was obliged to take the humiliating step of publishing an Executive Order (June 16th) admitting his mistake and annulling the action of the Adjutant-General.<sup>17</sup>

This did not end the affair, however. The President had been invited by Mayor Francis of St. Louis, to be

<sup>16</sup> *The Sherman Letters*, p. 375 (New York, 1896).

<sup>17</sup> It is interesting to note that eighteen years later (in February, 1905), a Republican Congress passed a bill identical in substance with President Cleveland's order, and that this bill having been signed by a Republican President, the "rebel flags" were returned.

present at the annual "encampment" of the Grand Army of the Republic, to be held in that city in July. He had accepted the invitation; but after the issuance of the "Rebel Flag Order" he began to receive threatening letters from all parts of the country. It was declared in them, and it was generally believed, that should he attend he would be publicly insulted. Facts seemed to bear out these assertions. A number of Grand Army posts held a meeting in the city of Wheeling, West Virginia. A street parade was one of the features of this meeting, and various banners had been suspended over the line of march. One of them bore the words: "God Bless Our President, Commander-in-Chief of Our Army and Navy." Nearly all the posts halted when they reached this banner. Then, refusing to pass beneath it, they folded and reversed their flags, and marched around it through the gutters. Soon afterwards, the President addressed a letter to Mayor Francis (July 4th), revoking his acceptance of the invitation to St. Louis, and saying:

"The threats of personal violence . . . which scores of misguided, unbalanced men, under the stimulation of excited feeling, have made, are not considered. Rather than abandon my visit to the West and disappoint your citizens, I might, if I alone were concerned, submit to the insults to which, it is quite openly asserted, I should be helplessly subjected if present at the encampment; but I should bear with me there the people's highest office, the dignity of which I must protect."<sup>18</sup>

The President at this time further exposed himself to a hot fire of criticism from his former supporters, the Independents and Civil Service reformers. He him-

<sup>18</sup> Parker, *Writings and Speeches of Grover Cleveland*, p. 398 (New York, 1892).



self had not altered his mind as to the value of the merit system; but in practice, the various departments had departed from his theory. There was a general relaxation of principle all along the line. A reformed Civil Service had become more and more unpopular among leading Democrats. In the Senate, the leaders of the President's party were openly hostile to him on this issue. Senator Vance of North Carolina, Senator Pugh of Alabama, and Senator Beck of Kentucky took the lead in this opposition within the party. Few of the Democratic Senators liked Mr. Cleveland personally.<sup>19</sup> Senator Vance even made an effort to have the appropriation for the Civil Service Commission discontinued. He failed in this; but the attempt seems to have nettled Mr. Cleveland and to have called out in him a certain petulance which was one of the noticeable traits of his character. Giving way to this mood, he let things take their course for a while, with the result that removals and appointments were made by his subordinates from strictly partisan motives. The most conspicuous instance of this was found in the Post Office Department. Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois had been made First Assistant Postmaster-General. He was an old-school Democrat, a thorough believer in the spoils system; and he now set to work unchecked to sweep Republicans out of office. In the political slang of the time, "thousands of heads fell into the basket," and Democrats all over the country wrote and uttered panegyrics on "Adlai and his Axe." Had Mr. Cleveland allowed these removals early in his term, he would at least have won the gratitude of his own party leaders. Had he stood fast by the principle of reform, he would have kept his hold

<sup>19</sup> "The Democrats in the Senate disliked him very much and gave him a feeble and half-hearted support."—Hoar, *Autobiography*, ii., p. 145.

upon the Independents. As it turned out, however, he had yielded too late to propitiate the former, while the latter were rabid in their denunciation of him. Mr. Stevenson won all the party applause, while the President received all the Mugwumps' abuse. Mr. Hale of Maine laid before the Senate a table showing the changes in office effected during two years of the Cleveland administration. A part of it may be quoted as illustrative:

Offices.	Number.	Changes.
Fourth-class Postmasters.....	52,609	40,000
Presidential Postmasters.....	2,379	2,000
Foreign Ministers.....	33	32
Secretaries of Legation.....	21	16
Collectors of Customs.....	111	100
Surveys of Customs.....	32	all
Naval Officers.....	6	all
Internal Revenue Collectors.....	85	84
District Attorneys.....	70	65
Territorial Judges.....	30	22
Territorial Governors.....	8	all
Local Land Offices.....	224	190

Years afterward, in speaking of this time to a personal friend, Mr. Cleveland said with much feeling: "You know the things in which I yielded; but no one save myself can ever know the things which I resisted."

The President had the misfortune to alienate the sympathies of the press at large. He had always had a dislike for the newspapers, possibly because of the manner in which he had been attacked by them in 1884, and perhaps also because of the journalistic discourtesy which had been shown him at the time of his marriage. This dislike

he took little pains to hide. The Washington correspondents, the élite of the profession, declared that he had snubbed them at public functions. On December 12, 1885, he wrote a letter to Mr. Joseph Keppler, the editor of *Puck*, in which he said, among other things:

“I don't think there ever was a time when newspaper lying was so general and so mean as at present; and there never was a country under the sun where it flourished as it does in this. The falsehoods daily spread before the people in our newspapers, while they are proofs of the mental ingenuity of those engaged in newspaper work, are insults to the American love of decency and fair play of which we boast.”

On July 25, 1886, he addressed another letter to Mr. C. H. Jones, an editor in Jacksonville, Florida, in which he said:

“I am surprised that newspaper talk should be so annoying to you, who ought so well to understand the utter and complete recklessness and falsification in which they so generally indulge.”

Again, in the speech which he made at the Harvard banquet (November 8, 1886) he spoke of

“the silly, mean, and cowardly lies that every day are found in the columns of certain newspapers, which violate every instinct of American manliness, and in ghoulish glee desecrate every sacred relation of private life.”

The newspapers certainly did their best to justify these strictures. Pretty nearly every public or private act of President Cleveland was misrepresented and made to appear in a light that was either unfavourable or ludicrous.

When he went fishing on Memorial Day, this was interpreted by the press as a studied insult to the memory of the Union dead. When Secretary Manning lay ill of the malady from which he soon after died, it was reported that Mr. Cleveland never sent to inquire after his condition, but rather ostentatiously went down the river to attend a dinner given by a duck-shooting club. When the President made a short journey to the Middle West, delivering occasional speeches on the way, the *New York Sun* at once asserted that all of these speeches had been compiled, sometimes word for word, from an encyclopædia. The same paper professed to believe that Miss Cleveland had written her brother's messages to Congress, and that his famous phrases, "offensive partisans," "pernicious activity," "innocuous desuetude," and "ghoulish glee," had been coined by her. Reports were printed to the effect that the President had quarrelled with his sister because she had published a book, and that she had left the White House because she disapproved of his marriage. Three newspapers, the *New York Tribune*, the *Sun*, and the *Washington Critic*, took to inventing imaginary dialogues between the President and the members of his household, including his private secretary, Colonel Daniel S. Lamont. These dialogues were, for the most part, stupid and rather silly, but they were widely copied by the press throughout the country, and they annoyed the President far more than might have been supposed. One of the earliest of them shows fairly well a purpose to perpetuate the notion that the President's tastes were rather primitive:

*Servant* (to Mr. Cleveland). "The cook wants to know, sir, what you will have for dinner, sir?"

*Mr. Cleveland*. "Isn't Miss Cleveland in?"

*Servant.* "She dines out, sir."

*Mr. Cleveland.* "Oh, yes. I had forgotten that. Dinner—let me see. Rose dines out and Dan is at Old Point Comfort. Good enough. We'll have pig's feet, fried onions and a bottle of Extra Dry."

Another, published at the time of Congressional elections, derived its point from the spoilsmen's assertion that Mr. Cleveland was no Democrat.

"Daniel," remarked the President this morning, as he sat at his desk with two or three political almanacs and several tables of last year's figures spread out before him.

"Yes, sire," replied Daniel, who was pasting an editorial from the *New York Times* into the Presidential scrap-book.

"The election is in progress to-day, I believe?"

"Yes, sire."

"I remember it because I have \$500 on it, Daniel."

"Yes, sire."

"Do you think we shall win, Daniel?"

"*We*, sire?" inquired Daniel, upsetting the paste-pot on the scrap-book.

"I said 'we,' Daniel."

"To whom do you refer by 'we,' sire?"

"The Democratic party, of course, Daniel," said the President, a little sharply.

"Oh!"

And Daniel slapped the scrap-book shut and went out of the room with a pernicious activity which surprised and shocked the President.

Toward the close of 1887, both parties began to look forward to the presidential contest of the following year. In spite of all the uproar that had been raised over the President's pension vetoes and over his partial failure as a

reformer of the Civil Service, the Republicans felt that they had no genuine issue upon which to make a strong appeal to the country. The people, as a whole, seemed very well satisfied with the President; and while they recognised his mistakes, they had come to admire his sturdy independence. On the other hand, although the Democratic leaders personally disliked him, because they found him hard to manage and exceedingly plain spoken, there was really no other candidate possible for the party. The congressional elections of 1886 showed a slight falling off in the Democratic vote; but the party still retained control of the House, while the Senate was almost evenly divided. If the President acted with discretion, so his friends told him, and precipitated no new issue, he might be fairly certain of a re-election. The Republicans were secretly depressed. The theory of their invincibility had been shattered in 1884, and they had no great confidence in their immediate future. Mr. Blaine was in Europe. His health was said to be very bad. The party lacked at once a leader and an issue. If the Democrats raised no new question, their prospect of success seemed good. But the President would not take advice. He had made up his mind that something must be done with regard to the national finances. For the coming year, it was estimated that the surplus in the Treasury would be, in round figures, \$140,000,000. That so much money should be withdrawn from general circulation and locked up in the Treasury seemed to him certain to disturb business, to diminish the circulating medium of the people, and at the same time to offer a perpetual temptation to extravagance in Congress. Inasmuch as this huge surplus, wholly unnecessary for the needs of the Government, was due to the operation of the tariff, he made up his mind that the tariff

ought to be revised. In this he was only following good Republican precedent. General Garfield, in a speech of July 13, 1868, had declared that there must be "a rational and considerate adjustment of the tariff." President Grant, in his message to Congress in December, 1874, had said: "Those articles which enter into our manufactures and are not produced at home should be entered free." A Republican Tariff Commission appointed by President Arthur in 1881 had, in its report, recommended "a substantial reduction of existing duties." The Commission advised such a reduction to the extent of an average of twenty per cent. Finally, the Republican national platform of 1884 had specifically pledged the party "to correct the inequalities of the tariff and *to reduce the surplus.*"

President Cleveland, therefore, prepared a message which he purposed to transmit to Congress at the opening of its session in December. Departing from an unbroken line of precedent, he resolved to devote his entire message to the single subject of tariff reform. His intimate friends to whom he disclosed this purpose were aghast. They thoroughly believed in the measure which he advocated, but they told him that the time was inopportune. The presidential election was at hand. The message would be styled by the Republicans a free trade document. The protected manufacturers would be alarmed. The people would not understand. To send such a message at this time would mean the loss of the election. Mr. Cleveland, however, stood firm. He admitted that the election might be lost, but he said that he had a duty to perform and that it must be performed regardless of any personal consequences to himself. "It is more important to the country that this message should be delivered to Congress and the people than that I should be elected President."<sup>20</sup> The

<sup>20</sup> A. K. McClure, *Recollections*, p. 129 (Salem, 1902).

message would at least give to the party and the people a living issue for the future, and one which would ultimately lead to victory.

Congress met on December 6th, and the message was transmitted to it. After speaking of the condition of the Treasury, the President went on to recommend a reduction of the duties on raw materials, and especially upon wool—a recommendation which had been made by President Grant in 1874. Toward the close of the message occurred the following sentences:

“Our progress toward a wise conclusion will not be improved by dwelling upon the theories of Protection and Free Trade. This savours too much of bandying epithets. It is a condition which confronts us, not a theory.”

The reading of this message created an immense sensation. The Republicans now felt that they had a fighting chance. The Democrats, on the other hand, saw that their one prospect of success lay in accepting the doctrine of the President, in closing up their ranks, and in presenting a united front. The party lines were very closely drawn. The word was passed that Democrats who would not speak and vote for tariff reform were no longer to be considered members of the party. A tariff measure was introduced in the House by Mr. Roger Q. Mills of Texas. It removed the duty upon raw wool and made other changes intended to reduce the annual customs revenue by some \$50,000,000. The average reduction in the tariff contemplated by this bill was seven per cent., or less by half than the reduction proposed by the Republican Commission of 1881. The House of Representatives passed the Mills Bill by a party vote. The Senate proposed, as a



substitute, a bill reducing the duty on sugar by one-half, and repealing altogether the internal revenue tax upon tobacco. Republicans intimated that they were willing to abolish the internal revenue taxes entirely rather than lower the customs duties. Debate waxed hot. The Republican proposal was jeered at by the Democrats. They said that it meant free whiskey and free tobacco while their own proposal simply meant free wool. The Republicans retorted with the alarm-cry of "Free Trade and the destruction of American industries!" The battle for the next presidency was already on.

There was a general feeling among the Republicans that Mr. Blaine was entitled to receive the nomination. No other candidate could make so strong an appeal to his own party; and there was felt, besides, a great deal of sympathy with him because of his defeat in 1884. It was believed that the old charges against him would no longer affect the masses of his party. Mr. Blaine, however, on January 25, 1888, addressed a letter from Florence, Italy, to the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, saying that because of "considerations entirely personal to myself," his name would not be presented at the next National Convention. Many were unwilling to accept this as a final withdrawal; but a second letter, from Paris, to Mr. Whitelaw Reid (May 17th), made it practically certain that Mr. Blaine was out of the running. Putting him aside, the names most often heard as of probable candidates were those of Senator John Sherman of Ohio, for whom a number of Southern States presently instructed their delegates to vote; Mr. Walter Q. Gresham of Illinois; General Russell A. Alger of Michigan; and ex-Senator Benjamin Harrison of Indiana.

The Democratic Convention met at St. Louis on June

5, 1888, and nominated Mr. Cleveland by acclamation, an honour not previously given to a Democratic candidate since Jackson's time. As the nomination was uncontested, the proceedings were unusually tame and lacking in incident. For the Vice-Presidency, the nomination went to Mr. Allen G. Thurman of Ohio. Judge Thurman was an old-fashioned Democrat who had been a Senator, and whose popularity in the West was reckoned upon to carry the doubtful State of Indiana. It was thought possible, too, that he might succeed in his own State of Ohio, which had given Mr. Blaine a rather small majority at the last election. Judge Thurman was a somewhat picturesque figure in politics and was popularly styled the "Old Roman"; but he was now advanced in years, feeble in health, and belonged wholly to the past. The average voter knew little about him except that he was in the habit of carrying and frequently brandishing a large red bandanna—a fact which gave point to a remark made by Senator Riddleberger of Virginia soon after the Convention. Some one asked the Senator what he thought of the nomination for the Vice-Presidency.

"Think?" said he. "Why, I think that you've simply nominated a pocket-handkerchief."

The Republican Convention met in Chicago on June 19th. It was not until the third day and after seven ballots that it chose its candidate. Senator Sherman led with a vote of 249 out of 830. Gradually, however, his following fell away, while that of General Alger and of Mr. Harrison increased. Mr. Sherman afterwards declared that the Southern delegates who had been instructed for him were brought over by the Alger interest. If so, Alger did not profit by the bargain. After the third ballot General Harrison's vote rapidly grew, until at last he obtained

a clear majority. Mr. Sherman charged that this was due to a secret and corrupt arrangement made with a member of the New York delegation (presumably Mr. Thomas C. Platt) and that friends of Mr. Harrison had made pledges on his behalf in order to secure the New York delegates.<sup>21</sup> For the Vice-Presidency, the Convention nominated Mr. Levi P. Morton, a New York banker, who had served a term in Congress and had been United States Minister to France.

Mr. Harrison was descended from Governor Benjamin Harrison of Virginia, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, and was the grandson of President William Henry Harrison. By profession he was a lawyer, and he had served in the Civil War under General Sherman. He was an excellent public speaker, a man of unblemished character, and a citizen of the State of Indiana, the vote of which was thought to be necessary to Republican success.

The campaign was comparatively a quiet one. No bitter personalities marred it. The contest turned mainly upon the issue presented by Mr. Cleveland in his tariff message. The Republican canvass was conducted with a feeling akin to desperation. Speakers sought to alarm the manufacturing interests by the cry of "British Free Trade," and in this they were successful. Large sums of money flowed into the campaign treasury and were spent like water. It was in this campaign that the old-time torch-light processions were generally given up. Political clubs were organised in their place, and did effective work. As in the Harrison campaign of 1840, party songs were sung to stimulate enthusiasm, and at all Republican meetings this crude minstrelsy held an important place. There was something almost fanatical in the spirit with which the

<sup>21</sup> See Sherman, *Recollections*, ii., p. 1029 (Chicago, 1895).

Republicans strove for victory. They were not very hopeful; yet all that unlimited money and careful organisation could do for them was done. The people at large admired the courage with which President Cleveland had raised an issue of principle, even when it jeopardised his own political prospects. Early in October, it seemed quite certain that in addition to the solid vote of the Southern States he could count upon that of Connecticut and New Jersey. The only two States that were really doubtful and that were needed to re-elect him, were Indiana and New York. Both parties recognised this fact, and the supreme efforts of each were concentrated upon these two States. As Mr. Harrison was a citizen of Indiana, he was thought on the whole to have the better chance; but the Republicans left nothing to mere luck. They proceeded to pour great sums of money into Indiana and to arrange quite openly a scheme for the purchase of voters on an elaborate scale. A letter, said to have been written by Mr. W. W. Dudley, the treasurer of the National Republican Committee, and unquestionably emanating from that Committee, was sent to the party leaders in Indiana. It contained the following memorable sentence:

“Divide the floaters into blocks of five and put a trusted man in charge of these five, with the necessary funds, and make him responsible that none get away, and that all vote our ticket.”

In New York, which was President Cleveland's own State, he might have looked for a majority had the political conditions there not been peculiar. A large number of Democrats who represented the Tilden wing of the party were very hostile to Mr. Cleveland. They accused him of gross ingratitude to Tilden. According to their story,

Mr. Cleveland's nomination in 1884 was due to Mr. Tilden's favour. They asserted that in June, 1884, Daniel Manning had gone to Mr. Tilden and had asked for his aid, promising in return to give to Mr. Tilden "any assurances he required in regard to the naming of Mr. Cleveland's Cabinet, should he be elected."<sup>22</sup> After Mr. Cleveland became President, he neglected to consult Mr. Tilden until every Cabinet place but one had been filled. He then asked Mr. Tilden to advise him as to the appointment of a Secretary of the Treasury. On Mr. Tilden's recommendation, Mr. Manning was appointed. He found himself, however, in an unfriendly atmosphere, as his letters to Tilden show. He wrote (December 21, 1885):

"I am living in an atmosphere that is full of mischief, and where the whirl is so great that one is inclined sometimes to doubt whether he comprehends his associates or fully understands anything of what he is about."

It is quite evident that Tilden had hoped, as Mr. Bigelow expresses it, that the Cleveland administration would be "a continuation of the Tilden dynasty," with Mr. Tilden himself as the power behind the throne. One can scarcely blame the President if he resented this assumption of control, though he might, doubtless, have been more tactful in declaring his independence. Practically, however, he proscribed all of Mr. Tilden's friends; he ignored Mr. Tilden's recommendations; and he made Mr. Manning feel that he was regarded with unfriendliness because of his relations with Tilden. Between the President and such a man as Mr. Tilden, indeed, there could be in any case little real sympathy. They had no more natural affinity than has a mastiff with a fox; and the result of this tempera-

<sup>22</sup> Bigelow, *Tilden*, ii., p. 280.

mental antipathy was an unfortunate one for Mr. Cleveland. When Secretary Manning finally left the Cabinet in 1886, his friends felt that he had been greatly injured;<sup>23</sup> and his death, which soon after followed, was even ascribed to the harshness with which the President had treated him. Consequently, in New York there were many Democrats who were not unwilling to punish the President by helping to defeat him at the polls. Even so staunch a Democrat as Mr. A. S. Hewitt, then Mayor of New York, let his long friendship for Mr. Tilden estrange him from the present leader of his party whom he had cordially supported in 1884. "I shall not make a speech nor spend a dollar in the campaign," said he. "Cleveland is no statesman and I don't believe in his re-election."<sup>24</sup> Tammany Hall was also disaffected. Its leaders had never

<sup>23</sup> An evidently inspired editorial in *Leslie's Weekly* of January 27, 1887, said: "In the party view, Mr. Manning was squeezed out because he was not sufficiently a creation of the President's to be willing to supply all the subserviency essential to obtain office without any of the ambition for real power involved in the independent possession of its opportunities. He was neither a partner, adviser, nor dividend-drawer, though he supplied nearly all the brains and will-power, and no small share of the capital required for the enterprise, the President contributing only his reticence, his obscurity, his powers of absorption and his luck. Thus the time had come when the President and his ladder must part. The ladder is therefore shoved from under, and the President is up the tree. The ladder politely says: 'Considered as a ladder, I think I will take a rest!' The President replies: 'Considered as a ladder, you have my thanks. Rather than admit that you have been more or less than just a convenient ladder, I will provide myself with another ladder by the first of April, until which time please remain. Also permit me to express the hope that in any new post to which you may be called, your merits as a ladder for others will be as conspicuous as they have here been in my behalf.' So the President and Mr. Manning part on as good terms as the gourmand who eats an orange parts with the rind which he throws away."

<sup>24</sup> Breen, *Thirty Years of New York Politics*, p. 714.

liked Mr. Cleveland, and they had come to like him even less. As it happened, too, there now arose in New York politics a personality which sought to profit by Democratic dissension.

When Mr. Cleveland became President he had resigned the governorship of New York. The Lieutenant-Governor succeeded him. This was Mr. David Bennett Hill, a sublimated type of the practical politician. Mr. Hill had regarded Mr. Cleveland's efforts to reform the Civil Service as disloyal to the Democratic party. He posed as being a partisan through and through, and was fond of uttering in public addresses the emphatic declaration: "I am a Democrat!" significantly intimating that the President was not. Mr. Hill was now a candidate for Governor, and he, or his friends for him, appear to have entered into an alliance with the Republicans under an arrangement by which Democratic votes were to be cast for Mr. Harrison in exchange for Republican votes to be given to Mr. Hill. The campaign in New York had, in consequence, some peculiar features. Flags bearing the words "Harrison and Hill" were displayed all over the State; meetings were held and were addressed by speakers who urged the election of Hill and said nothing about Cleveland. On the whole, the Democratic prospects in New York grew more and more unfavourable.

Toward the end of October, the Republicans prepared and executed a genuine *coup*. Mr. Cleveland's tariff position had been described by the campaign orators as essentially pro-British. It was difficult, however, to represent Mr. Cleveland as a partisan of England; for in dealing with the Canadian fisheries question, he had urged Congress to pass measures which would have brought the country within appreciable distance of a war with Great

Britain. Hence, the Republicans resorted to a trick to place the President in a false light on this issue. On September 4, 1888, a letter dated at Pomona, California, was addressed to Sir Lionel Sackville-West, the British Minister at Washington. This letter, which was signed "Charles F. Murchison," but which was actually written by a man named Osgoodby, purported to come from an Englishman, naturalised in the United States, and asked Sir Lionel for information as to whether Mr. Cleveland's policy toward Canada was sincere, and whether he was not at heart a friend of England. The following sentences, very artfully framed, deserve quotation:

"I am unable to understand for whom I shall cast my ballot, when, but one month ago, I was sure that Mr. Cleveland was the man. If Cleveland was pursuing a new policy toward Canada, temporarily only and for the sake of obtaining popularity and the continuation of his office for four years more, but intends to cease his policy when his re-election in November is secured, and again favour England's interest, then I should have no further doubt, but go forward and vote for him. I know of no one better able to direct me, sir, and most respectfully ask your advice in the matter. . . . Mr. Harrison is a high tariff man, a believer on the American side of all questions and undoubtedly an enemy to British interests generally. . . . As you . . . know whether Mr. Cleveland's policy is temporary only and whether he will, as soon as he secures another term of four years in the presidency, suspend it for one of friendship and free trade, I apply to you privately and confidentially for information which shall in turn be treated as entirely secret. Such information would put me at rest myself, and if favourable to Mr. Cleveland, enable me, on my own responsibility, to assure many of my countrymen that they would do England a service by voting for Cleveland and against the Republican system of tariff."



To this letter Sir Lionel Sackville-West was indiscreet enough to make the following reply:

“SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of the 4th inst. and beg to say that I fully appreciate the difficulty in which you find yourself in casting your vote. You are probably aware that any political party which openly favoured the mother country at the present moment would lose popularity, and that the party in power is fully aware of the fact. The party, however, is, I believe, still desirous of maintaining friendly relations with Great Britain, and still desirous of settling all questions with Canada which have been, unfortunately, reopened since the restriction of the treaty by the Republican majority in the Senate and by the President’s message to which you allude. All allowances must, therefore, be made for the political situation as regards the presidential election thus created. It is, however, impossible to predict the course which President Cleveland may pursue in the matter of retaliation should he be elected; but there is every reason to believe that, while upholding the position he has taken, he will manifest a spirit of conciliation in dealing with the question involved in his message. I enclose an article from the *New York Times* of August 22d, and remain yours faithfully,

“L. S. SACKVILLE-WEST.”

The Republicans held back this correspondence until October 24th, when they published it both in the newspapers and in millions of handbills. A shout went up that Mr. Cleveland was now undoubtedly “the British candidate.” Sir Lionel’s letter was interpreted as meaning that the President was especially friendly to British interests; that his apparently rigorous attitude toward Canada was adopted solely for electioneering purposes; and that in case of his re-election he would pursue a very different policy. Mr. Blaine, who had now returned from Europe in improved health, went about addressing great

gatherings of Irish-American voters, and using everywhere the Murchison letter as a text. President Cleveland at first paid no attention to this matter, and was obviously disposed to treat it with contemptuous silence; but his party managers insisted that something should be done to neutralise the effect of the letter. A telegram informed him that "the Irish vote is slipping out of our hands because of diplomatic shilly-shallying. See Lamont at once., Something ought to be done to-day." The clamour increased, and President Cleveland then showed the one and only trace of weakness that can be detected throughout his whole career. To gain votes he demanded that the British Government recall its Minister. Lord Salisbury demurred. Naturally enough he did not see why the diplomatic relations of the two countries should be strained because of the exigencies of an American political campaign. Thereupon the President ordered that Sir Lionel's passports be given him, and he left Washington soon after."<sup>25</sup>

Had this action been taken so soon as the Murchison letter was published, it might have saved some votes. Had no action at all been taken, the President's dignity and his reputation for political courage would not have been impaired. As it was, he had obviously yielded to expediency and, therefore, he gained nothing whatsoever. At the election, Mr. Harrison won by a majority of sixty-five electoral votes. He carried both Indiana and New York, though in the latter State Mr. Hill was elected Governor.<sup>26</sup> Cleveland carried the South and also New

<sup>25</sup> The dismissal of Sir Lionel was naturally resented by Lord Salisbury, who appointed no successor to him until after Mr. Cleveland's term had ended.

<sup>26</sup> Harrison had a majority in New York State of 12,096 votes; Hill had a majority of 18,481 votes.

Jersey and Connecticut. The Republicans were successful in the congressional elections, having a majority of ten in the next House. An analysis of the vote showed that Mr. Cleveland had been defeated by a very narrow margin. Even in Mr. Harrison's own State he had come within 2000 votes of a majority, and had obviously lost New York only through the treachery of his own party. In the popular vote, as against Mr. Harrison, he had a majority of over 100,000 ballots. The sentiment of the country as a whole, therefore, still seemed to be on his side.

But the victorious Republicans in their rejoicing took small account of these considerations. They had won, and they believed that their party had come back to stay. They spoke of Mr. Cleveland as of one politically dead. On the night before the inauguration of Mr. Harrison, Washington was filled with civic and military organisations which had come to celebrate the glorious victory. Late in the evening, a motley crowd proceeded to the grounds of the White House. The windows of the executive mansion were darkened as though to symbolise defeat. Then the crowd of revellers, composed of "marching clubs," drunken militiamen, and hooligans of the city, lifted up their voices and chanted in discordant tones the ditty which had been most popular of all, in the late campaign:

"Down in the cornfield  
Hear that mournful sound;  
All the Democrats are weeping—  
Grover's in the cold, cold ground!"

## CHAPTER V

### THE PRESIDENCY OF BENJAMIN HARRISON

BENJAMIN HARRISON was inaugurated in the midst of a violent rainstorm, which, continuing all through the day, converted the streets of Washington into a muddy lake. While the oath of office was being administered, Mr. Cleveland good-naturedly held his umbrella over the bared head of his successor; and when the new President stepped forward to pronounce his inaugural address, the torrential splashing of the rain made his words inaudible to the sixty thousand men and women who were huddled about the Capitol, drenched to the skin, and shivering in the raw east wind. Superstitious persons spoke of "the Harrison hoodoo," and recalled the fact that President William Henry Harrison had died within a few weeks after his inauguration, as the result of a chill contracted on that day. There was much criticism of the ceremonial arrangements, which had been unintelligently planned. Members of the House of Representatives complained bitterly of the insolence with which they were treated by the employés of the Senate, and they even discussed the subject afterwards in a heated debate upon the floor of the House. The procession from the Senate Chamber to the East Front of the Capitol was so badly managed that it degenerated into an unseemly scramble. The customary review, in which nearly forty thousand men defiled before the President, was shorn of its impressiveness by the condition of the streets and the bedraggled appearance of the paraders. Altogether, the inefficiency of man seemed to

combine with the disfavour of the elements to render this day of Republican triumph inauspicious.

Mr. Harrison's very long address contained, in addition to the usual rhetorical passages, several paragraphs that were of interest as foreshadowing his future policy. He spoke of the development of the new navy, and said that "the construction of a sufficient number of modern warships and of their necessary armament should progress as rapidly as is consistent with care and perfection in plans and workmanship." A general approval was given to the protective theory of the tariff, but on this head he probably thought it unnecessary to speak at length. There were a few sentences relating to the Trusts.

"The evil example of permitting individuals, corporations or communities to nullify the laws because they cross some selfish . . . interest . . . is full of danger, not only to the nation at large, but much more to those who use this pernicious expedient to escape their just obligations or to obtain an unjust advantage over others. They will presently themselves be compelled to appeal to the law for protection; and those who would use the law as a defence must not deny that use of it to others. If our great corporations would more scrupulously observe their legal limitations and duties, they would have less cause to complain of the unlawful limitations of their rights or of violent interference with their operations."

Regarding the matter of appointments to office, Mr. Harrison was very frank. Though he pledged himself to enforce "fully and without evasion" the Civil Service law, he added, for the encouragement of good party men:

"Honourable party service will certainly not be esteemed by me a disqualification for public office. . . . It is entirely creditable to seek public office by proper methods and with proper

motives; and all applicants will be treated with consideration. Persistent importunity will not be the best support of an application for office. . . . I hope to do something to advance the reform of the Civil Service. The ideal, or even my own ideal, I shall probably not attain. Retrospect will be a safer basis of judgment than promises."

The President established himself very quietly in the White House. He was far from being the object of that sort of public interest and curiosity which Mr. Cleveland had experienced. This was due, of course, partly to the fact that he was not, in politics, altogether a *novus homo*. Though not particularly well known in the East, his public career had been a long and honourable one. As colonel of an Indiana regiment in the Civil War, he had served with conspicuous gallantry, heading a bayonet charge at Resaca, and commanding a brigade at Kenesaw Mountain. Because of his share in the operations about Nashville in 1864, he had been breveted a brigadier-general of volunteers "for ability and manifest energy." After the war he practised law and was elected official reporter to the Supreme Court of Indiana, publishing subsequently a volume of judicial decisions. In 1876, he made his first appearance in politics as the Republican candidate for Governor, failing, however, to secure an election. In 1880, he was sent to the United States Senate, where he served upon several important committees, and won some reputation as a clear and forceful reasoner. With this record, and because his personal character had not been an issue in the presidential campaign, it was natural that he should, as President, be made the subject of fewer "pen-pictures" and anecdotes than his predecessor. But still another reason was to be found in the fact that his personality was less remarkable.

At the time of his inauguration he was in the fifty-sixth year of his age. Almost abnormally short of stature, he seemed, nevertheless, to be taller than he actually was, owing to the length of his body and the dignity of his manner. Sturdy of frame, he enjoyed vigorous health. A greyish beard, cut nearly square, covered a goodly portion of his face. His neck was so short as to give his head the appearance of being set directly upon his shoulders, and he usually held his chin down and partly drawn back upon his somewhat protuberant chest—a circumstance which led the irreverent to liken his appearance to that of a pouter-pigeon. If, however, he was not particularly impressive, his bearing was nevertheless the bearing of a gentleman, and he was one with whom not even an intimate friend would have dreamed of taking liberties.

Mr. Harrison, unfortunately for himself, had two separate and distinct manners. With the members of his own household and a very few others he was genial, hearty and spontaneously cordial. But to the rest of the world he exhibited a wholly different and most unsympathetic demeanour. His tone and manner were as cold as ice. He lacked that most delightful of all personal gifts—responsiveness. To strangers, and even to political friends who had to do with him, he appeared almost ungracious in his aloofness and indifference. Those who talked with him were met with a frigid look from two expressionless steel-grey eyes; and their remarks were sometimes answered in a few chill monosyllables devoid of the slightest note of interest. The President had also some rather unpleasant little personal traits and habits which offended many of his visitors; so that, on the whole, an unfavourable impression got abroad with regard to Mr. Harrison as an individual. The whole matter was rather strikingly summed

up by one who knew him well, in these two sentences: "Harrison can make a speech to ten thousand men, and every man of them will go away his friend. Let him meet the same ten thousand men in private, and every one will go away his enemy."

President Harrison was a man of much intellectual ability. He had the mind of a trained lawyer—acute, penetrating and analytical. Something of the casuistry of the advocate at times appeared in what he wrote and said; but in the main he was eminently fair. An uncompromising adherent of his own party, he accepted its policy without question and defended it without reservation.<sup>1</sup> This he could do the more readily in that his intellect, though cultivated, lacked breadth, so that his views of public questions were often narrow ones. He showed, indeed, during the first year of his presidency a certain absorption in minor interests, and a fondness for fussing over questions relating to petty patronage and to all the minutiae of politics. This tendency he afterwards largely overcame; for in him, as in most American presidents, the pressure of great responsibility gradually broadened and developed his whole nature. His integrity was never questioned, and this inherent honesty often made it hard for him to endure the companionship of many whose good will it was politic to conciliate. He felt, indeed, a strong personal dislike for some of the most influential leaders of his party; and though, in his official intercourse with them, he tried hard to treat them with cordiality, he did it with

<sup>1</sup> Senator Sherman wrote to him soon after the election: "The President should touch elbows with Congress. He should have no policy distinct from that of his party; and this is better represented in Congress than in the Executive." Mr. Harrison lived up to this admonition all through his term of office.



so bad a grace that his actual sentiments became perfectly well known.

As a public speaker, President Harrison attained to an unusual degree of excellence—in fact, more truly so than any other President since Garfield. While in the Senate he had always been listened to with interest; but at that time he had not yet matured his powers. There were invariably traces of formality and heaviness; and while he was always dignified, he was seldom graceful. His phraseology sometimes suggested the lay exhorter, the Presbyterian elder, or the leader of a prayer-meeting. One of his locutions was, “I lift up a prayer”—an expression which some of the newspapers caught up and rang the changes on with malicious glee. After his nomination, the party managers, who at first regarded him somewhat in the light of a respectable figure-head, urged him to be silent during the campaign.<sup>2</sup> But to this cautious advice he paid no attention; and when delegations visited him at his home, he made short, off-hand speeches which were so neat and telling as to be regularly reported in the press, and to furnish many effective texts to his followers. In all he delivered ninety-four of these impromptu addresses, and surprised even those who knew him, by his facility and felicity. As President, he never made a flat or feeble speech, nor one composed of platitudes. His oratory was marked by ease and finish, and a certain geniality of tone which by no means belonged to his ordinary conversation. In 1891, he made a journey through the South, and often addressed the throngs that greeted him. Here he was surrounded by those who were politically his opponents, and against whom he had fought at the time of the Civil War. It was no easy matter to speak off-hand under con-

<sup>2</sup> McClure, *Recollections*, p. 140.

ditions such as these without saying something that would give offense, or without descending to the most obvious banality. Yet President Harrison never once did either; but rose above all criticism in a series of little speeches that were gems of occasional oratory—graceful, winning, suggestive and tactful to a degree.<sup>3</sup> In the longer addresses which he made while he was President, the same qualities were noticeable; and sometimes there was revealed a touch of that higher eloquence which combines dignity and reason with sincere, unstudied feeling.

The new Cabinet, with two exceptions, was one of no very marked distinction or ability. The exceptions were Mr. Blaine and Mr. Tracy. President Harrison had been more or less reluctant to give Mr. Blaine a place in his official household. So brilliant, ardent and magnetic a personality was not likely to lend itself to subordination. The President felt that he might himself be overshadowed by it. In fact, his attitude toward Mr. Blaine resembled that of Mr. Cleveland toward Tilden. The President wished to be master in his own house, and it did not please him to hear Mr. Blaine spoken of continually as "the uncrowned king." Nevertheless, he had no choice. Precedent required that he should appoint to the chief Cabinet-office the man who might have had the nomination had he wished it, and who, it was said, had really given it to Mr. Harrison. Mr. Blaine had sent a telegram to his friends while the Chicago Convention was in session; and although its contents were kept secret, the Blaine leaders had given Mr. Harrison their support immediately after its receipt. It was claimed that, in return, Mr. Harrison had promised to make Blaine his premier. This was undoubtedly untrue,

<sup>3</sup> These speeches were collected and published by Hedges, *Through the South and West with President Harrison* (New York, 1892).

since such a pledge was quite unnecessary. The President practically had no choice in the matter; and therefore, as it appeared, with reluctance and somewhat sullenly, he offered the portfolio of State to Mr. Blaine.

Mr. Benjamin F. Tracy of New York, who became Secretary of the Navy, was an eminent lawyer, a veteran of the Civil War. He had been United States District-Attorney in New York, and for two years an Associate Justice of the highest court in that State. Surprise was expressed that he should be chosen for the Navy Department rather than for the Attorney-Generalship. He was, however, so intelligent an administrator as fully to justify the President's selection of him; and during the next four years he did admirable work in building up a modern fleet. Mr. William Windom of Minnesota, the Secretary of the Treasury, was a safe man of moderate ability. He had been for a few months a member of President Garfield's Cabinet, retiring at the accession of Mr. Arthur, and entering the United States Senate for a second time. The new Secretary of War was Mr. Redfield Proctor of Vermont, a wealthy gentleman who had been Governor of his own State. Mr. Harrison's Secretary of the Interior was Mr. John W. Noble of Missouri, a veteran of the war and subsequently a practising lawyer. At the time of his appointment he was little known outside of his own State. The new Postmaster-General was Mr. John Wanamaker of Pennsylvania, a rich business man. To the Attorney-Generalship the President called his former law partner, Mr. W. H. Miller of Indiana. Congress had established a Department of Agriculture in addition to the existing executive offices, and this post was now filled by Mr. Jeremiah M. Rusk of Wisconsin, a State of which Mr. Rusk had been Governor for seven years.

Mr. Rusk was a somewhat picturesque personage. He had been in his early years a farmer; and his quaint and often racy speech still smacked of the soil. He had served all through the Civil War, and had displayed remarkable gallantry at Atlanta and during Sherman's march to the sea, where, like Mr. Harrison himself, he had been breveted a brigadier-general. Next to Blaine, Mr. Rusk was the most popular member of the Cabinet. He had a bluff, hearty, unconventional manner; he administered the new Department with great success; and his frank honesty and quaint utterances endeared him to the masses, who spoke of him with affectionate familiarity as "Uncle Jerry."

The appointment of Mr. Wanamaker was one that called forth a certain amount of criticism. Mr. Wanamaker was the proprietor of a large shop in Philadelphia, and he was also conspicuous as a religious leader and a promoter of Young Men's Christian Associations and Sunday schools. But during the campaign of 1888, Mr. Wanamaker had both himself contributed, and had collected from the rich protected manufacturers of Pennsylvania, an immense campaign fund, which he turned over to Senator Matthew S. Quay, whose political methods were notoriously objectionable. Mr. Quay was then chairman of the Republican Executive Committee, conducting the campaign; and the cash provided by Mr. Wanamaker had formed a part of the funds which, in Indiana, had influenced the "floaters," and consolidated the "blocks of five." The contrast between Mr. Wanamaker's piety and the purposes for which his money had been given was a little too glaring to pass unnoticed by his political opponents; though there was no reason for holding Mr. Wanamaker accountable for the use made of the fund by others.

Nevertheless, under the circumstances, his appointment to a Cabinet office distinctly savoured of a commercial transaction. His acceptance of the post, therefore, was held to indicate conditions which, as was said by one critic, "President Harrison must know, and, knowing, must deplore and feel ashamed of."

"That Mr. Wanamaker will administer the office respectably we have little doubt; and that this will after a while be used as an argument, even by clergymen and religious newspapers, in favour of allowing Cabinet offices to be purchased by contributions to campaign funds, we have just as little. Nearly all corruption begins under some harmless guise. Votes are always bought for the good of the cause; decisions are always sold to the right side; and we finally get to the comfortable conclusion that not only is God with the big battalions, but that He makes political debauchery one of His instruments for good."<sup>4</sup>

Some adverse criticism also arose in certain quarters from the fact that Mr. Wanamaker did not always appear to keep his high political office distinct from the interests of his business. As head of the nation's postal system he was the absolute chief of thousands of country postmasters. These men were kept reminded by circulars and otherwise that the Postmaster-General was also a great retail merchant. When the Pan-American Congress, composed of delegates from all the American Republics, was in session, its members visited Philadelphia; and, as a matter of courtesy to the Postmaster-General, they made an inspection of his "emporium." Upon leaving, each of these gentlemen was presented with a "souvenir volume," ornately printed and containing a description in florid rhetoric of the glories of the Wanamaker shop. Following the description was this request, with which, however, Mr. Wanamaker, probably, had nothing to do:

<sup>4</sup> *The Nation*, March 7, 1889.

“DEAR SIR: Confident of our commanding position in the mercantile world as leaders in retail commerce, and believing that we have reached the highest point yet attained in our country in the science of retail trading, we beg leave to ask your acceptance of this souvenir of your visit to our place of business, *in the hope that it contains information sufficient to warrant its submission to your Government as a portion of your report upon the honourable Congress to which you are accredited.*”

Because of these and similar occurrences, the whole country was amused when the *New York Sun* gave an exhibition of its impish cleverness at the expense of Mr. Wanamaker. Picking out day by day the flamboyant advertisements of his wares which appeared over his signature in the newspapers, it treated them with great gravity, professing to believe that they had been personally composed by him as serious literary productions, and discussing in terms of æsthetic criticism Mr. Wanamaker's *Essays on Ladies' Underwear*, his unrhymed *Poems on Walking Skirts*, his *Reflections on Flannels*, and his philosophical *Musings upon Muffs*.<sup>5</sup>

But while the Postmaster-General contributed nothing to the prestige of the Administration, the new Secretary of State won laurels for himself and for his chief. The State Department was a post admirably suited to the tastes and intellectual qualities of Mr. Blaine. Like Disraeli, whom in some respects he strikingly resembled, Blaine loved administration on a large scale. He had long been the most conspicuous figure in national politics, and it gratified alike his ambition and his imagination to appear in the still more spacious theatre of international affairs. His friends shared his enthusiasm and spoke with proud anticipation of the “spirited foreign policy” which was presently to be carried out. Mr. Blaine's opponents, on

<sup>5</sup> See, for instance, the *Sun* for March 15, 1889.

the other hand, professed a feeling of disquietude. They said that, with regard to the foreign relations of the United States, safety rather than brilliancy was to be preferred in the conduct of affairs. They prophesied that Mr. Blaine—restless, aggressive, and with a love of dramatic effects—would involve the country in some dangerous complication; and to justify this belief, they recalled what had occurred in 1882, when for nine months Mr. Blaine had been Secretary of State in President Garfield's brief administration, and until President Arthur relieved him.

The reminder of that time was an interesting one. Peru and Chile were then at war with one another; and Secretary Blaine had used his influence to preserve the territorial integrity and the independence of Peru, both of which were threatened by the triumphant Chileans. This action had given great offence to Chile and it had been severely criticised in the United States. It was Mr. Blaine's misfortune to have excited a suspicion that his motives were not disinterested. He had had some casual interviews with an adventurer named Shipherd; and in the course of the negotiations over the Chilean affair, he had taken up certain claims against Peru, known as the Landreau and Cochet claims, in which Shipherd was pecuniarily interested. Mr. Blaine wrote a despatch (August 4, 1882) to the American Minister in Peru, directing him to notify both the Chilean and Peruvian governments that no treaty of peace between the two countries must be made until the Landreau claim should be settled.<sup>6</sup> This despatch deeply angered Chile, as did the further activities of the Secretary at that time. Many thought that had not Mr. Arthur become President when he did, and had he not taken the matter out of the hands of Mr. Blaine, war might

<sup>6</sup> Senate Exec. Documents, No. 79 (Forty-seventh Congress), p. 507.

have occurred. The whole matter was investigated afterwards by the House of Representatives. Mr. Blaine appeared before a committee of the House, and his appearance led to an exciting scene.<sup>7</sup> A Democratic member, Mr. Perry Belmont of New York, took a leading part in examining Mr. Blaine; and he asked such searching questions, and seemed so sceptical, that at last Mr. Blaine was nettled. Mr. Belmont was a new member of Congress and was, besides, a young and unknown man, while Mr. Blaine was the most eminent of American statesmen. He therefore tried to overawe his youthful cross-examiner by assuming the grand manner. The phrasing of a certain telegram was under discussion. Mr. Blaine declared that the words had been garbled. Mr. Belmont stuck to his own interpretation. "I am not in a police-court to be badgered!" said Mr. Blaine; and he went on to say that Mr. Belmont had intentionally altered the despatch and was persisting in a falsehood. Belmont's face grew white to the lips, and then flamed red with anger. He looked Blaine straight in the eyes. Then he said:

"I believe you are a bully and a coward!"

It was these incidents—the Shipherd connection, the so-called "guano claim," and the strained relations with Chile in 1882—which Mr. Blaine's opponents now brought up again; but most persons regarded them as ancient history, and waited with interest to see to what the new Secretary of State would first turn his hand. As a matter of fact, at the very moment when President Harrison was taking the oath of office, there existed in a far quarter of the globe a condition of affairs so critical that it might at any moment plunge the United States into a

<sup>7</sup> See House Report, No. 1790 (Forty-seventh Congress).



war with the foremost military power of Europe. To understand this situation one must recall the succession of events which had made it possible.

Ever since the humiliation of France at the hands of Germany in the war of 1870, the latter power had arrogated to itself a sort of supremacy over other nations. Allied with Austria and Italy, the German Empire set no bounds to its pretensions. Russia was quiescent; England was isolated; France was prostrate. Prince Bismarck, as he sat in his chancellery on the Wilhelm-Strasse, felt that there indeed was the true *omphalos* of earthly power. He had despoiled Denmark in 1864. He had humbled Austria in 1866. He had crushed France in 1870. He was now treated with almost servile deference by ambassadors and statesmen. A frown of his, an impatient speech, or a curt despatch, was enough to send the shivers down the back of every Foreign Minister in Europe. No wonder that he had grown arrogant, and that all official Germans, taking their tone from him, cultivated a swaggering insolence which paid no heed to others' rights or feelings. In the early eighties, the Chancellor was pushing his scheme of planting German colonies in distant lands; and any unconsidered trifles of territory which he chanced to find unclaimed were promptly visited by German men-of-war and recorded on the official map as being German soil. This policy was quite openly directed against England as the great colonising power; but England was under the spell of Germany's enormous self-assertiveness; so that Downing Street seemed timidly anxious to avoid a clash with the autocrat of the Wilhelm-Strasse. In course of time, Prince Bismarck cast his acquisitive eye upon the Samoan Islands.

The Samoan Islands are twelve in number, lying in the track of vessels which ply between the American seaports on the Pacific Coast, and Australia. They have, therefore, a certain commercial importance, and to a naval power a definite strategic value. Upon the principal island, Upolu, where the chief town, Apia, is situated, a number of Germans, Americans and English had settled. A Hamburg trading firm was established there, besides a thriving American business house and a company of Scotch merchants. In 1878, a treaty was made by which the Samoan chief or "king" of that time gave to the United States the use of the harbour of Pago-Pago for a naval station.

As was natural, the small foreign community in Upolu, isolated from the greater world outside and thus thrown in upon itself, was rent by the small jealousies, intrigues and bickerings which arise when petty interests clash in a petty sphere. Race prejudice intensified the feeling, until Apia fairly seethed with pent-up enmities. Gradually, however, two distinct factions were formed, when the Americans and English made common cause against the Germans, who were the more numerous and who were also unpleasantly aggressive. By the year 1884, it had become clear that Germany intended by hook or by crook to get control of the Islands, and in doing so to ignore the rights of the English and American residents. The German consul, one Herr Stübel, began to manifest extreme activity. He had all the *morgue* and frigid insolence of the true Prussian official, and moreover he had at his beck several German ships of war, which always appeared most opportunely whenever Stübel was carrying things with a particularly high hand. The German residents assumed a most offensive bearing toward the other foreigners as well as toward

the natives. In April, 1886, Stübel raised the German flag over Apia and in a proclamation declared that only the Government of Germany should thereafter rule over that portion of the islands. The British consul hesitated to act without instructions; but the American representative hoisted the colours of the United States and proclaimed an American protectorate.<sup>8</sup> This conflict of authority was serious, and led Secretary Bayard to energetic action. A conference at Washington between the representatives of Germany, Great Britain and the United States, agreed that the action of both consuls should be disavowed and that the *status quo ante* should be preserved in Samoa pending further negotiations.

Bismarck, however, had no intention of abandoning his ultimate purpose, or even of abiding by his agreement. A new consul, Herr Becker, was sent out from Berlin and proved to be as obnoxious as his predecessor. He planned a stroke that was delivered with prompt efficiency. The native king, Malietoa, was favourable to the English and Americans. Becker, seizing upon the pretext afforded by a drunken brawl between the German sailors and a few Samoans, declared war upon Malietoa, "by order of His Majesty, the German Kaiser." Martial law was proclaimed in Apia; German marines were landed; Malietoa was seized and was deported in a German ship; while a native named Tamasese, a creature of the Germans, was set up in his place. From that moment events tended rapidly toward a crisis. The American consul, Mr. Harold M. Sewall of Maine, wrote vigorous despatches to Washington and sent emphatic protests to Herr Becker, who answered him with sneering incivility. The Samoans refused to acknowledge the German puppet king and took to the bush, where the English and Americans furnished

<sup>8</sup> May 14, 1886.

them with arms. But in Apia, a German judge was set over the local courts, the captain of a German cruiser was made Prime Minister, and the German flag again flew over the soil which Germany had pledged itself to regard as neutral territory. A writer of genius, Mr. Robert Louis Stevenson, who was a resident of Samoa throughout these troublous times, has left a minute account of the intolerable bearing of the Germans and of the indignities to which other foreigners were subjected by them.<sup>9</sup> Mr. Sewell, single-handed, resisted their aggressions. The British consul sympathised with him; but the spell of Germany's predominance in Europe seemed to paralyse his will. At last, to punish those Samoans who were in arms against Tamasese, the German corvette *Adler* was ordered to shell the native villages, and thus to inspire the people with a wholesome dread of German power.

Just prior to this time, there had arrived in Samoan waters the United States gunboat *Adams*, under the orders of Commander Richard Leary. Commander Leary was to his very finger-tips a first-class fighting man. His name, as Stevenson remarked, was diagnostic. It told significantly of a strain of Celtic blood in the man who bore it. Leary had, indeed, a true Irishman's nimbleness of wit, an Irishman's love of trouble for its own sake, and even more than an Irishman's pugnacity. When he had learned just how things stood in Apia, and when he had noted the bullying demeanour of the Germans, his blood grew hot. Until now the notes of protest addressed to Becker had been couched in formal phrases. From the moment when Leary took a hand in the correspondence these notes be-

<sup>9</sup> Stevenson, *A Footnote to History: Eight Years of Trouble in Samoa* (London, 1891). See Callahan, *American Relations in the Pacific* (Baltimore, 1901).

came suddenly pungent with a malicious and most ingenious wit which made the sacrosanct emissaries of His Imperial and Royal German Majesty fairly gasp with indignation. The diabolical cleverness with which Leary followed up their every move was utterly infuriating, and no less so was his supreme indifference to what they thought or wanted. When the German warship fired rocket-signals at night, Leary used to sit on his after-deck and send up showers of miscellaneous rockets, which made the German signalling quite unintelligible. He refused to recognise their appointed king, and in a score of ways he covered them with a ridicule which seemed likely to make them ludicrous éven in the natives' eyes. Meanwhile, a German night attack upon the Samoan "rebels" had been repulsed and several Germans had been killed. Very eagerly, then, did Herr Becker urge the captain of the *Adler* to bombard the "rebel" position at Apia. Surely the sound of the *Kanonendonner* would bring the natives, and also the insolent Yankees, to their senses. Captain Fritze of the *Adler* therefore ordered up his ammunition and prepared for the bombardment.

Leary's ship, the *Adams*, was a wooden vessel whose heavy armament consisted of smooth-bores, only a few of which had been converted into rifled guns. The German corvette was also wooden, but her guns were of the latest pattern turned out by Krupp. Nevertheless, at short range, this superiority would count for little; and the *Adams* was commanded by a sailor who would rather fight than eat. At the appointed hour, the *Adler* steamed out with the German ensign flying at her peak. The *Adams* followed close upon her heels, as if for purposes of observation; but it was noticed that her deck was cleared for action. Soon the *Adler* slowed down and swung into

position, so as to bring her broadside guns to bear upon the helpless village. Instantly volumes of black smoke poured from the funnel of the *Adams*, the long roll of her drums was heard as they beat to quarters, and the American ship dashed in between the *Adler* and the shore, where she, too, swung about, her guns at port and trained directly on the Germans. Presently, Commander Leary in full uniform and accompanied by his staff boarded the *Adler*. His colloquy with the German captain was short and sharp: "If you fire," said he, "you must fire through the ship which I have the honour to command. I shall not be answerable for the consequences!" So saying, he took his leave and returned to his own vessel.

Captain Fritze could scarcely believe his ears. Such audacity had never yet confronted him. He could not fire on the village unless he fired through the *Adams*. He knew that his first shot would be answered by an American broadside, and that this would be the signal for a war between his country and the American Republic. He faltered, shrinking from so terrible a responsibility; and then, his heart swelling with humiliation, he turned tail and steamed sullenly away. That night there was joy in Apia; and the Germans, lately boastful, went about with shamefaced looks.

Soon afterwards, Leary set sail for Honolulu, whence he might send despatches to his Government. In his absence, the Germans tried to accomplish on land what they had failed to do on water. It was known that the Samoans had gathered in large numbers in the interior of the island, and that they were in arms against the king whom Germany had tried to force upon them. A dare-devil American named Klein, a correspondent of the *New York World*, was with them, and acted as a sort of military

leader. The Germans laid a plan to surprise them and to seize their chiefs. On December 18, 1888, long before daylight, a battalion of marines was disembarked from the German cruiser and marched stealthily through the forest. An hour later, the Samoans fell upon them and whirled them back to the seashore with a loss of fifty men and several officers. The fury of the Germans was unrestrained. Vice-Consul Blacklock telegraphed to Washington soon after:

“Germans swear vengeance. Shelling and burning indiscriminately, regardless of American property. Protest unheeded. Natives exasperated. Foreigners’ lives and property in greatest danger. Germans respect no neutral territory. Americans in boats, flying. American flag seized in Apia harbour by armed German boats, but released. Admiral with squadron necessary immediately.”

Up to this time, the situation in Samoa had aroused but little interest in the United States. Samoa was very far away. Most Americans had never even heard of it. But this stirring cablegram, followed as it was by detailed accounts of German aggression and of insults to the American flag,<sup>10</sup> roused the people to a warlike mood. To this mood President Cleveland’s Government responded. The warships *Nipsic*<sup>11</sup> and *Vandalia* were hurried off to Apia, followed shortly by the *Trenton*, the flagship of Admiral Kimberly, a fine old sea-dog of the fighting type. The

<sup>10</sup> The German sailors had taken a flag from an American named Hamilton, and had trampled on it and torn it to shreds. Stevenson wrote: “These rags of tattered bunting occasioned the display of a new sentiment in the United States; and the Republic of the West, hitherto so apathetic and unwieldy, leaped to its feet for the first time at the news of this fresh insult.”—*Op. cit.*, p. 527.

<sup>11</sup> Klein took refuge on the *Nipsic*, whose commander flatly refused to surrender him to the German naval officers.

British Government at last took heart of grace and ordered the cruiser *Calliope* to Samoa. The Germans were no less active; and early in March there were anchored off Apia, besides the vessels just enumerated, a German squadron consisting of the *Adler*, the *Eber*, and the *Olga*, all with their decks cleared and their crews ready for immediate battle. A single rash act might provoke a mighty war.

Such was the situation when President Harrison took office on March 4th. Four days later it was rumoured in Germany that the *Nipsic* had fired on the *Olga*. On March 10th, a despatch from Kiel, which was supposed to have come by way of Australia, reiterated the report, and added that the American vessel had been sunk by a torpedo from the *Olga*. A wave of excitement swept over the whole country. In San Francisco, great crowds filled the streets and massed themselves about the newspaper offices to await the posting of further bulletins. The tone of the press was one of intense hostility to Germany. The Government at Washington began preparing for any emergency that might arise. All the vessels of the Pacific Squadron were notified to be in readiness. The new steel cruiser, *Philadelphia*, was hastily equipped for service. But the news, when it came, was very different from that for which men waited. It told of a fearful battle, not with human forces, but with the elements. A fierce typhoon had struck the Samoan Islands on March 16th, and within a few hours, six of the warships that had been anchored in the harbour of Apia were driven from their moorings. The *Eber* was dashed against a coral reef and sunk. The *Adler* was capsized. The *Olga* and the *Nipsic* were hurled upon the sand; while the *Trenton* and the *Vandalia*, shattered and dismantled, settled to their gun-decks in the tremendous waves. The British ship,



*Calliope*, alone escaped. Her captain with high courage staked the safety of his vessel upon the chance of reaching the open sea. Crowding on every pound of steam until her boilers were almost bursting, and with her machinery red hot, the British cruiser fought her way out inch by inch against the hurricane. As she passed the American flagship, Admiral Kimberly led his sailors in three hearty cheers, which were answered by the British seamen amid the shrieking of the storm. When the typhoon subsided, it was found that few lives had been lost; and Admiral Kimberly, parading the band of the *Trenton*, took temporary possession of Apia to the strains of the national anthem.<sup>12</sup>

The news of this disaster dispelled all thoughts of war in Germany and in the United States. Prince Bismarck proposed a conference at Berlin to deal with the Samoan situation. He was confident that he could win by his strenuous diplomacy what he had failed to gain by bluster and a show of force. He felt perhaps that his personal presence and the greatness of his fame would overawe the untrained American commissioners, as it had invariably overawed the skilled diplomatists of Europe. He had dealt with Americans before. In 1883, a Minister of the United States at Berlin, Mr. A. S. Sargent, had displeased him by one of his despatches. Bismarck therefore ordered the officials at the Foreign Office to speak only German to Mr. Sargent whenever he called. As Mr. Sargent spoke nothing but English, he was placed in a very humiliating position, and for a whole year was obliged to transact all his official business through a secretary

<sup>12</sup> See, in addition to the description of Stevenson, *op. cit.*, the account by an eye-witness, J. Lyon Woodruff, attached to the *Trenton*, in the *Cosmopolitan Magazine* for November, 1895.

of legation. During Mr. Cleveland's administration, Germans naturalised in the United States were expelled from Germany with only twenty-four hours' notice. Mr. Bayard had tried to resent this breach of amity and of treaty rights, but he had proved to be no match for Bismarck. On the whole, then, the Chancellor felt quite easy in his mind.

The conference began on April 29, 1889. The United States was represented by Mr. J. A. Kasson, Mr. William Walter Phelps and Mr. G. H. Bates, Mr. Bates having already visited Samoa and made himself familiar with the conditions there. Prince Bismarck's object was to make a treaty which should recognise the political predominance of Germany in Samoa. After he had set forth his views, the American commissioners opposed them absolutely. They insisted that the United States, Great Britain and Germany should share alike, and that the rights of each should be recognised as equal. Bismarck was a great actor. He could assume at will a tremendous indignation, and work himself into a rage which his huge bulk of body made really awe-inspiring. He now resorted to this device, and frowned portentously as he growled out sentences that seemed full of menace. The Americans were thoroughly impressed by his manner, and they cabled to Secretary Blaine, informing him that the Chancellor was very irritable. Mr. Blaine at once flashed back the terse reply: "The extent of the Chancellor's irritability is not the measure of American rights."<sup>13</sup>

This message so stiffened the backbone of the American commissioners that they held to their point with unyielding pertinacity. Their British colleagues, heartened by their

<sup>13</sup> Hamilton (Dodge) *Biography of James G. Blaine*, p. 659 (Norwich, 1895).

example, united in supporting the American position. Bismarck found that he could accomplish nothing, either by threatenings or by cajolery; and at last the man of blood and iron backed down squarely, and conceded every point. Malietoa, whom the Germans had seized and exiled, was restored as King of Samoa. A general act was signed under which the three powers established a *condominium* in the islands.<sup>14</sup> This was the first diplomatic reverse which Bismarck had encountered in all his great career, and he had met it at the hands of the United States. It was a signal triumph for Mr. Blaine and for the nation. The incident made a profound impression in Europe, and most of all in England. The London *Saturday Review*, an organ usually known for its hostility to everything American, summed up the events in Samoa and then added: "It has been left for the navyless American Republic to give us a lead in the path of duty and of honour."

Taken by itself, this Samoan affair was but a trifling incident and might well be chronicled in a single paragraph. But in the light of subsequent events its ultimate significance is seen to have been very great. First of all, it revealed to the American people their need of a more powerful navy; and Congress soon after provided the sum of \$25,000,000 for the building of new ships, a sum which was presently augmented by a further appropriation of \$16,500,000. By the end of the year 1890, the United States had under construction five battleships of the first class, an armoured cruiser and an armoured ram, besides ten steel cruisers and six vessels intended for coast defence. Another and very far-reaching result was found in the growth among official Germans of an intense animosity toward the United States, for having, at every move of the

<sup>14</sup> This continued until 1898.

Samoan game, thwarted and humiliated Germany. This feeling grew with the lapse of time; and nine years later, in another island of the sea, it was destined once more to drive the two nations to the very brink of war.<sup>15</sup>

Even more impressive was the Samoan episode as the revelation of a new temper in the people of the United States. This has been well described by Mr. John Bassett Moore in the following words:

“The chief historical significance of the Samoan incident lies less in the disposition ultimately made of the Islands, than in the assertion by the United States, not merely of a willingness, but even of a right, to take part in determining the fate of a remote and semi-barbarous people, whose possessions lay far outside the traditional sphere of American political interests. The tendency thus exhibited, though to a certain extent novel, was by no means inexplicable. The intense absorption of the people of the United States in domestic affairs, which resulted from the Civil War and the struggle over Reconstruction, had ceased. . . . The old issues were no longer interesting. The national energy and sense of power sought employment in other fields. The desire for a vigorous foreign policy, though it jarred with tradition, had spread and become popular.”<sup>16</sup>

Mr. Blaine was less successful in his attempt to establish for the United States the claim that Bering Sea was practically a *mare clausum*. The object of this claim was to secure to American sealers the sole right to take seals in Bering Sea. Seal catching was immensely profitable and was engaged in by Russians, Canadians and Americans. These sealers made their catches in so indiscriminate a manner, killing alike the females and the males, as to make

<sup>15</sup> See pp. 574-585.

<sup>16</sup> *The Cambridge Modern History*, vii., p. 663 (New York, 1903). See also Henderson, *American Diplomatic Questions*, p. 251 (New York, 1901).

it probable that before many years all seals would be exterminated. The Cleveland administration had tried to establish American jurisdiction over Bering Sea and had seized several British sealing vessels in the open waters. These vessels were subsequently released; but the whole question still remained unsettled when Mr. Blaine began a correspondence with Lord Salisbury in support of the American claim. In this correspondence it must be said that the American Secretary did not appear to the best advantage. The traditions of diplomacy require the tone of all formal communications to be ceremonious and courtly to the last degree. However burning the question at issue may appear, the diplomatic duellists must everywhere observe the most punctilious etiquette, and never either in word or phrase overstep the limits of a stately self-restraint. These traditions Lord Salisbury on his side followed absolutely. His immensely able argument was couched throughout in terms of the finest courtesy, suggesting in every line the urbanity and graceful deference which mark the intercourse of high-bred gentlemen. Mr. Blaine's despatches, on the contrary, however plausible, were marked at times by a certain swagger, a tone of lurking insolence and an offensive assumption that his opponent's argument was one of conscious duplicity and falsehood.<sup>17</sup> This perhaps was due to the fact that in his heart of hearts, Mr. Blaine was quite aware of the weakness of his case. Certain it is that he accomplished nothing; and at last he betook himself from diplomacy to methods based on force. Instructions were issued to American revenue

<sup>17</sup> "One who reads the Bering Sea correspondence must admit the dialectic skill of Mr. Blaine, and yet feel on the whole that he was hurting his cause by being, in the phrase of his critics, 'too smart.' . . . This was perhaps the most conspicuous instance of Blaine's failure in tact."—Stanwood, *James G. Blaine*, p. 361 (Boston, 1905).

cutters to capture British sealing vessels even when found in open waters. The British Minister at Washington at once informed his Government, and immediately Lord Salisbury despatched a vigorous protest (June 14, 1890), which ended in the following very ominous words:

“The undersigned is . . . instructed formally to protest against such interference, and to declare that Her Britannic Majesty’s Government must hold the Government of the United States responsible for the consequences that may ensue from acts which are contrary to the established principles of international law.”

What this really meant was that if American cruisers should molest British vessels in Bering Sea outside of the three-mile limit, British ships of war would forcibly resist them. The gravity of the crisis was sufficiently apparent; and Mr. Blaine, though he seems to have weighed the question of war and peace, decided presently for peace. In a very characteristic private note to the President (March 6, 1891) he said:

“If we get up a war-cry and send naval vessels to Bering Sea it will re-elect Lord Salisbury. England has always sustained an administration with the prospect of war pending. Lord Salisbury would dissolve Parliament instantly if we made a demonstration of war. On the other side I am not sure—or rather I am sure—that war would prove of no advantage to you. New York and Massachusetts are steadily against war with England unless the last point of honour requires it. Again, I think you will bitterly disappoint Lord Salisbury by keeping quiet. We should have all the fuss and there would be no war after all. Not a man in a million believes we should ultimately have war.”<sup>18</sup>

The whole question was subsequently referred to arbitration. A mixed tribunal met in Paris in 1893 and de-

<sup>18</sup> Hamilton, *op. cit.*, p. 671.

cided that the American case was defective, and it was therefore lost upon every legal point involved. The final decision held: "That the United States have no right to protection of, or property in, the seals frequenting the islands of the United States in the Bering Sea, when the same are found outside the ordinary three-mile limit."

While Secretary Blaine was confronting Bismarck, President Harrison was busying himself with the much less noble task of parcelling out the offices. The significant sentence in his inaugural, which declared that honourable party service would not be a disqualification for appointment, had been accepted by party "workers" as a special invitation. These now descended upon the capital and overwhelmed the President with their importunities. Questions of petty patronage occupied his entire time, and they seem, moreover, to have greatly interested him. His activities for several months were those of an office-broker, and the spectacle was not altogether edifying. He observed the Civil Service law as it stood upon the books; and within the range of the classified service no changes were made from partisan motives. But elsewhere, what was practically a clean sweep was carried out. It cannot be said that that result strengthened Mr. Harrison even with his own party; since for every office-seeker who was gratified by an appointment, at least three or four expectant ones were disappointed, while the majority of the people viewed this office-mongering with something like contempt. It will be remembered that, according to Senator Sherman,<sup>19</sup> Mr. Harrison had received the Republican nomination, as the result of a bargain with Mr. T. C. Platt of New York. It was reported that to Mr. Platt had been promised the Secretaryship of the Treasury. If such a bargain had

<sup>19</sup> Sherman, *Recollections*, ii., p. 1029.

actually been made, it was undoubtedly made without Mr. Harrison's consent; for Platt was not appointed. Nevertheless, to console him, he was allowed to have a large share of Federal patronage; and the same concession was made to Mr. Quay of Pennsylvania. President Harrison likewise looked very carefully after the interests of his own relatives. Offices were given by him to his father-in-law, to his son's father-in-law, to his daughter's brother-in-law, to his own brother, and to several of his son's college chums. He also brought upon himself much criticism by bestowing important places on the editors of newspapers which had supported him in the late campaign. Mr. Whitelaw Reid of the *New York Tribune* received the mission to France. Mr. Thorndike Rice, who, as editor of the *North American Review*, had published an outrageously personal attack upon Mr. Bayard, was made Minister to Russia. Mr. Enander, a Chicago editor, became Minister to Denmark. An Oshkosh editor received the Peruvian mission, and an Indianapolis editor the English consul-generalship. One J. S. Clarkson, editor of the *Iowa State Register*, was allowed to distribute the fourth-class postmasterships. The editor of the *Utica Herald* became Assistant United States Treasurer at New York. Mr. Robert P. Porter of the *New York Press* was appointed head of the Census Bureau. Mr. Porter was an Englishman by birth, a Free Trader who had with suspicious suddenness become a convert to Protectionism. One of these appointments fell through. It was that of Mr. Murat Halstead of the Cincinnati *Commercial Gazette* to be Minister to Germany. Mr. Halstead was rejected by the Senate for an interesting reason. During the Cleveland Administration the Ohio Legislature had elected as United States Senator, Mr. Henry B. Payne, a warm



friend of the Standard Oil Company.<sup>20</sup> Subsequent investigation showed that Mr. Payne's election had been due to the most barefaced bribery. Another Ohio legislature secured the necessary evidence of this fact and forwarded it to Washington, accompanied by a resolution asking the Senate to investigate the case of Mr. Payne with a view to unseating him. Senatorial courtesy was held to demand that Mr. Payne himself should welcome such an investigation and should ask for it, as an honourable man might have been expected to do. But Mr. Payne held his tongue, and though lashed by Senator Hoar with indignant sarcasm, he said no word. The Senate, therefore, declined to investigate the matter.<sup>21</sup> Mr. Halstead in his newspaper had declared that this refusal was due to improper influences; and the Senate now took its revenge by rejecting the editor's nomination.

All these circumstances—the attempt to subsidise the press, the Wanamaker affair, the partisan removals and appointments, the affiliation of the President with such men as Platt and Quay, and the proofs of a petty nepotism—excited throughout the country a feeling of disgust which found expression in a most unexpected place. On April 29th and the two following days, there was celebrated in New York City the one hundredth anniversary of the first inauguration of President Washington. The details of the old-time ceremonies were carefully reproduced. Like Washington, President Harrison was entertained by the Governor of New Jersey, and then proceeded to Elizabethport, whence he was conveyed by water to the foot of Wall Street, landing at the very place where Washing-

<sup>20</sup> See p. 140.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Lloyd, *Wealth against Commonwealth*, pp. 373-388 (New York, 1898).

ton had disembarked a hundred years before. A squadron of warships thundered a salute as the President came ashore. There were given two public receptions and, in the evening, a gala ball. On the 30th, the President was escorted, as Washington had been, to St. Paul's Church, where, in the pew which Washington had occupied, he listened to a religious service conducted by the Bishop of New York, the Rt. Rev. H. C. Potter. When the Bishop entered the pulpit in which Bishop Provoost had preached before Washington, the presidential party settled themselves down comfortably, expecting to hear a polished historical address, lightened here and there by a few graceful compliments to Washington's successor. It came to them with something of a shock when the Bishop, far from pronouncing a bland discourse, replete with pleasant things, spoke out with something of the fire of an ancient prophet. In words that burned, he contrasted the simplicity, integrity, and honour of George Washington and of the nation's founders, with the vulgar display, the self-seeking, and the shamelessness of men in high places at the end of a hundred years.

“The growth of wealth, the prevalence of luxury, the massing of large material forces, which by their very existence are a standing menace to the freedom and integrity of the individual, the infinite swagger of our American speech and manners, mistaking bigness for greatness and sadly confounding gain and godliness—all this makes it impossible to reproduce to-day either the temper or the conduct of our fathers.”

And then the Bishop spoke two sentences which struck home:

“The conception of the national government as a huge machine existing mainly for the purpose of rewarding partisan service—this

is a conception so alien to the character and conduct of Washington and his associates that it seems grotesque even to speak of it. It would be interesting to imagine the first President of the United States confronted with some one who had ventured to approach him upon the basis of what are now commonly known as 'practical politics.' " <sup>22</sup>

This sermon caused a great sensation throughout the country. Some said that the Bishop was guilty of bad taste in choosing an occasion such as this for a rebuke so pointed and so personal. Others said that the whole discourse was on the very highest plane, and that the Bishop had shown himself a true priest of God, speaking out boldly the lesson which the hour and the place demanded, and undeterred from his duty by those considerations which too often influence the time-serving and timid ecclesiastic. Certain it is that his words were caught up and repeated all over the land, and that they voiced the sentiment of millions.

When Congress met on December 3d, the President's message took up the question of the surplus in the Treasury. At the end of the Cleveland administration this had amounted to very nearly \$97,000,000; and, as Mr. Harrison had pointed out, it was more likely in the ordinary course of events to increase rather than to diminish. He recommended, therefore, a revision of the tariff and the removal of the internal tax upon tobacco. Congress, however, in both houses of which the Republicans had a working majority, took a very cheerful view of the surplus, holding, in the naïve words of Colonel Frederick Grant, that "a surplus is easier to handle than a deficit." The Senators and Representatives felt that if the surplus

<sup>22</sup> New York *Herald*; *Sun*; *Evening Post*, for May 1, 1889.

in the Treasury proved embarrassing, the easiest and simplest way to reduce that surplus was to spend it. Hence, Congress promptly passed the Dependent Pension Bill which President Cleveland had vetoed. At once the number of pensioners rose from about 350,000 to nearly 550,000, and steadily increased until, ten years later, it had reached 1,000,000; while the yearly payments grew from \$65,000,000 to \$150,000,000, representing pretty nearly half the entire annual budget of the United States.<sup>23</sup> Heavy appropriations were made for the Navy and for an exposition in Chicago to celebrate the four hundredth anniversary of the discovery of America. Money was also poured out lavishly for various public works; until this Congress in its two sessions had made itself responsible for an expenditure which exceeded that of any other Congress by \$170,000,000. The total amount of money voted for various purposes was roughly computed at \$1,000,000,000. Hence, the Fifty-first Congress was generally spoken of as "the Billion-Dollar Congress." When this name was uttered in the presence of Mr. Speaker Reed he remarked casually, "Yes, but this is a billion-dollar country."

The saying was very characteristic of the man, who now began to play a somewhat spectacular part in national legislation. Mr. Thomas B. Reed was a native of Maine,

<sup>23</sup> Mr. Harrison appointed to be head of the Pension Office, an active politician, James Tanner, commonly known as "Corporal" Tanner,—a favourite of the Grand Army of the Republic. Tanner began "re-rating" the pensions illegally and bestowing "back-pay" at a lavish rate. Wealthy men, among them United States Senator Manderson, were thus made the recipients of large sums from the Treasury, simply by Tanner's mandate. Called to account by Secretary Noble, Tanner replied insolently that he was the Secretary's superior officer in the matter of pensions. The President had finally to remove him, so great became the scandal of his conduct.

who had been a member of Congress for twenty-three years. He was a very striking figure. Fully six feet in height, of huge girth, and impressing the beholder with a sense of great reserve power, he was both physically and mentally a giant. A keen reasoner, alert, audacious, and absolutely self-possessed, his party recognised in him a leader who could neither be outwitted nor outfaced. His speech was caustic, his wit keen; and he took delight in destroying shams, sometimes even those shams in which his associates pretended to believe. He had a nasal Yankee drawl, and the eyes which peered out of his large round face twinkled with an irrepressible humour. He was now elected Speaker of the House, and he was counted upon by the Republicans to force through some very controversial legislation against a minority which was both large and decidedly pugnacious.

The measure which threatened to meet with the bitterest opposition was a Federal Elections Bill, intended to give the Federal Government power to supervise Congressional elections, and if necessary to use military force for the protection of every legal voter. This measure was directed against the South, where the negro vote had practically been suppressed. The fact was perfectly well known. The South was unanimous against any interference which would once more tend to restore the negro to political importance. Over the proposed bill, therefore, the fight was certain to be acrimonious and protracted. It was believed that the minority, by making use of filibustering tactics, by introducing dilatory motions and by demanding the roll-call upon each of these, could wear out the endurance of the majority and thus prevent the passage of the bill. By refusing to vote, the Democrats could, under the existing rules, prevent a quorum of the

House unless practically all the Republican members should be present. Speaker Reed and his party friends decided to thwart such obstructions. They drew up and adopted a set of rules empowering the Speaker to refuse to entertain motions obviously intended to delay the business of the House, and also to "count a quorum"—meaning by this that the Speaker could direct the Clerk of the House to record as "present and not voting" all members who were actually there and who refused to answer to their names at roll-call.

It required strong nerves and complete presence of mind to enforce these rules to the letter; but Mr. Reed was fully equal to the task. The sessions of the House soon resembled pandemonium. Member after member on the Democratic side would rise and make a series of motions, shouting out the words at the top of their lungs; but the Speaker paid no more attention to them than if they had been miles away. While he counted his quorums, members sought to escape from the hall, but found that the doors were locked.<sup>24</sup> Then they raged up and down the aisles, denouncing the Speaker in unmeasured language, yelling, shrieking, and pounding their desks, while the Republicans added to the din by cheering and whistling with delight. Passion waxed so hot that even the correspondents in the press-gallery shared in it; and many of them leaned over the railing, shaking their fists at the Speaker, and pouring forth a torrent of profanity which was quite inaudible amid the uproar. Through it all, Mr. Reed sat tranquilly in his chair, serene as a summer morning, unheeding the deluge of denunciation which

<sup>24</sup> Mr. Kilgore of Texas, popularly known as "Buck" Kilgore, gained a transient fame by kicking down the door and making his escape at one of these sessions.

descended on him, while he would say slowly in his most exasperating drawl:

“When—the ex-ci-table gen-tle-man from Tex-as has come to or-der, the Chair will—rule—upon the point.”

These tempestuous sessions continued day after day, and under the guidance of “Czar Reed,” as he was called, the Federal Elections Bill ultimately passed the House. In the Senate, however, it died a peaceful death; because there existed in the upper House the right of unlimited debate; and an alliance was formed between the Democrats and a number of Republican Senators to prevent the passage of the bill. There was, as a matter of fact, little real desire in the North for its enactment into law. That the negro vote was suppressed throughout the Southern States was not denied; yet most fair-minded men had come to feel that the enfranchisement of the negro had been a political error; and no one liked to contemplate even a partial return to the hideous scenes of the Reconstruction Period, when ape-like blacks had leagued themselves with the vilest whites in a repulsive and disgraceful political orgy.

Under the Reed rules were passed the Dependent Pension Bill, already mentioned, a bill for the admission of Idaho and Wyoming as new States, and bills to repeal the Bland-Allison Act and to substitute in its place the so-called Sherman Silver Law. This last act provided that thereafter the Government should purchase every month 4,500,000 ounces of silver, and issue against this bullion, up to its full value, legal tender notes redeemable on demand in coin. As the genesis and the operation of this new law will be discussed more fully in a subsequent chapter,<sup>25</sup> it may be passed over here without especial comment. The most important legislation of the session was a tariff

<sup>25</sup> See pp. 272-3.

bill, framed by the Committee on Ways and Means, of which the chairman was Mr. William McKinley of Ohio. The passage of this bill marked a new stage in the development of protective legislation in the United States.

Prior to the Civil War, the tariff system of the United States had, as a whole, been primarily devised to produce revenue, and only secondarily to protect domestic industries against foreign competition. Thus, the acts of 1824, of 1828, and of 1832, which represent the high-water mark of protective sentiment in ante-bellum days, were at the most intended to give American manufacturers of iron, cotton and woollen goods and a few other commodities, some temporary assistance until they should have established themselves upon so firm a basis as to stand alone. The protectionists of those days were of the old school, regarding a high tariff on imported goods only as a means to a definite end, and not as an end in itself. The "infant industry argument" was the one which writers and speakers upon the subject most often used and which most appealed to the popular intelligence. "Give us help for a while, until our factories are built, our machinery installed, our business organised, and our experience acquired, and then we can hold our own against the world." This was quite in accordance with the independent, individualistic spirit of the native American of the early nineteenth century, who asked only for an opportunity to make a fair start and who, after that, had a sturdy confidence in the sufficiency of his own brain and his own hands. By 1842, in fact, the country at large had begun to experience a reaction from even so much of protectionism as was embodied in the acts just mentioned. To be sure, in 1842, a new tariff bill, passed by the



Whigs, was professedly a protective measure; but its life was short; and under President Polk the duties were scaled down by the tariff of 1846 to a point where many of the articles about which protectionist writers have the most to say were subjected to an average duty of only thirty per cent. These rates were lowered still further by the act of 1857—a purely non-political measure—and when the Civil War broke out, the tariff system of the United States represented an approximation to Free Trade in that it was intended to produce revenue for the needs of the Government and not especially to shelter or build up any industries which without protection would be unprofitable. Agitation on the subject of the tariff had at that time practically ceased. Both political parties were satisfied to leave things as they were. The country had been extraordinarily prosperous. Manufactures flourished, and the “infant industries” which had appeared to require assistance in 1832 were well past the period of infancy. When, therefore, in 1860, with a view to the coming election, the Republicans introduced into Congress a new tariff bill with a higher scale of duties,<sup>26</sup> they were rebuked by one of the ablest of their own number, Mr. Sherman, who declared:

“When Mr. Stanton says the manufacturers are urging and pressing this bill, he says what he must certainly know is not correct. The manufacturers have asked over and over again to be let alone.”<sup>27</sup>

In fact, the instinctive dread of any change whatever, which in after years led business men and producers gener-

<sup>26</sup> The object was to benefit certain special interests in Pennsylvania and in two or three other States, of which the electoral votes were indispensable in the next election.

<sup>27</sup> *Congressional Globe*, p. 1867 (1859-60).

ally to dread a lowering of the tariff, operated in 1860 to make them dread an increase in the duties.

The Civil War, however, brought with it an insistent and incessant demand for money to meet the drain upon the Treasury. Every species of taxation that could be devised by the harassed Chase was legalised by Congress. When at last the expenses of the Government had risen to something like \$3,000,000 a day, there came a climax to the financial agony in the passing of measures of taxation, direct and indirect, more sweeping than any modern people had ever known. Incomes were taxed; the excise imposts grew heavier and heavier; cheques, notes, drafts, wills, deeds, mortgages, business agreements, insurance policies, and almost every form of legal document, were valid only after they had paid their tribute in the form of revenue stamps. The barest necessities of life—even medicines, salt, and matches—yielded great sums to the tax-gatherer. Specific or *ad valorem* duties were heaped upon a vast number of products and manufactures. Transportation by rail or boat was taxed, and so was the business of the telegraphs and of the express companies. A multitude of ordinary callings had to pay heavy license fees. More than this, not only were manufactures subjected to a general tax, but at each stage of production a separate tax was levied on every article—first while it existed only as raw material and then again when it had been turned out as a finished product. Nothing escaped the eye of the inquisitor. Many persons ruefully recalled the pungent words in which Sydney Smith had depicted the miseries of tax-ridden England at the close of the Napoleonic wars.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> "Taxes upon every article which enters into the mouth, or covers the back, or is placed under the foot; taxes upon everything which it is pleasant to see, hear, feel, smell, or taste; taxes upon warmth, light and

It was the manufacturers who suffered most; and in order that they might not be absolutely ruined, some compensatory legislation was needed in their interest. "I shear my sheep; I do not flay them," said the Emperor Tiberius on one occasion; and in the same spirit the financiers at Washington sought to preserve the manufacturing industries from extinction, so that they might continue to be a source of revenue. "If we bleed manufacturers," said Mr. Morrill of Vermont in 1862, "we must see to it that the proper tonic is administered at the same time." The "tonic" was administered in the shape of a high tariff on imported manufactures. This largely shut out foreign competition, and so gave to the American producers a monopoly of the home market as a compensation for the heavy burdens which they were bearing in time of war. The measure was understood to be distinctly a war measure. It was avowedly a temporary arrangement, a part of the whole abnormal, exceptional legislation which Con-

locomotion; taxes on everything on earth, and the waters under the earth; on everything that comes from abroad, or is grown at home; taxes on the raw material; taxes on every fresh value that is added to it by the industry of man; taxes on the sauce which pampers man's appetite, and the drug that restores him to health; on the ermine which decorates the judge, and the rope which hangs the criminal; on the poor man's salt, and the rich man's spice; on the brass nails of the coffin, and the ribands of the bride; at bed or board, couchant or levant, we must pay. The schoolboy whips his taxed top; the beardless youth manages his taxed horse, with a taxed bridle, on a taxed road; and the dying Englishman, pouring his medicine, which has paid 7 per cent., into a spoon that has paid 15 per cent., flings himself back upon his chintz bed, which has paid 22 per cent. and expires in the arms of an apothecary who has paid a license of a hundred pounds for the privilege of putting him to death. His whole property is then immediately taxed from 2 to 10 per cent. Besides the probate, large fees are demanded for burying him in the chancel; his virtues are handed down to posterity on taxed marble; and he is then gathered to his fathers to be taxed no more."—*Works of Sydney Smith*, ii., p. 117 (London, 1848)

gress enacted in order to meet an extraordinary crisis in the struggle for national existence. Its advocates never dreamed that it was to be perpetuated, any more than the tax upon the telegraph, or the license to carry on an ordinary business.

After the war had ended, nearly all these unprecedented expedients for wringing money from the people were speedily abandoned. The floating debt was funded. Stability and order brought renewed prosperity; and when the need of maintaining half a million men in arms ceased to exist, Congress repealed tax after tax. At last every one of the exceptional burdens from which the manufacturers had suffered was removed. Logically, then, the protective duties which had been imposed to enable them to bear those burdens should also have been abolished. This, however, was not done. Leading Republican statesmen, even those who were protectionists, admitted that the high duties were no longer necessary, and, therefore, that they were no longer just.<sup>29</sup> Many attempts were made to remove or modify them, as in the abortive measure of 1867, which had a majority in both houses of Congress, but which failed to pass because, owing to a technicality of parliamentary law, a two-thirds vote was needed to bring it before the House as an amendment.

Gradually, the long delay in lowering the duties produced a singular effect upon the public mind. The special circumstances under which the duties had originally been levied were forgotten. They ceased to be regarded as a

<sup>29</sup> "It is a mistake of the friends of a sound tariff to insist on the extreme rates imposed during the war. . . . Whatever percentage of duties was imposed on foreign goods to cover internal taxation on home manufactures, should not now be claimed as the lawful prize of protection when such taxes have been repealed."—Speech by Senator Morrill, *Congressional Globe*, p. 3295 (1869-70).

war tax, but were rather viewed by many as an integral and normal part of our financial system. Moreover, the manufacturers, who were heaping up fortunes through the continuance of the war tariff, exerted all the power which great wealth afforded of creating a sentiment in their behalf. Liberal gifts to the campaign fund of the Republican party were rewarded by legislative favours. But the tariff issue was not strictly a party one. There were high-tariff Democrats as well as low-tariff Republicans. For instance, Mr. Samuel J. Randall, who was long a Democratic leader in the House and who twice served as Speaker, was as thorough-going a protectionist as "Pig Iron Kelly" himself; and in fact, in some of his canvasses for re-election, the Republicans in his district set up no candidate to oppose him. Protection sentiment, in a word, was strong in the States where protected manufactures flourished, and weak in the agricultural States, which received nothing from the tariff except an increase in the cost of living. When General Hancock in 1880 said, "The tariff is a local issue," the remark was received with a shout of derision; but in the sense in which he meant it, it was profoundly true.

In the course of time, the agricultural communities of the West began to get an inkling of the truth, and to perceive how preposterous it was to protect industries which had, without protection, successfully maintained themselves against foreign competition before the war. Various popular movements, such as the Farmers' Alliance, Grangerism, and the like,<sup>80</sup> made the Republican managers uneasy. Several revisions of the tariff were undertaken, ostensibly in the direction of lower duties. The act of 1872 was one of these attempts, but it was so artfully framed as, in fact, to leave things very much as they had been before. In 1883, a gen-

<sup>80</sup> See pp. 267-269.

eral revision of duties actually raised many of them, as, for example, those on woolen dress goods, iron ore, and steel. Nevertheless, economic causes were at work which were distinctly unfavourable to a perpetuation of high protectionism as a policy. Chief among these causes, as has been seen, was the increasing surplus in the Treasury. Every Republican President, from Grant to Arthur, had called the attention of Congress to this, and had specifically recommended lower rates of duty. It is likely that, had the Republican party remained in power, these recommendations would have been ultimately carried out. It was the election of Mr. Cleveland in 1884 and his attitude toward the tariff, which solidified the Republicans, not merely in support of the old war-rates, but of an extension of these rates to new classes of imported goods.

When Mr. Cleveland made a distinct issue of lowering the tariff, his opponents from sheer necessity were driven to take the other side. They ignored the whole history of protection in the United States. They put aside the utterances of their own leaders in the past. In the end they went even further than they had probably intended, until at last they flatly declared that protection, so far from being a temporary measure, was one to be perpetuated for its own sake, and that duties, instead of being lowered, should be made even higher than they had been under the actual stress of war. The campaign of 1888 had practically been fought out over this issue; and since the Republicans were successful, they felt that the country had given them a mandate to do whatever they saw fit. It was with this conviction that the act of 1890, popularly known as the McKinley Bill, was framed by the Republican members of the House Committee and ultimately reported by the chairman, Mr. McKinley. From this time dates the New

Protectionism, which proclaimed the doctrine that high duties and high prices are a distinct advantage to the country. Its framers intended to reduce the surplus in the Treasury by enacting tariff schedules that were prohibitive.

The McKinley Bill was a very radical measure. It raised the duties on a great number of articles, and it removed from the free list a great many others. Unlike the earlier acts, it laid imposts upon commodities which are used in every household—articles of clothing, carpets, table linen, thread, tools, and also upon many kinds of food. The effect of this was certain to be felt at once throughout the entire country in the shape of a direct rise in prices. Some of the Republicans themselves had an uncomfortable feeling that the measure was eminently unwise. Such was emphatically the view of Mr. Blaine, himself an old-time protectionist and one who remained unconverted to the doctrines of Mr. McKinley. Mr. Blaine saw that the new tariff bill would not only prove unpopular with the country, but that it would shut out American trade from the most desirable foreign markets. "There is not a section or a line in the entire bill," he wrote to Senator Frye, "that will open a market for another bushel of wheat or another barrel of pork." He even appeared before the committees of Congress to urge upon them with all his influence a wiser policy. Mr. Blaine was the shrewdest of politicians. He knew the value of a taking catchword. What he wanted to secure was the admission of foreign goods untaxed from such countries as would admit American products of certain classes free of duty. This was in reality a species of free trade, but he artfully described it as "reciprocity"—a word which would not alarm the timid voter, who had

been taught that free trade spelled ruin. Day after day, the Secretary of State laboured with his party associates to introduce the principle of reciprocity into the pending bill. Every stage of its passage was watched by him with intense interest, and he wrote to Mr. McKinley many pointed notes, of which the following is typical:

WASHINGTON, *April 10, 1890.*

DEAR MR. MCKINLEY: It is a great mistake to take hides from the free list, where they have been for so many years.

It is a slap in the face to the South Americans, with whom we are trying to enlarge our trade. It will benefit the farmer by adding five to eight per cent. to the price of his children's shoes.

It will yield a profit to the butcher only—the last man that needs it. The movement is injudicious from beginning to end—in every form and phase.

Pray stop it before it sees light. Such movements as this for protection will protect the Republican Party into a speedy retirement.

Very hastily,

JAMES G. BLAINE.<sup>31</sup>

Mr. Blaine had small success with the members of the House of Representatives. The McKinley following had gone mad over high protective duties. They acted as though, whatever they did, there would be no day of reckoning. They placed duties upon the sheer necessities of life. They sought artificially to stimulate the production in this country of commodities, such as tin plate, that had never before been produced in the United States. They were not forgetful of the fact that the protected manufacturers had furnished the great campaign fund which had carried Indiana for Mr. Harrison. Remembering that Mr. Cleveland, like his Republican predecessors, had urged the remission of duties on raw materials, Mr. McKinley removed one such duty. This, however, was the

<sup>31</sup> Hamilton, *Life of Blaine*, p. 683.



duty on raw sugar, and its abolition meant millions of profit to the great Sugar Trust, which was beginning to be extremely powerful in Washington. The folly of such a course was pointed out by Mr. Blaine,<sup>32</sup> who hammered away by argument, exhortation and published letters, in behalf of reciprocity. Before the Senate committee he made a speech so energetic and so full of passion that the reports of it in an imperfect form went all over the country. In his vehemence, Mr. Blaine pounded the desk on which lay a draft of the proposed bill, and in doing so he smashed his tall hat under his descending fist.<sup>33</sup> This appealed to the people's sense of the picturesque. "Blaine has smashed his hat on the McKinley Bill," was the sentence that went from mouth to mouth; and this trivial incident attracted more attention to the measure than whole columns of printed speeches. At last the Senate proved somewhat more open to reason than the House had been, and an element of reciprocity, in a negative form, was introduced into the bill by a Senate amendment, rather ungraciously worded, which authorised the President to impose duties on certain free goods whenever the country from which they came imposed duties that were "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" upon certain specified American exports.

The McKinley Bill had been passed by the House of Representatives in May. With the reciprocity amendment, it passed the Senate in September; and it became law by receiving the signature of the President on the first day of

<sup>32</sup> "Pass this bill, and in 1892 there will not be a man in all the party so beggared as to accept your nomination for the presidency."—Hamilton, *Life of Blaine*, p. 685.

<sup>33</sup> See Hamilton, *Life of Blaine*, p. 685. Mr. Blaine's latest biographer tells the story in a different way. See Stanwood, *J. G. Blaine*, p. 331 (Boston, 1905).

October, 1890.<sup>34</sup> Even before the measure had been adopted, but when its passage had become a moral certainty, a sharp advance in prices throughout the country was acutely perceptible. Merchants were unwilling to sell their goods at the old rates, when the cost of importation was so soon to be increased. Those who did so made a virtue of the fact by advertising that certain wares would be sold at low figures for the next few weeks, but that after a specified date the prices would be raised because of the McKinley Bill. Although these announcements were only business devices, they helped to imbue the public mind with a belief that the new tariff act was certain to increase the cost of living. Importers hastened to bring in enormous quantities of goods, so as to take advantage of the more favourable rates that still prevailed. Ocean liners sought to break the record for speed in hurrying cargoes across the Atlantic before the new act should take effect. The Cunard steamer *Etruria*, reaching the port of New York a few minutes before the hour set for the enforcement of the McKinley Bill, saved by her speed something like a million dollars for the owners of her cargo.

Everywhere the pinch of higher prices was quickly felt, while no increase in wages was perceptible. For the first time since the war, the nation received an object lesson as to what high protection really meant. Hitherto the average man, and especially the average woman, had turned a deaf ear to tariff talk. What did they care whether steel rails and iron ore cost more or less? They did not clothe themselves in iron, nor did they dine and breakfast upon steel rails. But now every household throughout the land learned that the purchasing power of the family income

<sup>34</sup> For an analysis of the McKinley Bill, see Taussig, *The Tariff History of the United States*, pp. 251-283 (New York, 1899).

had been seriously reduced. The housewife who went to market and suddenly discovered that she must pay much more for supplies than she had ever paid before, began at once to take a very personal interest in the cause of this phenomenon. Butter, eggs, flour, dried apples, lard, potatoes, bacon, corned beef and poultry leaped up in price after a fashion which to persons of limited means was most alarming.<sup>35</sup> It now cost more to clothe the family, to carpet the rooms, to provide table linen, and to keep the domestic utensils properly renewed. An outcry went up from those who usually paid no attention to economic questions. Party hacks tried hard to create enthusiasm for "Bill McKinley and the McKinley Bill," but their efforts were met with sullen silence or open denunciation.

The way in which the measure had been "jammed through" the House of Representatives under the iron rule of Speaker Reed was offensive to the American sense of fairness. Mr. Reed, having got a taste of arbitrary power, apparently became intoxicated by it. At first, the country had applauded the nerve with which he dominated the body over which he presided. So long as he used the new rules only to prevent "filibustering," and to insure the efficient despatch of public business, the sentiment of the people was with him. When he said in his epigrammatic way, "This House is no longer a deliberative body," the remark called forth an approving laugh. But in time, what at first had been a wise autocracy became something very like oppression. It was not permitted to members of the minority to question the accuracy of the Speaker's count. Representatives were recorded by him as present when they were actually hundreds of miles away. Even

<sup>35</sup> See the figures in a report by Senator Aldrich. Senate Report, 968, pt. i. (1891).

the privilege of an appeal from the ruling of the Chair was no longer recognised. Mr. Reed carried his tyranny so far that at last members of his own party were driven to revolt. On one occasion,<sup>36</sup> the Speaker ordered parts of the journal of the House to be omitted in the daily reading. Mr. Mills of Texas objected, and it came out that the Speaker had been guilty of a misstatement and that the parts of the journal which had been omitted contained a record of proceedings which had never taken place. Even then, the arrogant Reed refused to have the necessary correction made. An appeal from his ruling was taken, and enough Republicans united with the Democrats to override the "Czar."

The Congressional elections of 1890 took place at the very moment when public sentiment was most deeply stirred against the record which the Republicans had made. In less than two years the Treasury had been emptied, the odious Force Bill had been introduced, a sort of tyranny had been established in the popular Chamber, the cost of living had been enormously increased, and no one had received any benefit save the multi-millionaires of the protected industries and the Sugar Trust. The election, therefore, proved to be a veritable cataclysm. The Republican majority in the House was swept away. When Congress met in 1891, the Democratic Representatives numbered 235, and the Republicans only 88; while in the Senate the Republican majority was reduced from 14 to 6. A significant fact was the strength which had been shown in the West by a new party which now became known as the "Populists," who elected nine representatives and two senators.<sup>37</sup> In the South, out of 121 members, there were only three Republicans. Even in New England, the Democrats secured a fair majority. In Ohio, Mr. McKinley

<sup>36</sup> June 19, 1890.

<sup>37</sup> See pp. 267, 273.

was defeated at the polls, and retired for a time to private life. Mr. Blaine's prophecy of disaster had been strikingly fulfilled.<sup>38</sup>

In 1890, great popular interest was aroused by a movement to overthrow the Louisiana Lottery Company. The story of this contest deserves to be repeated here, because the issue presented was not unlike the issue involved in the battle against the Trusts. It was a contest between great wealth and selfish interest on the one hand and an enlightened moral sentiment upon the other. Those who feel a sense of hopelessness when they endeavour to forecast the final outcome of any struggle such as this, may take courage from recalling the defeat of one of the most ably planned conspiracies against the common welfare which this country has ever witnessed. The Louisiana Lottery had been chartered in 1868 by a "carpet-bag" legislature at a time when political conditions in that State were indescribably depraved. The promoters of the lottery were three in number—John A. Morris, Z. E. Simmons and C. H. Murray—men as unscrupulous and as able as any who engineered the later Trusts. At that time, although most States had by law forbidden the sale of lottery tickets within their borders, these laws were

<sup>38</sup> An explanation of this great defeat was given by Speaker Reed in the following words: "In hundreds of cases the 'drummers' were, intentionally or unintentionally, missionaries to preach Democratic doctrine. They went all over the country with their stories of advances in prices that were to be made next week or next month on account of the McKinley Bill. But I am inclined to think that the most important factor in the result of this election was the women of the country. It is the women who do the shopping, who keep the run of prices, who have the keenest scent for increased cost. They heard in every store the clerks behind the counters explain how this article or that could not be sold hereafter at the former price because of the McKinley Bill; they went

practically disregarded. Several enterprises of the sort, nearly all of foreign ownership, reaped a rich harvest by the sale of tickets for their monthly drawings. Among these were the Havana Lottery, the Royal Saxon Lottery, the Hamburg Lottery, and later the Kentucky Lottery.

Morris and his associates, having secured their charter in return for an annual payment of \$40,000 to a charity hospital, proceeded to organise their business in a very far-sighted way, taking every precaution to fortify themselves alike against the law and against popular prejudice. They secured the services of General Early and General Beauregard to superintend their monthly drawings. They advertised extensively in leading newspapers throughout the United States, paying for their advertisements several times the ordinary rates. They even established newspapers of their own and maintained them, so that if necessity arose, the Lottery would have staunch defenders in the press. In every great city of the Union the ablest lawyers were employed as counsel for the Company, to watch for and to avert every possible form of danger. In Louisiana, Morris practically controlled the State. Many of the judges were to all intents and purposes appointed by the Lottery. Money was spent lavishly in charity, on behalf of public enterprises, and in private gifts. Vast sugarworks were even opened and operated by the lottery owners, who desired to pose as representative business men engaged in fostering one of the great industries of the State. In 1877, when Louisiana was striving to shake off the last vestige of the carpet-bag régime, the Lottery Company gave the money needed to bribe those legislators whose

home and told their husbands and fathers, and their stories had a tremendous effect at the ballot-box."—Interview in the *New York Sun*, November 15, 1890.

votes were necessary to oust the carpet-bagger, Packard, from the Governor's chair. Public sentiment in Louisiana, therefore, was more than cordial to the Lottery. Its charter was renewed in 1879; and after that, it seemed to be assured of a permanent lease of life. Its revenues were very great. One-third of the entire mail-matter which reached New Orleans was addressed to M. A. Dauphin, the nominal head of the Company. It was said that the postal notes and money orders which it cashed amounted to no less than \$30,000 a day.

In 1880, the attention of Mr. Alexander K. McClure, editor of the *Philadelphia Times*, was attracted by the persistency with which the Louisiana Lottery sought to have advertisements inserted in his newspaper. He was startled also by the lavish offers of money made to secure such advertising. An investigation showed him that although the Pennsylvania law imposed a penalty for advertising lotteries, not less than \$50,000 a year was paid to the newspapers of the State for the use of their columns. Mr. McClure brought suit in the lower courts to test the law, and it was found to be defective. He then framed a more stringent bill; and after a vigorous canvass he secured its enactment by the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1883. In the course of the discussion which went on in the press, Mr. McClure's own paper spoke out with frank severity of the Lottery managers. These persons, angered by the loss of their Pennsylvania business and wishing to make an example of the man who had opposed them, noted down his name and waited until circumstances should enable them to take revenge.

Two years later (in 1885), Mr. McClure visited the New Orleans Exposition. The Lottery through its spies had learned that he was coming, and at the very moment of

his arrival he was served with a writ, sworn out by Dauphin and claiming \$100,000 damages for libelling the Lottery. Mr. McClure was in a distinctly hostile community, where the courts were in the hands of Lottery appointees. The lawyers of the city were nearly all in the Lottery's pay; and to defend the suit seemed to be an absolutely hopeless undertaking. Even one of Mr. McClure's personal friends said to him: "We are all in it here, and I hardly know how to advise you." So pleased was Dauphin over his successful *coup*, that he telegraphed an account of it to every city in the land, through the agency of the Associated Press.<sup>39</sup>

This little burst of exultant insolence on the part of Dauphin was perhaps not unnatural, but it cost the Lottery Company dear. It stirred to active indignation a feeling which had lain dormant all over the country, and even in Louisiana itself. Within a few hours after Dauphin's news had been made public, a wealthy Philadelphian telegraphed Mr. McClure that \$50,000 had been placed to his credit for use in his defence. The unbought press in every State took up the case with vigour. In New Orleans itself, a committee of lawyers, all strangers to Mr. McClure, called upon him to say that the bar of that city would defend the suit without cost. The Governor of the State, though friendly to the Lottery, deplored its action in this instance, and gave Mr. McClure the benefit of his advice, sending to him as counsel a lawyer whose fidelity and honour were above suspicion. The Lottery managers refused to take warning from this display of enlightened sentiment. They resolved to press the case at once to trial. They felt themselves to be omnipotent. They regarded the judges as their creatures. Even the marshal who drew the names for the jury was in their pay. They

<sup>39</sup> McClure, *Recollections*, pp. 173-183 (Salem, 1900).



had millions of money at their disposal. Why should they not make a conspicuous example of this stranger from the North? They laid their plans in such a way as to prevent (so they thought) all chance of an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. McClure's counsel, however, devised a plea which baffled them. It appeared that a suit instituted against Mr. McClure by the Lottery in Pennsylvania was still before a United States District Court on a question of appeal. The situation was therefore anomalous in that the Company was prosecuting Mr. McClure upon the same charge before two Federal courts at one and the same time. These facts were duly set forth, and a plea of justification was entered, to which was appended a long series of questions which Dauphin would be forced to answer should the case be tried. These questions were most ingeniously framed, and Dauphin could not answer them without giving information which would expose himself and his agents to criminal prosecution in nearly every State and Territory of the Union. This meant not merely fine and imprisonment for the Lottery officials, but the absolute destruction of their business.

So soon as Dauphin's lawyers perceived the gulf which was yawning for their employers, they experienced a genuine panic. When the case was called they actually opposed a motion to have the appeal advanced upon the docket. By this time many leading men in Washington had become interested in the matter. Senator Edmunds and Senator Hawley arranged that the trial, when it took place, should be presided over by Mr. Justice Wood—a judge of unimpeachable integrity. The Attorney-General of the United States appeared in the Supreme Court in opposition to the Lottery Company. An agitation was

begun in Congress which seemed full of menace to the lottery interests. Dauphin and his associates, therefore, capitulated on their knees. One of their representatives went to Mr. McClure and begged that the suit might be discontinued, offering to pay all the expenses—counsel fees, the cost of depositions, printing, and the rest. Mr. McClure consented; and within twenty-four hours the Company had settled every bill, and had withdrawn its suit. But they had gone too far, and they had thereafter to deal with the public resentment which they had evoked. Measures were passed in Congress excluding lottery tickets from the mails, and forbidding the transmission of newspapers which contained lottery advertisements. The Anti-Lottery Bill of 1893 even forbade the delivery of registered letters, or the payment of postal orders to the Company. Driven from the mails, the Lottery sought to carry on its business through the express companies; but as these were engaged in interstate traffic, Congress again effectively interfered. At last in Louisiana the question of a renewal of the Company's charter came before the people. A campaign against it was carried on successfully in a burst of moral indignation. The Company offered to pay the State a million and a quarter of dollars every year, but the bribe had no effect; and in 1893, this gigantic structure of lawlessness and corruption was swept out of existence forever.

Public wrath against the Lottery was only one phase of a wider agitation. The Fifty-first Congress enacted two very important legislative measures which reflected a rapidly-growing hostility to Trusts in general, and to the lawlessness of railway corporations. Senator Sherman of Ohio, on December 4, 1889, introduced a bill which, with a few amendments, was subsequently passed, and was ap-

proved by President Harrison on July 2, 1890. It is usually spoken of as the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, though its formal title was, "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies"; and both in its phraseology and in the intention of its framer it was a very drastic measure. Its purpose as described by Senator Sherman himself was

"—to arm the Federal Courts within the limits of their constitutional power that they may co-operate with the State courts in checking, curbing, and controlling the most dangerous combinations that now threaten the business, property, and trade of the people of the United States. It aims only at unlawful combinations. It does not in the least affect combinations in aid of production where there is free and fair competition. It is the right of every man to work, labour, and produce in any lawful vocation, and to transport his products on equal terms and conditions and under like circumstances. This is industrial liberty and lies at the foundation of the equality of all rights and privileges."<sup>40</sup>

The immediate cause of the enactment of this law was an investigation which had been conducted by a committee of the Senate in 1888-1889. Sittings were held in Washington, Chicago, and elsewhere; and in spite of the reluctance of some witnesses and the absence of others, a mass of testimony was taken which proved beyond question that many of the great corporations were crushing out competition and destroying industry by means which were in direct violation of the common law. Some very peculiar facts were brought to light regarding the operations of the Sugar Trust, the Standard Oil Company and the great dressed-beef combination, of which Armour and Company of Chicago were the head. But it was not this investigation alone which made it impossible for Congress

<sup>40</sup> Speech of March 21, 1890 (Senate).

to remain quiescent any longer. Similar inquiries had been conducted by State legislatures, and testimony taken in many civil and criminal cases in the State courts had been made public. Moreover, thousands of business men had felt the crushing weight of monopoly in the destruction of their means of livelihood. Therefore, although certain Senators professed to feel doubts about the constitutionality of the bill, it was passed by a non-partisan vote in both houses.

The essential provisions of this act applied to all contracts and combinations in the form of Trusts or otherwise, and to conspiracies in restraint of either interstate or international commerce. Such contracts or combinations were made illegal, and persons participating in them were declared to be guilty of a misdemeanour, and subject either to a fine not exceeding \$5000, or to imprisonment not exceeding one year, or to both these penalties, at the discretion of the court. Furthermore, all goods shipped in violation of the act were to be seized and forfeited by proceedings instituted by the Attorney-General on behalf of the United States. How far this act was to prove effective as a weapon against monopolies will be considered in another chapter.<sup>41</sup> It was in itself a strong measure and did honour to the statesman who framed it and ably advocated it.

Another concession to the widespread sentiment regarding corporate abuses was an act aimed against those railroads which had practically defrauded the Government and the nation in the matter of public lands. The generosity of the national Government to the railways of the West had been remarkable. The case of the Union Pacific Railway Company (after 1880 known as the Union Pacific Railroad Company) is sufficiently illustrative to jus-

<sup>41</sup> See pp. 383, 685.

tify citation. This company had been incorporated in 1862. It received from the Government a grant of five sections of public land for each mile of rail; and two years later, this grant was doubled. In all it received the enormous total of 6,806,497 acres.<sup>42</sup> It is interesting to remember that the contractors of the road, in order to augment the land grants, built their road, not in a straight line across the prairies, as would naturally have been the case, but in an erratic zig-zag, with twists and turns, intended solely to increase the length of line, and thus practically to cheat the Government out of hundreds of thousands of acres. In order to assist the railway still further the Secretary of the Treasury was directed to turn over to it, as a loan, sixteen currency bonds of the United States, each of the denomination of \$1000, for every mile of road constructed through the plains, and forty-eight similar currency bonds for each mile of road built through the region of the Rocky Mountains. The total issue of such bonds for the benefit of the railway was \$61,000,000. As though all this were not enough, the company was allowed to issue first-mortgage bonds equal in amount to the Government bonds just mentioned. Thus the lien of the Government upon the railway dropped to the position of a second mortgage. The road was actually built by the notorious *Crédit Mobilier*, which took over all the resources of the original company, both land and cash. Of course, the construction of a railway uniting the Atlantic States with those of the Pacific was a work of immense national importance. On the other hand it became evident in after years that the generosity of the Government had been ill requited. Thus, under the directorship of Jay Gould, and later of Mr. Charles F. Adams, the management diverted a

<sup>42</sup> See Sanborn, *Congressional Grants of Land* (Madison, 1899).

good part of its earnings, above operating expenses and fixed charges, to the building of branch lines, instead of applying a percentage of the profits toward cancelling the obligation to the Government, as provided in the act of 1862. Indeed, the Government received but slight consideration from any of these Western roads for whose construction it had pledged its credit.

In the matter of the public lands, the railroads were peculiarly unscrupulous. In President Cleveland's first message to Congress,<sup>43</sup> attention was sharply called to the whole subject by the declaration that these "princely grants and subsidies" had been "diverted to private gains and corrupt uses. Our great nation does not begrudge its generosity, but it abhors speculation and fraud. A faithful application of the grants to the construction and perfecting of their roads, [and] an honest discharge of their obligations are all the public asks, and it will be contented with no less." But as time went on, it was plain that the railroad magnates had no conception of public duty, and thought simply of their own enrichment. One of them, Mr. C. P. Huntington, who had wrung a great fortune out of his manipulation of Pacific railways, was told that if he did not fulfil his obligations, the Government might step in and take possession. "It's quite welcome to," he cynically answered. "There's nothing left but two streaks of rust and a right of way." In 1890, however, this scandalous state of things came to an end. The Western States were swept by a feeling of anger against the railways, which in impudent disregard of their own obligations, were holding vast tracts of fertile land, and thus barring them against intending settlers under the Homestead Law. An act of Congress which the President approved on September 29th, ordered the

<sup>43</sup> December 8, 1885.

forfeiture of all such lands, of which more than a hundred million acres were thus restored to public uses.

The last two years of Mr. Harrison's administration were marked by great activity in the State Department. This was due not so much to Mr. Blaine's fondness for "a spirited foreign policy" as to circumstances over which he had no initial control. In March, 1891, a band of Italian criminals in New Orleans reached a climax of sporadic lawlessness by murdering the chief of police. For a long time they had been extorting money from citizens under threat of death, and had committed other crimes with practical impunity, because the local juries were either afraid to convict them or else had been bribed to disagree in rendering a verdict. Hennessy, the head of the police, showed immense energy and acuteness in tracking down the members of this band. They had him watched and followed; and late one evening he was shot almost to pieces at a signal given by an Italian boy. Against nine Italians strong evidence was gathered, and they were promptly brought to trial. To the astonishment of the judge himself, the jury acquitted six of the prisoners, and disagreed in the case of the other three. On the following night a mob, led by some of the most substantial citizens, broke open the prison, seized the prisoners, and either hanged or shot them all. Within a few hours the Italian Government cabled a strong protest to Mr. Blaine. Italy's Prime Minister, the Marquis di Rudini, demanded that the lynchers should be immediately punished, and that an indemnity should be immediately paid. Mr. Blaine answered temperately to the effect that the United States Government had no local jurisdiction in Louisiana, but that to Italian residents the State courts were open pre-

cisely as to citizens. He did, however, strongly urge Governor Nicholls of Louisiana to set the legal machinery of the State in motion, and he assured the Italian Premier that the whole affair should receive most careful consideration. The Italian blood was up, however, and Baron Fava, Italy's Minister at Washington, was directed to press Mr. Blaine incessantly. Baron Fava intimated that unless immediate action were taken he must withdraw from Washington. To this hint he received from Mr. Blaine a very sharp reply:

“I do not recognise the right of any Government to tell the United States what it shall do. We have never received orders from any foreign power and shall not begin now. It is a matter of indifference what persons in Italy think of our institutions. I cannot change them, still less violate them.”

To this curt note, written much in the same spirit as Webster's famous letter to the Chevalier Hülsemann in 1850, the Italian Minister made no answer, but at once left Washington and took passage for Italy. His action caused great excitement, especially in New Orleans. Many persons expected that Italy would deliver an ultimatum which President Harrison's Government would certainly reject and thus bring war within an appreciable distance. Rumour said that an Italian squadron was being mobilised and might soon appear off the mouth of the Mississippi to menace New Orleans. The situation looked even graver when the American Minister at Rome left Italy. But those who were well informed felt no disquietude, in view of the enormous disparity in fighting strength between Italy and the United States. An English naval officer, who was in New York at the time, made a joking comment which contained a certain element of truth.



“You people,” said he, “want more ships for your navy. Just let those Italian fellows send over a fleet. Then you take the fleet, and there you are!”

As a matter of fact, the Italian Government thought better of it before very long; and though many Americans were mobbed and otherwise insulted in Italy, and though the Italian press breathed forth threatenings, amicable relations were soon restored. It turned out that only three of the Italians who had been lynched were subjects of the King of Italy, the rest having been naturalised in this country; and so, when Congress, purely as an act of grace, voted the sum of \$25,000 to be given to the relatives of the dead men, King Humbert accepted the award, and diplomatic relations were resumed.

An embroilment between the United States and Chile, which took place at this time, was a much more serious affair. In January, 1891, a furious civil war broke out in Chile. Of all the Spanish-American republics, Chile has been the only one to conduct its foreign and domestic affairs in such a way as to win the respect of other nations. Situated in the temperate zone and ribbed with mountain ranges, its climatic and geographic conditions seem to have developed in its people certain characteristics for which one looks in vain among the other South American States. The government of Chile has been conspicuous for its intelligence, conservatism and integrity. Its finances have been ably administered. Order has been maintained through the strict enforcement of enlightened laws. Its political institutions are modelled upon those of the United States, and throughout the greater part of its history it has been free from turbulence and mercenary insurrection. Its successful war with Bolivia and Peru in 1881 made it plain that

henceforth Chile deserved respectful consideration as a naval and military power.

A knowledge of these facts, however, has led the Chilean people to cultivate a self-consciousness which does not always show itself in the most attractive fashion. Educated Chileans are apt to forget that, after all, their nation is a very small one and that, from the nature of things, it cannot figure very conspicuously in the history of the world. They are too fond of comparing it with the wretched little republics which are its immediate neighbours; and they forget that while Chile is an important State when contrasted with Peru or Uruguay or Venezuela, it is only a dwarf beside the United States or the giant nations of Europe. But the typical Chilean has a dream of his own, and one which he has cherished for more than fifty years. He believes that ultimately his country is destined to assert an hegemony over all the Spanish-speaking peoples of South America, and in the end to extend its influence northward, until, at last, having absorbed even Mexico, Chile shall confront the mighty North American Republic upon the borders of the Rio Grande. There are not a few Chileans who even think that by the end, perhaps, of another century the United States may have to do battle with its Southern rival for the mastery of the Western world. There is a touch of Spanish vanity in this magnificent vision; yet, though to Americans it may seem only ludicrous and fantastic, it appeals very strongly not merely to the Chilean imagination but to the Chilean sense of probability. Not unnaturally, therefore, the statesmen of that small republic have always been extremely sensitive concerning the claim of the United States to concern itself with South American affairs; and they resent the assumption that the Monroe Doctrine has any application to their

country. It is necessary to remember these facts in order to understand the drift of the events which are now to be narrated.

In 1886, Chile elected as its President one of those extremely able but unscrupulous men who appear from time to time in South American nations, and among whom Francia of Paraguay and Guzman Blanco of Venezuela stand out in history as interesting types. This was Señor Don José Manuel Balmaceda, whose rule up to the end of 1890 was marked by the most enlightened measures. He belonged to the so-called Progressist Party, and as President he did much to promote public education, to foster internal improvements and generally to develop the resources of his country. His political opponents, however, who headed a sort of oligarchy made up of leading members of the Chilean Congress, accused the President of plotting to perpetuate his power by securing the election of a tool of his as his successor. When he dissolved Congress, and raised revenue without the authority of law, the Congressional party proclaimed a civil war<sup>44</sup> and sought to overthrow Balmaceda by force of arms.

In this struggle the United States had no direct interest; but various circumstances soon led to complications of a very serious nature. It had been for thirty years the policy of our Government to give no encouragement to revolts in other countries. Mr. Blaine, therefore, by President Harrison's direction, continued as before to recognise Balmaceda as the lawful head of the Chilean Republic, and to refuse to accord to the Congressionalists the belligerent rights which they claimed. Balmaceda had been legally elected President. He held possession of the capital of the country. He controlled an army which was carrying on operations in the field against the rebels. Therefore,

<sup>44</sup> January 7, 1891.

why should the United States sever its official relations with him and suddenly recognise his enemies?

The case seemed plain enough; yet there were circumstances which made the situation somewhat delicate. Ever since the events of 1882, which have already been narrated,<sup>45</sup> Mr. Blaine had been viewed with a certain rancour by Chileans of all classes. They regarded him as an intermeddler, or even worse, and honestly believed him to be actuated by a feeling of hostility to Chilean interests. Therefore, when he continued to recognise Balmaceda, the Congressional party in Chile claimed that his action was due to an unfriendly spirit; and before long they professed to see what they called his malign influence at work against them. A good part of the Chilean navy had joined the revolutionists. Some engagements took place between these ships and the ships whose officers were Balmacedists. A small American squadron under Rear-Admiral Brown had been ordered to Chilean waters to protect American interests, and the Congressionalists asserted in very bitter language that officers from American vessels had acted as spies; that they had reported to Balmaceda the strength and also the movements of the rebel ships; and that in various other ways the naval force of the United States had violated the requirements of strict neutrality. Admiral Brown indignantly denied this charge, which was made in the most offensive manner. There was, indeed, no evidence at all to justify it. Nevertheless, it was generally believed by the Congressionalists, who presently got possession of the entire seacoast and the great fortified port of Valparaiso. Hatred of the United States became nearly universal in Chile after an incident which occurred in May.

Early in that month, a Chilean ship the *Itata*, chartered

<sup>45</sup> See pp. 177-8.

by the Congressional party, put in at the harbour of San Diego, in California. It was reported to the Government at Washington that the *Itata* was taking on a cargo of arms and ammunition for the Chilean rebels, in defiance of the neutrality laws. On May 6th, a United States marshal took possession of the ship, forbidding it to leave the port. On the following day, the *Itata's* commander cut her cable, overpowered the United States officers, and put to sea, carrying them away as prisoners. This high-handed proceeding stirred the Washington Government to instant action. The cruiser *Charleston* was despatched in swift pursuit with orders to take the *Itata*, and to sink her if she resisted. When the Chileans heard of this, the hotheads among them sent their new steel cruiser, the *Esmeralda*, to meet the *Itata* and to protect her against capture. The *Charleston* and the *Esmeralda* were ships of equal size and armament, and the result of a fight between them was awaited with breathless expectancy. It was supposed that the *Itata* would put in at the harbour of Acapulco on the Mexican coast; and to this harbour the *Charleston* hastened. The *Esmeralda* did the same; and both cruisers lay there with steam up, with decks cleared for action, and with the crews ready at their guns. It was an exciting moment, but no shot was fired; for the *Itata* failed to appear, and made her way direct to her destination. By the time of her arrival there, the Congressionalists had thought better of their defiance of the United States; and on June 4th, they delivered up the *Itata* to Rear-Admiral McCann, in command of the American squadron at Iquique.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Suit was afterward brought in the United States District Court of California by the owners to test the legality of the Government's action in seizing the *Itata* at San Diego. On appeal the Supreme Court decided in favour of the Government.

The revolt in Chile proved to be successful. On August 7th, Balmaceda's forces were routed by the Congressional army, which marched upon the capital, Santiago, and entered it in triumph. Balmaceda took refuge in the Argentine legation, where, on September 18th, he committed suicide. A new government was proclaimed in Chile under the presidency of Señor Jorge Montt. Everywhere the revolutionists prevailed, and they were now formally recognised by the United States. The most serious part of the whole affair was, however, still to come.

Soon after becoming Secretary of State, Mr. Blaine had secured the appointment, as Minister to Chile, of Mr. Patrick Egan. Mr. Egan was one of the group whom Mr. Blaine's political opponents were accustomed derisively to call "Blaine Irishmen." He had not long been naturalised as an American citizen, having come to the United States somewhat hastily in order to escape arrest and imprisonment at the hands of the British authorities in Ireland, who charged him with political offences in connection with the Irish Land League. Critics of the Harrison administration spoke of Mr. Egan as "an escaped jail-bird" and even insinuated that he had been connected with the Phoenix Park murders in 1882. There was not a shadow of truth in all this. Mr. Egan was a man of ability and honour, who had simply made himself disliked by the Castle set in Dublin at a time when the British Government was trying one of its periodical experiments in repression. Nevertheless, his appointment to a diplomatic post was properly open to criticism; and in Chile, especially, where there were so many influential English residents, it was a cause of social embarrassment. Mr. Egan, moreover, in carrying out his early instructions to recognise the Balmaceda Government had perhaps erred through excess

of zeal; so that he was peculiarly obnoxious to the Congressionalists, who regarded him as a partisan of their enemy.

When Santiago fell and the troops of the revolution entered that city, intoxicated with their victory, there were enacted fearful scenes of lust and wholesale murder. Many of the Balmacedists, fearing for their lives, took refuge in the American legation, begging the protection of the Minister. By the law of nations, the precincts of an embassy or of a legation are regarded as being the soil of that country whose flag flies over it; but whether the immunity which such a place enjoys should be used to protect citizens of the State to which the embassy is accredited, is a disputed point. Mr. Egan, however, received the Balmacedists—among them the late Minister of Foreign Affairs and the late Governor of Santiago, together with members of their households. The new Chilean Foreign Minister demanded the surrender of the fugitives. Mr. Egan hoisted the American flag and declined to accede to the demand. The Chileans were furious, yet they hesitated to violate the sanctity of the legation. They tried other means, however, hoping to annoy Mr. Egan into compliance. The neighbourhood of his residence swarmed with spies. Drunken soldiers reeled by, yelling out vile epithets and making boisterous threats. It was believed by Mr. Egan that a plot existed to set fire to the legation and thus drive out the fugitives. Meanwhile, the Chilean State Department carried on a correspondence with the American Minister with regard to the rights of the question from the standpoint of international law. Here Mr. Egan neatly scored on his adversary in a series of very able notes, in which he showed that in 1866, during a revolution in Peru, the Chilean Government had directed its Minister in that country to insist upon two principles,—

the right of asylum and the right of safe conduct to a neutral territory for persons taking shelter in a foreign legation. In 1888, at the Congress of American Republics, Chile had again defended the same principles. Mr. Egan, in fact, made out so good a case as to put an end to the design of taking his guests from him by force, though the right of safe conduct was still denied.

All this controversy, following upon the charges against Admiral Brown, and also the affair of the *Itata*, intensified Chilean animosity toward the United States. The newspapers contained violent attacks upon Egan, Blaine, and Americans in general. Every sort of slanderous story was circulated and believed, and day by day popular feeling grew more and more inflamed. At this time the United States cruiser *Baltimore*, commanded by Captain W. S. Schley, was in the harbour of Valparaiso. On October 17th, Captain Schley rather unwisely gave shore-leave to nearly one hundred of his sailors. Within a few hours after they had landed, they were surrounded by a mob of over two thousand Chileans, who separated them into small groups and then attacked them. The sailors were unarmed, but defended themselves manfully until a body of fifty policemen armed with carbines and bayonets took part in the assault upon them. Two of the Americans were killed—one of them being shot by a policeman—and eighteen were badly stabbed, cut, or bruised by stones. The rest were dragged to prison through the streets, some of them by the heels, amid the threats, curses, and uproar of the mob.

The news of this affair naturally caused great indignation in the United States and it led to a long and voluminous diplomatic correspondence, as well as to a sharp interchange of notes between Captain Schley of the *Baltimore*



and the Intendente of Valparaiso. Of course, the sailors who had been dragged to prison were speedily released, but the Chilean authorities were unwilling to admit that the United States had a just grievance. An investigation instituted by Captain Schley showed the facts concerning the assault to have been those which have been here set forth—that the police of Valparaiso had taken part with the mob in shooting and otherwise assaulting unarmed bluejackets. The Chileans, on the other hand, asserted that the Americans were drunk, and that they had provoked the attack by their outrageous conduct. The charge of drunkenness was doubtless true, for sailors of whatever nationality are not wont to ask for shore-leave from motives which would commend themselves to total abstinence societies.<sup>47</sup> But it was perfectly evident that the attack had been made upon them because of hatred to the uniform they wore, and that it was directed against them, not as individuals, but as Americans. The conduct of the police, moreover, showed an official animosity which surpassed even that of the rabble. Under the circumstances, Secretary Blaine insisted upon a specific apology from the

<sup>47</sup> Commander Evans afterwards summed the matter up with delicious frankness in these words: "He [Captain Schley] was in the midst of a correspondence with the Intendente, conducted in the most perfect Castilian, to show, or prove, that his men were all perfectly sober when they were assaulted on shore. I did not agree with him in this; for in the first place I doubted the fact, and in the second, it was not an issue worth discussing. His men were probably drunk on shore, properly drunk; they went ashore, many of them, for the purpose of getting drunk, which they did on Chilean rum paid for with good United States money. When in this condition they were more entitled to protection than if they had been sober. This was my view of it, at least, and the one I always held about men whom I commanded. Instead of protecting them, the Chileans foully murdered these men, and we believed with the connivance and assistance of armed policemen. That was the issue—not the question of whether they were drunk or sober."

Chilean Government, and upon an indemnity to the wounded men and to the families of those who had been killed. The Chileans put the demand aside pending a further investigation on their part. This investigation was protracted interminably, and on November 25th Mr. Blaine complained of the delay. The Chilean Minister in Washington informed him that Spanish law was "slow in its processes, but exact in its conclusions"; and with this statement Mr. Blaine was for the time forced to be content.

It was plain enough that the Chileans intended to postpone any definite action and to let the affair drag along until it should have been half forgotten. From time to time, vague hints were made looking to arbitration, but nothing definite was suggested. Meanwhile, the newspapers of Santiago and Valparaiso continued their abuse of the "North Americans," and especially of Mr. Egan and Mr. Blaine. It looked as though the final outcome of the incident might be very grave. As a precautionary measure, the United States Government put all its vessels of war into commission. Rear-Admiral Walker with a squadron was ordered to Brazil, and the vessels already stationed off the Pacific Coast were held in readiness for active service. At this time, the opposition press in the United States very intemperately accused Mr. Blaine of seeking to stir up a war with Chile. Reviewing all the evidence, it is impossible now to hold this belief. Mr. Blaine's attitude was a firm one, yet it is certain that all the while he was exerting his influence to hold back the President. Mr. Harrison was, perhaps unconsciously, influenced by the thought that a foreign war would almost certainly re-elect him; but whatever his motives, he seemed anxious to force matters to a point at which war would

become inevitable. Mr. Blaine, on the other hand, displayed a commendable patience, and refrained from any action which could be regarded as precipitate.<sup>48</sup> The *Baltimore* was withdrawn from Valparaiso. The *Boston*, which was cruising in Chilean waters, merely touched there and then proceeded northward. During the critical days of December, although the harbour of Valparaiso was dotted with foreign ships of war, the United States was represented only by the little gunboat *Yorktown*, under the orders of Commander Robley D. Evans.

Commander Evans was a Virginian, who had adhered to the Union throughout the Civil War, in which he had fought with great gallantry, receiving several serious wounds. He was popularly known to his comrades in the navy as "Fighting Bob," a name which was always a curious puzzle to the honest commander himself, for in his own estimation he was one of the most peaceful of living men. He thought himself a miracle of patience and forbearance, whereas in fact he was never truly happy unless he could sniff the smell of gunpowder. He resembled that interesting hero of Conan Doyle's who vivaciously announced that he would slash to pieces any man who dared describe him as pugnacious. The position of Commander Evans at Valparaiso was a very trying one. Nearly the whole of the Chilean fleet was distributed about him in the harbour. If he went ashore, he was dogged by spies and scowled at by the rabble. The foreign element, especially the Germans, were still more unfriendly, if such a thing were possible. Finally, the Government at Washington depended upon him for frequent and detailed accounts of the state of

<sup>48</sup> From this time probably dates the estrangement between the President and Mr. Blaine, which was to have important consequences. See p. 286.

public feeling, while Mr. Egan was continually sending to him from Santiago messages of the most alarming character.

Commander Evans, however, kept his head and carried off the situation in admirable form. He treated the Chilean officials with punctilious courtesy, while at the same time resenting hotly any overt acts of enmity. The Chilean torpedo-boats began to engage in what they called practice drill. This drill consisted for the most part in speeding their craft as near to the *Yorktown* as was possible without touching it, often within a distance of a few feet. The object of this was twofold. First of all it was meant to show the American commander how utterly he was at their mercy. In the second place, it was intended as a little diversion at the expense of the *Yorktown* and for the amusement of the German, French and English naval officers whose ships were in the harbour. After a few days of this sort of thing, Commander Evans sent for the officer in charge of the torpedo drill, and protested against his action as discourteous.

"I beg to inform you," said the Chilean, with a veiled sneer, "that the water of this harbour belongs to my government, and that I propose to use it in manœuvring the torpedo-boats under my command."

"Very good," returned Commander Evans. "But I beg to inform you that the *Yorktown* is the property of my government, and that if one of your boats so much as scratches its paint I will blow her bottom out."<sup>49</sup>

This put a speedy end to the Chilean torpedo drill. On another occasion, a party of roughs amused themselves by throwing stones at one of the small boats of the *Yorktown* and daring the men in it to come ashore. Commander Evans at once visited the Chilean cruiser *Cochran*,

<sup>49</sup> Evans, *A Sailor's Log*, p. 297 (New York, 1901).

whose captain, Vial, was senior officer, not only of the fleet, but of the city. Evans has described the interview in these words, which suggest that his sobriquet of " Fighting Bob " was not wholly misapplied:

" I could hardly hold myself down while I told him of it; but I did, and then read him the riot act. I demanded of him immediate and efficient protection by the police, and served notice on him, then and there, that a repetition of the offence would be sufficient evidence that they could not control their people; and that I should arm my boats and shoot any and every man who insulted me or my men or my flag in any way. Vial was greatly shocked, turned as white as a sheet—my manner was not very mild, I fancy—swore and damned the discharged soldiers and said they were doing all they could to involve the country in war with the United States. . . . After a few moments Captain Vial hastened on shore to jump on the police, assuring me that I should have an ample apology to-morrow."<sup>50</sup>

In the meantime, the situation of the refugees in the American legation at Santiago was becoming a very serious one. Crowded into a comparatively small house, unable to leave its shelter, their lives threatened at every moment, they were doubtful whether the protection accorded them by the American Minister would prove effectual for very long. The Chileans were now willing to let them slip away secretly to the shore, but refused to grant them formally a safe conduct. As the American Government still refrained from pressing matters to an extremity, the

<sup>50</sup> Evans, p. 287. An entertaining, though inaccurate, narrative of events in Chile at this time may be found in Hervey, *Dark Days in Chile* (London, 1892). See also Hancock, *Short History of Chile*, pp. 365-371 (Chicago, 1896); and for the Chilean view of these occurrences, Matta, *Cuestiones Recientes con la Legacion y el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos* (Santiago, 1892).

arrogance of the Chileans increased from day to day. Most of them believed in all sincerity that their navy was more than a match for that of the United States. Their newspapers boasted that in case of war, San Francisco would be laid in ashes and that the whole Pacific Coast of the United States would be ravaged and laid under contribution. This boast, although it seems preposterous now, was not wholly due to the sort of pride which goes with Spanish blood. There was in Valparaiso a very large German colony composed of merchants and persons engaged in shipping. They, together with the English, had largely monopolised the foreign trade of Chile, thanks to the high protective tariff of the United States. The Chileans, therefore, knew little about Americans. They did not trade with them. They seldom saw them; and they listened eagerly to the German talk about the helplessness and general insignificance of the United States. It came at last to be an article of faith that in the event of war, the German Empire would come to the support of Chile.

One finds it difficult to believe that any such delusion possessed the government officials in Santiago. Yet, perhaps, one member of that Government may have entertained it; since otherwise it is very difficult to understand his action. On December 11, 1891, Señor Don Manuel Matta, formerly a journalist, but now the Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed a telegram to the Chilean Minister in Washington relating to a message on Chilean affairs sent by President Harrison to Congress. In this telegram, language was used which was insulting not only to Mr. Egan, but to Secretary Tracy and even to President Harrison. Señor Matta spoke of the President's statements as "erroneous or deliberately incorrect" (*deliber-*

*adamente inexactos*). A note of Mr. Egan's was described as "aggressive in purpose and virulent in language." Matta's telegram ended with an allusion to what he called "the intrigues which proceed from so low a source, and the threats which come from a source so high." This despatch was read by Matta to the Chilean Senate and was telegraphed to all the Chilean legations in Europe, thus publishing the insult to the world.

Mr. Egan at once sent a note to Señor Matta demanding to know whether the text of the telegram as given in the newspapers was correct. Matta replied that it was, intimating at the same time that it did not concern any one save the Government of Chile and its officials. The Chilean Minister at Washington thoroughly appreciated the "blazing indiscretion" of which his chief had been guilty, and he took the responsibility of suppressing the offensive telegram so far as he could do so. It was, however, cabled to the American press and was read by the American people with intense indignation. Even Mr. Blaine no longer sought to hold President Harrison in check. Preparations for war were openly begun. The navy yards at San Francisco and Brooklyn worked night and day. A squadron of eight cruisers was assembled in Pacific waters; blockading ships were ordered to be bought; and an ultimatum was finally sent to the Chilean Government containing three peremptory demands: first, that the Matta telegram should be withdrawn, its language disowned, and an explicit apology offered for it; second, that an indemnity should at once be paid for the outrage upon American sailors; and third, that the refugees in the American legation at Santiago should receive a safe conduct to neutral territory.

For a moment the scales were evenly balanced between

peace and war. Volunteers offered their services to the War Department in Washington. The Chileans boggled over the terms which Mr. Blaine had laid before them. They talked of arbitration. They offered, while refusing to withdraw the Matta telegram, to declare that it was not meant to be offensive. The Chilean Minister argued that it was a purely domestic communication and therefore privileged. Mr. Blaine and the President, however, stood firm, and on January 23d the Chilean Government executed a complete backdown. The terms in which its submission was offered left nothing to be desired on the score of completeness. Wrote Señor Pereira to Mr. Egan:

“ The undersigned deplors that in that telegram there were employed through an error of judgment the expressions which are offensive in the judgment of your Government. . . . In fulfilment of a high duty of courtesy and sincerity toward a friendly nation . . . the Government of Chile absolutely withdraws the said expressions . . . —a declaration which is made without reservation in order that it may receive such publicity as your Government may deem suitable.”

The sum of \$75,000 was paid from the Chilean Treasury to the injured sailors of the *Baltimore*; and the refugees in the American legation received a safe conduct and left Chilean territory unmolested, under the protection of the United States.<sup>51</sup>

This was the second incident during the Harrison administration which showed that the American people were no longer unconcerned with their foreign relations. As in Samoa, so in Chile, a new spirit in American diplomacy had been manifested in a striking manner, and had made

<sup>51</sup> The whole diplomatic and naval correspondence was submitted to Congress by President Harrison as an appendix to his message of January 26, 1892. It makes a volume of some 650 pages.



it plain to all the world that the United States was becoming a force to be reckoned with in international affairs. Mr. Blaine's enemies at home bitterly attacked his conduct of these negotiations. The opposition press accused him of jingoism, of duplicity, and of insincerity. So violent was this opposition in the end, as to find expression in the most unpatriotic sentiments. At the very moment when peace and war were trembling in the balance, a semi-political association in New York, known as the Reform Club, actually invited a Chilean emissary to address it, and listened with applause to his venomous attacks upon the President and Government of the United States.<sup>52</sup> Such incidents as this, however, merely disgusted and repelled all right-thinking people; and Mr. Blaine came out of the Chilean imbroglio with his popularity greater even than it had been before.

Not long after the Chilean affair had reached its climax, events of much interest took place in a distant island of the Pacific. The little kingdom of Hawaii had for forty years been living under a constitutional monarchy which continued the line of native kings. Its independence had been guaranteed by France and England in 1843; and the United States, though not a party to this agreement, had, nevertheless, on more than one occasion, used its armed forces to repress disorder and maintain the reign of law. The white population of the island comprised a large number of persons of American ancestry, and these acted in accord with the resident English, the two together constituting an enlightened and highly prosperous community. In 1881, the Hawaiian king, Kalakaua I., who had not before regarded himself as a particularly im-

<sup>52</sup> One member, Mr. Ellery Anderson, honoured himself by rising at this meeting and protesting against it as unpatriotic.

portant personage, made a tour of the world. Much to his surprise and delight, he found his kingly dignity recognised by some of the greatest sovereigns of Asia and Europe, who treated him with every mark of respect as a member of the royal caste. His flag was saluted by the fleets of Japan, England, France and Germany; military reviews were held in his honour; and he was welcomed to palaces and fêted as cordially as though he were a monarch of much greater power and pretensions.<sup>53</sup> When he returned, he brought with him not merely jewelled decorations from the Czar, the Austrian Kaiser, the Queen of England, and the Pope, but brand-new crowns which he had purchased in London for himself and for his consort, together with a field battery intended for a standing army, which, in his imagination, already existed. His foreign journey, in fact, had turned his head. On a small scale he reproduced the follies and extravagances of the Egyptian Khedive, Ismail, the greatest spendthrift of modern times. Kalakaua began to imitate the monarchs at whose courts he had been so lavishly entertained. In his private life he gave himself up to the parasites and panders who swarmed about him and suggested to him new forms of wastefulness and new refinements of vice. He instituted an Order with insignia and decorations; he built himself a palace; he had himself crowned with splendid ceremonial, though he had already been a king for nine years. Already he saw himself at the head of a great Polynesian empire; and in 1887 he tried to interfere in the affairs of Samoa, with some dreamy notion of adding its islands to his own small kingdom.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>53</sup> For an interesting and often amusing account of this tour, see Armstrong, *Round the World with King Kalakaua* (New York, 1904).

<sup>54</sup> The King fitted out a small expedition in 1887 and despatched it to

Worse than this, he tried to ignore or to evade the constitution which had been established and ratified by the Hawaiian people. The royal expenses were now paid, by the personal order of the King, out of the public funds, and without the knowledge or approval of his Ministers. He tried to negotiate a foreign loan of \$10,000,000 in order to maintain a standing army for the enhancement of his royal prestige. He even lent an ear to the native element, who urged him so to modify the constitution, as to exclude from the franchise the white residents of Hawaii. These, however, uniting with the more intelligent of the natives, not only resisted the attempt, but compelled the King to keep more closely within his constitutional limitations.

In 1891, worn out by worry and by unrestrained excesses, Kalakaua died, and was succeeded by his sister, Liliuokalani. The new Hawaiian Queen was a woman of great force of character and of much personal charm. Her bearing was truly regal. She presided over public functions with marked dignity, while all who were received by her in private audience came away charmed by her grace and affability. She had been highly educated, and spoke both French and English with perfect purity and elegance. She was, however, as thoroughly imbued with a sense of her royal prerogative as though she had been an Elizabeth or a Maria Theresa. She was in England when the Constitution of 1887 was established in Hawaii;

Samoa in the steamer *Kaimiloa*. Just what he expected the expedition to accomplish is not very clear; but the drunken crew of the *Kaimiloa* ran the ship aground, and the whole affair ended in an absurd fiasco. See House Exec. Documents, 238, Fiftieth Congress, p. 39 seqq. (1888); and President Cleveland's Message of April 2, 1888, with the appended documents. Further details are given in Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, pp. 373-374 (Boston, 1903).

and when she learned that under its provisions the white residents were to have an equal share of political power, her indignation passed all bounds. Upon her accession to the throne, she set herself to the task of abrogating that instrument and of restoring the personal government of the Kamehamehas. She had no sooner taken the coronation oath than she declared to one of the Cabinet, "My Ministry shall be responsible to me alone!" She dismissed the existing Cabinet and chose a Ministry of her own selection, which was opposed by a majority in the Hawaiian legislature. To provide the funds needed for her campaign against constitutionalism, she leagued herself with certain interests which sought a lottery franchise and a law licensing the sale of opium. By a series of intrigues which it would be tedious to detail, these measures were legalised, and at once the Legislature was dissolved. On January 14, 1893, the Queen had planned to promulgate by royal decree a new Constitution, which should supersede the old one. Her Ministry informed her that such an act would be revolutionary. She demanded their resignations, but they refused compliance, and issued a proclamation (January 15th) setting forth these facts and declaring the throne vacant. On the following day, a mass meeting of the foreign residents and many of the natives formally decided that in view of the Queen's arbitrary acts, stringent measures were needed "for the preservation of the public credit and to avert the final ruin of a financial condition already overstrained."

A Provisional Government, headed by Mr. Sanford B. Dole, a Justice of the Supreme Court, was organised, with an Advisory Council representing the best elements of the community. This body, in view of the intense excitement prevailing in Honolulu, called upon the United States

Minister, Mr. John L. Stevens of Maine, for assistance in preserving order. The United States cruiser *Boston* was lying in the harbour; and at the request of Mr. Stevens a battalion of sailors and marines was landed by Captain Wiltse and marched through the streets of the capital, encamping before the Government Building. Mr. Stevens on his own responsibility recognised the new Government and officially proclaimed Hawaii to be under the protection of the United States (February 1, 1893). The Queen, seeing that resistance was useless, made a formal protest and then yielded, as she said, only "to the superior forces of the United States of America."

The Provisional Government, doubtful of the effect of these events upon public opinion in the United States, hurriedly despatched a commission to lay their case before President Harrison, and to ask for the annexation of Hawaii to the United States. The President and Mr. J. W. Foster, who had succeeded Mr. Blaine as Secretary of State, strongly favoured this suggestion, which was, in fact, not a new one, since as early as 1854 annexation had been considered. A treaty was hurriedly negotiated between the Commissioners and the Secretary of State; and on February 15th a treaty of annexation was signed, providing for the continuance in power of the Dole government, and the retention of the existing Hawaiian laws, subject, however, to the exercise of supreme authority by the United States, which was to appoint a commissioner empowered to veto any or all acts of the local administration. It was further provided that the United States should assume the Hawaiian debt,<sup>55</sup> that it should allow the deposed Queen an annual grant of \$20,000, and that it should give to the Princess Kaiulani, who was next in line of succession, the sum of \$150,000 in return for a renuncia-

<sup>55</sup> At this time a little over \$2,000,000.

tion of her rights. This treaty, after having been duly signed, was immediately submitted by President Harrison to the Senate for ratification, accompanied by a message in which he said:

“The overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this Government, but had its origin in what seemed to have been a reactionary and revolutionary policy on the part of Queen Liliuokalani, which put in serious peril not only the large and preponderating interests of the United States in the Islands, but all foreign interests, and indeed, the decent administration of civil affairs and the peace of the Islands. . . . The restoration of Queen Liliuokalani to her throne is undesirable, if not impossible; and unless actively supported by the United States, would be accompanied by serious disaster and the disorganisation of all business interests. The influence and interest of the United States in the Islands must be increased and not diminished.

“It is essential that none of the great Powers shall secure these Islands. Such a possession would not consist with our safety and with the peace of the world. This view of the situation is so apparent and conclusive that no protest has been heard from any Government against proceedings looking to annexation. Every foreign representative at Honolulu promptly acknowledged the Provisional Government, and I think there is a general concurrence in the opinion that the deposed Queen ought not to be restored.”<sup>56</sup>

President Harrison's assertion that the United States had had no part in the revolution in Hawaii was regarded by the opposition as disingenuous. It was said that Mr. Dole and his associates were simply conspirators, who had acted in accordance with a preconceived plan, the details of which had been fully communicated to the American Government. The opportune presence of the *Boston* at Honolulu was viewed as something more than a coincidence. The action of Mr. Stevens was denounced as

<sup>56</sup> Message of February 15th, 1893.

treacherous to the Government to which he had been accredited. The whole affair was described as an outrage upon a helpless people and as an attempt on the part of Mr. Harrison and his advisers to seize territory in a distant part of the world without any shadow of justification. The white residents of Hawaii were styled "carpet-baggers," and their new Government a barefaced usurpation. Many sneers were directed at these "sons of missionaries," who, though aliens, had deprived the natives of their political birthright.

Reviewing this affair in the light of all that is now known, two facts stand out beyond the possibility of refutation. In the first place, there can be no doubt that Queen Liliuokalani had justly forfeited her throne. She had violated the Constitution which she had solemnly sworn to maintain, and was proceeding to action such as would, in the case of an English sovereign, have led at once to the forfeiture of the royal rights. Furthermore, the sneers aimed at the "sons of missionaries" as aliens, were thoroughly unwarranted. Mr. Dole, for instance, and his immediate associates were not aliens at all. Though of foreign ancestry, they had been born in Hawaii. Their homes were there. All their interests were there. They were the ones who had transformed the island into a civilised and prosperous community. It was they who maintained the system of public education, who paid the greater part of the taxes, and who supported the administration of the laws. If revolution is ever justifiable—and of this no Anglo-Saxon can feel any doubt—the revolution in Hawaii was surely so, as being the act of men defending their political liberties and personal rights.

On the other hand, it may be regarded as absolutely certain that the American Minister, Mr. Stevens, was not only

well aware of what was going on, but that he had fully informed his Government, and that President Harrison and his advisers sympathised with the annexation movement. In February of 1892, Mr. Stevens had written to the State Department a letter in which he said:

“There are increasing indications that the annexation sentiment is gaining among the business men.”

On March 8th of the same year, he had asked Mr. Blaine for special instructions, “in case the Government here should be reorganised and overturned by an orderly and peaceful revolutionary movement. I have information which I deem reliable that there is an organised revolutionary party in the Islands. . . . These people are very likely to overthrow the monarchy and establish a republic with the ultimate view of annexation to the United States.”

On December 30th, Admiral Skerrett, who was under orders to take command of the Pacific Squadron, had called at the Navy Department in Washington for final instructions. He said to the Secretary:

“Mr. Tracy, I want to ask you about these Hawaiian affairs. When I was out there twenty years ago, I had frequent conversations with the then United States Minister, Mr. Pierce, on the subject of the Islands. I was told then that the United States Government did not wish to annex the islands of Hawaii.”

Mr. Tracy answered:

“The wishes of the Government have changed. They will be very glad to annex Hawaii. As a matter of course, none but the ordinary legal means can be used to persuade these people to come into the United States.”



“All right, sir,” answered Admiral Skerrett, “I only wanted to know how things were going on, as a cue to my action.”<sup>57</sup>

Finally, Mr. Stevens, on the day when the American marines were landed in Honolulu, had sent a despatch to Washington saying, “The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe, and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it.”

From all these facts, it is quite obvious that the American Government was fully aware of the impending revolution and was in sympathy with it as a means of securing the annexation of the Islands. Whether the revolution would have succeeded had not marines been landed from the *Boston* at the critical moment is a purely hypothetical question. As to the morality of the whole proceeding, opinions will always differ. At the time, the administration received much harsh criticism, and though President Harrison, in his message of February 15th, urged the Senate to ratify the annexation treaty at once, definite action upon it was delayed. The sands of the Harrison administration were fast running out. Its hours were numbered; and the Hawaiian question was soon to assume a new form and to pass through many different phases before it reached a final settlement. A few days more, and another hand had laid a firm grasp upon the helm of State.

<sup>57</sup> Senate Report on Hawaii, p. 10 (1893). See President Cleveland's message of December 18, 1893, with the appended documents.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE ELECTION OF 1892

AFTER witnessing President's Harrison's inauguration, Mr. Cleveland had left Washington and presently became a resident of New York City, where he resumed the practice of law, as an associate of the firm of Bangs, Stetson, Tracy and MacVeagh. In the eyes of the professional politicians of both parties, his public career seemed to have ended, and to have ended in utter failure. He was regarded as one who had, by an accident of politics, attained a transitory greatness to which he had proved to be personally unequal. His dogged determination in forcing an apparently unpopular issue, almost on the eve of a presidential election and merely as a matter of conviction, had been quite incomprehensible at the time, and the result appeared to justify the contempt which partisans such as Senator Gorman and Governor Hill confidentially expressed to their intimates. They felt that Mr. Cleveland had now been eliminated from national politics. He had settled down as an every-day lawyer in a great cosmopolitan city, where the complexity of life and the clash of material interests reduce even the most eminent of its citizens to comparative obscurity. Mr. Henry Watter-son rather complacently remarked at this time: "Cleveland in New York reminds one of a stone thrown into a river. There is a 'plunk,' a splash, and then silence."

The ex-President accepted this verdict with philosophical good humour. He had nothing to regret. He had acted in accordance with his sense of right, and had done

what he believed to be the best both for his country and for his party. As he said a little later, at a banquet given in his honour:<sup>1</sup> "We know that we have not deceived the people with false promises and pretences. And we know that we have not corrupted and betrayed the poor with the money of the rich."

By his savings and by judicious investments in real estate, Mr. Cleveland had already secured a modest competence. As a lawyer, his professional labours yielded him a generous income. He practised little in the courts; but important cases were often referred to him by the sitting justices, while his unquestioned integrity and conscientiousness led many prospective litigants to submit their interests to his arbitration. There was one kind of legal practice which he persistently refused to undertake. No persuasion could induce him to accept retainers from the great corporations.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Cleveland was convinced that the moneyed interests had already become a menace to the welfare of the nation; and with them he was unwilling to associate himself in any fashion whatsoever. In the message which he sent to Congress soon after his defeat for re-election, he had pointed out the perils which he saw in vast and irresponsible aggregations of wealth, whose possessors felt themselves to be above the law.

"The fortunes realised by our manufacturers are no longer solely the reward of sturdy industry and enlightened foresight, but they result from the discriminating favour of the Government and are largely built upon undue exactions from the masses of our people. The gulf between employers and the employed is constantly widening, and classes are rapidly forming, one comprising

<sup>1</sup> By the Democratic Club of New York, April 27, 1889 (Parker, p. 248).

<sup>2</sup> Hensel and Parker, *Life and Public Services of Grover Cleveland*, pp. 319, 320 (Philadelphia, 1892).

the very rich and powerful, while in another are found the toiling poor.

“As we view the achievements of aggregated capital, we discover the existence of trusts, combinations, and monopolies, while the citizen is struggling far in the rear or is trampled to death beneath an iron heel. Corporations, which should be carefully restrained creatures of the law and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the people’s masters.

“The existing situation is injurious to the health of our entire body-politic. It stifles in those for whose benefit it is permitted, all patriotic love of country, and substitutes in its place selfish greed and grasping avarice. Devotion to American citizenship for its own sake and for what it should accomplish as a motive to our nation’s advancement and the happiness of all our people is displaced by the assumption that the Government, instead of being the embodiment of equality, is but an instrumentality through which especial and individual advantages are to be gained.

“Communism is a hateful thing and a menace to peace and organised government; but the communism of combined wealth and capital, the outgrowth of overweening cupidity and selfishness, which insidiously undermine the justice and integrity of free institutions, is not less dangerous than the communism of oppressed poverty and toil, which, exasperated by injustice and discontent, attacks with wild disorder the citadel of rule.”<sup>3</sup>

But although Mr. Cleveland was no longer an object of interest to the politicians, there were many quiet indications that the great mass of his countrymen had not forgotten him. Invitations came to him continually from professional, commercial, religious, educational, and civic organisations, which sought the honour of his presence at commemorative banquets and other public gatherings.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Message of December 3, 1888.

<sup>4</sup> For instance, at the laying of the corner-stone of the New York Academy of Medicine; at the banquet of the Hibernian Society of Philadelphia;

When his engagements permitted, he acceded to these requests; for, as he said on one occasion, he had no sympathy with those good souls who "are greatly disturbed every time an ex-President ventures to express an opinion on any subject." Not infrequently he spoke at length to interested listeners; and what he said was always sensible and wise, and sometimes pregnant with suggestion. As a public speaker, Mr. Cleveland was far from attaining brilliancy. Even his warmest friends could scarcely claim that he was an orator. His manner and his style alike were heavy. He had a strong preference for polysyllabic words, and for sentences so involved as to be Johnsonian in their ponderosity. He had probably never heard the dictum of the French stylist who said: *L'adjectif, c'est le plus grand ennemi du substantif*; for almost every noun was coupled with an adjective, and these adjectives were frequently applied in pairs. Moreover, like many another statesman, he often took refuge in the baldest truisms, which were seldom freshened up by originality of phrasing. Mr. Abram S. Hewitt once said of him, in a tartly cryptic epigram, which may be interpreted as conveying either praise or censure: "Cleveland is the greatest master of platitude since Washington."

It is likely, however, that Mr. Cleveland's oratorical deficiencies were, on the whole, a distinct advantage to him. The American people at that period still held to the conservative tradition which viewed exceptional accomplishments in public men, if not with suspicion, at least with a certain amount of caution. Brilliancy might rouse admiration, but it could not inspire confidence. In the

at the Cornell Alumni Society meeting; at the Thurman birthday banquet in Columbus, Ohio; at the banquet of the New York Chamber of Commerce; and before the Young Men's Democratic Association, Philadelphia.

long run it was the safe man rather than the showy man who secured the highest honours from the electorate. Clay and Webster and Blaine had won the frantic applause of millions; yet they had all failed to achieve the one great prize on which their hearts were set. No President had ever been an orator of the first rank, save only Lincoln; and Lincoln's great political addresses represented the oratory of reason rather than the oratory of emotion. And hence, in Mr. Cleveland's case, even when his utterances were very tame and his sentences quite commonplace, they appealed to the multitude as embodying sound morality, conservative opinion, and what General Grant was fond of calling "good horse sense."

Mr. Cleveland's lines, therefore, at this time were cast in pleasant places. Successful in his profession, and respected by those whose personal esteem was worth the having, he enjoyed a period of tranquillity that must have been most grateful after his stormy years of public office. He spent his summers at a charming country-seat upon the Massachusetts coast, to which he gave the name "Grey Gables." There he entertained his intimate friends with a genial, friendly hospitality; and there, as an angler, he won a reputation which he was said to value quite as much as any public honours that he had ever gained. It was an ideal life for a retired statesman, a life that he would gladly have continued to enjoy, unvexed by the strife and din of party politics. But the fates had decreed it otherwise.

The discussion of the McKinley Bill in 1890, and the overwhelming Republican defeat in the congressional elections which followed close upon the passage of that measure, brought Mr. Cleveland once again into a prominence such as he was far from seeking. It was he who in

his bold message of 1887 had first raised the tariff issue. It was he who had forced the Republicans to adopt a policy which had ended in their utter rout. Though he had, at the time, failed of re-election, he had, nevertheless, inspired his party with aggressiveness and confidence. Many Democrats now began to ask whether any one was so well fitted as he to lead the party back again to power. The campaign of education, begun in 1888, was commencing to bear fruit. Looking forward to the coming struggle for the presidency, popular feeling instinctively went out to Mr. Cleveland as the logical candidate for 1892. Yet, although this sentiment was beginning to pervade the rank and file of the Democracy, it was most distasteful to the party managers. In a phrase of their own choosing, they "had no use" for Mr. Cleveland. To them he had always shown himself intractable, and they had been pleased at what appeared to be his permanent elimination from politics. It was not agreeable to think of him as likely to become again a candidate. Therefore they took no notice of the popular feeling in his favour, but endeavoured to ignore him and to speak of him in public with a studied indifference, as of one whose day was over and who had become politically "a back number." Most of the party organs refrained from mentioning him in connection with the presidency. Some of them endeavoured to discredit him by a systematic press campaign of defamation. Conspicuous in this was the *New York Sun*, at that time under the editorship of Mr. Charles A. Dana.

Charles Anderson Dana was undoubtedly the most remarkable figure that had yet arisen in the history of American journalism. Born in 1819, and educated at Harvard, he was a careful student and omnivorous reader, with a memory so tenacious as to place at his command a vast

array of facts, which his quick wit and literary skill enabled him to use with singular effectiveness. As a very young man he had joined the Fourierites for a time, in the erratic though memorable experiment at Brook Farm. A little later, he was engaged in miscellaneous writing for the Boston newspapers. In 1847, he joined the staff of the New York *Tribune*, in whose office he developed a pungent style, which was afterward to make him feared and famous. Here, too, he came into contact with all the most important public men of the ante-bellum period. A violent dispute with Horace Greeley over the latter's unfortunate "On to Richmond" editorial led to Dana's retirement from the *Tribune* in 1862;<sup>5</sup> and in the following year he was made Assistant Secretary of War. In this capacity he rendered highly important service to his chief, Stanton, who sent him upon confidential missions to the headquarters of the army, with instructions to report upon the character and conduct of the leading generals. Dana's knowledge of human nature, his grasp upon essentials, and his power of going to the very heart of things, made his reports invaluable both to the Secretary and to Mr. Lincoln. It was due to Dana's favourable judgment that General Grant was not relieved of his command in 1863, but was upheld by the administration in the teeth of the fiercest criticisms. In 1864, however, Dana left the War Department and returned to journalism, editing for a while the Chicago *Republican*. In this he failed completely. Discouraged and uncertain of his future, he came to New York, where he established himself, in 1868, as editor of the New York *Sun*.

It was the year of Grant's first election to the presi-

<sup>5</sup> An interesting account of the relations between Greeley and Dana is given in Benton, *Greeley on Lincoln* (New York, 1893).



dency. Dana, remembering the service which he had done the General, and having, besides, a real liking for the man, wrote a life of Grant, which he intended to be a sort of campaign biography; for it was highly eulogistic and was written with an intimate knowledge of its subject. Political usage and personal gratitude might have suggested to the new President the bestowal of some reward on one whose ability was so exceptional as Mr. Dana's. Yet for some reason which has never been satisfactorily explained, Grant absolutely ignored the claim. It was Dana's desire to be made Collector of the Port of New York, but the office was given to another; and by this act Grant made an enemy whose unrelenting hatred pursued him to the grave. With an almost frantic eagerness, Dana set about destroying every copy of the *Life* upon which he could lay his hands; so that to-day the book is practically unattainable outside of a few libraries. Then, in the columns of the *Sun*, he waged upon Grant a war of slander which for sheer malignity has never been surpassed. Dana knew quite well that Grant was honest, clean-living, patriotic and sincere;<sup>6</sup> yet now, with a perversion of facts that was infernal in its ingenuity, he painted him as a corrupt and brutal scoundrel, one who used his office for his personal enrichment, a tyrant, a vulgar ruffian, and a common drunkard. Every one connected with the President, even his wife and family, came in for a share of Dana's wrath or ridicule. At one time the editor was indicted in the District of Columbia, and an attempt was

<sup>6</sup> Dana had written in his life of Grant: "The unimpeachable and enduring record of his acts bears testimony to the zeal, urbanity, patience and ability with which he has executed his responsible trusts. . . . He possesses abilities and attainments that entitle him to a place among the wise and prudent statesmen of the country."—Dana, *Life of Ulysses S. Grant*, pp. 422-424 (Springfield, 1868).

made to have him removed to Washington for trial. Over such a prospect, Dana was almost beside himself with fear. His hysterical editorials made it plain that had his case been actually tried in Washington he must have gone to prison; but Judge Blatchford, sitting in New York, refused the change of venue. In consequence, the case was dropped, and Dana continued to lash the President with even greater fury than before. After Grant's retirement to private life, the attitude of the *Sun* remained the same. Even when the hero of the great war was awaiting burial, and when all other criticism was stilled in the presence of death, Dana launched a poisoned shaft at those who loved Grant best. The *Sun* published an account of an undertaker's bill which the General's family had very properly refused to pay, but which Dana himself had settled with an ostentatious show of hypocritical benevolence that was absolutely devilish.

The change in Dana's attitude toward Grant in 1868 was, however, only a single aspect of a change which had altered his entire nature. Until then he had been genial and fair-minded, with a touch of something like idealism in his view of things. He had associated with honourable men, and his life had been a useful one. But as he now looked back upon it, that life appeared to him a failure. Uprightness, optimism, and a regard for others had not "paid." Both in journalism and in public life he had somehow missed success, and he was now in his fiftieth year. And so he seems to have said to himself that henceforth in his career as journalist he would take no heed of right or wrong, but would gain a certain sort of fame and a sure material reward by throwing overboard all principle. From that time he was thoroughly a cynic and a pessimist. In his charming home at Roslyn and to a very

few intimate friends, he still showed himself to be a genial, cultivated gentleman, interested in his books and flower-gardens, and with a genuine enthusiasm for rare pottery, of which he was a connoisseur. But as editor of the *Sun*, he played consistently the part of devil's advocate. He set himself to jeer at whatever was best and noblest, to degrade and burlesque whatever decent men respected, to defend or palliate the base, and to treat corruption as an admirable joke. Thus, he supported Tammany in the days of its worst offences. He was the apologist of Tweed. He warmly commended the proposal to erect a public monument to that notorious malefactor. On the other hand, every attempt to improve political conditions—such as the reform of the civil service and the movement for an honest ballot—was greeted by Dana with an outburst of derision. He used his newspaper also as a weapon to avenge his personal dislikes; and whoever incurred his enmity or roused his prejudice was pilloried in the columns of the *Sun*.

Had Mr. Dana been a journalist of the usual type, his hatreds and his expression of them would soon have ceased to be of any interest, and would most probably have proved the ruin of the *Sun*. But the man was a genius in his way. His rhetoric was superb, and even those who most disliked him were reluctantly compelled to own the power of his invective. He had an unerring instinct for touching his victim on the raw; and his ingenuity in giving pain was marvellous. Furthermore, there was something tricky, something impish, even, in his malevolence; so that, outrageous though he was, his outrageousness had an indefinable quality which raised it far above the level of vulgarity. To him might well have been applied the description which Disraeli once gave of Lord Salisbury—"a

master of gibes and flouts and jeers." A careful student of his editorial work once wrote of him: "He had a gift for making men seem hateful or contemptible or ridiculous, and he used this talent most unsparingly. His nicknames and epithets stuck like burrs to those at whom he hurled them. Who cannot recall a score of these appellations,<sup>7</sup> every one of which conveyed to the mind the suggestion of something ludicrous?" And, quite apart from its editorial page, the *Sun* was managed with great ability. It was then, perhaps, the most readable newspaper in the United States. Its news was collected with the utmost accuracy. Its reporting was often done with a skill and cleverness that gave it a distinctly literary quality. Its editor was regarded with intense admiration by journalists throughout the country, and he became the founder of a journalistic cult.

Dana was ostensibly a Democratic partisan. His friends asserted that at election time he always voted the Republican ticket. If so, this was a characteristic example of his cynicism; for in his editorial columns everything Republican was anathema. Most probably he preferred to be in opposition, because such a rôle gave fuller scope to his peculiar gifts. Indeed, in 1880, when the September elections seemed to indicate that the Democratic candidate, General Hancock, was likely to be chosen President in November, Dana deliberately wrote a double-leaded editorial, in which he sneered at Hancock as "a good man, weighing 250 pounds"—a gibe which greatly delighted the Republicans. The only note of sincerity in Dana's writings was found in his support of Mr. Tilden,

<sup>7</sup> E. g., "Seven Mule Barnum," "Pinkpank Wheeler," "Coffee-Pot Wallace," "Fire-Alarm Foraker," "Sambo Bowles," "Aliunde Joe," "His Fraudulency."

who was his personal friend. When Mr. Cleveland was elected Governor of New York, Dana at first was favourable to him, but presently he became inimical for reasons that are variously given. Some say that as Mr. Tilden's liking for Governor Cleveland cooled, Dana took his own cue from Tilden. Others assert that Mr. Cleveland rejected certain overtures that were made to him by Dana, and declined to invite the editor to Albany in answer to a hint.<sup>8</sup> However this may be, the *Sun* soon ranged itself

<sup>8</sup> See the detailed statement in McClure, *Our Presidents*, pp. 312-315 (New York, 1905), of which the following quotation contains the essential points:

"Dana had very earnestly supported Cleveland's nomination and election for Governor in 1882, and after the election he wrote a personal letter to Cleveland asking the appointment of a friend to the position of Adjutant-General. His chief purpose was to give a position on the staff to his son, Paul Dana, who is now his successor in the editorial chair. Cleveland received that letter as he received thousands of other letters recommending appointments, instead of recognising the claim Mr. Dana had upon him for the courtesy of an answer. Beecher had a candidate for the same position, and Cleveland gave it to Beecher's man without any explanation whatever to Dana, who felt that he had been discourteously treated by Cleveland. Mr. Dana gave no open sign of disappointment; but some time after Cleveland's inauguration, when it became known that Dana felt aggrieved at the Governor, some mutual friends intervened and proposed to Cleveland that he should invite Dana to dine with some acquaintances at the Executive Mansion. To this Cleveland readily assented. Dana was informed that Cleveland would tender such an invitation if it would be accepted, and he promptly assented. Cleveland then became involved in the pressing duties of the Legislature and allowed the session to close without extending the promised and expected invitation to Dana. Mr. Cleveland told me that he was entirely to blame for neglect in both instances, as Dana would doubtless have been satisfied if he had courteously informed him of his conviction which required him to appoint another for Adjutant-General; and he had no excuse to offer but that of neglect for not inviting Dana to dinner.

"Dana naturally assumed that Cleveland had given him deliberate affront, and Cleveland could make no satisfactory explanation. As Governor and as President he was first of all devoted to his official duties,

among the anti-Cleveland journals; and in 1884, it supported the Greenback nominee, General B. F. Butler. It was exceedingly like Dana to advocate the election of this brazen charlatan, who holds in history the bad eminence of having been the only conspicuous Northern commander in the Civil War against whom charges of personal corruption were practically proven.<sup>9</sup> Throughout Mr. Cleveland's Presidency, Dana maintained a sort of malevolent neutrality, giving many a satirical thrust at the man whose reforming spirit was obnoxious to the presiding genius of the *Sun*. On the day after Cleveland's defeat in the election of 1888, Dana printed without comment an entire column of quotations from medical and physiological works on the subject of obesity. Thereafter, the *Sun* ignored the ex-President until once more he loomed up as a possible candidate. Now, dipping his pen in vitriol, Dana outdid himself in running the entire gamut of abuse, from ridicule to excoriation. To him Mr. Cleveland became "the Perpetual Candidate," and later "the Stuffed Prophet." Some of these editorials were masterpieces of malignity, and as such they are almost worthy of permanent preservation. They served no end, however, save to draw increased attention to his enemy's political availability. It was Mr. Cleveland himself who, in the judgment of many persons, deliberately ruined his own prospects by an utterance which he made at this time upon which he discharged with rare fidelity, and he gave little time even to the common courtesies which most Governors and Presidents would recognize as justly belonging to their friends. Efforts were made to conciliate Dana, but he never would discuss the question, and he sacrificed half the circulation of his paper in the campaign of 1884 in his battle against Cleveland."

<sup>9</sup> Official Records of the War, series iii., vol. ii., p. 173; Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, vol. v., pp. 303-308, 312, 313 (New York, 1904).

a question which had been violently injected into national politics. Before narrating the occurrence, it is necessary to give a brief account of the growth of the silver movement in the Western States.

In the early years of its existence, the Republican party had been dominated by one controlling purpose—the destruction of slavery. The issue which gave it birth was distinctly a moral issue, and the enthusiasm which inspired it was a moral enthusiasm. Its first declaration, made at Jackson, Michigan, on July 6, 1854, declared that the Republican party was “battling for the first principles of Republican government and against the schemes of an aristocracy.” All Republicans were pledged in this declaration to “act cordially and faithfully in unison, postponing and suspending all difference with regard to political economy or administrative policy.”<sup>10</sup> The Republican party, therefore, was distinctly not a party of caste or of class but preëminently a party of the people, devoted to the cause of human freedom. In those days the power of wealth and the pride of birth were equally arrayed against it. The rich merchants and bankers of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia viewed this new party as a menace to political tranquillity and vested interests. They joined hands gladly with the aristocratic planters of the South in seeking to stamp out so strange and disquieting a fanaticism. It was the most respectable citizens of Massachusetts who ostracised Charles Sumner, who broke up anti-slavery meetings, who mobbed Garrison and threatened to lynch Whittier. The Republican leaders boasted that their party was not one of wealth and privilege, but of intelligence and moral worth. Clergymen, teachers, writers and small professional men joined its ranks, which

<sup>10</sup> Curtis, *The Republican Party*, i., p. 1 (New York, 1904).

were still further recruited from the agricultural portions of the country. The great strength of the Republican party lay, not in the Eastern States, but in the young commonwealths of the West—in Ohio, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The first Republican President was the very incarnation of democracy, so plain in manner, so simple in life, and so ruggedly sincere, as to seem to the fastidious denizens of the East a mere barbarian.

It was, therefore, as a party of the people that Republicanism first won its way to political power. When the Civil War ended, the great purpose of the primitive Republicans had been achieved. Slavery was abolished forever. The feudalism based upon it was annihilated. Every inch of American territory had become free soil. As we now look back upon that period, with a sense of true political perspective, it is plain that the old Republican party really died in the year 1866. The party which afterwards continued to bear its name was altogether different from that which had rallied around Frémont in 1856, and which had twice elected Lincoln. It was different in its aims and aspirations, different in the character of its leaders, and different in the influences which shaped its policy. Its years of almost irresponsible power had utterly transformed it. Controlling the national finances, with an overwhelming majority in Congress, and having in its gift not merely office and opportunity, but every sort of legislative favour, it drew to itself the support of every interest which ten years before had been arrayed against it. It was now the party of the bankers, the manufacturers, the lords of commerce, and all those active, restless, scheming spirits who had learned that great fortunes were to be made in other ways than by legitimate industry. The



true citadels of the Republican party were now the crowded centres of the East, while the agricultural States received but slight consideration. The continuance of the war tariff, which enriched a comparatively few interests at the expense of the entire population, was the most striking factor in the development of this new Republicanism. The farmer was compelled to pay tribute to the manufacturer; and so the Republican party in this second phase of its existence became a party of class, as truly as the Democratic party had ever been in the days before the war.

The West was slow in recognising the significance of this change; but as time went on, financial conditions operated to cause serious distress. In the first place, the gradual appreciation in the value of the paper dollar pinched the debtor class severely. The farmer, for example, who in 1863 had mortgaged his farm for five thousand paper dollars, worth, perhaps, not more than half that sum in gold, found that he must repay the loan in dollars worth nearly twice as much, and therefore representing twice as much economy and diligence and labour. The resumption of specie payments in 1879, though a triumph of financial management, did, nevertheless, inflict a serious hardship upon all men who had borrowed money at a time when the paper currency of the United States was worth much less than its face value. This hardship was of course inevitable; but it was none the less a hardship, and it is not surprising that those who suffered from it should have tried to seek a remedy. Hence arose the so-called Greenback party, which as early as 1876 nominated candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency on a platform which demanded the repeal of the act for resuming specie payments and which advocated the issue of United States notes as the sole currency of

the nation. Upon this platform, Peter Cooper of New York received in that year a popular vote of 81,000; while in 1880, another "Greenback" candidate, James B. Weaver of Iowa, polled a vote of over 300,000.

This movement, however, represented only one form of popular discontent. There were other grievances more irritating and apparently more easily remediable. One was the manner in which the railways of the country had monopolised the public lands,<sup>11</sup> barring great tracts to settlers, while refusing to comply with the conditions under which the grants of land had been bestowed. Another grievance was the discrimination in railroad rates, by which the small shipper was forced out of business by powerful corporations.<sup>12</sup> Still another was the working of the tariff laws, which had steadily discriminated against the most widespread of all American industries—agriculture—while forcing it to bear the greater burden of taxation. It came at last to be widely asserted and believed that the Government of the United States was becoming a creature of the corporations, that Congress was filled with corporation agents—"railway Senators" and Trust representatives—and that even the judges on the bench were often men whose antecedents as corporation lawyers discredited their judicial decisions.

All these and still other reasons for public discontent first found expression in isolated political movements throughout the West. Besides the "Greenback" or National party, there arose the so-called Anti-Monopoly party, which held its first convention at Chicago in 1884. In 1888, two Labour parties appeared, each with a different set of grievances. The so-called Granger movement was another evidence of the popular discontent. The Grangers, or, as they were officially styled, the "Patrons

<sup>11</sup> See p. 222.

<sup>12</sup> See p. 221.

of Husbandry," were an organisation of which the founder was one O. H. Kelly, a clerk in the Bureau of Agriculture. Their general aim was to unite for self-protection all who were actually engaged in agricultural pursuits. By 1875, the Grangers, who then numbered more than 1,500,000 men and women, had definitely formulated certain measures which they hoped to have embodied in both State and national legislation. Like the Knights of Labour, they advocated woman's suffrage and the regulation of railway rates.

This organisation afterwards grew into the Farmers' Alliance, just as the Knights of Labour grew into the American Federation of Labour; and as both of them had many aims in common, they effected a coalition in 1889, when they agreed upon a common platform of principles, demanding the abolition of national banks, an increased issue of Government paper, and the Government ownership of all means of transportation and public intercourse.

By this time, the Western States were in a condition of political ferment. As yet there was no general cohesion or agreement between the different factions and parties. They lacked a leader. They had not as yet developed any political machinery. In the East, little notice was taken of them. The newspapers treated them with easy ridicule and described the intensely earnest men and women who composed them as "cranks" and "calamity howlers." Many of them were, indeed, unintelligent fanatics. Many of their wrongs were fanciful. Many of their remedies were quite impossible. Yet there did remain a very solid substratum of reason for these various movements, and the discontent was not without substantial justification. The epithets so sneeringly applied to the rank and file of the new parties recalled the no less sneering epithets that

had been hurled at the Republicans in the days of their anti-slavery crusade. They, too, had been described as wild men and fanatics and enemies of public order.

It may be asked why the discontented did not flock to the Democratic party and use it as an instrument for turning out the Republicans, who were held to be primarily responsible for existing conditions. The reason was that both of the old parties were now almost equally distrusted. Both were regarded as being under the control of the "money power." During Mr. Cleveland's administration, from 1885 to 1889, it had been made clear that the Trusts were quite as influential in Democratic as in Republican politics. Mr. H. B. Payne, for whom the Standard Oil Company had bought the Ohio legislature, was ostensibly a Democrat. It was charged also that Secretary Whitney, Mr. Cleveland's closest adviser, was dominated by the same sinister influence. Senator Hoar had asked, "Is it [the Standard Oil Company] represented in the Cabinet at this moment?"<sup>13</sup>—and the question had rasped the nerves of the entire nation. Therefore, these new factions that were springing up in the West and in the South felt that a clean sweep must be made, and that both of the old parties must be driven out. Seceding Republicans in the West declared themselves to be reverting to the earlier Republicanism of Lincoln, while in the South those who had once been Democrats professed to be reviving the Democracy of Jefferson. All of them "wished to get back to simplicity, honesty, and economy in government; to secure a fair field for all; to resist commercialism, to oppose the money power and the general corruption and cowardice of the old parties."

<sup>13</sup> *Congressional Record* (September, 1886), pp. 8520-8604. Mr. Whitney in an open letter afterwards denied the implied accusation.

“ Party conventions and organisations were now mere machines for winning elections and keeping control of the offices. They were unscrupulous oligarchies, controlled by the rich. A few astute and wealthy managers and magnates, called ‘ business men,’ controlling the party managers as their henchmen, set things up in private conferences, while the masses were being fooled and manipulated like voting herds. Then the business magnates, who dictated the nomination of the candidates and furnished the sinews of war for the campaign, were, of course, to conduct the Government; and, equally, of course, the laws were to be made and administered in such a way as to take good care of these managers’ business interests. It was felt that if any President or Senator or Congressman began to urge, honestly and effectively, that the great mine-owners, or railroads, or trust combinations,—the moneyed forces that controlled the money, land, and transportation of the people,—should be actually brought face to face with the enforcement of just and equal laws, then some silent but powerful influence within the parties would retire such public servants to private life.”<sup>14</sup>

The storm-centre of this third-party agitation was the State of Kansas. In September, the Farmers’ Alliance and the Knights of Labour assembled in convention there and nominated a full State ticket and also candidates for Congress. In the October elections, this ticket was elected, and out of the seven Congressmen allotted to Kansas, the new party elected five, while the State Legislature sent to the Senate a country editor, Mr. William Alfred Pepper, who had been a leader in the movement. In the following year, a general fusion took place of the different factions representing both the industrial and agricultural interests, now uniting for the first time as a definite political party under the name of “ People’s Party,” or “ Populists.” Their first national convention was held

<sup>14</sup> Woodburn, *Political Parties and Party Problems in the United States*, pp. 114, 115 (New York, 1903).

at Cincinnati, in May, 1891, and it drew up a platform which demanded the free and unlimited coinage of silver; the issue of paper money which should be loaned to the people at not more than two per cent. per annum on the security of non-perishable agricultural products; the national ownership of railroads, telegraphs, telephones, and steamship lines; a graduated income tax; and the election of United States Senators by popular vote.<sup>15</sup>

It was the financial part of this platform that was most immediately important. The demand for the free coinage of silver represented a general belief which had permeated the minds of the Western people. They had come to entertain what is known as the quantitative theory of money, believing that an increased supply of money would raise the prices of farm products. It was a matter of indifference to them how this increase of money was to be effected, whether by the issue of irredeemable "greenbacks" or by the unlimited coinage of silver. They would have preferred, if left to themselves, to substitute paper money for a metallic currency of any sort. But here came in another influence which for some time past had been at work. The price of silver, as compared with that of gold, had for a long while been steadily falling. In consequence, the great mine-owners of Nevada, Colorado and other Western States found the production of silver ceasing to be profitable. They had, therefore, as early as 1877, secured the passage of the Bland Silver Law, directing the Government to purchase silver bullion and to coin each month not less than 2,000,000 or more than 4,000,000 silver dollars.<sup>16</sup> In 1890, this act had been repealed, and in

<sup>15</sup> Hopkins, *Political Parties in the United States*, pp. 187, 188 (New York, 1900); see also Reynolds, *National Platforms and Political History* (Chicago, 1898).

<sup>16</sup> See pp. 81, 82, 272.

place of it the so-called Sherman Silver Law had been enacted, directing the Government to purchase every month 4,500,000 ounces of silver, and to issue against it legal tender notes redeemable on demand in "coin"—either gold or silver, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury.<sup>17</sup> These two laws, although afterwards attacked by the Republicans, involved a logical application of the doctrine of protection. Silver was an American product; and the mine-owners, as representing an American industry, demanded legislation which should make their industry a profitable one. As the tariff could not effect this, it was accomplished by forcing the Government to provide an artificial market for the product of the silver mines. The Sherman Law was passed in the hope of propitiating the adherents of silver in the West, but it failed entirely of its object. It did not go far enough to please the silver men, while it alarmed conservative financiers. What the Populists now desired was to make the coinage of silver an unlimited one, so as to render money plentiful and "cheap," to drive gold out of circulation, and thus to secure artificially a general increase in the values of agricultural products. The silver propaganda was received with great enthusiasm in the West. Meetings were held in thousands of country schoolhouses to hear this new gospel of prosperity proclaimed by perfervid orators. The movement threatened to demoralise both of the old parties; for it was felt that the silver vote would be able at the next election to turn the scale in favour of whatsoever candidate should show himself to be most truly "a friend of silver."

It was while this agitation was at its height that the

<sup>17</sup> Under the Bland Act and the Sherman Act, the currency had been expanded by some \$450,000,000.

Reform Club in New York City<sup>18</sup> held a meeting to voice the opposition of New York business men to the free coinage of silver. An invitation to be present was sent to Mr. Cleveland. When this fact became known, many of his friends urged him to stay away and to keep to himself his opinions on the silver question. They knew that he was inflexibly opposed to an increased silver coinage. His messages to Congress had shown this very plainly. But they pointed out to him that by keeping silence he might let it be supposed that he had changed his mind, or that at least he was willing to approve a compromise. To offend the silver men was, they said, to throw away his chances for the presidency. He could not possibly receive a nomination if it were known that he was not a "friend of silver." The West would be solidly against him. It was a time to temporise and to exercise a little diplomacy both for his own sake and for the welfare of his party. Mr. Cleveland listened to this talk without saying very much. His engagements made it impossible for him to attend the Reform Club meeting. But he wrote a letter to the chairman, which on the following morning appeared in every newspaper throughout the United States. In it he said:

"It surely cannot be necessary for me to make a formal expression of my agreement with those who believe that the greatest peril would be invited by the adoption of the scheme for the unlimited coinage of silver at our mints."

And in the last sentence of his letter he spoke of "the dangerous and reckless experiment of free, unlimited, and independent silver coinage."<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> February 11, 1891.

<sup>19</sup> Parker, *Writings and Speeches of Grover Cleveland*, p. 374 (New York, 1892).



These bold, uncompromising words created an immense sensation. Mr. Cleveland's enemies read them with exultation. Cleveland was out of the race at last! He had once more played the fool and made himself a political impossibility out of sheer pig-headedness. At last he was in reality "a dead one." So thought the cynical Mr. Dana of the *Sun*, and so thought all the leading Democrats who had been nourishing presidential ambitions of their own. Admirers of the ex-President admired him more than ever; yet they could not repress a feeling of regret that he had spoken out so freely and, as it seemed to them, so unnecessarily. For they, too, viewed this Reform Club letter as putting an end to the movement for his re-election. Such was, in fact, Mr. Cleveland's own belief; yet in his heart there lurked no shadow of regret. An intimate friend who met him on the day after the letter had been published, spoke to him ruefully about the matter. Mr. Cleveland's only answer was to throw out both his arms with the gesture of one who casts away a heavy burden.

"Ouf!" said he.

And then, with a gleeful look at his friend's troubled face, he went on to talk about his summer plans.

Yet neither his enemies, nor his friends, nor he himself, had accurately gauged the effect of this act of defiant frankness. Beyond the haunts of the scheming politicians who manage caucuses and pack conventions, the pregnant sentences of that letter were read with an electric thrill of joyful recognition. Here at last was a Man—one who knew his own mind and was not afraid to speak it; one who would not trim and shuffle to win votes; one who would kick aside a nomination for the presidency rather than wear a muzzle even for a moment. A shrewd English observer

was once asked to explain the secret of Lord Palmerston's unbounded popularity. "Why," said he "what the nation likes in Palmerston is his you-be-damnedness!" It was something of the same quality in Mr. Cleveland that caused the American people at this moment to let their hearts go out to him; for the American people admire courage in their public men in exact proportion to the infrequency with which they have a chance to see it. Instantly, from having been merely a logical candidate for the presidency, Mr. Cleveland became the inevitable candidate. The stampede of Democrats to the ranks of the Populists was checked at once. All through the West, the party lines were closed up solidly once more; while in the East, conservative men, Republicans and Democrats alike, rejoiced over the growing influence of this dominant personality. It was only among a small coterie of professional politicians that the new aspect of affairs produced a feeling of anger and consternation.

Before the appearance of the Reform Club letter, there had been several aspirants whose chances for the next Democratic nomination were seriously considered. One was Mr. Horace Boies of Iowa, an earnest, able leader with convictions and a reputation for intelligence and integrity. He had fought a hard fight on the tariff issue ever since Mr. Cleveland's message of 1887 had brought that question to the forefront; and in the campaign which followed the passage of the McKinley Bill, he had wiped out the vast Republican majority in Iowa and had been elected Governor. He was a man of the people, in the best sense of the term, representing new issues and new blood; and he had always been consistently a Cleveland Democrat. Mr. Isaac Pusey Gray of Indiana was an old-school party leader, not conspicuous for his mental attain-

ments, but popular in his own State, of which he had been Governor. It was thought that he could carry Indiana, and he had the negative qualification of having made no important enemies in the party. Still another receptive candidate was Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois, who had been Assistant Postmaster-General in Mr. Cleveland's administration. His partisanship while holding that office <sup>20</sup> had highly commended him to the petty spoilsmen of the Democracy, and they pictured to themselves, with rare enthusiasm, the liberal fashion in which, if elected President, he would deal out offices to faithful henchmen. In the background, alertly watching every opportunity, was Senator Arthur P. Gorman of Maryland. Senator Gorman was one of the most astute and subtle of all the Democratic leaders. Of Irish descent and humble origin, he had, as a boy, been a page in the Senate Chamber. In after years, with a truly Celtic genius for political intrigue, he had made himself master of the party organisation in his own State, and an important personage in the national councils. Smooth, bland and insinuating, he resembled both in appearance and in manner a typical Italian ecclesiastic; and his adroitness and inscrutability fully carried out the same resemblance. Mr. Gorman had kept on good terms with Mr. Cleveland during the latter's presidency. For his sake the administration had incurred the odium of retaining Mr. Eugene Higgins in office <sup>21</sup> against the protest of the Maryland civil service reformers, and had given aid and comfort to Mr. Gorman in his local party fights. Senator Gorman, however, was always at heart absorbed in his own ambitions. He had many private interests and personal associations not known to the world at large; he spun webs of exceeding fineness that were invisible even to his nearest friends; and, while he was all

<sup>20</sup> See p. 147.

<sup>21</sup> See pp. 78, 79.

things to all men, oily of speech and propitiatory in manner, he nourished ambitions for which he would sacrifice unsparingly whatsoever person interfered with them.

The effect of Mr. Cleveland's outspoken letter on the silver question had been to eliminate these four would-be rivals from immediate consideration. There still remained, however, one who was rightly regarded by the Cleveland Democrats as a very formidable obstacle in the way of their candidate's success. This was Mr. David B. Hill, who had been chosen Democratic Governor of New York in 1888, receiving for that office some 18,000 votes more than were given to Mr. Cleveland at the same election.<sup>22</sup> Governor Hill now stood forth conspicuously as the only person who could possibly wrest the next Democratic nomination from Mr. Cleveland; and therefore around him there rallied all who represented machine politics, hatred of reform, and the worship of the great god Expediency, together with such as entertained a personal dislike for the only Democrat who had been inaugurated President since 1857.

Mr. Hill was a lawyer who had attained to his prominent position by the most meticulous attention to the minutæ of New York politics. His private life was as blameless as his public record was vulnerable. He had no personal vices even of the minor sort. He neither smoked nor drank. To the society of women he was utterly indifferent. He cared nothing for money, and earned a moderate income by hard professional labour. His one joy in life was found in political strategy and intrigue, to which his heart and mind and soul were unstintedly and absolutely given. Over great questions of public policy he wasted no reflection. He seems to have had at this time no serious convictions on such national issues as the tariff,

<sup>22</sup> See pp. 161, 164, 165.

finance, or foreign relations. It was the machinery of politics that absorbed his whole attention—the manipulation of primaries, the arrangement of “slates,” the elaboration of “deals,” the word-juggling of party platforms, the carrying of elections. He knew the pettiest details of New York State politics by heart. Nothing was minute enough to escape his microscopic eye. He mistook, in fact, political myopia for statesmanship, and the march of great events bewildered him. But in his own sphere he was unsurpassed as a wily, patient, and hitherto successful plotter—a consummate artist in intrigue.

During his two terms as Governor, Mr. Hill had devoted all his powers to building up an organisation in New York State which should have the efficiency of an absolutely flawless machine, and he had succeeded to a marvellous degree. Every local leader was a partisan of Mr. Hill, taking orders from him alone, and executing them implicitly. An alliance with Tammany Hall gave him the support of that well-drilled and disciplined organisation. In short, Mr. Hill was now absolute master of the New York political engine, and this fact gave him an undoubted claim upon the attention of the Democratic party throughout the nation. Mr. Hill's friends said with an air of finality: “Hill carried New York State in 1888. Cleveland lost it. You can't win without New York. Hill is the man who can surely give you New York's thirty-six electoral votes.”

This boast, however, was heard by many Democrats with the deepest anger and resentment. They said: “Yes, Cleveland lost New York and Hill carried it. But why? Because Hill sold out Cleveland, and made us lose the presidency in order that he might gain the governorship. Do you think that we have forgotten this, and

that we are going to give the highest honours of the party to the man who openly betrayed it?"

But Mr. Hill cared little for mere talk. He set about giving the party and the country an object lesson of his grip upon New York. He remarked to a friend of his: "Presidential nominations are not handed out on silver salvers in these days!" In January, 1892, the Democratic National Committee issued a call for the Convention of the party, to be held in Chicago on June 21st. Within a few days (on January 25th) after this call had been promulgated, the New York State Committee, at Mr. Hill's dictation, summoned a State Convention to meet in Albany on February 22d, for the purpose of choosing New York's delegates to Chicago. The Democrats of New York were startled. Never had a State Convention been called so early—four full months before the National Convention. It was clear that Mr. Hill intended to steal a march upon the Cleveland men, to pack the State Convention, and to secure for himself the delegates from New York. A burst of indignation and of angry protest came from every quarter against the attempt to force a snap judgment from a "snap" convention. But the Hill machine worked smoothly, and began at once to grind out delegates to Albany. Democrats friendly to Mr. Cleveland refused to take any part in the district caucuses; and so a solid body of "Snappers," as they were called, poured into Albany on the 22d, to do the bidding of their master. The Convention met, organised, and finished its entire business in two hours and a half. Only three speeches were made, all carefully revised beforehand. Mr. Cleveland's name was not so much as mentioned. A delegation to Chicago was selected, pledged to Mr. Hill, who was then summoned from the Delavan House, where, in

Tweed's old headquarters, he had been waiting for his followers to do their work. He spoke briefly and in a perfunctory sort of way, and the gathering then adjourned. The only spontaneous applause which had been heard there on that day was given to Mr. Richard Croker, the new head of Tammany Hall.

Once more, then, Mr. Cleveland was thought to be out of the running. His own State had apparently declared against him; and no candidate had ever received a nomination for the presidency without the support of his home delegation. Whether Mr. Hill should win or not, he seemed to have it in his power to defeat his quiescent rival, or, failing that, to give the nomination to any one with whom he could make the best political bargain. The Cleveland men in New York called a convention of their own, alleging that the gathering at Albany had not been truly representative. These "Anti-Snappers" chose a Cleveland delegation for Chicago, though there was practically no chance of its securing recognition there.<sup>23</sup> For the moment, the star of Mr. Hill was undoubtedly in the ascendant.

In the meantime, the Republicans, though outwardly harmonious, were on the verge of serious dissension. President Harrison's administration had, on the whole, been satisfactory to the masses of his party; but the President himself had not been able to inspire any marked devotion to his own person. Every one admitted his integrity, his good judgment, and his ability. He had gained the respect even of his opponents. Nowhere, however, was there the slightest enthusiasm for him or for his

<sup>23</sup> See Breen, *Thirty Years of New York Politics*, pp. 717-719 (New York, 1899).

administration. The feeling of the Republican managers toward the President was not so tame a one as that of the rank and file. It had, in fact, become one of positive and intense dislike. Quite typical was the changed attitude of two very conspicuous leaders, Mr. Thomas C. Platt of New York and Senator Matthew Stanley Quay of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Platt had, at the beginning of President Harrison's term, expected to receive either a Cabinet office or some other high appointment. It was he who, as head of the Republican State organisation in 1888, had presumably arranged the bargain with the Hill Democrats, by which Hill had been chosen Governor, while the electoral votes of New York were cast for Harrison. Mr. Platt, however, had been thwarted in his hope. He had received no appointment to office; though a certain amount of Federal patronage had been placed at his disposal. Mr. Platt was a secretive, silent sort of person, and he accepted what was given him. He was not, however, satisfied, and he felt that he had been treated with ingratitude. Furthermore, the President showed no great liking for his company, nor did he receive Mr. Platt's advice with any perceptible cordiality. Therefore, Mr. Platt, in his subterranean fashion, set himself to undermine President Harrison with the party as a whole.

The case of Mr. Quay was somewhat different. In his private life this man had many attractive qualities. He was genial and sympathetic in manner and was always doing little acts of spontaneous courtesy to those about him. He had a scholar's tastes, and an Elzevir Horace was his constant companion. But in his public career he was one of the most depressing illustrations of triumphant baseness in all American political history. He perpetuated



in Pennsylvania the corrupt traditions of Simon Cameron, who had been forced to leave President Lincoln's first Cabinet because he had used the War Department's funds in private speculations. Quay was a man without honour, without principle, and without shame. He began his political life by the betrayal of his friends for a money bribe; and this first act of his career was typical of all the rest. His audacity, however, and his skill in appealing to the lowest motives of the men about him, had given him almost absolute control of the Republican party in Pennsylvania, his only rival being another able "boss," one "Chris" Magee. Quay had at first secured a share of President Harrison's favour, and was rather ostentatiously his supporter; but in 1890, something happened which affected the President very deeply. In that year, Mr. H. C. Lea, a very eminent and influential citizen of Philadelphia, published certain charges against Senator Quay, which, if true, made it clear that Quay's proper place was not in the Senate of the United States, but in the penitentiary. Mr. Lea declared—and his assertion was corroborated by a vast amount of testimony—that Quay, while Secretary of State for Pennsylvania, had misappropriated the sum of \$260,000, which he had lost in speculation; and that while State Treasurer, he had used \$400,000 of the public funds in stock gambling, which amount was subsequently replaced. These charges were repeated in the House of Representatives by Mr. R. P. Kennedy of Ohio; but by a party vote the Republican majority refused to let Mr. Kennedy's speech appear upon the record. Quay, with his wonted shamelessness, allowed the charges to go unanswered; and though they were published all over the country, he remained silent with regard to them. The immediate result was an overwhelming Democratic victory

in Pennsylvania in that year and the election of Mr. Robert E. Pattison as Governor. That Quay was guilty of common theft was accepted as a fact, not merely by the people at large, but by the President, whose sturdy honesty made him shrink from all association with a felon, even though that felon had escaped unwhipped of justice. Quay's anger was extreme. In private he accused Mr. Harrison of profiting by his services and then repudiating him "under fire." There were many other malcontents whom Mr. Harrison had either knowingly or unknowingly offended—some by his cold, unsympathetic manner, others by his refusal to appoint them to office. All these men flocked to Platt and Quay as natural leaders, and plotted with them to prevent the President's renomination.

It was plain enough that under ordinary circumstances the party was bound to make Mr. Harrison its candidate a second time. Not to do so would be to declare that his administration had been a failure and thus to stultify Republican professions. But if for him there could be substituted a still more eminent leader—one of unquestioned supremacy and of unchallenged claims—then this action would not necessarily put the party upon the defensive. That Mr. Blaine was such a leader could not be disputed; and so the Republican opponents of President Harrison begged the great Secretary for permission to use his name. Mr. Blaine's position was a very delicate one. He had become almost as unfriendly to the President as had Messrs. Quay and Platt, though for very different reasons. His personal and official intercourse with Mr. Harrison had grown more and more distasteful to him. The two men were temperamentally antipathetic—Blaine, ardent, impulsive, abounding in original ideas, a man of imagina-

tion; Harrison cold, sluggish, matter-of-fact, inhospitable to suggestion. From the beginning, the seeds of an estrangement were sown by the refusal of the President to appoint Mr. Blaine's son, Walker, to be Assistant Secretary of State. This refusal constituted "a personal, a family grievance,"<sup>24</sup> and other causes of a gradual alienation were presently not wanting. During the Chilean crisis, the divergent views of the two had strained their relations nearly to the breaking point. At one of the Cabinet meetings, Mr. Blaine's excited opposition to the President's opinions became so violent as to induce an attack of vertigo and an illness of several days.

Not from love of his chief therefore, did the Secretary of State reject the advances of Quay and the anti-Harrison leaders, but because of the fact that Mr. Harrison was, indeed, his chief. Political etiquette, and even common decency, forbade a member of the Cabinet to intrigue against the President who had appointed him and of whom he was the official adviser. But, urged the plotters, why not resign the Cabinet office and announce frankly that you are a candidate? Then another and an even stronger reason became known. Mr. Blaine, in very truth, was sick of party strife. For thirty years he had toiled and fought. He had received high honours, even though he had failed of his supreme ambition. But now he was weary of it all—the noise, the turmoil, the intrigues and the lying, the seething mass of mean ambitions, the bold-eyed greed, the insolence of vulgar curiosity, the steam of sweating mobs—and all for what? Mr. Blaine reviewed it with the sense of true perspective which comes to men with years, and in his very soul he loathed the thought of dragging once again his weary limbs down into that reeking, roaring hell of all the evil passions. His strength

<sup>24</sup> Stanwood, *J. G. Blaine*, p. 338 (Boston, 1906).

was spent. Though still apparently in perfect health, there was lurking somewhere in his system an obscure disorder that was draining his vitality. His chosen biographer tells us that he had become a hypochondriac, given to morbid brooding over his condition, and to the use of many drugs. Nothing, not even the presidency, seemed any longer worth his while. And so he wrote an open letter declaring that he would not, under any circumstances, consent to be a candidate. Quay and the other plotters, therefore, turned away from Mr. Blaine and shaped their plans to give the nomination to ex-Speaker Reed, who had also become estranged from President Harrison.

The weeks sped on. The Republican Convention at Minneapolis had been summoned for the 7th of June. On June 4th—three days before the Convention met—the country was amazed to learn that Mr. Blaine had written a curt note to the President, resigning the Secretaryship of State, and asking that his resignation take effect at once.<sup>25</sup> Intense excitement ran through the ranks of the Republicans. What was the meaning of this sudden act? Had Mr. Blaine's health really broken down? Had he quarrelled with the President? It was felt that no matter what the ultimate cause might be, the time chosen for the resignation made it an act of obvious unfriendliness to Mr. Harrison. Senator Quay sought to rouse the old-time Blaine enthusiasm among the delegates. But the effort was in vain. Some believed that their former hero's health

<sup>25</sup> "TO THE PRESIDENT: I respectfully beg leave to submit my resignation of the office of Secretary of State of the United States, to which I was appointed by you on March 5, 1889.

"The condition of public business in the Department of State justifies me in requesting that my resignation be accepted immediately.

"I have the honour to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"JAMES G. BLAINE."

was now completely shattered. Others resented the confusion and bewilderment caused by the letter of resignation. "Mr. Blaine is playing fast-and-loose with us. He will ruin himself by his duplicity," said Mr. Depew, until then his devoted admirer. "The Plumed Knight now carries a broken lance," said Mr. New of Indiana. The anti-Harrison leaders came to the Convention with divided counsels; the Harrison forces were compact and confident. The former fought for delay in order to form new combinations; and for three days the sessions were devoted to the platform and to trivial details. The Reed movement did not appeal to very many, and the delegates from Mr. Reed's own section failed to stand by him, greatly to the disgust of several of his ardent friends. Mr. (then Governor) McKinley of Ohio had been made permanent president of the Convention, and the enthusiasm which his appearance called forth led the opponents of Mr. Harrison to "boom" the high-tariff advocate, though soon they returned once more to Mr. Blaine. Finally, on June 9th, in the midst of the flurry, a vote upon the admission of a contesting delegation afforded a fair trial of the relative strength of the two factions. The Blaine men controlled 423 delegates; the Harrison men, 463. Instantly there was a break in the ranks of the opposition. It was plain that Harrison must win. All the time-servers at once flocked to him. On the following day, after the usual speech-making, Mr. Harrison, who had been put in nomination by Mr. Depew, was chosen on the first ballot with 535 votes, or 82 more than were required. Mr. Blaine received 182 votes and Governor McKinley precisely the same number. On the following day, Mr. Whitelaw Reid, the editor of the New York *Tribune*, was nominated for the Vice-Presidency.

When Mr. Blaine learned of what had happened, he wrote an open letter urging his friends, with all the loyalty of a veteran, to support the Minneapolis ticket. But Mrs. Blaine remarked, in the presence of a large gathering, "I am sick and tired of the whole thing!" It was, in truth, upon Mrs. Blaine that the responsibility of this rather pitiable *dénouement* rested. No authorised explanation of Mr. Blaine's sudden retirement from the Cabinet has ever been put forth, yet it was perfectly well known to many at the time that this step, so ill-advised and so contrary to Mr. Blaine's own judgment, was taken because of his wife's insistence. Mrs. Blaine was a very masterful, high-spirited woman, unblessed with tact and far too prone to interfere with her husband's political concerns. More than once in his career this interference had caused him great embarrassment, though matters had always been arranged in such a way as to avoid anything like an overt *esclandre*. But when Mr. Blaine entered President Harrison's Cabinet, his political difficulties were heightened by domestic complications. Almost at the outset a coolness arose between the wife of the Secretary of State and the wife of the President; and this coolness increased until it became at last a positive antipathy. Mrs. Blaine was far too conscious of the fact that her husband might have been elected President in place of Mr. Harrison, had he chosen to accept the nomination in 1888; and she let this consciousness be felt in many of the irritating little ways which feminine ingenuity so easily devises. Mrs. Harrison not unnaturally resented this, with a result that can be imagined. When, therefore, Mr. Blaine was urged to let his name be used in opposition to the President, Mrs. Blaine became an active ally of the anti-Harrison politicians. For a long time she was unsuccessful. But age

and illness had sapped her husband's power of will and had perhaps obscured his judgment; so that finally he yielded to incessant domestic pressure and took the step which resulted so disastrously. From that moment his political career was ended. He retired to his home in Maine, and, after a lingering illness, died early in the following year.<sup>26</sup>

There is something infinitely pathetic in a survey of Mr. Blaine's remarkable career. With so many brilliant qualities, with such high ambitions and such splendid opportunities, he never reached the goal upon which his gaze had been continually fixed and toward which he had struggled with such dauntless hope and energy. It is not too much to say of him that for resourcefulness and for that sort of imagination which enters into constructive statesmanship, he had had no equal since the days of Jefferson. He possessed every gift that goes with supreme leadership, save only one. He lacked that higher moral sense without which, in the last and crucial test, a statesman's strength is turned to weakness. As was said of him at the time, he reflected accurately the influences that were in the ascendant throughout the Civil War, amid whose storm and stress his political character had been moulded. The ardent patriotism, the fiery courage, the intense devotion to a cause which made that period memorable, were his. But through all those years he had seen about him the play of meaner motives, and the inevitable jobbery and corruption which are the accompaniment of war; and long familiarity with these had blunted a naturally fine sense of honour and had led him to set expediency sometimes in the place of right. The most serious charges brought against him were undoubtedly untrue; but he had so acted as to justify them in the minds of millions of his country-

<sup>26</sup> January 27, 1893.

men, and he was forced to pay the penalty of his indiscretion.

Yet whatever were his faults, he was a very great American; and when he bade farewell to public life, even his political opponents thought of him with something more than kindness. At a Democratic mass meeting held at Chicago in the campaign which followed, a speaker chanced to mention Mr. Blaine. At once the great audience sprang to its feet and thundered forth its uncontrollable applause. When it subsided, the speaker said: "Blaine seems to have more friends here than he had at Minneapolis!" and a voice replied amid a second tempest of applause, "We are all his friends!"

The Democratic National Convention met at Chicago on June 21st, with Mr. William L. Wilson of West Virginia as its permanent president. Events had taken an unexpected turn. Senator Hill's "snap convention" of the preceding February had proved to be a political boomerang. Its action, so far from coercing the Democrats of other States, had inspired them with indignation toward Mr. Hill and with enthusiasm for Mr. Cleveland. They regarded the manœuvre as a most unworthy trick. The prominence of Tammany in the whole proceeding had repelled them; for Tammany had always been mistrusted by the Democracy at large, particularly in the West. Therefore, a very strong drift had at once set in toward Mr. Cleveland's candidacy. In the words of General Bragg, uttered in 1884, men "loved him most of all for the enemies that he had made." State after State had instructed its delegates to vote for him, and it was already plain that he would have a sure majority in the Convention at Chicago. Democratic usage, however, required a



two-thirds vote to effect a nomination, and therefore Senator Hill did not yet despair. He might not himself win, but he felt that he could at least defeat his rival and give the nomination to another candidate. Even Mr. Cleveland's friends were still afraid to hope. Mr. Tracey of New York met Colonel Morrison of Illinois in Washington a day or two before the Convention had assembled.

"Morrison," said he, "we are going to nominate Cleveland or die!"

"Maybe," returned Morrison; "but are you certain that you are not going to do both?"

When the Convention met, however, the tide for Cleveland was running like a mill-race. His portraits were displayed all over the city; his badges were on the breasts of more than half the delegates; his name alone seemed to be in the mouth of every one. A feeling of buoyant confidence inspired the great crowds which poured into Chicago. A sense of coming victory was in the air. The Democracy was at last in fighting trim, and had fixed upon a leader of whose invincibility no doubt was felt. Ex-Secretary Whitney was in charge of Mr. Cleveland's canvass. He had come to Chicago expecting to make an up-hill fight, but he found himself at once the master of the situation. "I can't keep the votes back," said he to an intimate friend. "They tumble in at the windows as well as at the doors." On June 20th, the day before the Convention was opened, even the New York *Sun* grudgingly admitted that Cleveland's nomination was quite probable.

The immense "wigwam" at Chicago, with its amphitheatre roped off like a prize-ring, was packed to suffocation. Mr. Wilson, whose voice was weak and whose presence was unimpressive, could not control the delegates, who

sang and cheered and had things wholly their own way. In the committee which drafted the platform there was a sharp struggle over its tariff plank. The conservatives of the committee inserted a shifty and ambiguous declaration such as had been usual in other years; and being in the majority, they had adopted it. No sooner had it been read to the Convention, however, than it was greeted with tempestuous derision. The delegates were in an aggressive mood. They would have no compromise, no evasion of a dominant issue; and so by a great majority the plank as reported was stricken out and a substitute adopted, bolder than any declaration on the subject of the tariff which a Democratic convention had ever ventured to put forth. It began:

“ We denounce Republican protection as a fraud, a robbery of the great majority of the American people for the benefit of the few. We declare it to be a fundamental principle of the Democratic party that the Federal Government has no constitutional power to impose and collect tariff duties, except for the purposes of revenue only; and we demand that the collection of such taxes shall be limited to the necessities of the Government when honestly and economically administered.”

In vigorous phrase it went on to speak of the McKinley tariff law as “ the culminating atrocity of class legislation.” It pledged the party to give the people free raw materials and cheaper manufactured goods. It declared that since the McKinley tariff had gone into operation, wages had been lowered in many trades, with resulting strikes and general distress. It called attention to the fact that after thirty years of high protection “ the homes and farms of the country have become burdened with a real estate mortgage of over \$2,500,000,000 ”; and it denounced “ a

policy which fosters no industry so much as it does that of the sheriff."

The Convention had now taken the bit between its teeth and was beyond control. The Hill leaders fought vainly to secure delay. The discussion of the platform had lasted until nearly midnight, and an attempt was made to adjourn the Convention until the following day. The motion was shouted down amid indescribable uproar. The delegates refused to adjourn before the candidates were nominated. The customary nominating speeches were then made. Mr. Cleveland's name was presented by Governor Abbett of New Jersey, and the name of Senator Hill by Mr. William C. De Witt of New York. Other candidates were put in nomination, among them Governor Boies of Iowa, Senator Gorman of Maryland, and Mr. Stevenson of Illinois. It was now two o'clock in the morning, but the Convention showed no signs of weariness. The vote was certain to be taken before daybreak. The friends of Mr. Hill therefore played their trump card—the threat that Mr. Cleveland could not possibly be elected without the vote of his own State. To drive home the assertion with all possible point and power, they had reserved their ablest speaker until this moment. At 2.15 A. M. the bulky form of Mr. Bourke Cockran was seen emerging from the mass of delegates and moving toward the platform. Mr. Cockran was an Irishman by birth, who had come to New York as a young man, and had been admitted to the bar, achieving great success as a jury lawyer. Fluent of speech, witty and adroit, he was a natural rhetorician and could be either denunciatory or persuasive, with great effect. In after years he received the nickname of "the Mulligan Guard Demosthenes," because his eloquence was almost always at the disposal of

Tammany Hall. Nevertheless, he was a superb stump speaker, and even the Cleveland men became hushed and silent to catch his opening words.

Mr. Cockran had some of the gifts of a very clever actor. As he faced his audience he seemed languid, heavy-eyed and utterly exhausted. A feeling of sympathy won him the good will of the Convention before he spoke a word. Then in a voice that was rich and resonant, he uttered an earnest plea for harmony, making it appear that harmony could be achieved only by dropping Mr. Cleveland as a candidate. Here he spoke with perfect tact, anxious to offend no prejudice. For the personality of Mr. Cleveland he entertained, so he said, the most profound respect. "I feel for him a personal friendship. I oppose him in this Convention solely because he stands between the Democratic party and the light of victory." He spoke of the great tidal wave of 1890, which had overflowed the Force Bill and repudiated McKinleyism. He alluded to the service which Mr. Hill had rendered in that fight, and to the importance of New York as a factor in the election which was imminent.

"Pennsylvania boasts [he then went on] that she has never made a threat in a Convention. I ask you what could Pennsylvania threaten? Pennsylvania in November, with her thirty-two electoral votes, will thrust the Democracy of New York into the ditch dug for it here. I believe that Mr. Cleveland is a popular man (applause)—a most popular man (increased applause). Let me now add that he is a man of most extraordinary popularity—on every day of the year except election day! (Uproar.) He is popular in Republican States because his Democracy is not offensive to Republicans. I oppose him in this Convention because his candidacy imperils the success which now comes to us with bright, alluring prospects. I appeal to you to pause now,

before this contemplated action is taken, before this invasion is made complete. Build, gentlemen, build your hopes of success, not upon the shifting sands of political professions. Build it upon the solid rock of Democratic harmony, of Democratic unity and of Democratic enthusiasm. Then the people in whom you have trusted will repay your confidence with majorities so decisive that Republican prospects throughout the Union will receive a completer check even than they have received in the State whose triumphant Democracy now asks you only for permission to win for you a Democratic victory in November!"<sup>27</sup>

But Mr. Cockran's eloquence was unable to stem the tide. In the early hours of the morning, the roll of the Convention was called; and long before the last delegation had responded, it was plain to every one that Mr. Cleveland had secured not merely a bare majority, but more than the two-thirds necessary to make him his party's candidate. The record showed that 617 votes were cast for him—10 more than were required—while Senator Hill received only 114, Governor Boies 103 and Senator Gorman 36. Amid a scene of tumultuous enthusiasm, with bands blaring and banners waving, the galleries joined with the excited partisans upon the floor in chanting a song<sup>28</sup> which had struck the fancy of the public:

“ Grover! Grover!  
Four more years of Grover!  
In he comes,  
Out they go,  
Then we'll be in clover!”

On the following day, to please the old-fashioned party men, Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois was nominated

<sup>27</sup> Chicago *Tribune* and New York *Sun* for June 23, 1892.

<sup>28</sup> Parodied from “Babies,” in the comic opera *Wang*.

for the Vice-Presidency. Another candidate was said to be more acceptable to Mr. Cleveland; but just before the balloting began, a serious personal scandal regarding him became known to the delegates and served to prevent his nomination.

It was characteristic of Mr. Cleveland that on the night when his political fate was hanging in the balance he should have been chatting quietly in a friend's library, far distant from the telegraph wires and quite out of reach even of his own excited partisans. When the news was brought to him the next morning he received it with the same tranquillity that had marked his bearing ever since his retirement from office. The same news was heard in a very different spirit by Mr. Dana of the *Sun*. He had pinned his faith on Hill up to the last moment, hoping against hope. In his paper for June 22d, he had styled Hill "that heroic and powerful statesman," "a faithful, fearless and successful champion." Now that Mr. Cleveland had been nominated, Dana was in a dreadful quandary. He hated Cleveland and everything for which Cleveland stood; yet not to support the nominee of the Democratic party would probably mean for himself and for his paper financial ruin. Furthermore, there was no other party open to him. And so he reversed himself in a fashion so awkward and so insincere as to excite the mirth of every one. Pretending that Republican success would mean the enactment of a Force Bill, he came out for Cleveland on June 24th, saying that the one supreme issue was

"the question whether those Southern States which have inherited a negro population surpassing the number of their white citizens, shall, by Federal law and Federal military force, be subjected to

the political domination of the negroes, to negro Legislatures, negro Governors, and negro Judges in their courts, or whether they shall continue to be governed by white men as now. . . .

“Better vote for the liberty and the white government of the Southern States, even if the candidate were the Devil himself, rather than consent to the election of respectable Benjamin Harrison with a Force Bill in his pocket!”

And so, throughout the ensuing campaign, Mr. Dana devoted himself to writing vociferous leaders around his watch-words, “No Force Bill! No Negro Domination!”

The Populists held their National Convention at Omaha on July 2d, and nominated for the presidency, General James B. Weaver of Iowa<sup>29</sup> and for the vice-presidency, Mr. James G. Field of Virginia. Their platform accused both of the older parties of subserviency to the capitalists, declaring that “from the same prolific womb of governmental injustice we breed the two great classes of tramps and millionaires.” It demanded, among other things, the free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold at the ratio of sixteen to one, a graduated income tax, the establishment of postal savings-banks, and the ownership by the government of railroads, telegraphs, and telephones.

Few political campaigns in American history have been conducted upon so high a plane as that which followed in the summer and autumn of 1892. President Harrison said, in a spirit that did him honour, “I desire this campaign to be one of Republicanism and not one of personalities.” A very dignified campaign it was. Even the

<sup>29</sup> James Baird Weaver was a veteran of the Civil War who had helped to organise the Greenback Party in 1876, and who had served three terms in Congress.

speakers upon the stump alluded to their opponents in terms of personal respect. No scandals were unearthed, and no sensational episodes occurred, like that of the Murchison Letter. The main fight between the two great parties was fought out upon the issue of the tariff. For the first time in its history the Republican party was on the defensive. In 1884, it had been obliged to defend the record of Mr. Blaine, but its own past was held to be unassailable. Now the inequalities of the McKinley tariff were vigorously attacked by every Democratic speaker, and the explanation and defence of them taxed the ingenuity of the Republicans. Higher prices and lower wages were, indeed, strong Democratic arguments. President Harrison's own contribution to political discussion consisted of the sapient remark, "A cheap coat means a cheap man under the coat"—an epigram which was about as convincing as Dr. Johnson's burlesque line:

"Who drives fat oxen must himself be fat."

By tacit consent, both Republicans and Democrats said very little about the silver question. The Populists, on the other hand, preached the doctrine of free silver with great vigour and enthusiasm. In some States of the West and South, coalitions were made with the Populist party. Thus, in Louisiana, the Republicans divided their electoral ticket evenly with the Populists. In Oregon, one Populist elector was placed upon the Democratic ticket; and in Minnesota both Democrats and Populists united upon four electors. In five States—Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, North Dakota and Wyoming—the Democrats nominated no electoral ticket at all, but voted for the Populistic candidates. The object of this was not merely to defeat the



Republicans at the polls. It was thought possible that enough Populist electors might be elected to prevent any party from having a clear majority in the Electoral College. In that event, the election would be thrown into the House of Representatives,<sup>30</sup> voting by States, in which case the Democrats would have a clear majority.

As the summer drew near its end, both parties were hopeful, yet both believed that the result would be very close. One feature of the election would be novel. For the first time it was recognised that money could no more be used in directly bribing voters. Of the forty-four States of the Union, thirty-five had adopted some form of the Australian ballot, thus enabling the voter to cast his vote in secrecy. As was written at the time:

“No ‘blocks of five’ can be marched to the polls on election day with their ballots held in sight of the man who has bought them till they are dropped into the ballot boxes. What the same isolation will accomplish in great manufacturing centres is equally obvious. . . . No working man need fear loss of employment if he votes in accordance with his own beliefs and against the ‘interests of his employer’; for his employer cannot see how he votes. In the list of the thirty-five States which have the new systems are to be found all the so-called ‘doubtful States,’ and all those States in the Northwest in which the tariff reform sentiment has made such havoc with old-time Republican majorities. . . . In the great cities of the land there is another gain from the new system which is as important as that of the secret ballot. Trading and deals will be practically impossible, because of the difficulties which are thrown in the way. . . . Other agencies for securing votes must be sought, and other managers than professional corruptionists and traders must be put at the head of the party organisations to conduct the campaign.”<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> As provided by the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution.

<sup>31</sup> *The Nation*, June 16, 1892 (pp. 442, 443).

(Something which occurred in Pennsylvania during this year did much to endanger the prospects of Republican success. In June, the Carnegie Steel Company at Homestead, reduced the wages of its employés. A trade organisation known as the Amalgamated Steel and Iron Workers sought to intercede; but the Carnegie Company refused to recognise it, and soon afterwards ordered a shutdown, and closed its works, throwing thousands of men out of employment. These men, a majority of whom had served the Company long and faithfully, were not strikers.) They were summarily deprived of their employment, for the sole reason that they were members of a union. The intention of the Company was to reopen the mills with non-union men. Anticipating trouble, the Carnegie managers, instead of appealing to the authorities for legal protection, employed a force of armed men to act as a garrison for the mills. This small army was placed in armoured barges and brought to Homestead by the river. As they neared their destination, the men who had been locked out fired upon them and were met by a counter-fire. A sort of battle took place, lasting for nearly two days and involving the use of cannon and of burning oil, with which the river was flooded. Seven of the Carnegie "army" were killed and a much larger number wounded. The loss of their assailants was even greater. In the end the men in the barges surrendered and were badly treated by a mob; and finally State troops were sent to Homestead and restored order by the establishment of martial law.

In various ways this incident was unfortunate for the Republicans. In the first place, here was a highly protected industry cutting down the wages of its workmen at the very time when Republican orators were proclaim-

ing the blessings of the McKinley Bill. In the second place, the country beheld a very striking instance of the lawlessness of corporations. These great steel magnates, so said the Democrats, were acting precisely after the fashion of feudal barons, maintaining private armies, disdainng the protection of the law, and shooting down citizens without any legal warrant. The employment of armed men by corporations had already attracted the attention of Congress, and the bloody affair at Homestead made the private militia system exceedingly unpopular. Another cause of concern to the party in power was the condition of the national treasury. The "Billion Dollar Congress" had not only wiped out the surplus, but had authorised expenses which it was practically impossible to meet. For the six months ending December 31, 1891, the Treasury had paid out \$86,000,000 less than was called for by the existing laws. This sum had not been paid, for the excellent reason that the funds were lacking. The customs revenue had fallen off; expenses had increased; and now the Government of the richest nation in the world was in the position of a hard-up debtor, postponing from day to day the payment of its bills, and living, as it were, from hand to mouth.

On the whole, then, the Democratic chances seemed very good. Only in one State, but that a most important one, could danger be detected. This was in New York. Mr. Hill and his followers had returned from the National Convention in a sullen mood. They had been soundly beaten by the Cleveland element. Would they take their revenge upon election day? This was a question which perplexed the Democratic managers, and most of all, Mr. W. C. Whitney, who felt himself responsible for the result in his own State. The most dangerous ele-

ment of opposition, as in 1884, was to be found in Tammany Hall. John Kelly had died, and had been succeeded by Mr. Richard Croker, who now wielded a power far greater even than that of Kelly. Croker was an Irishman by birth, who had been brought to the United States when he was two years old. He had been a machinist and then a fireman, and had gradually worked his way into local politics, advancing from one position to another, until in 1886 he became the head of one of the most formidable political organisations in the world. He was a man of immense force of character, illiterate, but shrewd. In many of his personal traits, as in his physical appearance, he reminded one of General Grant—having the same taciturnity, the same grim doggedness of purpose, the same iron strength of will. The vote of New York City was in his gift, and he had been consistently opposed to Mr. Cleveland. Nevertheless, it was known that Tammany Hall was anxious not to be regarded as disloyal to the party.

Years before, Croker had been accused of murder, and among his counsel had been Mr. Whitney. For him, ever since that time, Croker had entertained a kindly feeling. Upon this feeling Mr. Whitney diplomatically worked, until Croker agreed to meet his party's candidate and come, if possible, to an understanding. He not unnaturally supposed that Mr. Cleveland would give promises in exchange for Croker's own promise to make his men "vote straight." Mr. Cleveland, however, showed no inclination for an interview with Croker. It was only as a personal favour to Mr. Whitney that he at last consented; and the three men, with a second Tammany chief, dined together in a private room at Mr. Whitney's house. When the political conversation began, Mr.

Cleveland took a line that was most unexpected. Instead of suggesting conciliation and speaking smoothly, he squared his shoulders and gave Croker such a talk as he had never listened to before. He told him what he thought of Tammany Hall, of Tammany politics, and of Tammany men. As he towered above Croker, punctuating his remarks with heavy blows of his fist upon the table, he completely dominated the great "boss," who in reply could merely iterate his hope that matters might be arranged between them. In the end, Mr. Cleveland said that what had happened in the past would not influence him in his future actions; and with this very meagre concession Croker had to go away content.

Mr. Cleveland, in fact, meant to win the Presidency, if he won it at all, without giving pledges to any human being. Among the many interesting anecdotes then current regarding him, one of the most characteristic was told by a distinguished man of letters who had long been his intimate personal friend. There was a certain rich contractor, a "Blaine Irishman," a liberal employer of labour, who, because of his own ancestry, was thought to have great influence with the Irish voters in New York. Just at that time, the "Irish vote" in New York was a very uncertain element in Democratic calculations. Therefore, it occurred to the literary gentleman, who happened to know the contractor very well, that he might perhaps do his favorite candidate a good turn by bringing the two men into personal relations. So it came to pass that one evening they met in the poet's library, without the least suspicion on their part that the interview had been pre-arranged. After a few moments, their host made some excuse for slipping out of the room. Returning at the end of half an hour, he found Mr. Cleveland and the

contractor chatting very amicably together. A little later, the ex-President, having finished his call, departed.

"Well," said the host, "what do you think of him?"

The contractor's face fairly glowed.

"Ah, sure," said he, slipping into his native brogue, "he's the greatest man I ever saw. He's a fine man—a grand man. *He wouldn't promise to do wan d—d thing I asked him!*"

And from that time until election day, no one worked harder for Mr. Cleveland than the man who had failed to extort a single promise from him.

The November election astonished Democrats, Republicans, and Populists alike. Mr. Cleveland swept the country. Of course, the Southern States were solidly for him; but in addition he carried all the "doubtful" States—Connecticut, Indiana, New Jersey, and New York—while to the amazement of the political prophets, California, Illinois, and Wisconsin gave him their electoral votes. Michigan cast five of its nine votes for him, and even Ohio, the home of Mr. McKinley, returned one Democratic elector. In the Electoral College, Cleveland and Stevenson had 277 votes against 145 for Harrison and Reid.<sup>32</sup> Even had Mr. Cleveland lost New York, the presidency would still have been his own.

A very startling result of the election was the enormous strength displayed by the Populists throughout the West. Not only did their candidate, General Weaver, poll more than a million votes, but he actually carried four States—Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, and Nevada—receiving also one electoral vote in Oregon and one in North Dakota. For the first time since the birth of the Republican party,

<sup>32</sup> Cleveland's majority over Harrison in the popular vote was 380,000.

a third political organisation was represented among the presidential electors.<sup>33</sup> It is true that the vote given to the Populists was an exaggeration of their actual numbers, because in all but one of the States which they carried, the Democrats had made no nominations; but none the less, the election figures were indicative of an immense popular upheaval that was ominous for the future of the older parties.

Meanwhile, Mr. Cleveland had won an extraordinary personal triumph. Disliked by all the politicians, nominated against the protest of his own State, and opposed by the powerful corporate interests throughout the country, he had, nevertheless, been carried into the presidency by a great spontaneous movement of the people themselves, who gave him their implicit confidence because they felt that in him they had found a leader courageous enough to defy coercion, and of moral fibre strong enough to resist those other influences which are only the more dangerous because insidious. He received the presidency for the second time, bound by no pledge save that contained in the declaration of his party to govern honestly, to reduce the tariff, and to curb the Trusts.

<sup>33</sup> Weaver's strength in the Electoral College was 22.

## CHAPTER VII

### PRESIDENT CLEVELAND ONCE MORE

WHEN Mr. Cleveland, as President-elect, proceeded to the Capitol to take the oath of office for the second time, it seemed almost as though the earlier ceremony of 1889 were being faithfully repeated. Now as then, he was accompanied by Mr. Harrison, and only the relations of the two were changed. Then, Mr. Cleveland was a defeated candidate giving place to his victorious successor. Now, it was Mr. Harrison who was gracefully sustaining the same rôle, and in his turn making way for an opponent. In externals, however, the scene was essentially the same, even to the aspect of the weather; for a storm of mingled sleet and rain was raging, and Washington had awakened on that raw March morning to find the streets all whitened by a swirl of snow.

Amid a driving gale, and standing in what an observer graphically described as "a blizzard-riddled wooden pen," the new President, bareheaded, delivered without notes of any kind, a brief inaugural address; and then for five hours he reviewed the long procession which marched past the presidential stand. Its most conspicuous feature was the entire National Guard of Pennsylvania, headed by the Democratic Governor of that State. For the first time also in the history of inaugural parades, women participated in the pageant. A cavalcade of them from Maryland, superbly mounted, rode past the President, adding a new element of the picturesque. More interesting, however, in view of recent political events, was the presence



of three thousand Tammany men, of whom several hundred were arrayed in Indian garb, and with whom were leaders such as Croker, Grady and others, who for nine years had waged relentless war on Mr. Cleveland. Assuredly it was for him a day of genuine triumph when even such consistent enemies as these had been brought to heel. On the day following the inauguration, Senator Hill called upon the President, and the two were closeted for hours. Just what passed between them no one ever learned; but it seems quite certain that Mr. Hill accepted frankly the inevitable. From that day he never seriously opposed the policy of his successful rival, and more than once in the tempestuous times which followed, he did staunch service in its defence.

And thus began the years of President Cleveland's second term of office, which a philosophical writer has truly characterised as "the most momentous period in a time of peace in the history of the country, and the most interesting, from a political point of view, in either war or peace."<sup>1</sup> The fury of the elements, that raged throughout the day of its inception symbolised, as it were, the storm and stress which marked the years of its continuance, and which reached a climax at its close.

The composition of the new Cabinet had become known to the people before the nominations were laid before the Senate. The Secretary of State was Mr. Walter Q. Gresham of Illinois, lately a judge in one of the Federal courts. Mr. Gresham had been a lifelong Republican until a few months prior to President Cleveland's election. He had even been regarded as a possible Republican candidate for the Presidency. At the Republican National Convention of 1888, he had received on the first ballot 111 votes, standing second only to Senator Sherman, who led the

<sup>1</sup> Stanwood, *A History of the Presidency*, p. 519 (Boston, 1898).

poll until the combination in favour of Harrison was effected.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Gresham had always been a conservative, a "Lincoln Republican," wholly out of sympathy with the later tendencies of his party; and when the tariff was made a direct issue in 1892, he turned his back upon high protection as a policy, and publicly announced his purpose of voting for Mr. Cleveland. Mr. Gresham was, popular with the labour element in the Middle West, and as a judge had given from the bench decisions accompanied by *obiter dicta* that greatly pleased the opponents of privilege. He was a man of the Cleveland type, sternly honest, inflexible of purpose, and vigorous in mind. In some respects he fell short of the ideal requirements in a Secretary of State. His training had not sufficiently familiarised him with the minutiae of diplomatic relations. He failed, perhaps, to appreciate the importance of these relations as compared with concerns of domestic interest. Moreover, on the personal side, he lacked something of that regard for the fitness of things which ought to characterise one who has to do with the representatives of foreign countries. It was Mr. Gresham's wont to receive ambassadors and ministers—men bred to the most punctilious etiquette—sitting in his shirt-sleeves at his desk, and chewing on the stump of a cigar; while he was overfond of lounging about the corridors of Willard's Hotel and mingling with the very motley mob which sprawled there at all hours of the day and night. Naturally, Mr. Gresham's appointment was rather sharply criticised. Republicans regarded him as a renegade from their ranks, while many Democrats thought it hard that the chief Cabinet position should go to so very recent a convert to Democracy.

Mr. John G. Carlisle of Kentucky was made Secretary

<sup>2</sup> See p. 156.

of the Treasury, and offered a brilliant contrast to his two immediate predecessors. He was an experienced legislator, who had been three times Speaker of the House and a member of seven different Congresses, in all of which he had concerned himself with questions of theoretical and practical finance. Mr. Carlisle was of a calm, reflective, and judicial cast of mind, and he had to an exceptional degree the gift of lucid and convincing exposition. While acting as Speaker, Mr. Carlisle once received an unusual compliment from a political opponent. Mr. (afterwards Senator) Hiscock of New York, said of Mr. Carlisle: "He is one of the strongest of Democrats and I am one of the strongest of Republicans; yet my imagination is not strong enough to conceive of his making an unfair ruling or doing an unfair thing against the party opposed to him in this House."<sup>3</sup>

The President appointed as Secretary of War, Colonel Daniel S. Lamont of New York, who had been private secretary to Mr. Cleveland while the latter was Governor of New York, and also during his first administration as President. It was essentially a personal appointment, well justified both by Colonel Lamont's devotion to Mr. Cleveland and also by his ability, his sound judgment and his admirable tact. Another personal appointment was that of Mr. Wilson S. Bissell of New York, an old and intimate friend, to be Postmaster-General. The new Secretary of the Navy was Mr. Hilary A. Herbert of Alabama—the first ex-Confederate to be placed in charge of one of the military departments of the Government. Mr. Herbert was an accomplished gentleman and a skilful administrator. He had served as chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs in three Congresses and was intimately familiar with the duties of his new office.

<sup>3</sup> A. D. White, *Autobiography*, ii. p. 126 (New York, 1905).

Under him, the navy of the United States, which a few years before had ranked as only twelfth among the navies of the world, advanced to the fifth place, being surpassed only by the armaments of Great Britain, France, Russia and Germany. Mr. Hoke Smith of Georgia became Secretary of the Interior and Mr. Julius S. Morton of Nebraska, Secretary of Agriculture. The Cabinet was completed by the appointment to the Attorney-Generalship of Mr. Richard Olney of Massachusetts, whose name was destined to be honourably associated with some of the most stirring events of President Cleveland's administration. When he became Attorney-General he was almost unknown outside of his native State. Educated at Brown and Harvard, he was a successful lawyer who had mingled but little in public life, beyond serving in the Massachusetts Legislature. He had, however, a very forceful personality, combining the keenness and prompt decisiveness of a trained reasoner with a certain aggressive quality which suggested, under all the suave amenities of a polished gentleman, the pugnacity, and also the tenacity, of a bulldog.

President Cleveland entered upon his duties under no illusions as to the difficulty of the problems which confronted him. There was a seriousness, amounting almost to solemnity, in some of the sentences of his inaugural address, which may have been regarded lightly by those who then heard or read them, but which afterwards were seen to have been full of meaning. Toward the close, he said with something like the spirit of prophecy:

“Anxiety for the pledges which my party has made . . . constrains me to remind those with whom I am to co-operate, that we can succeed in doing the work which has been especially set

before us, only by the most sincere, harmonious, and disinterested effort. Even if insuperable obstacles and opposition prevent the consummation of our task, we shall hardly be excused; and if failure can be traced to our fault or neglect, we may be sure the people will hold us to a swift and exacting accountability."

And then he added:

"I shall, to the best of my ability and within my sphere of duty, preserve the Constitution by loyally protecting every grant of Federal power it contains, by defending all its restraints when attacked by impatience and restlessness, and by enforcing its limitations and reservations in favour of the States and the people.

"Fully impressed with the gravity of the duties that confront me . . . I should be appalled if it were my lot to bear unaided the responsibilities which await me. I am, however, saved from discouragement when I remember that I shall have the support and the counsel and co-operation of wise and patriotic men, who will stand at my side in Cabinet places or will represent the people in their legislative halls."

In a letter to Mr. Justice Lamar, which was written at this time, but of which the full text still remains unpublished, the President spoke of his own misgivings and of his doubt as to whether his administration were not destined to disaster. It may, however, be questioned whether even he had yet become aware how formidable were the dangers which beset him. There were three elements in the political situation so closely interrelated as to make action in regard to any one of them involve an instant complication with the other two. These three factors were (1) the relation of the great moneyed interests to national legislation; (2) the spread of Populism in the West and South; and (3) the condition of the Government's finances.

The rapid growth of great fortunes which accompanied and succeeded the Civil War had long been a subject of comment and, very properly, of pride among Americans of every class. Never, perhaps, in the history of the world was there witnessed a parallel to the extraordinary outburst of energy and genius devoted to material success, which marked the years from 1864 to 1890. All at once the untouched resources of the United States seemed to be revealed to its inhabitants; and thousands upon thousands of keen-witted, inventive, far-seeing men had grasped the vast possibilities which the development of these resources inherently contained. What had been accomplished in the whole of the preceding century was now surpassed by the railway builders, miners, traders, promoters, manufacturers and financiers of this new era. The United States was like a freshly opened gold field into which prospectors flung themselves in a frantic rush for wealth. And from one point of view the results were admirable. Here were rich rewards for brain and muscle, for courage and capacity. America, far more than ever, was for a time a land of opportunity. Yet there was another and a darker side, which more and more became apparent as the years went by. This was seen first of all in the growing tendency of many who had become extremely rich to monopolise the sources of their wealth and thereby to bar the door of opportunity to others; and furthermore, in the effort, too often successful, to render subservient or worthless the machinery of the law, to which alone those who were wronged must look for swift redress. The most signal instance of corporate power was to be found in the railways. These companies, the creatures of the State, deriving their charters from the people, and often aided by generous public grants, went

far beyond the rights that were conceded to them. From being simply common carriers, they began to get possession of those natural products which are included among the necessities of life. First in order, they secured the three great coal fields in which 95 per cent. of the anthracite coal of the United States is mined—and they secured them, not by legitimate purchase, but by forcing private owners to sell at prices fixed by the railway managers. Those who refused, found that the railways would no longer furnish cars for the shipment of “private” coal, thereby shutting off the individual miner from his market. When the State of Pennsylvania in 1873 forbade, by a constitutional provision, its railways to engage in mining coal, the prohibition was at once evaded. Railway officials formed mining companies, of which the directors were the same men as those who made up the railway directorates; and the old abuses were continued, with the added zest of defying the fundamental law. This arrangement even augmented the extortion; for now the railways, acting as common carriers, could charge exorbitant freight rates, thus justifying the mine owners (*i. e.*, the railway owners) in selling the coal they shipped at whatsoever prices they pleased. It was found by a Congressional committee in 1893 that the railway charge for carrying coal was far greater than the charge for carrying wheat or other similar freight; and that while the means of transportation had been continually improved and the cost of handling cheapened, the railway rates were higher than they had been fifteen years before.<sup>4</sup>

What was true of coal was also true of timber, cop-

<sup>4</sup> Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, pp. 183 foll. and 242 foll. (1893.) See also House Report, 2278; Fifty-second Congress (2d session); and Parsons, *The Heart of the Railroad Problem* (Boston, 1906).

per, iron and other minerals. In the West, great tracts of arable land were held by the railways and barred to settlers;<sup>5</sup> while there, too, by an unfair discrimination in freight charges, one locality was favoured at the expense of another, just as one merchant or manufacturer might be ruined because of the more favourable terms that were secretly given to his competitors. Thus the railways were, in a sense, the masters of the State rather than its servants, arbitrarily bestowing or withholding prosperity, getting a firm grip on small communities, fixing at will the cost of articles of prime necessity, choking competition, and thus earning for the companies the great sums necessary to enable them to pay extravagant salaries and to keep up dividends on "watered" stock.<sup>6</sup>

But the railway owners offered merely the most conspicuous and worst, and not by any means the sole, example of a gross abuse of power. They had bred a score of other organised and equally rapacious corporations, of which the Standard Oil Company<sup>7</sup> and the so-called Sugar Trust were especially obnoxious to public sentiment and most successful in their defiance of the processes of law. The continuance of a high protective tariff had added to the number of these monopolies; for while the tariff did not invariably or necessarily create an actual monopoly, its tendency was distinctly to limit competition; and in 1892, Mr. John De Witt Warner, a careful student of politico-economic questions, published a list of one hundred corporations of this sort which had, by one means or another,

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 223-5, 268.

<sup>6</sup> "The excess over just and reasonable rates of transportation constitutes an available fund by which they [the railways] are enabled to crush out the competition of independent coal-producers."—Interstate Commerce Commission Report, p. 4 (1893).

<sup>7</sup> See pp. 134-136.



secured tariff legislation in their own favour. The tariff, however, had nothing to do with the absorption by private corporations of valuable franchises all over the country, for which they paid little or nothing, while they usually exploited them in a spirit of insolent rapacity. Gas companies, having a monopoly in many cities, used fraudulent meters, supplied inferior gas and collected excessive rates from the consumers, who were absolutely helpless and without redress against what every one well knew to be sheer robbery. It was the same with electric lighting. The street railways were in the hands of another set of owners, who treated the travelling public like mere cattle—crowding them into insufficient cars in defiance of either comfort or decency, charging excessive fares for an inadequate service, and caring nothing for remonstrance or complaint. The telegraph was still another instance of an almost complete monopoly; the telephone of another; the business of the express companies of another.

The mere enumeration of these facts, however, is less significant than another circumstance connected with them. Every country has witnessed phenomena not unlike these. Unscrupulous and able men are always ready to enrich themselves and to wring great fortunes from the people. In the United States, even at the time of its birth as a nation, the records were smirched by the story of stock-jobbing, dishonest contracts, and the sale of influence and by a vicious eagerness to exploit every public source of private gain.<sup>8</sup> Some decades later, the nation had a further experience of the political power of wealth, at the time when Nicholas Biddle and his associates of the United States Bank waged a long war against the national admin-

<sup>8</sup> See, for instance, McMaster, *With the Fathers*, pp. 71-86 (New York, 1896).

istration, until they were routed by the fiery Jackson. Later still, the period of the Civil War, which may be extended to cover the years from 1860 to 1875, saw men wielding the weapon of wealth with an unscrupulousness that has never been surpassed. But in business and in public life, this period is one to be recalled with shame by every American. Senator Hoar, in a memorable speech, once gave, as by a sudden glare of lightning, a glimpse of those appalling years.

“My own public life,” said he, “has been a very brief and insignificant one, extending little beyond the duration of a single term of senatorial office. But in that brief period I have seen five judges of a high court of the United States driven from office by threats of impeachment for corruption or maladministration. I have seen the Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs in the House rise in his place and demand the expulsion of four of his associates for making sale of their official privilege of selecting the youths to be educated at our great military school. When the greatest railroad of the world, binding together the Continent and uniting the two great seas which wash our shores, was finished, I have seen our national triumph and exultation turned to bitterness and shame by the unanimous reports of three committees of Congress—two of the House and one here—that every step of that mighty enterprise had been taken in fraud.

“I have heard in the highest places the shameless doctrine avowed by men grown old in public office, that the true way by which power should be gained in the Republic is to bribe the people with offices created for their service; and that the true end for which it should be used when gained is the promotion of selfish ambition and the gratification of personal revenge. I have heard that suspicion haunts the footsteps of the trusted companions of the President himself.”<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Speech on the impeachment of Secretary Belknap, May 6, 1876 (Senate).

Yet the things done in those years gave in their direct results no reason for despair. Those who did them were acting almost in isolation, and in most instances professedly outside the pale of honesty and decency. Fisk and Gould and Huntington, Belknap, Babcock, Brady, the chiefs of the Whiskey Ring, the plotters of Black Friday, and the Star Route criminals, were by the very crudity of their methods so conspicuously evil as hardly to be dangerous.

Like Tweed and his confederates, who belonged to the same period, they were vulgar bandits, operating boldly enough on the by-ways of politics and commerce, yet ready to take flight when attacked by the law and by public indignation. But in 1892, great wealth had led to the development of a caste, of which the members were exceedingly respectable, and of a very different stripe from those whom they succeeded. Well-mannered, kindly gentlemen were they, usually irreproachable in their private lives, generous in their benefactions, and upholders of a conservative tradition which they had themselves created. The protected manufacturer rapidly enriched himself, not by defiance of the law, but strictly in accordance with it. The railroad magnate who gave rebates and "drawbacks," the organiser of a mighty trust, and the able captain of industry who closed and barred the doors of opportunity to any other than himself, were in their own estimation far from being violators of the statutes. Every step they took was taken under the advice of the most eminent lawyers of the land. If what many of them did appeared to contravene alike the letter and the spirit of explicit legislation, and if they were often sued, indicted, or otherwise brought before the courts, this gave them slight concern, for nothing ever came of it. The law's delays were endless, its tech-

nicalities most interestingly labyrinthine, and the judges patient and extremely well-disposed.

The most striking feature of this new wealth was its solidarity and the close relationship of interest among its owners. There were no longer isolated millionaires, fighting each for his own hand. The chief figure in an oil company, for instance, would likewise be the principal stockholder in a great electric light concern, having also a subsidiary interest in a match trust, a candle monopoly, and a dozen gas-works. Mr. H. D. Lloyd, whose zeal sometimes led him to exaggerate the importance of his deductions, but whose facts were based on irrefutable evidence, was well within the truth when he wrote in 1894:

“A small number of men are obtaining the power to forbid any but themselves to supply the people with fire in nearly every form known to modern life and industry, from matches to locomotives and electricity. They control our hard coal and much of the soft, and stoves, furnaces and steam and hot-water heaters; the governors on steam-boilers and the boilers; gas and gas fixtures; natural gas and gas pipes; electric lighting and all the appurtenances. You cannot free yourselves by changing from electricity to gas, or from gas of the city to gas of the fields. If you fly from kerosene to candles, you are still under the ban.”<sup>10</sup>

Add to this the fact that the very same men, and others like them, held directorships in “chains” of banks, in railways, in insurance companies, and other fiduciary institutions; that they owned a controlling interest in the leading newspapers of the country which helped to mould and control public opinion by colouring the news;<sup>11</sup> that they were lavish contributors to the campaign funds of one or both of the great political parties; that they helped

<sup>10</sup> Lloyd, *Wealth against Commonwealth*, pp. 9, 10.

<sup>11</sup> See pp. 757-8.

their own protégés to seats in municipal councils, in State legislatures and in Congress; and that their influence was benevolently exerted to promote their former legal advisers to positions in the State and national judiciary—and one may form a faint conception of the enormous power which they wielded.<sup>12</sup>

It was primarily to check this power, and to bring it under the more efficient control of law, that the People's Party had been founded. In that party there were some who were sufficiently clear-sighted to perceive that the crux of the whole situation lay in the question as to who should control and regulate the public means of transportation and communication, with such other public utilities as heat and light and water. In private hands this control was certain always to be abused and made an instrument of oppression, precisely as it had been in the past. The Standard Oil Company and the coal monopoly had been reared upon the secret agreement between the railways in Pennsylvania. The Beef Trust had crushed competition, largely by its grip upon the Western roads. The trans-continental railways had fraudulently acquired and held great tracts of public lands. These and a multiplicity of related facts were known to almost everyone, and therefore here should have been found the *point d'appui* of the Populist campaign. But unfortunately for their cause, the leaders—and most of all, the masses—of the new party were led astray by another plan, which seemed at once more tempting and more simple of execution. They did, indeed, as we have already seen, insert in their various platforms a demand for the government ownership of railways, telegraphs and telephones; yet it was upon the silver question that they elected to make the strongest fight.

<sup>12</sup> See George, *The Menace of Privilege* (New York, 1905).

Perhaps they had vaguely in mind the military maxim of a great French strategist: "Find out what it is that your enemy most desires you not to do—and then do it." To the Populists, the whole body of merchants, bankers, and business men in the Eastern States were collectively "the enemy." No distinction was made between the Wall Street gambler, the trust promoter and the note-shaver on the one hand, and the conservative, fair-minded representatives of legitimate commerce on the other. In Kansas and Nebraska, these were all equally "the enemy"; and when it became apparent that their interests were violently opposed to the free coinage of silver, that they dreaded it and viewed it as a menace to prosperity, then the rank and file of the new party felt a keen delight. Here was a sharp-edged weapon ready to hand. Here was a sword wherewith to slay the money-sharks, the Shylocks, the Wall Street blood-suckers, and the Trusts. If free silver was a bad thing for them, then surely it must be a good thing for the honest farmer.

The free-silver leaders, of course, were not all actuated by a purely emotional view of a strictly economic subject. They called themselves bimetallists, and honestly believed that it would be possible for the United States to maintain a double standard, even though its mints should be opened to the unlimited coinage of silver dollars at the old ratio of 16 to 1, which had long since ceased to be a true one.<sup>13</sup> They had read the works of theoretical bimetallists who held that the use of both metals would be economically desirable if adopted through a common agreement by the great commercial nations of the earth. This is, indeed, a question that still remains an open one, although purely

<sup>13</sup> The intrinsic value of the standard silver dollar in July, 1892, was eighty-eight cents.

academic. The important fact in 1893 was that, with the exception of India and the United States, all the leading nations of the world were either upon a definite gold basis or were preparing to accept it. England, which, in fact, though not by law, had made gold its standard since 1699, adopted that standard legally in 1870 by the Coinage Act. In 1871, Germany demonetised silver and became a "gold country." The nations composing the so-called Latin Union (France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and Greece) did the same in 1877, and their example was shortly followed by Holland, Norway and Sweden; while Russia, Austria and Japan signified their intention to adopt a policy of gold monometallism at an early date. The practical question at issue in the United States, therefore, was not whether the double monetary standard might not be feasible through an international agreement, but whether one nation alone could successfully maintain it, in the face of the use of a single standard by the rest of the civilised world. The serious and more intelligent leaders of the silver men—Democrats, Republicans and Populists, alike—believed this to be possible. They caught eagerly at stray passages in the writings of international bimetalists, and gave them an illogical application. Some very conservative economists and statesmen were, in fact, theoretically in favour of bimetalism as a principle—among them Mr. (afterwards Lord) Goschen and Mr. A. J. Balfour in Great Britain; and in the United States, General Francis A. Walker, Mr. Charles Francis Adams, Mr. S. Dana Horton, and President E. B. Andrews of Brown University.<sup>14</sup> The names of these and other authorities

<sup>14</sup> See Walker, *International Bimetalism* (New York, 1896); Horton, *The Silver Pound* (London, 1878); and Andrews, *An Honest Dollar* (Hartford, 1884).

were dragged into the argument, and made to support assertions and deductions such as would greatly have astonished the worthy gentlemen to whom they were ascribed.

But the great mass of the "friends of silver" did not know or care anything about the niceties of financial doctrine. They made up their own minds in a much more direct and simple way. To them, "free silver" had a most enticing sound, indicative of opulence and easy times. They had a vague notion that if the amount of money in the country should be increased *per capita*, each individual citizen would necessarily have more of it in his pockets. Just how he was to get it except by working for it precisely as he had done before, they did not attempt to demonstrate; but they were certain that the free coinage of silver would increase the number of dollars "per capita" in the United States, and that any objection to such a measure could come only from cruel capitalists in the East, who wished to hold the Western farmers forever in the bonds of debt. When assured that unlimited silver coinage would drive gold out of circulation, they replied that silver was good enough for them if they could only get enough of it. When told that the United States could not single-handed maintain a system at variance with that of the great European nations, they answered that this country was big enough to do anything it pleased without asking for leave or license from the monarchies of Europe. Such were the simple, primitive ideas which influenced the minds of the silver men throughout the West; but most potent of all was the belief that a vote for silver was a direct blow struck at the hated Eastern capitalist and creditor.

The third serious element in the political situation at the time of President Cleveland's second inauguration was the



condition of the United States Treasury. When it had been turned over to Mr. Harrison's financial secretary four years before, it contained a net surplus of \$97,000,000. This had all been spent, and it was now difficult even to meet current expenses. Moreover, the financial legislation of past years had begun to inspire foreign holders of American securities with increasing apprehension. When specie payments were resumed in 1879, the Treasury had set apart in gold, a special fund, which was never to be less than \$100,000,000, for the redemption of outstanding legal tender notes ("greenbacks"). Of these greenbacks, there were in circulation \$346,000,000 in 1892. There were also outstanding \$147,000,000 of "coin certificates," which had been issued in the purchase of silver bullion under the Sherman Act of 1890.<sup>15</sup> These by law were redeemable in "coin"—i.e., in either gold or silver, at the option of the Treasury; but President Harrison's Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Windom, had very unwisely ruled that the holder of the notes might exercise his option. In other words, the "coin certificates," like the greenbacks, were really payable in gold. Hence, there were now outstanding government notes calling for \$493,000,000 of gold, while the Treasury had little more than one-fifth of that sum with which to redeem them. Yet this was not the worst; for under the Sherman Act, which still remained in force, the Government must buy each month 4,500,000 ounces of silver, and issue against this bullion still more paper money to be redeemed in gold.

The perplexities of the situation with which President Cleveland was confronted were, therefore, plain enough to be seen by any intelligent observer. He was pledged to reduce the tariff in the interest of freer trade, and in this

<sup>15</sup> See pp. 201, 273.

he was certain to find himself in conflict with the whole power of consolidated capital—not the power of the protected industries alone, but of all the allied forces of monopoly; for these well knew that a radical reform of the tariff would be only the first step toward a reform of other and even worse abuses. It was also plain that he must take measures to protect the Treasury and keep it solvent. But such measures would of necessity run counter to the convictions of the silver men of every party, and would convince the people of the West that Wall Street was supreme in Washington. President Cleveland's task, then, involved a bitter struggle with the capitalists on the one side, while it must inevitably fan the flames of popular suspicion on the other. The stoutest heart might well have shrunk from such an undertaking. To carry it through successfully demanded a high order of political genius—an exceptional gift for the management of men, a perfect union of tact and firmness, and a broadly tolerant understanding of human prejudice and passion.

Mr. Cleveland was by no means possessed of this rare political genius, though he did have some very fundamental qualities of the governing man—a robust intelligence, a rigorous conscience and unlimited courage. With these qualities he had also some of their usual defects. When he understood a subject, he was a little intolerant of those who failed to understand it, or who understood it in a different way. When he was convinced that he was right, he had no patience with those whom he conceived to be in the wrong. Because he was himself absolutely fearless, he scorned all such as shrank from following where he led. He wished, in fact, not only to accomplish his own ends, but to accomplish them in his own way; and coercion was to him more natural than conciliation. In fact, just

as Strafford's motto was "Thorough," so Mr. Cleveland's motto might have been "Downright." Whatever policy he might adopt was sure to be a heavy-fisted one, and to be carried out, if carried out at all, with no *finesse*, but by dint of hard sledge-hammering blows. This temperament was a fine one for an absolute ruler—for that enlightened despot whom Aristotle held to be the ideal governor of men—but it was dangerous in him who, in a Republic, was obliged to carry out his plans through the unforced co-operation of other and no less independent men.

Mr. Cleveland in many ways had changed in the eight years which had elapsed since his first assumption of the presidency. For one thing, he had ceased to be a provincial and had risen to the full measure of the office which he held. In 1885, those who noted his appearance on public occasions of great dignity, as, for instance, at the funeral ceremonies of General Grant, found in his external aspect,—his tilted hat, his "slouchy" bearing, his stolid face—something that recalled the country sheriff. Since that time, a wide acquaintance with men of every type no less than the pressure of high responsibility, had broadened and elevated his whole cast of thought. If he was now, beneath a less ungracious exterior, even more self-willed than ever, and more bent on having his own way, this was only natural in view of what had happened in the preceding years. He had flouted all advice, he had done precisely as he pleased, and yet the nation had set him once more in the seat of highest honour. It is not surprising, then, if from the time of his second inauguration, the President displayed what seemed to many a certain arrogance of manner and of language, with a disposition to enlarge the prerogatives of his high office. The very phrasing of his official papers—his proclamations and his messages to Congress—is noteworthy

for a haughtiness such as would have been far more appropriate in the rescripts of an hereditary monarch. The personal pronoun "I" occurs in these documents with an unusual frequency; and such expressions as "I have deemed it fitting," "It is my purpose," "It affords me signal pleasure," "I am decidedly of the opinion," and "I am satisfied," appear and reappear so often as to give to the whole a strongly personal colouring. Very characteristic was an Executive Order issued by the President on May 8th. He had set apart certain hours for receiving such Senators and Representatives as desired interviews with him. As is usually the case, these interviews related largely to questions of patronage. The President became so irritated in consequence, as to make public his annoyance in a remarkable order, the effect of which, upon both Senators and Representatives, may be easily conceived. It ran:

"The time which . . . was set apart for the reception of Senators and Representatives has been almost entirely spent in listening to applications for office, which have been bewildering in volume, perplexing and exhausting in their iteration, and impossible of remembrance.

"A due regard for public duty . . . and an observance of the limitations placed upon human endurance, oblige me to decline, from and after this date, all personal interviews with those seeking appointments to office, except as I on my own motion may especially invite them. . . . Applicants for office will only prejudice their prospects by repeated importunity and by remaining in Washington to await results."

It was a number of incidents such as this that gave point to a contemporary cartoon entitled "Cleveland's Map of the United States," wherein the figure of the President was so drawn as to coincide with the outlines of the country,

which was thus made, by implication, identical with himself. Under the drawing were the words:

“ My country, 'tis of Me,  
Of Me I sing! ”

One might well have sympathised with the President in his annoyance over the importunities of office-seekers, and the lack of consideration shown by the Senators and Representatives of his own party. But in view of the fact that he was about to recommend legislation of the most controversial character, and that only by the good will and co-operation of the majority in Congress could it be carried through, this Executive Order was an extraordinary example of political tactlessness. Far more important, however, was a line of action adopted by President Cleveland with regard to a pending international question. By this, at the very outset of his administration, he brought upon himself, both in and out of Congress, an avalanche of political unpopularity and personal dislike.

At the Inauguration Ball, in Mrs. Cleveland's company, a dark-skinned, graceful girl had attracted much attention. This was the Princess Kaiulani, the heiress-apparent to the Hawaiian throne in direct succession to Queen Liliuokalani, of whom she was the niece. The Princess was only eighteen years of age. She had been educated in England, and was in that country at the time when the Hawaiian monarchy was overthrown and the Queen deposed.<sup>16</sup> On getting news of this, she had come at once to the United States, accompanied by her guardian, Mr. Theophilus Davies. It will be remembered that President Harrison's last important act had been the submission to

<sup>16</sup> See pp. 245-248.

the Senate of a treaty by which Hawaii was to be annexed to the United States. This treaty had not yet been ratified; and it was with the purpose of opposing it that the Princess Kaiulani had hastened to Washington. Her advisers shrewdly counted on the chivalrous disposition of the American people toward women. They believed that a young and pretty girl pleading for the restoration of her rights would make a strong appeal to popular sentiment throughout the land. No sooner had Kaiulani reached New York than she issued an "Appeal to the American People," which was published in the newspapers on March 2d. Whether she wrote it herself or whether it was written for her, was a question much mooted at the time. Whoever wrote it, the "appeal" was sweetly pretty, with a touch of false sentiment about it and a schoolgirl rhetoric that did not ring quite true; so that it wholly failed of its effect, and was received with smiles by nearly all who read it. In it the Princess said:

"Unbidden I stand upon your shores to-day, where I thought so soon to receive a royal welcome on my way to my own kingdom. I come unattended, except by loving hearts that came with me over the wintry seas. I hear that Commissioners from my own land have been for many days asking this great nation to take away my little vineyard. . . .

"To-day I, a poor, weak girl with not one of my people near me, and with all these Hawaiian statesmen against me, have strength to stand up for the rights of my people. Even now I can hear a wail in my heart, and it gives me strength and courage, and I am strong—strong in the faith of God, strong in the strength of seventy million people who in this free land will hear my cry and will refuse to let their flag cover dishonour to mine!"

Of Mrs. Cleveland, this island princess made an im-

portant convert to the cause she represented. Mrs. Cleveland welcomed her very warmly to the White House, and gave her a most womanly sympathy. Kaiulani was, indeed, a very charming girl, and she made a favourable impression upon the President and also upon the Secretary of State, to whom she was presently introduced. Mr. Gresham, during the years when he was a Republican, had been a rival of Mr. Harrison, and this rivalry had in time deepened into a personal dislike. No wonder that the Harrison policy regarding Hawaii should be viewed by him with extreme disfavour. Altogether, then, between the President's natural caution, which led him to move slowly in an affair begun with so much haste, and Mr. Gresham's eagerness to undo the work of one whom he disliked, no surprise was felt when, on March 9th, a message of five lines was sent to the Senate, withdrawing "for the purpose of re-examination" the treaty framed by President Harrison and the Hawaiian Commissioners. A few days later, Mr. Cleveland despatched to Hawaii, as a Special Commissioner, Mr. James H. Blount of Georgia, to investigate the circumstances under which the change of government in the Islands had been effected.

Mr. Blount was an honest, but somewhat cross-grained politician, who had been Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives; yet one more unfamiliar with foreign affairs could scarcely have been selected for this delicate mission. He had never been out of the United States in his life; and his knowledge of diplomatic usage was as limited as his mastery of social forms. In keeping with the rather primitive notions of Secretary Gresham in matters of ceremonial, Mr. Blount proceeded to Hawaii, not by a regular mail steamer nor in a man-of-war, but on board a little

revenue-cutter, the *Richard Rush*. He reached Honolulu on March 29th. President Dole and the other members of the Provisional Government had heard that a Commission, consisting of representatives of the judiciary, the army, and the navy, had been sent to them; and suitable preparations were made to receive such a Commission with due dignity. An eye-witness has given a graphic account of what actually happened. All the vessels in the harbour displayed the American flag, and the American colours were wreathed about the pillars and columns of the city houses. At the pier a great multitude had assembled, strewing the passage-way with roses. As the *Rush* hove in sight, a Japanese cruiser, the *Naniwa*, fired a thunderous salute, to which the little *Rush* responded—"like the 'yap' of a terrier echoing the deep baying of a stag-hound."

"And then—then came an anti-climax that very closely approached the ridiculous. Instead of the dignified, affable and courteous body of officials that had been expected, there stepped ashore a commonplace and rather sullen-looking man of sixty, clad in ill-fitting clothes of blue homespun, and a Panama hat. Public expectation had been roused to the highest pitch, and the revulsion of feeling was instantaneous and painful."<sup>17</sup>

Mr. Blount delivered to President Dole a letter from President Cleveland beginning:

"GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: I have made choice of James H. Blount, one of our distinguished citizens, as my Special Commissioner to visit the Hawaiian Islands and make report to me concerning the present status of affairs in that country. . . . His authority is paramount."

<sup>17</sup> Krout, *Hawaii and a Revolution*, p. 145 (New York, 1898).



Mr. Blount brought with him other letters from the American President. One of them, addressed to Minister Stevens, practically suspended that gentleman from the exercise of his diplomatic functions and made him subordinate to Mr. Blount. A second letter directed Rear-Admiral Skerrett, in command of the Pacific Squadron, to consult freely with Mr. Blount and "obey any instructions you may receive from him regarding the course to be pursued in the Islands by the force under your command." Armed with these remarkable credentials, Mr. Blount began in his own way to investigate the events of the preceding February. On the day after his arrival, he ordered the American flag to be lowered from the Government Building in Honolulu, and directed the force of marines which had been stationed there to break camp and return to their ship, the *Boston*. This was done, and the Provisional Government at once raised its own flag and posted its own troops with a battery of rapid-fire guns to quell any attempt to restore the Queen.<sup>18</sup>

When the news of these events reached the United States, a great deal of very bitter feeling was excited. The American people were not strongly in favour of annexing Hawaii. Apart from a few speculators in sugar, there was no great interest in the matter. A desire for foreign territory had not yet stirred the popular imagination. Had Mr. Cleveland simply put the treaty in the fire and kept his hands off Hawaii altogether, the whole affair would have been speedily forgotten. But when the credentials which he had given to Mr. Blount were fully known, they were very generally disapproved, alike by Democrats and by Republicans. The President had, apparently, delegated the whole power of his great office to an individual "Commissioner"—a nondescript functionary unknown to the

<sup>18</sup> April 1, 1893.

Constitution—who had by a stroke of the presidential pen been put over the head of a regularly appointed Minister, and invested with the absolute command of an important naval force. There is, indeed, no doubt that Mr. Cleveland exceeded his constitutional rights, and that Mr. Blount's "paramountcy" was unlawful. Before long, a still more intense feeling was aroused by the report that the President intended to restore Queen Liliuokalani to her throne.

The rumour proved to be true. Mr. Blount's reports and a study of the earlier despatches of Minister Stevens convinced Mr. Cleveland that the Hawaiian monarchy had been subverted by the active aid of Mr. Stevens, and through "the intimidation caused by the presence of an armed naval force of the United States."<sup>19</sup> Having assured himself of this, the President felt it his duty, as he expressed it, "to undo the wrong . . . and to restore the status existing at the time of our forcible intervention."<sup>20</sup>

It was here that the President made a second blunder, and, as it proved, a most humiliating one for him. He forgot, in the first place, the wise tradition that in the foreign policy of the United States there should be no break, and that in essentials a change of administration should cause no change in the attitude of the State Department toward other countries.<sup>21</sup> There was another and more practical consideration. Whether or not the Provisional Government of Hawaii could have held its own against the Queen's forces in the preceding January with-

<sup>19</sup> See President Cleveland's message of December 4, 1893.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> This principle had been especially upheld by Webster while Secretary of State. See Curtis, *Life of Daniel Webster*, ii, p. 534 (New York, 1870).

out the presence of American marines, there was no doubt that it was now quite able to sustain itself. It had an efficient force of some 1200 well-drilled troops—nearly all Americans and Englishmen—it was supplied with artillery, and it enjoyed the support of the responsible residents of Hawaii.<sup>22</sup> Hence, to restore the Queen would require something more than a curt request from President Cleveland.

But with his innate obstinacy, the President resolved to make the attempt, and the unpopularity of such a course only strengthened his resolve. Recalling Mr. Blount, whose churlish manners had made him thoroughly disliked, Mr. Cleveland appointed as Minister to Hawaii, Mr. Albert S. Willis, of Kentucky, a gentleman of intelligence and judgment. Mr. Willis, however, was specifically instructed to bring about the restoration of the Queen; and a naval force was stationed at Honolulu to give point to his instructions. On his arrival, the new Minister sent to President Dole a formal request that he “relinquish to the Queen her constitutional authority.” President Dole replied by a courteous but firm refusal. Here was an *impasse* which could be broken through by nothing short of armed force. Would the guns of American ships of war be turned upon men of American blood in order to re-enthroned a Polynesian queen who had broken her coronation oath and had sought to govern irresponsibly?

Mr. Willis hesitated; yet he might, under his instructions, have taken even this last step, had not the unexpected obstinacy of the Queen herself deterred him. She was asked whether, if replaced upon the throne, she

<sup>22</sup> For an account (unfavourable in tone) of Hawaii under the Provisional Government and later, see Palmer, *Again in Hawaii* (Boston, 1895).

would agree not to punish those who had deposed her.<sup>23</sup> This question she met with an indignant negative. Not punish them? Most assuredly she would punish them! The leaders—Mr. Dole, Mr. Thurston and their associates—must be executed at once. She would have their heads, and their families must be banished. Here spoke not merely the queen, who felt herself in all respects a sovereign, and who had been deprived of power and publicly humiliated. Something of the implacable hatred of an insulted woman found voice in the sharp answer which she made to Mr. Willis. For the annexationists in the zeal of their self-justification had not been satisfied merely to assail the public acts of Liliuokalani. They had tried to smirch her private life as well; and Mr. Stevens in his despatches to the State Department, repeating the scabrous gossip of the foreign clubs in Honolulu, had declared the queen to be unchaste. Hence, the indignation with which Liliuokalani refused to promise any amnesty. She would be queen without conditions, or she would not be queen at all. One may well admire her high spirit and her womanly indignation; but her persistence made further effort on her behalf impossible.

Mr. Willis sent his report to President Cleveland, who afterwards asked Congress to take action. Congress, however, like the vast majority of the American people, was most antagonistic to what the President had done in the Hawaiian affair. Therefore it took no action at all; and in due time the Republic of Hawaii had to be formally recognized by the United States. Mr. Cleveland's interference had not only failed to restore the Queen, but his withdrawal of the annexation treaty had deprived her, and also the pretty young Princess Kaiulani, of the liberal

<sup>23</sup> President Cleveland had himself insisted upon this condition.

income which that instrument had guaranteed to them. Furthermore, the President, at the very outset of his administration, had incurred a vast amount of odium, just when he most needed the harmonious support of all who had ever been his friends.

Already a serious crisis had arisen. The condition of the Treasury, to which allusion has been made, soon began to affect the prosperity of the country. Foreign investors were steadily selling American securities, thus causing a general decline in prices. This movement had begun during the latter part of the Harrison administration, but it was now perceptibly accelerated. Although the business of the country was fairly good, although the crops were bountiful and the general industries not idle, there existed, nevertheless, something like a vague premonition of disaster, a pervasive distrust to which no name was given. The most obvious reason for this feeling seemed to be a lurking doubt as to whether the Government could continue to meet its obligations in paying gold upon demand for all its notes—forced as it was by the Sherman Law to purchase more than two tons of silver bullion every month. Most Republicans insisted that the lack of confidence arose from a dread of the tariff changes to which the party now in power was pledged. But whatever the cause, commercial and financial activity languished. "The country exhibits all the symptoms of a patient suffering from low fever," said a writer in the *Nation*; and this very well describes the situation up to the end of June.

After the 26th of that month, however, this "low fever" assumed the form of a delirium. The Government of India on that day suspended the free coinage of silver at its mints. That such a measure was certain to

be taken had been well known to students of finance; yet the announcement at once precipitated a panic, the like of which had not yet been seen in the United States. The value of the silver dollar, which had long been falling, dropped from 67 cents to less than 60 cents. Individuals all over the country began collecting gold and hoarding it, having lost their confidence in government notes. Banks called in their loans and refused new discounts. In this the lead was taken by those Canadian banking-houses which, for the purpose of "moving the crops," were accustomed to lend money to American customers in the Northwestern cities, such as Milwaukee, Detroit, Minneapolis and St. Paul. Business, therefore, came almost to a standstill; and before long the weaker banks headed the long list of failures and suspensions which occupied whole columns in the daily press.<sup>24</sup> A "chain" of shaky banks, nearly fifty in number, organised by one Zimri Dwiggin in the West, came down in a single crash. The gold reserve in the Treasury for the first time fell below the traditional minimum and sank to less than \$97,000,000. Many prophesied that the country would soon be forced to a silver basis.

Four days after the demonetisation of silver in India, President Cleveland issued a proclamation<sup>25</sup> summoning an extra session of Congress to meet on August 7th. In the proclamation he spoke of the distressing condition of the country as "largely the result of a financial policy which the executive branch of the Government finds embodied in unwise laws—laws which must be executed until repealed by Congress." This meant, of course, that the

<sup>24</sup> The number of national banks that failed or suspended during the year 1893 was 158.

<sup>25</sup> June 30, 1893.

President intended to press for the repeal of the purchasing clause of the Sherman Act. The proclamation had but slight effect in calming public anxiety. It was known that the number of silver men in both houses of Congress was a very large one; and many persons doubted whether these would consent to the repeal of a measure so likely to bring about the very situation which they earnestly desired. Hence, all through July, the failures still continued, mines were closed, factories shut down, and labourers were discharged. On August 1st—six days before Congress met—the savings banks put in force the clause which requires sixty days' notice from depositors desiring to draw money. The effect of this was to create what came to be known as a "currency famine." Until then the general public had feared lest gold should not be paid upon demand; but now the belief spread rapidly that no money of any kind would long remain in circulation. Hence, whereas men had previously hoarded gold, there now began a frantic rush to hoard silver, paper money—in fact, any kind of circulating medium.

Of course, this movement, if not checked, would have led to a panic so tremendous as to cause a universal crash; and therefore in New York, most of the banks that were members of the Clearing House resorted to a strong and quite unprecedented measure. They declined, as a rule, to cash cheques drawn by their depositors, except for very small amounts. Depositors were told that they had usually made their deposits in the form of cheques, and that for the present, therefore, they must themselves employ the same medium of exchange. In other words, instead of drawing money, they received certified cheques payable through the Clearing House. If a depositor insisted upon receiving cash, it was given him, but he was informed that

he must at once withdraw his account. Large employers of labour were provided with the money necessary for them in making up their payrolls; and in other cases, where good reasons could be shown for drawing cash, it was paid out. But otherwise cheques were not directly honoured. To sustain the weaker banks, the Clearing House issued loan certificates.

This plan was put into effect on August 3d; and on the following day, currency of every kind was at a premium ranging from 1 to 2 per cent. The money-brokers, who had foreseen the action of the banks, had for several days been quietly accumulating a stock of cash; and they now proceeded to cash certified cheques at the discount mentioned. An enormous business of this sort was done. A well-known brokerage firm near the head of Wall Street bought currency at a premium of 1-2 of one per cent., and sold it at a premium of 3 per cent. Great bundles of paper money were stacked up behind the counters, and all day long the exchange went on. In no other way could cheques be readily converted into money. Even those drawn by the Assistant Treasurer of the United States at the Sub-Treasury in New York in payment of pensions were not accepted at their face value. On August 8th, the premium on currency rose to 3 per cent.; while for the first time since January 1, 1879, the banks themselves paid a premium for gold. By August 11th, the "currency famine" was at its height, and it was estimated that at least \$1,000,000 in cash was paid out daily by the money-brokers to holders of certified cheques. The country was swept from one end to the other for coin and notes; and even from Canada there was sent to New York a consignment of nearly a million dollars in small bills and fractional silver. Oddly enough, silver



was now taken as readily as gold, while paper money was preferred to either. On August 5th, a firm of money-brokers advertised for silver dollars, offering a premium of \$7.50 per thousand.<sup>26</sup> Many persons bought and hoarded Bank of England notes, or French and German gold.

The special session of Congress opened on August 7th in the midst of these unusual occurrences. For the first time since 1853, when Pierce was President, the Democratic party was in control of the executive and legislative branches of the Government—Presidency, Senate and House of Representatives. Under President Hayes, both Senate and House had been Democratic for a short time; during Mr. Cleveland's first administration his party had the Presidency and the House; but now it was in complete possession, and was therefore undividedly responsible. In the House, the Democrats had 219 members, the Republicans 124, and the Populists 12.<sup>27</sup> In the Senate, there were 44 Democrats, 36 Republicans, 5 Populists, and three vacancies. The weakness of the Democrats lay in the slenderness of their majority in the Senate, and in the fact that on financial questions there existed a great divergence of opinion among them in both houses.

The President's message was sent to Congress on August 8th. It was a clear, concise and convincing statement of what he held to be the cause of "an alarming and extraordinary business situation." This cause was, according to him, primarily, the purchase provision of the Sherman Act of July 14, 1890. Between July, 1890, and July, 1893, he said, the gold coin and gold bullion in the

<sup>26</sup> See the New York *Herald* and *Times* of that date.

<sup>27</sup> One seat was vacant at this session.

Treasury had decreased more than \$132,000,000, while during the same period the silver coin and silver bullion had increased more than \$147,000,000.<sup>28</sup>

“Unless Government bonds are to be constantly issued and sold to replenish our exhausted gold, only to be again exhausted, . . . the operation of the silver purchase law now, in force leads in the direction of the entire substitution of silver for the gold in the Treasury, and this must be followed by the payment of all government obligations in depreciated silver. At this stage gold and silver must part company. . . . Given over to the exclusive use of a currency greatly depreciated according to the standard of the commercial world, we could no longer claim a place among the nations of the first class.”

The President therefore recommended the repeal of the Sherman Act.

Mr. Wilson of West Virginia, who soon came to be regarded as the administration's spokesman in the House, introduced a bill carrying out this recommendation, and the debate upon it began on August 11th. At once it became evident that the question was not to be decided by a purely party vote. Other lines of cleavage rapidly developed. A large group of the Democratic representatives were opposed to repeal, unless in place of the Sher-

<sup>28</sup> In an authorised interview given to the press on June 15th, Secretary Carlisle had summed up the situation as follows:

“The records of the Treasury Department show that during the eleven months beginning May 31, 1892, and ending May 1, 1893, the coin Treasury notes issued for the purchase of silver bullion under the act of July 14, 1890, amounted to \$49,961,184, and that during that same period the amount of such notes paid in gold was \$47,745,173. It thus appears that all the silver bullion purchased during that time, except \$2,216,011 worth, was paid for in gold, while the bullion itself is stored in the vaults of the Treasury and can neither be sold nor used for the payment of any kind of obligation.”

man Act there should be substituted a still more radical measure intended to "do something for silver." A majority of the Republicans stood with the President. Consistency, in fact, if nothing else, would have made this necessary; for Mr. Wilson's repealing bill was almost identical in language with a like bill offered in the preceding Congress by Mr. Sherman himself.<sup>29</sup> Yet there were also a good many "silver Republicans"; and these, combining with the silver men among the Democrats, and the entire body of Populists, made a formidable opposition. This fact explains why the special session of Congress and the President's message did nothing immediately to relieve the financial situation. It was on the day when the debate began that the premium on currency reached its highest figure.

The debate was very interesting. Mr. Wilson's argument for repeal was weighty, and represented the position of conservative expositors of finance. Mr. Reed of Maine, the Republican leader, spoke at some length, and in a blandly philosophic tone. He mentioned the existing business depression, and seemed to give in his adhesion to the cyclic theory of panics. Great panics, he remarked, seem to occur at long intervals, but with a sort of cosmic regularity. Who shall say just why they come? And then between there are minor panics—curious, interesting phenomena of the business world. Nothing could have been more beautifully detached than Mr. Reed's whole tone and manner, though as he neared the end, he made it clear that to his mind the advent of the Democratic party to power had, in this particular instance, afforded a very reasonable explanation of the genesis of panic. Mr. Grosvenor of Ohio, had no philosophic doubts. In a burst of declamatory eloquence, he charged the collapse

<sup>29</sup> In the Senate, July 14, 1892. (Senate bill 3423.)

of prosperity to a dread of Democratic domination and the menace of free trade. He drew a picture of the country after the election in November.

“One by one the furnaces went out. One by one the mines closed up. One after another the factories shortened their time. Why did they do this? Was it a mere senseless stampede? Was it a Wall Street panic? Was it an unintelligent curtailment of the business of the country? I say not. Where is there an intelligent man to-day, if he were a manufacturer, with the threat of the Democratic party in power—the menace of its possession, the threat of its mere existence under that platform—and confiding as human nature does in the belief that a great political party will do as it says—a violent assumption, I admit, in the present instance—what one of you at the head of an industrial institution would carry on your business?”

The Republican leaders, however, while casting the blame for the existing situation upon the President and his party, gave their assent to the measure for repeal.

The allied silver men were led by Mr. Richard P. Bland of Missouri, who had grown grey in the advocacy of a freer use of the white metal. He was the author of the Bland-Allison Act of 1878,<sup>30</sup> and his activity in behalf of silver had never ceased, so that he had won for himself the popular nickname of “Silver Dick.” In the debate now in progress, he had answered Mr. Wilson on August 12th. His arguments were those with which all men were familiar; and while they were listened to with respect, they were neither new in substance, nor especially forcible in the form of their presentation. Four days later (August 16th) the discussion was enlivened by the participation in it of a remarkable figure who now for the first time drew to himself the attention of men of every party throughout the

<sup>30</sup> See pp. 81-82.

United States. This was Mr. William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska. Mr. Bryan at this time was a young man of thirty-three, the son of an eminent lawyer and judge, whose profession he had followed. In 1890, he had accepted a Democratic nomination for Congress, in a district where no other Democrat was willing to stand, the contest being considered hopeless. Without financial aid from the State Committee of his party, Mr. Bryan had made a spirited canvass, and had astounded everyone by converting a Republican majority of 3000 into a Democratic majority of 7000. In 1892 he had been re-elected, and he now appeared as the ablest of Mr. Bland's lieutenants in opposing unconditional repeal.

The time allotted to each speaker had by agreement been limited to one hour; but when Mr. Bryan's period expired, he had so engaged the attention of the House that by unanimous consent, his time was indefinitely extended, and he continued speaking for nearly two hours longer, to the admiration of all who heard him. This admiration was, no doubt, partly due to Mr. Bryan's command of the arts of the orator—to his attractive presence, his pleasing manner of delivery, and his clear, vibrant and beautifully modulated voice—yet, making all allowance for these adventitious aids, the speech which he then delivered still remains perhaps the most forcefully persuasive exposition of the argument for silver that has ever been presented before a deliberative body. Its rhetoric never obtruded itself in the form of garish tropes or adjectival excess. It was the subtler and more effective rhetoric which gives to undisputed facts the exact colouring that the artist in words desires to apply, and which insensibly leads the listener to accept the facts and the deductions from those facts, as of precisely equal value.

Mr. Bryan's argument, briefly summarized, was to the effect, that there existed neither gold enough nor silver enough for either to form the sole basis of the world's metallic money; and that to discriminate against the use of either was to contract the currency everywhere. To demonetize silver was to augment artificially the value of gold, and thus to lower the price of all commodities when measured in gold, while increasing the burden of the debtor class who must pay their debts in a kind of money more valuable and hence more difficult to earn, than that in which the debt had been originally contracted. He held that the United States should make a free use of silver and should allow free coinage of it at some ratio; and he declared the ratio of 16 to 1, to be a just one. Retaining it, the parity of the gold and silver dollars could still be maintained. He quoted Lord Goschen's dictum:

“At present there is a vicious circle. States are afraid of employing silver on account of the depreciation; so the depreciation continues because States refuse to employ it.”

And he flung at the Republicans the following citation from a speech of Mr. Blaine:

“The destruction of silver as money and establishing gold as the sole unit of value must have a ruinous effect on all forms of property except those investments which yield a fixed return in money. These must be enormously enhanced in value and must gain a disproportionate and unfair advantage over every other species of property.”<sup>31</sup>

As against the proposal to repeal unconditionally the Sherman Act, Mr. Bryan said:

“The main objection which we heard last spring was that the Treasury [Sherman] notes were used to draw gold out of the

<sup>31</sup> Speech in the House, February 7, 1878.

Treasury. . . . But the objection is hardly important enough for consideration. While the Treasury notes have been used to draw out gold, they need not have been used for this purpose; for we have \$346,000,000 worth of greenbacks with which gold can be drawn so long as the Government gives the option to the holder. If all of the Treasury notes were destroyed, the greenbacks are sufficient to draw out the \$100,000,000 reserve three times over, and then they can be reissued and used again. To complain of the Treasury notes while the greenbacks remain, is like finding fault because the gate is open when the whole fence is down."

Mr. Bryan's effort won him the sincere applause of party friends and foes alike; but it could not prevail to defeat the administration's measure. The power of a new President is very great, and perhaps the power of a new Speaker is even greater. Mr. Charles F. Crisp of Georgia, who had succeeded Mr. Reed, and now occupied the Speaker's chair, was, or had been, an advocate of free silver coinage; but he frankly accepted the policy of the President, and did all he could to press the repeal bill to a final vote. This was taken on August 28th, when Mr. Wilson's measure passed the House by a vote of 239 to 108. Here was apparently a triumph for the President; yet the triumph was not unalloyed. During the contest, a proposal had been made to re-enact the old Bland-Allison Law of 1878, and this proposal had been lost by a vote in which the majority of Democratic representatives had opposed the policy of Mr. Cleveland, so that he was sustained only by the aid of the Republicans.

The repealing bill now went to the Senate, where it was introduced by Mr. Voorhees of Indiana with an amendment which declared it to be the policy of the United States to use both gold and silver as standard

money, and to coin both gold and silver into money of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value, such equality to be secured through international agreement. The object of this amendment was to win the votes of those who, like Senator Lodge, were theoretical bimetalists, and also to make it clear that the use of silver was not to be discontinued. But in the Senate, the passage of the bill was stubbornly resisted; and both the Populists and the silver advocates belonging to the older parties threatened to "talk the bill to death." As the Senate rules provided for no restriction of debate, and as each Senator might talk as often and as long as he desired, this threat was a most serious one. Prodigious feats of oratory were performed by the recalcitrant Senators. Mr. Allen of Nebraska made what was doubtless the longest speech in the history of legislative bodies, in talking for fourteen hours without interruption, resting himself by sending volumes of history or statistics or poetry to be read from the desk as part of his address. Other Senators, especially the Republicans, took a humorous view of the whole situation. Senator Hale and Senator Chandler told fish stories and exchanged jokes. Other Senators discoursed upon current topics having not the slightest relevance to the order of the day. In fact, the proceedings degenerated into an undignified and most discreditable farce.

On September 25th, several influential Senators, representing the administration, went privately to Vice-President Stevenson, who presided over the Senate, and urged him to break the deadlock. By refusing to recognize those Senators who should thereafter rise to speak for purposes of pure obstruction, the debate might be brought to a close and a vote taken. Such a course would be contrary to all American precedents; it would be almost



revolutionary. Yet it was in accordance with the dictates of common sense that a minority should not be allowed permanently to prevent a majority from enacting legislation, least of all in so serious a crisis and when every day's delay was so ruinous to the business of the country. There was recent English precedent for such action as they asked. In the absence of a rule providing for a closure, the Speaker of the House of Commons, Mr. Arthur Peel, after an almost interminable period of obstruction on the part of the Irish members, had refused to entertain dilatory motions, and on his own responsibility had put the question to the House.<sup>32</sup>

But Mr. Stevenson lacked the courage to carry out a *coup* like this. He sat there day after day, quite helpless in his chair, often unable to preserve more than a mere semblance of order and decorum. His were not the audacity and the dominant vigour of a Reed. It may be, too, that his secret sympathies were with the silver men, as his subsequent political career would seem to show. At any rate, he would not accept the suggestion made to him, nor would he even promise to compel Senators to speak to the question before them. He would do nothing whatsoever; and so the administration Senators carried word to the President that the affair seemed hopeless.

But the President knew well enough that, in the last resort, he could force the repeal bill through the Senate. Every President has influences at his command which, if he be inclined to use them, make it possible for him to impose his will upon a congressional majority of his own party, and sometimes even upon a majority of the oppo-

<sup>32</sup> February 2, 1881. See McCarthy, *England under Gladstone*, p. 126 (London, 1884); and Morley, *Life of W. E. Gladstone*, iii., pp. 52, 53 (New York, 1903).

sition. When President Johnson was at the very ebb of his popularity in 1867, and when House and Senate were over-riding his vetoes and treating his recommendations with contempt, he once said to a personal friend: "Even now if I *really* wish anything very much indeed, I can get it done." Mr. Cleveland was still new in office, and the vast patronage at his disposal was still practically untouched. He had rebuffed, by his order of May 8th, those Senators who had importuned him on behalf of their constituents and friends. Now, he had only to show himself a little more complaisant, to listen a little more patiently, to say "yes" instead of "no"—and the thing would be done. It would be merely a reversion to the invariable practice of his predecessors from Lincoln<sup>33</sup> down to Harrison; yet to one of Mr. Cleveland's temperament, and in view of the higher tone of public opinion, such a course could be justified only by the existence of a supreme emergency. Such an emergency was undeniably at hand. The Government was threatened by the necessity of a partial repudiation of its debts, by the impairment of its credit, and by the loss of its financial honour. Yet still the President held his hand.

The majority at last tried to wear out the minority by a plan to prevent adjournment until a vote upon the bill should have been taken. One session lasted continuously for three whole days and nights,<sup>34</sup> during which time haggard and blear-eyed men talked and talked while others slept with their heads upon their desks. But this physical test proved as exhausting to one side as to the

<sup>33</sup> For an interesting example of Lincoln's use of patronage to influence legislation, see Dana, *Recollections of the Civil War*, p. 177 (New York, 1898).

<sup>34</sup> October 11th-13th.

other; and the plan was given up. The Senate had now been considering the bill for two long months, and the end appeared no nearer than it had in August. Then at last the President very quietly made a move—so quietly that few perceived it. But on October 29th, one of his supporters came to him to express discouragement. There was really no chance at all of anything being done. The silver men would never yield or let a vote be taken.

“Why, Mr. President,” said he, “there is Senator ——, whom I have just seen, and he says that this bill won’t pass till hell freezes over!”

The President looked up with just a half perceptible gleam of interest.

“Did Senator —— say that?” he asked. “Then please say to Senator ——, with my compliments, that hell will freeze over in exactly twenty-four hours.”

And on the following day, the filibustering mysteriously ceased, and the Sherman Act was repealed by a vote of 48 to 37. But the measure so earnestly advocated by the President had been adopted by the help of Republican votes.<sup>35</sup> The House promptly concurred in the Voorhees Amendment, and the bill was signed and became law on November 1st.

Mr. Cleveland had now been in office for only eight months, and already his party was divided and unwilling to be led. He had forced the passage of one measure of immense importance; but in doing so he had made a host of enemies, while he had depleted his available sources of influence, both moral and material. And the tariff fight was still to come.

<sup>35</sup> Of the votes in the affirmative, 26 were cast by Republicans and 22 by Democrats; of those in the negative, 22 were cast by Democrats, 11 by Republicans and 4 by Populists. Two Senators abstained from voting.

## CHAPTER VIII

### STORM AND STRESS

APART from events of a political character, the most memorable occurrence that took place during the years of Mr. Cleveland's second term was the Columbian Exposition in Chicago, which was opened by the President on May 1, 1893, and was closed to the public on October 31st. From several points of view, this magnificent revelation of American capacity and versatility deserves to be considered in any record which has to do with the intellectual and æsthetic development of the United States. Its inception, no less than its successful elaboration, must remain one of the enduring civic glories of the city of Chicago; and because of it, Chicago became known all over the civilized world as the most vitally American, if not the greatest, city of the Western Hemisphere.

The plan for a World's Fair, to commemorate the quadricentenary of the first landing of Columbus, began to take definite form in 1889. That the site of the Exposition should be in or near the city of New York was at first regarded as a matter of course. A great many persons in New York wished it, though New York, collectively, did not wish it very much. There is never anything which New York, collectively, wishes very much. Yet with a sort of uninterested generosity, its wealthy citizens subscribed the sum of \$5,000,000 to defray the cost of the affair, and measures were taken to assure the opening of a Columbian Exposition in October, 1892, the anniversary month of America's discovery. But when Congress was

asked to approve this plan and thus to give the celebration a national character, it appeared that other cities than New York had claims which they were anxious to submit. St. Louis contended for the honour, though half-heartedly. Many thought that Washington, as the nation's capital, deserved the most consideration. But the people of Chicago fairly hurled themselves into the contest. They longed intensely for the opportunity to accomplish something sufficiently stupendous to satisfy their own ambition, their own love of bigness, their civic pride, and, most of all, their vivid and spectacular but very genuine, patriotism. They harped upon their city's nearness to the centre of population. They claimed the Exposition not merely on behalf of their own State, but of the entire West. They pledged themselves to do anything and everything that might be necessary to make it triumphantly successful. They laughed with a large, amused contempt at New York's pitiful five millions. Their own estimates, at the very least, were twice that sum; and before long they spoke of fifteen millions as barely adequate to realise their magnificent ideal. In the end they and their supporters fairly carried Congress by storm, and the Exposition was given to Chicago. Ere long it was declared, and as the event showed, truly, that not less than \$20,000,000 would have to be expended.<sup>1</sup> The very hugeness of the sum, the colossal daring of the conception, which seemed to the conservative East almost a frenzy, served only to exhilarate the people of Chicago and nerve them to surpass all that they had hitherto imagined. In New York, there was a

<sup>1</sup> In round figures, the management of the Exposition expended \$20,000,000; the United States Government, \$2,250,000; the separate States and foreign governments, \$12,000,000, making a total expenditure of nearly \$35,000,000.

certain feeling of relief because the Exposition had gone elsewhere. The enthusiasm of Chicago seemed to the Manhattanese a bit of patavinity, an amusing exhibition of provincialism. Chicago's promises were rated as mere "wind." Of course, some kind of a huge raree-show would be given on the borders of Lake Michigan, but its bigness would be equalled only by its crudity.

How superbly and with what overwhelming completeness, the metropolis of the West transformed this mocking criticism into wondering admiration, the whole world came to know, when on the lakeside, a rough, unkempt and tangled stretch of plain and swamp became transmuted into a shimmering dream of loveliness under the magic touch of landscape gardener and architect and artist. No felicity of language can bring before the eye that never saw them those harmonies which consummate Art, brooding lovingly over Nature, evolved into that maze of beauty. Not one of the twelve million human beings<sup>2</sup> who set foot within the Court of Honour, the crowning glory of the whole, could fail to be thrilled with a new and poignant sense of what both Art and Nature truly mean. The stately colonnades, the graceful arches, the clustered sculptures, the gleaming domes, the endless labyrinth of snowy columns, all diversified by greenery and interlaced by long lagoons of quiet water—here were blended form and colour in a symmetrical and radiant purity such as modern eyes, at least, had never looked upon before.

It was the sheer beauty of its wonderful *ensemble*, rather than the wealth of its exhibits, that made this Exposition so remarkably significant in the history of such

<sup>2</sup> This is a conservative estimate of the attendance, excluding duplicate admissions.

undertakings, and especially in its effect upon American civilisation. So far as the display within its buildings was concerned, this had been equalled several years before in Paris, as it was afterwards surpassed in both Paris and St. Louis. Upon that side, indeed, the American people stood far less in need of education than was commonly supposed. The importance of the Columbian Exposition lay in the fact that it revealed to millions of Americans whose lives were necessarily colourless and narrow, the splendid possibilities of art, and the compelling power of the beautiful. These possibilities and this power could never have been forced upon their understanding in any other way than by a demonstration so impressive as to stultify denial. The far-reaching influence of the demonstration was not one that could be measured by any formal test. But a study of American conditions will certainly reveal an accelerated appreciation of the graces of life and a quickening of the æsthetic sense throughout the whole decade which followed the creation of what Mr. H. C. Bunner most felicitously designated as the White City.

The year 1894 is one to be long remembered in American history. In it those elements of dynamic discontent which had long been gathering strength, half unperceived, now loomed upon the political horizon with the black and sullen menace of a swelling thunder-cloud, within whose womb are pent the forces of destruction. For years, by bargain and by compromise, the day of reckoning had been postponed; but now both compromise and bargain were impossible, and the nation had to face, however fearfully, the issues which would no longer down. The events of 1894 must of necessity be narrated in succession;

yet the reader should remember that they took place simultaneously, and that each of them had a very definite relation to the others.

It had been expected by the President and his immediate supporters that the repeal of the Sherman Act would at once revive prosperity by restoring confidence to the business world. Such, however, proved not to be the case. The premium on currency had, to be sure, disappeared as early as September 6th, and the list of failures and suspensions was gradually curtailed. But there was no general revival of commercial activity. If the country had previously shown the symptoms of financial fever, it now exhibited a condition of extreme debility. The income of the Government was far from satisfactory; and the Secretary of the Treasury, in his estimates for the coming year, anticipated a deficit of \$28,000,000, as against a surplus of some \$2,000,000 for the fiscal year just ended. This unfavourable condition of affairs was ascribed by the Democrats to the incubus of the McKinley tariff legislation; while the Republicans continued to assert that the business of the country was at a standstill because of a general distrust of Democratic rule and a feeling of uncertainty as to what action the party now in power might take with reference to the tariff. It seemed, indeed, an unpropitious time for entering upon a revision of the revenue system. Many Democrats would have been glad to wait. Yet in the face of their explicit party pledges, delay would have convicted them of insincerity. They had carried the election chiefly on the tariff issue; their platform had said of the McKinley Law: "We promise its repeal as one of the beneficent results that will follow the action of the people in intrusting power to the Democratic party." Finally, some new tariff measure was neces-



sary in order to secure additional revenue for the Treasury. The schedules of the McKinley Act had, in part, been framed for the purpose of reducing the revenue and preventing the accumulation of another huge surplus. This they had accomplished only too successfully; and therefore a revision was imperative as a matter of finance.

In the face of all this, it was impossible to take any backward steps or to hesitate and seek refuge in delay. Furthermore, the President, as always, was earnestly in favour of an aggressive policy. His party had been divided by the silver controversy; but on the tariff question he felt sure of its support. Hence, when the regular session of Congress began on December 4th, the President's message spoke with confidence and vigour of new tariff legislation as "both an opportunity and a duty." "After a hard struggle, tariff reform is directly before us."

"After full discussion, our countrymen have spoken in favour of this reform, and they have confided the work of its accomplishment to the hands of those who are solemnly pledged to it. . . . Nothing should intervene to distract our attention or disturb our effort until this reform is accomplished by wise and careful legislation."

The President outlined the sort of tariff measure that seemed to him desirable. It should give to American manufacturers free raw materials, thus enabling them to produce as cheaply as the foreigner; and hence to enlarge the market for American-made goods. In general, the tariff charges should be reduced upon the necessaries of life. Finally, the President announced that a measure such as he had in mind had been already framed and would be promptly submitted to the Congress. This

measure was not to be unduly radical—not providing as yet for a tariff for revenue only. The country could not in a moment cast aside every vestige of the protective system. “We cannot close our eyes to the fact that conditions have grown up among us which in justice and fairness call for discriminating care in the distribution of . . . duties and taxation.”

On December 19th, Mr. Wilson, the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, reported to the House the bill to which the President had made allusion in his message. It was officially styled “An act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other purposes”; but popularly it was known as “the Wilson Bill.” The Republicans at once denounced it as free-trade legislation; yet an analysis of its provisions as originally reported showed plainly enough that while it was distinctly a step in the direction of freer trade, it was on the whole a very conservative measure. In the first place, it removed entirely the duties on wool, on coal, on iron ore, on lumber, and on sugar, both raw and refined. It made rather moderate reductions in the duties on woollen goods, cottons, linens, silks, pig iron, steel billets, steel rails, tin plate, china, glassware, and earthenware. A number of minor and miscellaneous articles received new schedules. The most noticeable feature of the bill was its treatment of raw materials as just described. Here lay the point of departure from Republican tariff legislation, which in taxing raw materials had made American protectionism a thing unlike the protectionism of other leading nations. The Wilson Bill, in providing for the free entry of wool, coal, iron ore, lumber and sugar, adopted a principle recognised by scientific economists, while it adhered closely to the recommendations of President Cleveland’s

various messages and to the promise made in the Democratic platform of 1892.

The remission of the duty on wool was the boldest assertion of the new policy; for the duty on wool was the one provision of the McKinley tariff that had been of practical advantage to many American farmers. Its repeal was bitterly opposed by the wool-growers of Ohio and other States, whom Senator Sherman estimated at a million souls, and the value of their annual product at \$125,000,000.<sup>3</sup> Free iron ore was opposed by the interests that had secured control of the Western ore beds, but it was of distinct advantage to the Eastern manufacturers. Free coal affected very few sections of the country. In New England and on the Pacific Coast, consumers might get their supply of coal from the adjacent mines in Canada rather than from the more distant coal-fields of Pennsylvania and West Virginia; but the country at large must still use American and not imported coal. The same thing was true with regard to lumber. The question of the tariff on sugar, however, was somewhat more complex. During the years preceding 1894, the refining of sugar in the United States had gradually become monopolised by the American Sugar Refining Company, oftener spoken of as the Sugar Trust, of which Mr. H. O. Havemeyer was the head. This corporation was one of the most powerful of all those to which public attention had been directed, and it was one of the most unpopular. The interests of this corporation would be served by admitting raw sugar free (thus giving the Trust the benefit of cheap material), and by a tax upon refined sugar which came from other countries. This was precisely what the McKinley Act had done, enormously increasing the profits of the Trust. The Wilson Bill, as reported

<sup>3</sup> Sherman, *Recollections*, ii, p. 1203 (Chicago, 1895).

to the House, provided for the admission of raw sugar free, in accordance with the general theory as to raw materials, but it also admitted refined sugar free, thereby depriving the Sugar Trust of any special advantage, and leaving it to stand upon its own legs.

So much for the distinctive features of the new tariff measure in its original form. The rest of its schedules were lower than those of the McKinley Act, but in the main quite as high if not higher than those of the Tariff Act of 1883, passed by a Republican Congress. In fact, taken as a whole, the Wilson Bill, so far from being in essence a free-trade measure, was one that would have been regarded in the years before the Civil War as a piece of rigorous protective legislation. It embodied, however, as has been explained, the general principle of free raw materials; while still it dealt considerately with the many interests which had grown up under the shelter of the thirty-two tariff acts which the Republicans had passed between 1860 and 1890.

The Wilson Bill was very well received by the Democrats in the House and by the party as a whole. Little change was made in the original draft during the five weeks when it was under consideration by the Representatives. But many Democrats and some Republicans from the South and West eagerly advocated the insertion in the bill of a clause providing for a tax on incomes. This would yield, it was said, a substantial revenue and wipe out the anticipated deficit; and most of all, it would make the possessors of large fortunes contribute to the Government a sum proportionate to their wealth. There was a strong and very widespread feeling that many of the richest persons in the country had so successfully "dodged" their taxes, as to have secured a practical

exemption from any taxation whatsoever. Secretary Carlisle had suggested laying a tax upon certain classes of corporations; but the House adopted instead a tax of 2 per cent. upon all incomes of more than \$4,000, the tax to remain in force until January 1, 1900. This clause was adopted on January 24th by a vote of 204 to 140, and the bill as a whole received the approval of the House on February 1st, by a vote of 182 to 106—61 members not voting. When the result was announced by the Speaker, it was received with a burst of Democratic cheering, and Mr. Wilson was showered with congratulations by his followers and friends.

But after the bill reached the Senate, affairs took a decidedly different turn. The Democratic majority in the upper house was a very small one, and its close cohesion had already been destroyed, while there were many reasons why a tariff measure such as the Wilson Bill should encounter serious opposition there. These reasons may be indicated briefly as springing, first, from personal opposition to President Cleveland, and, second, from the fact that the Senate, unlike the House, was controlled by powerful financial interests, which were ably represented on the floor. The personal animosity toward the President, which did not at once find open expression, was in part an inheritance from his first administration;<sup>4</sup> in part a result of the masterful way in which he had forced the repeal of the Sherman Act; and to a large degree, it represented the traditional antagonism which most Senators entertain toward every President who has not had congressional experience sufficient to make him understand and properly respect the usages, the prerogatives and the prejudices of the senatorial body. In various ways, Senators of the United States feel themselves to be above

<sup>4</sup> See pp. 75, 76.

the President. They are elected, not by a direct vote of the people, but by the legislatures of the several States, and therefore they are not directly influenced by the popular will. Their term of office is longer than the presidential term of office; and a Senator who is either a man of real distinction or a master of political management is certain to be elected for term after term; so that in very many instances, a seat in the Senate is held by what is practically a life tenure. Finally, the ramifications of so-called "senatorial courtesy" traverse party lines and create among the members of the Senate an *esprit de corps*, which is often stronger than the dictates of party loyalty. As to the interests other than political interests which at times control the action of individual Senators, these may be sufficiently divined from what has been set forth in the preceding chapter.<sup>5</sup> Most Senators are wealthy men, and their private and personal affiliations are not unnaturally with those who represent the power of wealth in public life.

It was something more than ominous that the Wilson Tariff Bill after passing the House by a majority of 76, and after having been referred by the Senate to its Finance Committee, should have been held back by that committee for almost two months. When reported (March 20th), it had been so clipped and trimmed as to exhibit a very curious metamorphosis. Yet in the open Senate the measure fared still worse. As might have been expected, the Republicans fell upon it tooth and nail; but acting in entire harmony with them, were certain Democratic Senators who seemed to have forgotten altogether the solemn pledges which their National Convention of 1892 had given to the country. Foremost among these were the blandly inscrutable Senator Gorman of Maryland, and the

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 317-319.

newly elected Senator Brice of Ohio. The two appeared upon the Democratic side of the Senate as the unavowed yet most efficient agents of the protected interests, and their object was plainly to modify and mutilate the Wilson Bill in such a way as to deprive it of any real significance and meaning. As its schedules were discussed, Messrs. Brice and Gorman played upon the local interests of little knots of Democratic Senators, so that amendment after amendment was made, each one restoring a part of the remitted duties. In all, the Senate made 634 changes in the House measure, destroying entirely its original character. Coal, iron ore, lumber and sugar were removed from the free list altogether, leaving wool and copper the only raw materials to be let in untaxed.

The action of the Senate upon the sugar schedule led to a most deplorable scandal. The House had put all sugar—both refined and raw—upon the free list, thereby giving governmental aid neither to the Sugar Trust nor to the domestic producer. The two Senators from Louisiana, however, having in mind their sugar-growing constituency, insisted that raw sugar must be taxed. Without their votes, the bill could probably not be carried at all, so close was the division. Furthermore, other Senators believed that such a duty was necessary as a revenue measure;<sup>6</sup> since the funds in the Treasury were low, and the receipts from the income tax would not be available for many months. Hence, the Senate imposed a duty upon raw sugar of 40 per cent. *ad valorem*, equivalent to about one cent a pound. But a duty on raw sugar without a counter-vailing duty on refined sugar would have been a serious blow to the Sugar Trust. All the powerful influences at

<sup>6</sup> The President himself was favourable to this modification—not as a measure of protection, but for raising revenue.

the command of this corporation were immediately brought to bear upon the Senate. Here was a direct issue between one of the most notorious of Trusts on the one side, and the purpose of crippling Trusts avowed by the Democracy on the other. The Democratic platform had spoken of "Trusts and combinations" as "a natural consequence of the prohibitive taxes, which prevent . . . free competition." Would Democratic Senators, in the face of this declaration, impose a prohibitive tax at the bidding of a Trust whose monopoly controlled one of the necessities of life?

The debate upon the subject soon waxed hot. While it was in progress, ugly rumours began to fly abroad. The certificates of the Sugar Trust fluctuated in value every day, as the Senate seemed first favourable and then unfavourable to its interests. The story was at first whispered, and then published all over the country, that certain Senators were buying and selling sugar certificates—speculating, that is, in sugar on the basis of their own official action. So great an outcry went up, and such sweeping charges were made, that an investigation was instituted by the Senate itself—an investigation only half-heartedly pursued. Probably no Senator really wished to smirch the reputation of a fellow-Senator. Yet if only to pacify the public, something had to be done at once. Senators were questioned by the special investigating committee, but with slight result save in one striking instance. Mr. Quay of Pennsylvania most characteristically admitted that he had speculated in sugar, and that his speculations had been guided by his official knowledge of the Senate's action. With even greater effrontery, he justified what he had done, adding as an afterthought, that his financial interest in the affair had not in the least



degree influenced his course on the floor of the Senate! Other Senators were less impudent if not less culpable. Definite knowledge could not be had; it must come, if at all, from New York brokerage firms through which the speculative Senators had sent their orders by telegraph. There was some difficulty about getting this evidence; and in the end nothing was accomplished save to leave a taint upon the names of several Senators and to disgust the country with the whole tariff controversy.

One very instructive feature of this investigation was found in the testimony given to the committee by Mr. Henry O. Havemeyer, the President of the Sugar Trust. Mr. Havemeyer was asked about the relations of his Trust to the great political parties, and their State campaign funds. Did it contribute to the funds of both parties? "Yes," said Mr. Havemeyer with cheerful frankness, "we always do that. In the State of New York, where the Democratic majority is between 40,000 and 50,000, we throw it [the Trust's contribution] their way. In the State of Massachusetts, where the Republican party is dominant, they probably have the call. Wherever there is a dominant party, wherever the majority is very large, that is the party that gets the contribution, because that is the party which controls the local matters." The importance of this admission was obvious when one remembers that what Mr. Havemeyer vaguely alluded to as "local matters," meant the election of Senators and Representatives to Congress, and of judges to the State judiciary. Mr. Havemeyer further remarked that the practice of dividing money between the two political parties was the practice of "every corporation and firm and Trust, or whatever you may call it." This illuminating discourse of Mr. Havemeyer's was, on the whole, the most

valuable contribution to knowledge made by the Senate committee when it finally reported.<sup>7</sup>

But meanwhile, the Trust had its way. Refined sugar was taxed one-eighth of a cent a pound, with an additional duty of one-tenth of a cent on refined sugar imported from countries giving an export bounty. This tax, minutely insignificant though it may appear, was ample to continue and confirm the Sugar Trust in its supremacy. The fractional duty of one-eighth of a cent a pound meant to the treasury of the Trust not less than \$20,000,000 of profit every year.<sup>8</sup>

After months of wearisome delay, with frequent scenes of disorder and indecorum, the Senate finally, on July 3d, allowed the mutilated tariff bill to pass, by a scant majority of five votes (39 to 34), with twelve Senators not voting. During these proceedings, President Cleveland had watched the course of the Senate with a very natural indignation. In his message of the preceding December he had said:

“Success can only be obtained by means of unselfish counsel on the part of friends of tariff reform, and as a result of their willingness to subordinate personal desires and ambitions to the general good. The local interests affected by the proposed reform are so numerous and so varied, that if all are insisted upon, the legislation embodying the reform must inevitably fail.”

As the event showed, there had been no “unselfish counsel” in the Senate. “Personal desires and ambitions” had not been subordinated. “Local interests” had been most greedily insisted upon. It was now evident that the legislation would “inevitably fail” so far as it

<sup>7</sup> Senate Report No. 606, Fifty-third Congress (second session).

<sup>8</sup> Mr. Havemeyer estimated it at a lower figure.

professed to embody a reform, unless the Senate could be induced to rescind some of its amendments.

The bill went back to the House for its concurrence. Mr. Wilson, rising in his place on July 7th, urged that as altered and amended, it be not passed. He spoke with force and eloquence, and then took the unusual step of reading to the House a personal letter addressed to him by the President on July 2d, anticipating the action of the Senate. It was an extraordinary letter, and the fact of its being read was still more extraordinary; for thus the Executive was made to criticise the action of one house of Congress in a letter practically written to be read before the other house. From a party point of view, a Democratic President was arraigning Democratic Senators before both Democratic and Republican Representatives. The most significant sentences of the letter were the following:

“ My public life has been so closely related to the subject, I have so longed for its accomplishment, and I have so often promised its realisation to my fellow-countrymen . . . that I hope no excuse is necessary for my earnest appeal to you that in this crisis you strenuously insist upon party honesty and good faith, and a sturdy adherence to Democratic principles.

“ It is quite apparent that this question of free raw materials does not admit of adjustment on any middle ground; since their subjection to any rate of tariff, great or small, is alike a violation of Democratic principles and Democratic good faith. . . .

“ There is no excuse for mistaking or misapprehending the feeling and temper of the rank and file of the Democracy. They are downcast under the assertion that their party fails in ability to manage the Government, and they are apprehensive that efforts to bring about tariff reform may fail; but they are much more downcast and apprehensive in their fear that Democratic principles may be surrendered.

“Every true Democrat knows that this bill in its present form is not the consummation for which we have long looked. . . . Our abandonment of the cause or the principles upon which it rests means party perfidy and party dishonour.”<sup>9</sup>

That President Cleveland should have permitted such a letter to be read at such a time has seemed to many the clearest possible evidence of his incompetence as a party leader. It was most certainly a gage of defiance to the Senate—a body already inimical to him. It violated to some extent the proprieties of executive courtesy toward a branch of the national legislature. It was certain to give the bitterest offence to Senators of his own party. What, then, could the President hope to gain by what was, on its face, a serious indiscretion? The answer to this question is probably to be found in the remark of an English student of Mr. Cleveland's political career. As this observer wrote in 1896, Mr. Cleveland was possessed of “an enduring faith in the common sense of the nation. He had always acted on the rule that the people were capable of understanding the truth, if it was clearly and frankly put before them.”<sup>10</sup> This does, beyond all doubt, sufficiently explain why, as President, Mr. Cleveland so often sent to Congress long messages advocating measures which he knew very well would not be considered for a moment by that body. His arguments were in reality addressed, not to the Senators and Representatives, but to the entire nation. And so his letter to Mr. Wilson, by the very unusual circumstances under which it received publicity, was not by any means a peevish plaint, uttered in a moment of irritation, but rather a well-con-

<sup>9</sup> *Congressional Record*, xxvi., p. 7712 (July, 1894).

<sup>10</sup> Whittle, *President Cleveland*, p. 179 (London, 1896).

sidered disclaimer of responsibility for the action of the Democratic Senators. It was an appeal from the politicians to the people.

But the effect of it in the Senate was to seal irrevocably the fate of the Wilson Bill as a measure of true reform. Although the President had named no names in his accusation of "party perfidy and dishonour," the shaft had gone unerringly to its proper mark. Senator Gorman, stung by those pungent words, brought the subject before the Senate, with a show of virtuous indignation. Senator Hill defended the President in a long speech (July 20th); but Mr. Gorman having prepared himself for battle, went into the whole question on its personal side (July 23d). After some satirical remarks directed against Mr. Wilson for having made public what he (Senator Gorman) assumed to be a private letter, he went on to say that Mr. Cleveland's charges were wholly disingenuous. He asserted that the President had been consulted with regard to the Senate amendments, and had given them his approval. In corroboration of this statement, Mr. Gorman called upon two other Democratic Senators (Messrs. Vest and Jones) to bear him out in what he had just said. In short, he raised a question of veracity between the President and himself.

Whatever view the Senate took of this personal controversy, its opposition to Mr. Cleveland's wishes now became solidified and irrevocable. The House refused to concur in the Senate's amendments, and the bill was sent to a conference committee of both houses. In conference, the Senate's representatives refused to yield a single point. The House could take the bill precisely as it left the Senate, or the bill could fail, leaving the McKinley tariff still in force. In the end, the House was forced to accept

the amendments in their entirety, and to pass the bill which Mr. Cleveland had stigmatised as involving perfidy and dishonour.<sup>11</sup>

The predicament of the President was a cruel one. He could not put his signature to such a measure. He could not veto it, and make the professions of his party utterly ridiculous. And so he let it become a law without his signature (August 28th), giving his reasons for so doing in a letter to Mr. Catchings of Mississippi. The Wilson Act was, he said, in some of its provisions, better than the existing tariff law. It effected an average reduction of duties which left them less by eleven per cent. than those of the McKinley tariff. It provided for the admission of free wool. The tax on incomes would relieve the Treasury. But he then went on to speak of the sinister influences which had marred the measure as a whole. The war against those influences had only just begun.

“Tariff reform will not be settled until it is honestly and fairly settled, in the interest and to the benefit of a patient and long-suffering people. . . .

“I take my place with the rank and file of the Democratic party . . . who refuse to accept the results embodied in this bill as the close of the war; who are not blinded to the fact that the livery of Democratic tariff reform has been stolen and worn in the service of Republican protection; and who have marked the places where the deadly blight of treason has blasted the councils of the brave in their hour of might. The trusts and combinations—the communism of pelf—whose machinations have prevented us from reaching the success we deserved, should not be forgotten nor forgiven.”

<sup>11</sup> For a good account of the contest over the Wilson Bill (written mainly from a Republican point of view), see Stanwood, *American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century*, ii., pp. 296-559 (Boston, 1903).

Humiliating as this lamentable fiasco was to the section of his party which had been steadily loyal to the President, there still remained a no less disappointing sequel. Many who felt chagrin over the defeat of genuine tariff reform, had comforted themselves with the remembrance that, at least, the section of the Wilson Bill establishing an income tax had been saved. This section had, indeed, proved to be the most popular of any in the bill, as the majorities given it in both houses very clearly showed. Men recalled the dictum of Secretary Fessenden, who in 1864 declared that "the ability to pay increases in much more than arithmetical proportion as the amount of income exceeds the limits of reasonable necessity." To the Western and Southern Democrats and also to the Populists, an income tax seemed, perhaps, a thing of greater immediate importance than a revision of the tariff—the more so as it was bitterly opposed by Eastern capitalists. In the Senate, Mr. Hill of New York had attacked it with an energy and force most unusual in him. This income tax, said Mr. Hill, is unconstitutional, because it is a direct tax; and a direct tax, not based upon the population, can be levied only by the several States and not by the Federal Government. It is odious because it is a war-tax and has never been imposed in time of peace.<sup>12</sup> It exempts incomes of \$4,000 and less, and therefore represents class legislation, distinguishing between the rich and

<sup>12</sup>The first income tax imposed in the United States was during the Civil War. By the Act of August 5, 1861, a tax of 3 per cent. was laid on all incomes over \$800. The Act of 1862 laid a tax of 5 per cent. on incomes ranging from \$600 to \$5,000; a tax of 7½ per cent. on incomes from \$5,000 to \$10,000; and a tax of 10 per cent. on incomes over \$10,000. The Act of 1864 taxed incomes from \$600 to \$5,000 at the rate of 5 per cent., and all incomes above \$5,000, at the rate of 10 per cent. The tax on incomes expired in 1872.

the poor. It is a purely sectional measure because this tax will bear more severely upon the East than upon the West.<sup>13</sup> Finally, its administration is necessarily offensive, for it establishes that sort of inquisition into the individual citizen's private affairs, which amounts practically to espionage.

No sooner, however, had the Wilson Bill become a law, than preparations were made by the Treasury to collect the tax which Senator Hill had so energetically denounced. The necessary blanks and other papers were printed, and the collecting officers began their distribution. Opposition to the measure was no less prompt. Several test cases were prepared.<sup>14</sup> These cases presently reached the Supreme Court, where they were argued at length, and (to anticipate) a partial decision was rendered on April 8, 1895. The Court pronounced that part of the law unconstitutional which taxed values derived from land and from State or municipal bonds. But a final decision on the law as a whole was deferred, owing to the absence of Mr. Justice Jackson, who was ill. A few weeks later, however, Justice Jackson, having recovered, rendered his opinion, so that the decision as finally handed down by a full bench pronounced the income tax unconstitutional as being a direct tax.<sup>15</sup> The Court was divided 5 to 4.<sup>16</sup>

There were circumstances connected with this decision

<sup>13</sup> In 1866, three-quarters of the entire income tax was paid by seven States.

<sup>14</sup> *Moore vs. Miller*; *Hyde vs. The Continental Trust Company*; and *Pollock vs. The Farmers' Loan and Trust Company*.

<sup>15</sup> Constitution of the United States, Section iv. 4. "No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken."

<sup>16</sup> The Court stood (May 20) as follows: In favour of the constitutionality of the tax: Justices Harlan, Brown, Jackson, White; against it, Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Brewer, Field, Gray, Shiras.



which caused deep feeling throughout the country. It had been long since a case before the Supreme Court had attracted such general attention. A brilliant array of counsel had submitted arguments, among them ex-Senator Edmunds, Mr. James C. Carter, Mr. Joseph H. Choate, and the Attorney-General himself. The final judgment, as given on May 20th, carried with it a reversal of an earlier judgment handed down fifteen years before. In 1880, the Supreme Court had decided<sup>17</sup> with no dissenting opinion that an income-tax on rents is not a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution, but an excise tax, and hence permitted to the general Government. That the Supreme Court should reverse a decision which had stood for fifteen years, was a very unusual occurrence.<sup>18</sup> That it should reverse, by a majority of only one, a decision which had been unanimously reached was still more remarkable. Yet this was not all. On April 8th, Mr. Justice Shiras had been favourable to the constitutionality of the law. Had he not altered his view, the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson on May 20th would have made the Court stand five to four in support of the income-tax. But Justice Shiras in the interval had gone over to the other side, and so the result already described was ultimately reached. In expressing their dissent from the decision of the majority of the Court, Justice Harlan and Justice White departed wholly from the impassive and impersonal manner which is usual in that high tribunal, and spoke in terms of marked feeling. Mr. Justice Harlan, indeed, let it be plainly seen that he believed the Court to have dealt a severe blow at the stability and safety of American political institutions.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> In the case of *Springer vs. The United States*.

<sup>18</sup> See Baldwin, *The American Judiciary*, p. 106 (New York, 1905).

<sup>19</sup> Mr. Justice Harlan said:

“In its practical operation this decision withdraws from national taxa-

In this he struck a note which was echoed all over the land, but most of all throughout the West and South. Men said that the influences which had crippled tariff reform in the Senate, had proved no less powerful in the highest tribunal of the nation. Populism grew daily stronger; while other events which were coincident with those already told, stimulated the new movement and enhanced its power.

The slow progress of the Wilson Bill, prolonging as it did the feeling of uncertainty in the business world, had

tion not only all incomes derived from real estate, but the personal property of the whole country—invested personal property, bonds, stocks, investments of all kinds—and the income that may be derived from such property. This results from the fact that under the decision of the Court, such incomes can not be taxed otherwise than by apportionment among the States on the basis simply of population.

“No such apportionment can possibly be made without doing monstrous, wicked injustice to the many for the benefit of the favoured few in particular States. Any attempt on the part of Congress to apportion taxation of incomes among the States upon the basis of their population, would, and properly ought to, arouse such indignation among the freemen of America that it would never be repeated. No one should doubt this statement.

“When, therefore, this Court adjudges, as it does now adjudge, that Congress can not impose a tax or duty upon incomes arising from rents of real estate, or upon ‘invested personal property,’ or upon incomes arising from ‘invested personal property, bonds, stocks, investments of all kinds, except by apportioning the sum to be so raised among the States according to population, it practically decides that, without an amendment of the Constitution, such incomes can never be made to contribute to the support of the national Government.

“By its present consideration of the Constitution, this Court, for the first time in all its history, declares that our Government has been so framed that in matters of taxation for its support and maintenance those who have money derived from the renting of real estate or from the leasing or using of tangible personal property, or who own invested personal property, have privileges that can not be accorded to those who have money derived from the labour of their hands, or the exercise of their skill, or the use of their brains.”

depressed all forms of industry. Thousands of men who had been thrown out of work in the summer and autumn of 1893 found themselves at the beginning of winter wholly destitute. Some of them had left their homes in the Eastern States and had gone to the Pacific Coast as railway builders. They now turned their faces homeward, intending to tramp the long distance, and to live upon the charity of the intervening towns and cities. These men were presently joined by others who were out of work, and finally by swarms of professional vagabonds and tramps. Through some curious psychological impulse, the notion of a general crusade of squalor spread all through the country; and from every quarter of the West and the Southwest, bands of ragged, hungry, homeless men appeared, fierce of aspect, and terrifying to the people of the hamlets and sparsely settled districts through which they passed. Theft, rape, and sometimes murder marked the trail of this new *jacquerie*, which had at first no conscious purpose, as it had no leader.

Both purpose and leader were presently provided. Three odd fanatics came to the front, and after a fashion took command of the roving bands. These three—Coxey, Kelly, and Frye—styling themselves “generals,” led the largest groups, which were now known as “armies of the unemployed,” and later as “Industrials” and “Commonwealers.” Coxey was the most conspicuous of the three. He had a definite plan of action. He organised what he styled the “Army of the Commonweal of Christ,” and with it he intended to march on Washington, to enter the Capitol and to overawe Congress into passing a law providing for the unemployed. His demand was that \$500,000,000 in irredeemable paper money should be issued, and that this sum should be spent in improving

the public highways throughout the country. Such became at last the declared purpose of all the Commonwealers; and so the three "armies" began their march to Washington from different points,—Coxey setting out from Massillon, Ohio, on March 25th, Frye from Los Angeles, California, early in April, and Kelly from San Francisco on April 26th.

There was something grotesque and also something very pitiful in the purpose of these poor men, many of whom were honest and well-meaning, but who were driven to desperation by poverty and cold and hunger. Yet among them were also many criminals and vicious characters, so that again and again the Industrials came into conflict with the police, and sometimes even with the militia, which was called to arms in several States because of them. The newspapers made much of "Coxey's army," and naturally viewing its march on Washington as a huge joke, began to humour the idea and to treat it with mock-seriousness. Hence in Europe, where American humour, if unlabelled, is seldom understood, the belief spread that the United States had fallen into anarchy. The Republic was to be overthrown by a great uprising of its own citizens. The movement of Coxey's prowling tramps upon Washington was gravely likened to the famous march of the mob from Paris to Versailles. English leader-writers waited solemnly for the crash of a widespread and terrible revolution.

Coxey and his followers straggled into Washington on April 28th. By that time their numbers had been reduced to about three hundred men. The mild spring weather had led most of the "army" to roam off as individuals into the pleasant country valleys, where they could bask in the sunshine and live by begging. On the first of May, how-

ever, Coxey marched his dwindling host into the grounds of the Capitol, bearing aloft some improvised banners of calico and paper muslin. But by this time public interest in the Industrials had waned. The joke had ceased to amuse. And, therefore, no particular notice was taken of Coxey until he and some of his "lieutenants" marched across the lawns, when the Capitol police at once arrested them for walking on the grass. Such was the farcical end of the Coxey crusade, which foreigners regarded as a dreadful menace to the Republic, but which terminated in a short jail sentence served for the violation of a local ordinance by the would-be Robespierre.

While, however, this pilgrimage of the Commonwealers was in itself of no importance, it did reveal a state of restlessness in the industrial world. This was soon to find expression in a tremendous struggle of organised labour against organised capital—a struggle of which the outcome was at last determined by the unprecedented action of Mr. Cleveland and his Attorney-General. It involved questions, both administrative, judicial, and constitutional, of far-reaching consequence.

In 1886, the capitalists who controlled or owned the twenty-four railways which then entered the city of Chicago, had formed a voluntary association known as the General Managers' Association.<sup>20</sup> This body had for its main purpose the effective and arbitrary control of all persons employed by the railways represented in the Association. Wages were cut down according to a general agreement. Discharged workmen were "blacklisted," so that they could not easily get new employment. With no standing whatever in law, the Managers' Association was establishing a complete control of the independence and

<sup>20</sup> It represented also some eighteen other railway corporations.

even of the livelihood of thousands of railway employes.<sup>21</sup> To offset this combination of the owners, the men had organised, in 1893, the American Railway Union. The two bodies, antagonistic as they were in their special interests, came into conflict early in 1894, over a question which did not in its origin directly concern either of them.

The Pullman Palace Car Company was not a railway corporation, but was engaged in manufacturing cars which it operated through written contracts with the railways. It was a highly prosperous concern, and Mr. Pullman, its President, had won much commendation from philanthropic sociologists for having built the pretty little village of Pullman, near Chicago, where employes of the Company could at moderate rentals find houses that were clean, well-lighted, and supplied with admirable sanitary arrangements. Lakes, parks, and well-kept streets made the place appear to be a poor man's paradise. On the other hand, those who lived in Pullman saw another side. Not many residents stayed there long. While they stayed, they seemed to be under a singular constraint. If they spoke of the Company, they did so in a half-whisper, and with a furtive glance behind them, very much "as a Russian might mention the Czar."<sup>22</sup> Every one felt that he was spied upon, and that an incautious word might lead to his discharge and get his name upon the "black-list."

In May, 1894, the Pullman Company dismissed a large number of its workmen. The wages of such as were retained were lowered by some twenty per cent. Many were now employed for less than what was usually re-

<sup>21</sup> The number of men directly and indirectly employed was estimated in 1894 at more than 200,000.

<sup>22</sup> Andrews, *The United States in Our Own Time*, p. 723 (New York, 1903).

garded as full time. A committee of employés waited upon Mr. Pullman to ask that the old wages be restored. Mr. Pullman refused this request, but promised that he would not punish any member of the committee for having presented the petition. This promise he apparently violated; for on the very next day, three of the committee were discharged. Mr. Pullman, in fact, evidently regarded himself as a personage so sacrosanct as to make even a respectful petition to him a serious offence. Indignant at his action, five-sixths of his men went out on strike. Mr. Pullman promptly discharged the other sixth, who had remained faithful to his interests.

To justify the Pullman management, a general statement was given out on its behalf, that the close of the Columbian Exposition and the existing business depression had checked the demand for its cars; that it had been employing men at an actual loss; that it could not afford to continue them at work and at the old scale of wages. In reply to this, the fact was pointed out that while the wages of the men had been cut, the salaries of the officers remained as large as ever; and that rents in the town of Pullman had not been lowered. Moreover, the stock of the company was selling above par; its dividends for the preceding year on a capital of \$36,000,000 had been \$2,520,000, while it had a surplus of undivided profits amounting to \$25,000,000.

About 4000 Pullman employés were members of the American Railway Union. In June, a convention of the Union was held in Chicago, and this body took up the question of the Pullman strike, although the men on strike were not railway employés at all. A committee of the Union wished to confer with the Pullman management, but were not allowed to do so. The Civic Federation of

Chicago, with the approval and support of the mayors of fifty cities, urged the Company to submit the matter to arbitration. The Company answered: "We have nothing to arbitrate." Then, on June 2d, the Railway Union, finding no settlement possible, passed a resolution to the effect that unless the Pullman Company should come to an agreement with its men before June 26th, the members of the Railway Union would refuse to "handle" Pullman cars. The Company remained obdurate; and therefore, on the 26th, the Union fulfilled its promise. From that day, on all the roads running out of Chicago, no train to which Pullman cars were attached could move.

The President of the Railway Union was Mr. Eugene V. Debs. He had formerly been a locomotive engineer and afterwards a grocer. Going into politics, he had served a term in the Indiana legislature. He was a very shrewd, long-headed strategist. He understood the strength of his organisation. He was equally well aware of the one weak point in all the great labour demonstrations of the past. The 150,000 men whom he controlled could, by acting together, completely paralyse the railway system centering at Chicago. Local public sentiment was, on the whole, favourable to the Pullman employés. That sentiment would, however, be alienated if violence and general disorder were to follow on the strike. It was vital that the Railway Union should employ no lawless means. Mr. Debs therefore issued an address on June 29th, in which he said:

"The contest is now on between the railway corporations united solidly on the one hand, and the labour forces on the other. . . . I appeal to the strikers everywhere to refrain from any act of violence. A man who will destroy property or violate law is an enemy and not a friend of the cause of labour."



The order of Mr. Debs was implicitly obeyed by the members of the Railway Union; and the peaceable strike which was begun upon the 26th proved at once to be remarkably effective. Switchmen refused to attach Pullman cars to any train. When they were discharged for this, the rest of the train's crew left it in a body. By the end of the fifth day after the strike began, all the roads running out of Chicago were practically at a standstill. The Railway Managers' Association was facing absolute defeat. Its resources in the way of men were exhausted, and its trains could not be operated. Yet all this had been accomplished by peaceable means. There was no sign of violence or disorder. But the men who made up the Managers' Association were very able. They had at their command unlimited money, and legal advisers who could conceive daring plans. This struggle against the power of the railways meant to them a struggle for existence. Their chairman, therefore, issued a bold statement, in which he said:

"We are supported in our stand by the railway managers all over the United States. It is no time for weakness of policy. . . . The fight must be won."

It must have been plain to the managers that if the strike remained a peaceful one, the railways would be defeated. If, however, violence and crime were associated with it, public sympathy would no longer sustain the strikers, and the power of the law would be invoked against them. Singularly enough, on June 30th, just when this situation became very plain, disorder suddenly broke out in Chicago. The close of the World's Fair had left in that city a large residuum of vagabonds and semi-criminals, who had drifted thither during the Exposition, and who re-

mained to swell the lawless population of the slums. As is usual in times of widespread excitement, these men now swarmed by thousands to the railway yards, intent upon prospective plunder. It was widely asserted at the time, that the Managers' Association employed *agents provocateurs* to incite the disorderly elements to acts of violence. Of this there is no convincing proof. That thieves and bullies and jail-birds should seize upon so rare an opportunity for mischief was natural enough. But their sudden appearance was certainly most opportune for the railway managers and most fatal to the real interests of the strikers.

On June 30th, a mail train was stopped in the suburbs of Chicago. The engine was cut off and disabled by a mob, ostensibly directed by strikers. At about the same time, the mails were completely obstructed on parts of the Southern Pacific System, the strike having extended to the Pacific States. Mail trains having Pullman cars attached were not allowed to run. This news brought the United States Government into the field at once. Attorney-General Olney issued vigorous instructions to the United States district-attorneys all over the country; deputy marshals were sworn in; and other precautionary measures were taken. Writing to Mr. Edwin Walker, who acted as special counsel for the Government in Chicago, Mr. Olney made the novel suggestion that, instead of relying upon warrants issued under criminal statutes against persons who had actually committed illegal acts, Mr. Walker should apply to the Federal courts for injunctions forbidding the commission of such acts.

On July 1st, the roads were still paralysed. Disorder had still for the most part been sporadic. There was no evidence that the local authorities were not fully compe-

tent to deal with the situation so far as the unruly elements were concerned. On the following day, however, on motion of the United States District-Attorney, Judge Woods issued a sweeping injunction forbidding the president of the Railway Union, Mr. Debs, and also its vice-president, secretary and others, from interfering with the transportation of the mails and from obstructing interstate commerce. Mr. Walker also sent word to Washington that in his judgment, United States troops would be needed to enforce the order of the court. On that very day, President Cleveland ordered General Miles to Chicago, to assume personal command of the troops at Fort Sheridan. Mr. Walker seemed strangely insistent in his demand for troops and for their immediate use.<sup>23</sup> Mr. Olney telegraphed him (July 3d): "I trust use of United States troops will not be necessary." Mr. Walker reiterated his demand, and with him were joined Judge Grosscup, the District-Attorney, and the United States Marshal. The strikers had, indeed, been deeply stirred by the injunction, which forbade even an attempt to persuade railway employés to strike. They felt that the Federal courts were the mere tools of the railway managers, and were attempting to deprive men of the right to leave their work. Perhaps because of their indignation at this new move, the peaceful strike came to an end, and a régime of violence began. Baggage-cars were wrecked and strewn along the tracks, and a mail-train was ditched. The writ of injunction was read to the mob by a marshal, but it was received with jeers and curses.

That same afternoon, President Cleveland ordered

<sup>23</sup> It is perhaps not without significance that Mr. Walker for many years had been general solicitor for several railway companies; and that he was then a partner in a mining and shipping company.

Colonel Crofton, in command at Fort Sheridan, to enter Chicago with the entire garrison of infantry, artillery and cavalry. This order was promptly carried out; and on the following morning the troops were in camp upon the lake front. Reinforcements were hurried to them, and General Miles had presently at his disposal a force of several thousand men. A brigade of State militia was also ordered to the city by the Governor at the Mayor's request. The story of the next few days is one of perpetual disorder, controlled, however, or greatly lessened by the admirable work of the regular troops, whose cool firmness had that indescribable effect which discipline always exercises upon disorder. Yet there was much destruction of railway property, both within the city and near it; while the temper of the soldiers was often severely tried. The spirit of the mob grew more and more dangerous; and at last (on July 7th) General Miles issued an order to all officers in command of troops, directing them to fire upon persons engaged in overt hostile acts. Mr. Debs, whose prudence had begun to fail him, made an inflammatory address, in which he said:

“The first shot fired by regular troops at the mobs here will be a signal for civil war. Bloodshed will surely follow.”

Events moved quickly. On the following day, the President issued a proclamation ordering all persons engaged in unlawful assemblages to disperse “on or before twelve o'clock noon of the ninth day of July instant.” Those who disregarded the warning were to be viewed as public enemies. “There will be no vacillation in the decisive punishment of the guilty.” On that same day, a mob at Hammond, Indiana, some twenty miles distant

from Chicago, set upon several non-strikers, killing one and wounding four. Matters grew still more serious; and a detachment of regular troops, commanded by Major Hartz, was hurried to the Monon station. Under their protection, several trains were moved. This infuriated the mob, which, after exhausting every form of insult, began to shower the soldiers with missiles. The troops remained unmoved, awaiting orders. Emboldened by this apparent timidity, their assailants, who now numbered fully three thousand, made a wild rush, intending to overwhelm the compact company in blue. Major Hartz gave a sharp command, and the magazine rifles spirted fire into the yelling mob, drilling it through and through with bullets and strewing the ground with dead.

Coincidentally with these events, Judge Grosscup delivered a charge to a special Federal Grand Jury, which at once found indictments against Debs and three of his associates, the charge being one of conspiracy under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890. On July 10th, the four men were arrested and gave bail in \$10,000 each. On July 17th, the same men were brought before Judge Woods and were charged with contempt of court, in having disobeyed the injunction of July 2d. They refused to give bail upon this charge, and were sent to prison under guard.

This swift and stern action of the Federal Government broke the backbone of the strike, as Mr. Debs himself afterwards admitted. The movement, in which the Knights of Labour had also taken part, had spread over twenty-seven States and Territories and had affected the operations of 125,000 miles of railway. But everywhere it was dealt with in the same energetic manner whenever it obstructed the service of the mails; and after the arrest of Mr. Debs it died speedily away. On July 20th—less

than a month after the general strike began—the United States troops left Chicago, their presence being no longer needed.<sup>24</sup>

In the opinion of the Governor of Illinois, Mr. John P. Altgeld, their presence there had never been required. Mr. Altgeld was a Democrat of the Populistic type. In appearance, he resembled a typical German agitator—fanatical and intense. He had pardoned the Anarchists who were sentenced to imprisonment at the time of the Haymarket murders in 1886.<sup>25</sup> Many persons regarded him as no better than an Anarchist himself, yet this judgment was too harsh. His sympathies were undoubtedly with the strikers, and he felt, with some reason, that the presence of Federal troops was essentially provocative. He read over the Fourth Article of the Constitution, which pledges the United States to guarantee to each State protection against domestic violence “on application of the Legislature or of the Executive.” As Governor Altgeld interpreted that section, it meant that United States troops may be sent into a State *only* upon application of the Legislature or of the Executive. He, therefore, immediately after the arrival of the troops in Chicago, telegraphed the President that they were not needed:

“Waiving all question of courtesy, I will say that the State of Illinois is not only able to take care of itself, but it stands ready to-day to furnish the Federal Government any assistance it may need elsewhere. . . . As Governor . . . I protest . . . and ask the immediate withdrawal of Federal troops from active duty in the State.”

But Governor Altgeld had missed the point involved in the despatch of troops. These had not been sent to

<sup>24</sup> The strike, as a whole, ended on August 3d.      <sup>25</sup> See pp. 129, 130.

protect the State of Illinois from "domestic violence," but to guard the property of the United States, to prevent obstruction of the United States mails, and to enforce the judgments of the United States courts as against illegal combinations. Authority for this was found in the law of April 20, 1871.<sup>26</sup> The President answered Governor Altgeld, explaining the matter very briefly; only to receive another and very long despatch, arguing about the relations of State and Federal authority, and still missing the point as completely as before. To this second telegram, Mr. Cleveland sent (July 6th) a short response which ended the discussion:

"While I am still persuaded that I have neither transcended my authority or duty in the emergency that confronts us, it seems to me that in this hour of danger and public distress, discussion may well give way to active efforts on the part of all in authority to restore obedience to law and to protect life and property."

President Cleveland's course in sending troops to Chicago against the protest of the State's executive, and in using the army elsewhere to prevent obstruction of the

<sup>26</sup> "In all cases where insurrection, domestic violence, . . . or conspiracies in any State shall so obstruct or hinder the execution of the laws thereof and of the United States, . . . or whenever any such insurrection, violence, . . . or conspiracy shall oppose or obstruct the laws of the United States or the due execution thereof, . . . it shall be lawful for the President and it shall be his duty to take such measures by the employment of . . . the land or naval forces of the United States . . . as he may deem necessary for the suppression of such insurrection."

The suppression of the so-called Whiskey Insurrection in Pennsylvania, in 1794, by President Washington was really a quasi-precedent for Mr. Cleveland's action. The legal forms adopted in ordering the despatch of troops at this time were followed by the officers of the Government in 1894—just a century later. Cf. Schouler, *History of the United States*, i. pp. 275-280 (New York, 1898).

mail-routes, was, on the whole, generally approved by public opinion and by Congress. A great deal of the comment made upon it was, however, based upon a misapprehension of the facts. Many persons then imagined, and many still believe, that the President put a new and bold construction upon his own powers, and that in consequence the functions of the Executive were by his action substantially enlarged. Such, however, was not the case. He was merely doing what he was empowered and even required to do by statute—a statute originally enacted under President Grant, and aimed at the Ku Klux Klan. Hence both the States' Rights Democrats, like Governor Altgeld, who condemned him, and the advocates of centralisation, who applauded him, did so with insufficient knowledge. If he deserved praise at all, it was not because of a new precedent which he established, for he established none; but for his rude courage in using, through a sense of duty, his statutory powers in a way that was certain to intensify the hatred of him which had by this time come to be almost a religion in the Western States.

The serious constitutional question which the strike of 1894 brought into prominence concerned the judiciary rather than the Executive. "Government by injunction" was a phrase that now came into general use. The Interstate Commerce Law of 1887, and the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890, had both been framed with a view to checking the power of the corporations. Clever lawyers, however, had most ingeniously converted these two acts into instruments to protect the railway corporations against attack. If an engineer left his post, or if the crew of a train deserted it, this was held to be a conspiracy in restraint of commerce. A United States Circuit Court had issued a "blanket" injunction against all the em-



ployés of the Northern Pacific Road, forbidding them to strike. As to Mr. Debs and his associates, they had been enjoined from inciting men to strike. On December 14th, they were brought before Judge Woods in Chicago, and sentenced—Debs to six months' imprisonment and the others to three months—for contempt of court. This extension of the enjoining power was contrary to the whole spirit and practice of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence as hitherto understood. By the new procedure, a judge defined in advance the nature of an offence, and by injunction forbade the commission of it by certain specified persons. If they disobeyed the injunction, they were brought before the judge and fined or imprisoned, not directly for the act itself, but for contempt of court. In this way, the judge became also the accuser, and the accused lost the right of a jury trial. Many of the most conservative publicists in the East were alarmed by this alarming stretch of the judicial power. In the case of Mr. Debs, the principle at issue was admirably summed up in these words:

“ If Debs has been violating the law, let him be indicted, tried by a jury, and punished. Let him not be made the victim of an untenable court order and deprived of his liberty entirely within the discretion of a judge. . . . If the precedent now established is to stand, there is no limit to the power which the judiciary may establish over the citizen.”<sup>27</sup>

The action of Judge Woods in sentencing Debs was, however, sustained by a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court handed down on May 27, 1895, and he served his term in prison. Yet it is to be noted that the indictments for conspiracy found against him in legal form

<sup>27</sup> *Springfield Republican*, quoted by Andrews *op. cit.* p. 342.

by a Federal Grand Jury were afterwards dismissed. The report of a Commission appointed by President Cleveland<sup>28</sup> to investigate the origin of the great strike was full of deep significance. This Commission found in the Railway Managers' Association an example of "the persistent and shrewdly devised plans of corporations to overreach their limitations and to usurp indirectly powers and rights not contemplated in their charters." It found that neither the Railway Union, nor any general combination of railway employés had been planned, until the railway managers had set the example. In the judgment of the Commission, the evils of intensive combination must in the end be met by government control of such corporations as have a public or quasi-public character. The report was widely read, and its unquestioned facts and dispassionate deductions impressed themselves upon the minds of thousands. More and more was it becoming evident that the proper form of resistance to the glacier-like power of consolidated capital, was not through strikes or other efforts of voluntary associations, which tended too readily to promote disorder, but rather through the Federal Government itself, using all its latent and immense resources to protect its citizens impartially.

<sup>28</sup> In July, 1894. The members of this Commission were Carroll D. Wright of Massachusetts, John D. Kernan of New York and Nicholas E. Worthington of Illinois. See the President's message of December 3, 1894.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE BOND SALES AND VENEZUELA

WHILE the Wilson Bill was dragging its slow way through Congress, and while the fierce struggle against the railways in the West was being fought out to the bitter end, another highly controversial question had arisen to plague the President and to widen still further the breach between him and the majority of his party. Throughout the entire four years of the second Cleveland administration, the sensitive nerve of the Government lay in the condition of the Treasury; and it throbbed painfully in response to every event of serious import, whether this related to domestic politics or to international affairs. Here, again, the makeshifts and compromises of the past broke down completely, and the President was forced to take upon himself the whole burden of a responsibility which his predecessors had managed to evade. The events now to be narrated are those concerning which the sharpest differences of opinion existed at the time. They obscured in the mind of the people all the other acts of the administration. They stirred millions of Americans to a pitch of acrimonious frenzy for which there are few parallels in our history. And in the end they shivered and rent the Democratic party until it cast aside its old traditions and, while retaining its historic name, stood forth transformed into the champion of new causes and new political ideals.

It has already been mentioned in these pages that the Treasury's gold reserve of \$100,000,000 was intended to

protect an outstanding issue of notes which, by the end of 1893, amounted to nearly \$500,000,000. This gold reserve had proved adequate in the past, until the operation of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 gradually shook public confidence in the Treasury's ability to meet its steadily increasing obligations. The repeal of this act under pressure from President Cleveland, as already described, had, to be sure, absolved the Secretary from buying two tons of silver every month and paying for it in gold; yet in matters of finance, distrust when once aroused dies hard. In ~~June~~<sup>April</sup> of 1893, when the hoarding of gold was at its height, the Treasury's gold redemption fund had for the first time fallen below the hundred-million mark, and the circumstance had sent a shiver through the business world. Some had quickly seen in it an opportunity for making money. For the true peril of the Treasury, from the standpoint of conservative finance, lay not so much in the discrepancy between its obligations and its gold reserve, as in the fact that under existing laws, no sooner was a government note presented at the Treasury and redeemed in gold, than it must immediately be re-issued, to become again a new obligation. The situation was admirably and forcibly described to Congress by Mr. Cleveland in several of his later messages. Thus, speaking of the gold reserve fund, he said:

“ Even if the claims upon this fund were confined to the obligations originally intended,<sup>1</sup> and if the redemption of these obligations meant their cancellation, the fund would be very small. But these obligations when received and redeemed in gold are not cancelled, but are reissued and may do duty many times by way of drawing gold from the Treasury. Thus we have an endless chain in operation, constantly depleting the Treasury's gold, and never near a final rest.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I. e., “greenbacks.”

<sup>2</sup> Message of December 3, 1894.

Referring to the statute of May, 1878, he remarked with epigrammatic pungency:

“The Government was put in the anomalous situation of owing to the holders of its notes debts payable in gold upon demand, which could neither be retired by receiving such notes in discharge of obligations due the Government, nor cancelled by actual payment in gold. It was forced to redeem without redemption, and to pay without acquittance.”<sup>3</sup>

These two paragraphs indicate very well the view which Mr. Cleveland and his supporters in the Eastern States took of the financial situation. They held that the Treasury was bound to redeem all its notes of every kind in gold, at the discretion of the persons who presented the notes for payment. The corollary to this theory was that when the gold reserve in the Treasury had been unduly lowered by the process, it became the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to sell bonds of the United States in order to replenish the reserve<sup>4</sup> and thus make it possible for the operation of the “endless chain” to continue indefinitely. Of course, the issue of more bonds meant an increase of the national debt; but as Mr. Cleveland understood the case, there was no help for this until Congress should enact new currency legislation, providing for the retirement and cancellation of all notes when once redeemed.

But most bimetallists and all the “friends of silver” declared that such a policy was both unreasonable and likely to prove ruinous. They pointed out the fact that of all the government obligations, only the legal tender

<sup>3</sup> Message of December 2, 1895.

<sup>4</sup> Under the authority given by the Resumption Act of January 14, 1875.

Treasury notes (greenbacks) were specifically redeemable in gold. The silver certificates issued under the Bland-Allison Act of 1878 were on their face declared to be redeemable in silver; while the notes issued for the purchase of silver bullion under the Sherman Act of 1890 were by the terms of that act redeemable in "coin," i. e., in either gold or silver, at the option of the Treasury. And as they were issued against the silver bullion purchased by them, why should they be redeemed in gold? That the Treasury might pay out silver for them if it chose, was not denied even by Secretary Carlisle himself. On his appearing somewhat later before a committee of the House,<sup>5</sup> Mr. Sibley of Pennsylvania asked him:

"What objection could there be to having the option of redeeming either in silver or gold lie with the Treasury instead of with the note-holder?"

To which Mr. Carlisle made the following reply:

"If that policy had been adopted at the beginning of resumption—the policy of reserving to the Government . . . the option of redeeming in gold or silver all its paper presented—I believe it would have worked beneficially, and there would have been no trouble growing out of it. But the Secretaries of the Treasury, from the beginning of resumption, have pursued a policy of redeeming in gold or silver at the option of the holder of the paper, and if any Secretary had afterwards attempted to change that policy and force silver upon a man who wanted gold, or gold upon a man who wanted silver, and especially if he had made that attempt at such a critical period as we have had in the last two years, my judgment is that it would have been very disastrous. There is a vast difference between establishing a policy at the beginning and reversing a policy after it has been long established, and especially after the situation has been changed."

<sup>5</sup> Testimony before the Committee on Appropriations, January 21, 1895.

But the silver men would not admit the strength of this position. If, argued they, Republican secretaries have incorrectly interpreted the law, that is no reason why a Democratic administration should not revert to its correct and unquestioned meaning. Redeem the greenbacks in gold, for such is the law; but redeem the silver certificates and coin certificates in the silver in which the statute makes them payable. Why, when the gold in the Treasury is low, and while the vaults are bursting with silver dollars,—why lay open the gold supply to be raided by every speculator, and decline to make use of the ample stock of silver?

The President, however, took his stand upon the declaration of Congress which had been made a part of the Sherman Act of 1890, to the effect that it was “the established policy of the United States to maintain the two metals at a parity with each other upon the present legal ratio, or such ratio as may be provided by law.” Mr. Cleveland held that such a parity between gold and silver could not be maintained if the Treasury made any discrimination whatsoever between the different kinds of government paper. It must redeem them all alike—greenbacks, silver certificates, and coin notes—in gold, or else excite a suspicion of “the good faith and honest intentions of the Government’s professions, or create a suspicion of our country’s solvency.”<sup>6</sup> Hence, he made up his mind that gold should be paid for every note presented, and that he would make an unstinted use of the nation’s borrowing power, rather than reverse the policy of his predecessors. He would buy gold with bonds to any extent that might be necessary. Such, too, had been the determination of President Harrison; and towards the close

<sup>6</sup> Cleveland, *Presidential Problems*, pp. 130, 131 (New York, 1904).

of his administration he had been almost forced to take such a step; for the drain upon the gold reserve had begun even then. Orders, in fact, had been given to engrave the plates for the printing of such bonds in February, 1893; but the necessity had been staved off by Secretary Charles Foster, who managed to get a temporary supply of gold (about \$8,000,000) from a group of New York bankers. Thus the outgoing Republican administration was spared the necessity of doing that to which President Cleveland was soon forced by circumstances.

The gold reserve which in April, 1893, had fallen to \$97,000,000, continued steadily to diminish throughout the year. The general hoarding of gold was one cause of this; for persons who wished to hoard could draw gold from the Treasury far more easily than from the banks.<sup>7</sup> Gold was also drawn out freely for export and in the way of trade. On the other hand, the customs receipts, which are, as a rule, made in gold, were now, for the most part, paid in paper; so that there was no flow of gold back to the Treasury to offset the drain. Hence, at the beginning of the eventful year 1894, the Government's gold fund had sunk to only \$70,000,000, against which there was outstanding nearly \$500,000,000 of paper money—all of it, according to the Cleveland policy, redeemable upon demand in gold. The discrepancy was a frightful one,—the more so in view of the general business depression, the uncertainties of tariff legislation, and the lack of public confidence. Hence, by direction of the President (January 17th), an issue of \$50,000,000 in United States bonds

<sup>7</sup> The banks had adopted a new form of deposit slip, indicating whether the customer had deposited gold, silver or paper. Unless he had made his deposits in gold he could not demand gold, if the bank chose not to give it to him.



was advertised for sale in exchange for gold.<sup>8</sup> Bidders were required to offer a premium of not less than 17 per cent. It was hoped by the President and the Secretary that these bonds would be at once over-subscribed, and that the mere announcement of their sale would check the run upon the gold fund in the Treasury. But both these hopes were disappointed. Bids came in so slowly that by February 1st, it seemed as though the sale would be a total failure—a result to be averted at any risk. To announce that the United States could not borrow fifty millions of dollars in the open market would have been at once humiliating and disastrous. Yet such appeared for a time to be the case; while the announcement of the bond issue, so far from lessening the drain of Treasury gold, actually hastened it. On January 31st, the reserve fund stood at only \$66,000,000.

In this crisis, Secretary Carlisle hurried to New York, and called together a number of leading financiers. He pointed out to them that if the loan should fail, the shock to the public credit would disastrously affect the interests which they represented; that in this event the Treasury must inevitably suspend gold payments, and the country's finances be placed upon a silver basis. Moved by these considerations, the Secretary's hearers promised to support the loan; and within a week, the bonds had been exchanged for sufficient gold to bring the Treasury's gold balance up to more than \$107,000,000.<sup>9</sup> But the incident had been a very trying one,—a grievous disappointment to the President, and very ominous for the future.

<sup>8</sup> These bonds were redeemable after ten years; they bore five per cent. interest, and they were payable in "coin"—the law of 1875 not permitting the issue of bonds specifically promising payment in gold.

<sup>9</sup> The exact proceeds of the sale were \$58,660,917.63.

In fact, the relief proved to be only temporary. Some of those who had subscribed for the bonds had drawn the gold to pay for them from the Treasury itself, thus taking out with one hand what they put back with the other. Furthermore, it had now been made plain that the credit of the United States was at the mercy of the great bankers and other heads of financial institutions. They could at will so bleed the Treasury of gold as to compel new bond issues; and by combining together, they could in the future exact such terms from the Government as to assure themselves an extraordinary profit. This lesson they resolved to put into practice while the opportunity was still open. Within a little more than two months after the reserve had been reinforced by the purchased gold, it had again fallen to \$78,000,000. The Government tried every possible means to check the drain, but to little purpose. In November, the fund stood at only \$61,000,000, and it was known that preparations were being made by New York bankers of foreign extraction to draw heavily upon this scanty store, for shipment to foreign countries. On the 14th of the month, the situation being most serious, Secretary Carlisle called for bids in gold for a second issue of \$50,000,000 in bonds. This issue was taken up by a syndicate of thirty-three banking-houses and financiers, who managed to secure the entire allotment, by bidding for "all or none." As the other bids did not cover the whole amount, and as the acceptance of them would have involved delay at a time when delay might prove disastrous, the syndicate was successful. One of its members, the president of the United States Trust Company of New York, afterwards testified under oath that the transaction was unprofitable to the subscribers—an assertion which was received with a very general scepticism.

This second bond issue, like the first, afforded only a momentary relief. Wall Street had now thoroughly learned the lesson, and began applying it with a vengeance. In a single month (December, 1894), the sum of \$32,000,000 in gold was taken from the Treasury. In the following month (January, 1895) \$45,000,000 more was sucked out of the dwindling fund. Early in February, there remained only \$41,000,000—an alarmingly slender store with which to secure the undiminished \$500,000,000 of notes that were still in circulation. Thus, within two months after the second bond sale, nearly \$80,000,000 of gold had vanished from the Treasury, and the reserve fund touched the lowest point it had ever reached. In this emergency, the President invited to a conference at the White House Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan, a very eminent and sagacious financier. In a sort of *apologia*, published eight years later, Mr. Cleveland wrote with a touch of irony:

“It never occurred to any of us to consult . . . farmers, doctors, lawyers, shoemakers, or even statesmen. We could not escape the belief that the prospect of obtaining what we needed might be somewhat improved by making application to those whose business and surroundings qualified them to intelligently respond.”<sup>10</sup>

Of course, what the President now wanted, in the light of past experience, was not merely gold to replenish the reserve, but some effective guarantee that the gold so acquired would not be immediately drawn out again. Only a very powerful financial combination could give this guarantee; and such a combination was effected as a result of the conference with Mr. Morgan. On February 8th, in a special message, the President laid before Congress

<sup>10</sup> Cleveland, *Presidential Problems*, pp. 147, 148.

the terms of an agreement entered into by Secretary Carlisle on behalf of the Government, and by Messrs. J. P. Morgan and Company and Messrs. August Belmont and Company. The former banking-house was acting also for Messrs. J. S. Morgan and Company of London; the latter for Messrs. N. M. Rothschild and Sons of London. By the terms of the agreement, the subscribing bankers were to take up an issue of United States 4 per cent. coin bonds to the amount of \$62,315,400 at the rate of 104½, to be paid for in gold, at least half of which was to be brought from Europe. They were also, to the extent of their ability, to "exert all financial influence and make all legitimate efforts to protect the Treasury of the United States against the withdrawal of gold, pending the complete performance of this contract." On the other hand, the Secretary of the Treasury agreed to give these banking-houses the first option upon any further bonds which might be issued before October 1, 1895.

So far, the contract was one which it was within the legal power of the Secretary to make without referring the matter to Congress at all. But the second clause contained a special provision. If Congress would authorise the payment of principal and interest to be made specifically in gold instead of in "coin," then the syndicate would accept 3 per cent. bonds in place of the proposed bonds at 4 per cent. The difference would mean a saving to the United States of some \$16,000,000 in interest in the course of the thirty years during which the bonds were to run. The President, therefore, laid the contract before Congress and asked for authority to issue 3 per cent. bonds payable in gold.

Until now, Congress had had no opportunity to deal directly with the President's policy regarding the bond

issues. In March of 1894, it had passed a bill for coining the seignorage, or so much of the silver bullion in the Treasury as represented the difference between its intrinsic value and its value when coined into money. This bill the President had promptly vetoed, on the ground that its wording was ambiguous, and because in his judgment "sound finance does not commend a further infusion of silver into our currency."<sup>11</sup> As a matter of fact, the intrinsic value of the silver bullion purchased under the Sherman Act had already decreased, so as to represent a loss to the Treasury of more than \$10,000,000. Hence, Mr. A. S. Hewitt very neatly described the scheme to coin the seignorage as a plan for "coining a vacuum." Again, the President had urged upon Congress a bill for currency reform, drawn by Secretary Carlisle.<sup>12</sup> The object of this bill was "the absolute divorcement of the Government from the business of banking," by giving greater facilities to national and State banks.<sup>13</sup> But Congress was in no mood to legislate in favour of banks of any kind; and the House, by a test vote upon a subsidiary motion, made this fact so clear that the bill was dropped. But now the whole matter of the bond issues came directly before that body, and a Democratic majority had to discuss the financial policy of a Democratic President. A joint resolution authorising the issue of 3 per cent. bonds payable specifically in gold, was reported by the Committee on Ways and Means. On February 14th, Mr. Bryan of Nebraska spoke in opposition to the measure, and

<sup>11</sup> Veto message of March 29, 1894.

<sup>12</sup> See Message of December 3, 1894.

<sup>13</sup> It repealed the laws providing for the deposit of United States bonds as security for circulation, and permitted national banks to issue notes up to 75 per cent. of their paid up capital. The prohibitory tax on the note issues of State banks was, under certain conditions, to be abrogated.

for the second time attracted widespread attention by the force and piquancy of his style. He gave voice, in fact, to the rising note of doubt, distrust, and discontent which the course of the President had excited throughout the Western States. At the same time, the fairness and courtesy of his whole tone and manner could give no personal offence even to Mr. Cleveland's partisans. Speaking of the President, Mr. Bryan said:

"The President of the United States is only a man. We entrust the administration of Government to men, and when we do so we know that they are liable to err. When men are in public office we expect them to make mistakes—even so exalted an official as the President is liable to make mistakes. And if the President does make a mistake, what should Congress do? Ought it blindly to approve his mistake, or do we owe it to the people of the United States and even to the President himself, to correct the mistake so that it will not be made again? But some gentlemen say that the Democratic party should stand by the President. What has he done for the party since the last election to earn its gratitude? . . . What gratitude should we feel? The gratitude which a confiding ward feels toward his guardian without a bond, who has squandered a rich estate. What gratitude should we feel? The gratitude which a passenger feels toward the trainman who has opened a switch and precipitated a wreck."

Then, coming to the Morgan-Belmont contract, he went on to say:

"What is this contract? I am glad that it has been made public. It is a contract made by the Executive of a great nation with the representatives of foreign money-loaners. It is a contract made with men who are desirous of changing the foreign policy of this country. They recognise by their actions that the United States has the right to pay coin obligations in either gold or silver,

and they come to us with the insolent proposition, 'We will give you \$16,000,000, paying a proportionate amount each year, if the United States will change its financial policy to suit us.' Never before has such a bribe been offered to our people by a foreign syndicate, and we ought so to act that such a bribe will never be offered again. By this contract we not only negotiate with foreigners for a change in our financial policy, but we give them an option on future loans. . . . We cannot afford to put ourselves in the hands of the Rothschilds, who hold mortgages on most of the thrones of Europe.

"There is another objection to this contract. It provides for the private sale of coin-bonds running thirty years at 104½, which ought to be worth 119 in the open market, and which could have been sold at public auction for 115 without the least effort. Why this sacrifice of the credit of the United States? . . . What excuse was there for selling a thirty-year bond for 104½? What defence can be made for this gift of something like seven million and a half dollars to the bond syndicate?"

And finally he attacked with much force the fundamental assumption of the President that all the obligations of the Government must be paid in gold and in gold alone if the note-holder and bond-holder demanded it.

"So long as the note-holder has the option, bonds may be issued over and over again without avail. Gold will be withdrawn either directly or indirectly for the purpose of buying bonds, and an issue of bonds will be compelled again whenever bond buyers have a surplus of money awaiting investment. . . . The only remedy is the restoration of the bimetallic principle and the exercise of the option to redeem greenbacks and Treasury notes in silver whenever silver is more convenient, or whenever such a course is necessary to prevent a run upon the Treasury. . . . The Government is helpless so long as it refuses to exercise this option. . . . I propose the only policy which will help the Government. I

propose the only policy which will stop the leak in the Treasury. I only ask that the Treasury Department shall be administered on behalf of the American people and not on behalf of the Rothschilds and other foreign bankers.”

Mr. Bryan's attack upon the joint resolution was not the only cause of its defeat. Many Democrats who believed that all bonds were and ought to be payable in gold, disliked the terms of the Morgan-Belmont contract as inequitable. The Republican members of the House were, for the most part, glad to thrust the Democratic administration still further down into the mire of popular dislike. And, therefore, the measure was finally defeated by a vote made up of all the Populists, of two-thirds of the Republicans, and of more than half the Democrats.<sup>14</sup> The President's transactions with the bond syndicate were thus condemned by the representatives of all three parties. He carried out the original contract, however, and delivered bonds to the amount of \$62,315,500 in return for gold, at the rate of 104½. When he did so, the gold reserve had fallen to so low an ebb, that the Sub-Treasury in New York was within twenty-four hours of suspending gold payments altogether.

Then something happened which seemed to many to be full of sinister meaning. No sooner had the syndicate secured the bonds which it had bought at 104½, than it offered them for sale in the open market. Almost at once their price rose to 118. Investors were eager to buy them at this figure. And yet these were the bonds which had been described as of uncertain value, because they were not made specifically payable in gold! It is not surprising

<sup>14</sup> Ayes: Democrats, 89; Republicans, 31=120. Noes: Democrats, 94; Republicans, 63; Populists, 10=167.



that the administration was widely and severely censured for the whole transaction. In financial circles Mr. Cleveland found defenders, who said that he was not responsible for the vicious legislation of earlier years; that the pressing necessities of the situation gave him no choice save to get gold where he could, as quickly as he could, and on the best terms possible; and that, in a word, he had done the very best thing in his power. But there were many loyal followers of the President who were deeply impressed with the belief that the whole affair had been very badly managed. The United States, one of the richest countries in the world, was apparently dependent upon a little group of bankers for a loan of some \$60,000,000, and was forced to make those bankers a gift of nearly \$7,000,000 in return for the accommodation. Such usury might be paid by a country like Turkey, but hardly by the United States. Why, it was asked, did the President wait until the gold in the Treasury was almost gone before negotiating a new bond issue? Why were not the bonds offered to the people at large for popular subscription? If the bonds were sold in this way to small investors throughout the country, self-interest would make the people anxious to sustain the national credit; whereas, these favours to foreign bankers created a strong sentiment inimical to the very cause which Mr. Cleveland was upholding. The *New York World*, which had consistently and ably supported the President until this time, now attacked the syndicate transaction with unsparing energy. It had opposed all exclusive issues of bonds to bankers, who, after giving the Treasury a supply of gold "would at once siphon it all out again." "In less than a year," said the *World*,<sup>15</sup> "the Government has had \$117,000,000 from the banks, and has lost it all and

\$8,000,000 more, through the financial thimble-rigging of Wall Street." Its comment upon the completed syndicate transaction, or "bank-parlour negotiations," as it called them, was made in these words, which very fairly expressed the verdict of a majority of Democrats even in the East:

"It is an excellent arrangement for the bankers. It puts at least \$16,000,000 into their pockets. . . . For the nation it means a scandalous surrender of credit and a shameful waste of substance."<sup>16</sup>

Scientific bimetallists pointed to the transaction as an object-lesson, and as a warning of the financial dangers inherent in the adoption of the single gold standard. Refuse to make any use of silver, said they, and see the position in which you find yourself. The very credit and financial stability of the Government are at the mercy of Wall Street money kings, who can bleed the gold reserve and force new bond issues at their pleasure. But if the Treasury were to make only a very small part of each payment in silver, it would thus serve notice upon the speculators that they cannot go on raiding the reserve at will; and it would induce exporters of gold to depend for their supplies upon the banks. They cited the practice of the Bank of France in support of their contentions.

Such were the opinions most often met with in the East. But all through the West, astonishment, disgust and rage spread like a prairie fire. Here was the President, who had been chosen because he was the enemy of privilege, the champion of the people against consolidated wealth, the man who had denounced monopoly and "the communism of capital,"—here was that President lowering the credit of the nation at the behest of a syndicate of

<sup>16</sup> See the files of the *World* for February, 1895

bankers, adding millions upon millions to the national debt, and all for what? To prevent the free use of the silver money with which the Treasury was overflowing, and which, both by law and custom, was legal tender for all debts. The Democrats of the West felt themselves to be not only injured but betrayed; and in the violence of their resentment, they even refused to credit Mr. Cleveland with upright motives. Many believed that he had himself derived personal profit from his negotiations with the syndicate and the bankers with whom he had to do. They pointed to his intimate friendship with a certain Mr. E. C. Benedict, a promoter who had been interested in various syndicates and in the Chicago Gas Trust; and they interpreted this intimacy in a sinister light. From the time of the third bond issue, Mr. Cleveland's following in the West melted completely away; while Populism and the cult of free silver were getting a tremendous grip upon the masses.

In the country as a whole, the unpopularity of the syndicate affair had not been needed to create a tremendous revulsion against Democratic rule. This had already found effective and spectacular expression at the Congressional elections of 1894. The Democratic Party had then been in full possession of the Government for eighteen months. During that time there had occurred a disastrous panic, banks had failed or had suspended by the score, business was at a standstill, and the national debt had been increased by a hundred millions. Moreover, the President had lost control of his own party. The pledge of tariff reform had ended in the pitiful fiasco of the emasculated Wilson Bill, which the President himself had been ashamed to sign. The sugar scandals in the Senate, the quarrels within the party, and the open breach between

Mr. Cleveland and other Democratic leaders—these afforded a picture, almost unrelieved, of unwisdom, incompetence and failure. The losses incurred during the great strikes had exasperated the corporations. The President's action in using troops to check disorder had made organised labour hostile to him. Mr. Olney's resort to "government by injunction" was equally obnoxious. Finally, the President's ill-advised Hawaiian policy added still another charge to the general indictment which the Republicans drew against their divided and distracted opponents. As for the people, they, as usual, judged things in the large, not looking into the causes of what had happened or apportioning the responsibility between the present and the past. They saw only that a year and a half of Democratic rule had been a year and a half of disorder and distress. Hence, at the polls they showed their displeasure in a tremendous political avalanche, which blotted out the Democratic majority in the Senate<sup>17</sup> and almost annihilated that party in the House, where the Republicans now had 248 members to 104 Democrats—the latter being almost wholly from the South. From the Northern States scarcely a dozen Democrats were returned. The State elections showed a no less overwhelming reaction. Everywhere the Republicans were jubilant, and looked forward to 1896 with eager confidence. "We can nominate a rag-baby or a yellow dog and elect it," was a common boast of theirs. The Democrats were downcast and full of gloom. They charged most of their misfortunes upon Mr. Cleveland, yet the party had as yet produced no other leader at whose summons it might once more rally on a new fighting line.

It is likely that the President in his heart of hearts regarded with considerable equanimity the Republican

<sup>17</sup> Republicans, 43; Democrats, 39; Populists, 6.

resumption of control in Congress. Republicans would, of course, oppose him as a matter of party policy; but the open assaults of avowed enemies were much less vexatious than the treachery and defection of those who should have been his friends. Moreover, the really eminent Republican leaders were more favourably disposed toward the President than they openly admitted. His financial doctrines were very much the same as theirs; and they respected the firm way in which he had stood by his convictions. In fact, the more radical Democrats had come to regard him as essentially a Republican. Mr. Bryan had already said of the President in his speech of February 14th:

“ He has attempted to inoculate it [the Democratic party] with Republican virus, and blood poisoning has set in.”

Hence, while the Republicans in the new Congress which met on December 2, 1895, would do nothing to help the President out of his various perplexities, they refrained from a policy of pin-pricks, and sought merely to accumulate some telling political capital for use in the presidential contest of the coming year. For this purpose, they continued what they had begun some time before,—a general criticism of the manner in which the foreign relations of the Government had been conducted by Mr. Cleveland. They wished to show that a Democratic President was careless of the country's interests and dignity abroad—that he was just the person to truckle to foreign powers and to think but little of the honour of the flag. His entire course in relation to the Hawaiian question had laid him open to easy censure; but there were many other incidents upon which his Republican

critics also seized. Indeed, the foreign relations of the United States during this administration would of themselves have made the period a memorable one. The momentous importance of our domestic problems was in no way so strikingly exhibited as by the fact that they wholly overshadowed a series of most dramatic events of an international character. With one exception, however, these last can be no more than outlined here.

In June, 1893, a treaty with Russia was ratified. Its third article, relating to the extradition of criminals, was widely denounced even by the Democratic press; for in pledging the United States Government to deliver up to Russia all murderers, or those who should be accessories to murder, no exception was made in the case of purely political assassinations. Later events lessened among Americans this tenderness toward crimes of a political character; but in 1893, the ambiguity of the treaty was widely condemned as showing the administration's sympathy with monarchical institutions. Again, a prolonged diplomatic correspondence with the French Government led to much friction, and gave many persons an opportunity to say that the President was indifferent to the rights of American citizens abroad. The French, having invaded and conquered Madagascar, had found an American ex-consul, Mr. John L. Waller, in the enjoyment of certain valuable concessions formerly granted him by the Queen whom France had just deposed. Mr. Waller was accused of giving military information to the natives; a French court-martial tried and convicted him, and sentenced him to twenty years' imprisonment. It appeared to many that the charge and the conviction were arranged simply to deprive Mr. Waller of the concessions

which French exploiters coveted. Mr. Cleveland's critics said that he had dealt with this matter in a spirit of indifference, and at variance with the spirited traditions of the State Department when in Republican hands. With Germany, also, there existed causes of irritation. The German Empire had partially excluded American food products—especially cattle and pork—on the pretence that they were diseased, and that the inspection at American ports was so carelessly conducted as to be practically worthless. The true motive was the protection of German landowners and agrarians against American competition. President Cleveland spoke in his messages to Congress of these unfriendly and injurious acts as "vexatious," and hinted at a policy of retaliation; yet this latter he deprecated as "leading to consequences of the gravest character." More rasping to American susceptibilities was an incident which arose from a clash between Nicaragua and Great Britain. The Central American Republic had expelled a British vice-consul named Hatch and several other British subjects, and had subjected them to indignities, for which the British Government demanded an apology and the payment of \$75,000 as a solatium. Nicaragua returned a flat refusal; whereupon a British man-of-war entered the Nicaraguan port of Corinto, landed marines, hauled down the Nicaraguan flag, and took possession of the custom-house for the purpose of collecting the revenues until the amount of the indemnity should be secured. Although this occupation was declared to be only temporary, and although Great Britain assured the American Government that no infringement of Nicaragua's sovereignty was contemplated, the incident produced a painful impression throughout the United States. "O for one day of Blaine!" was the cry which went up

from the Republican editors, who declared, quite unreasonably, that the Monroe Doctrine had been violated. President Cleveland took no spectacular action in this affair; but by putting some friendly pressure upon both governments, he persuaded the Nicaraguan President to promise payment of the \$75,000, while he induced the British Government to terminate the occupation of Corinto. Conservative persons felt that the whole matter had been most admirably managed; but sensational newspapers continued to accuse the President of subserviency to Great Britain and of deserving the comprehensive epithet "un-American." Some even found fault because he had not interfered to check the Turkish massacres in Armenia; although as no American citizens were among the victims, it was hard to say just why the United States should meddle in lands so distant, especially when great Christian powers, such as England, which were by treaty responsible, did not go beyond remonstrance.

One minor episode, however, was viewed with satisfaction by Americans without regard to party. In the Republic of Brazil, the navy had revolted, and several of the more southernly States had followed its example. The insurgent leader was Admiral Mello, and it was perfectly well understood that the ulterior object of the outbreak was to restore the Empire and replace Dom Pedro or one of his family upon the throne. This was made plain in a proclamation issued by Mello's second in command, Vice-Admiral da Gama, who in January, 1894, with a part of the Brazilian fleet, was blockading the harbour and city of Rio de Janeiro. The warships of many European powers were also gathered in the harbour. Their commanders were ostensibly neutral, yet secretly willing to aid the rebels in their attempt to overthrow the young Republic.



Here presently assembled an American squadron, under the command of Rear-Admiral Benham, and consisting of five cruisers.<sup>18</sup> For the first time since the close of the Civil War, the United States was represented in a critical situation by an efficient squadron of modern ships, armed with modern guns, and with an equipment that was wholly modern. The presence of this powerful group of vessels under the American flag led the foreign commanders to remain quiescent. They tacitly admitted the hegemony of the United States in an affair affecting an American Republic. What were the intentions of the Government at Washington? These were soon to be made clear. The rebel fleet had not received belligerent recognition, yet it was blockading a great seaport. Would the blockade be recognised? If so, the success of the revolt was almost certain; for President Peixoto could not hold out against an enemy that was able to bring Brazilian commerce to a standstill. And Peixoto's downfall meant the downfall of the Republic.

In the outer harbour of Rio de Janeiro were several American merchant vessels. Their captains were anxious to enter with their cargoes, but da Gama's ships of war had threatened to fire upon them, and had turned them back. On January 28th, one of the American skippers got word from Admiral Benham to take his vessel, the barque *Amy*, up to the wharves on the next day. He would be amply protected. A brief note from Benham to da Gama notified the Brazilian that the United States did not recognise the blockade, and that American ships must be permitted to come and go quite unmolested. Da Gama's answer was to draw up his fleet in battle line. Admiral

<sup>18</sup> These were the *New York*, the *Charleston*, the *Newark*, the *Detroit* and the *San Francisco*.

Benham sent an officer to the commanders of the foreign men-of-war, requesting them to drop down to the lower harbour so as to be out of his own line of fire on the following day. Meanwhile, all the American ships were put into thorough fighting trim, the decks were cleared, the ammunition hoists made ready, and each cruiser, beginning with the flagship *New York*, swung 'around, broadside on, so as to confront the long line of their dark-hulled antagonists.

At the time appointed, the *Detroit* steamed down alongside the little merchant ship, to escort her from her moorings to the inner port. As the two moved slowly past the first Brazilian cruiser, it was a breathless moment. The American gunners stood ready to pour a terrific broadside into da Gama's fleet. Suddenly from one of the Brazilian ships a musket-shot was fired at the *Amy*. In reply a gun boomed on the *Detroit*, and a solid shot screamed angrily along da Gama's line, burying itself in the hull of the Brazilian *Trajano*. But no other shot was heard that day. The Brazilian guns were silent. Da Gama's courage had oozed away; the blockade was broken; the revolt was doomed to failure; and the Republic of Brazil was made perpetually safe from foreign interference.

But the most striking chapter in the record of American diplomatic relations under President Cleveland is one that marks a distinct epoch in our history. Even before the end of the next decade, its consequences were seen logically to involve a wholly new and very startling development of American policy on the Western Hemisphere. In the President's first annual message to Congress,<sup>19</sup> the following sentence had found a place:

<sup>19</sup> December 4, 1893.

“The boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana is yet unadjusted. A restoration of diplomatic intercourse between that Republic and Great Britain, and a reference of the question to impartial arbitration, would be a most gratifying consummation.”

A year later, his second annual message <sup>20</sup> contained a much longer paragraph upon the same subject, again expressing the hope that the question at issue might be settled by reference to arbitration—“a resort which Great Britain so conspicuously favours in principle, and respects in practice, and which is earnestly sought by her weaker adversary.”

Probably not one American in a million took any notice of these sentences at the time when they were given to the public. Certainly no human being could have guessed that the controversy to which they made allusion held within it mighty potentialities of mischief. The very few persons who knew anything about the subject were aware that for more than half a century there had existed a dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain over the boundary line between the domains of the former and the colony of British Guiana. Certain sections of territory were claimed by both countries. Venezuela's title rested upon the alleged explorations and discoveries of early Spanish adventurers, while that of Great Britain was inherited from the Dutch, who had ceded the colony to the English in 1810, without, however, defining its boundary. The whole question of delimitation was so vague as very naturally to give rise to the dispute which began as early as 1841, when the Venezuelan Government protested against the hoisting of the British flag upon what it regarded as Venezuelan soil. A request was also made for

<sup>20</sup> December 3, 1894.

the drafting of a treaty which should describe and fix a definite boundary line. From this time a long and desultory diplomatic correspondence was carried on at intervals, sometimes with scant courtesy on the part of the British Foreign Ministers, who often left the Venezuelan notes unanswered, or in answering, gave no definite promise of satisfaction. Meanwhile, the English had themselves caused a survey to be made by Mr. (later Sir) Robert Schomburgk, who established what Lord Aberdeen called "boundary posts" as a "preliminary measure." Great Britain, however, disclaimed any intentions of encroaching upon the disputed territory, and regarded the whole subject as still open to negotiation.

Here the matter had rested for many years, when, in 1876, it was once more revived, and Venezuela appealed to the United States Government to interest itself in any further steps that might be taken, and to concern itself "in having due justice done to Venezuela." But something of much importance had occurred. On the territory in dispute, rich gold deposits had been discovered. It was no longer a question of getting possession of a tropical wilderness, but of securing a great mining field, stored with immense and still undeveloped riches. Thenceforth, English unwillingness to arrange a boundary treaty perceptibly increased. The Venezuelan Minister in London pressed for some definite solution of the pending controversy. Lord Derby, and later Lord Salisbury, delayed giving any answer for two whole years. Meanwhile, British settlers, miners and others, were entering the territory and were establishing their homes within its bounds. In 1880, after delaying eight months before answering another Venezuelan note, Lord Salisbury suddenly put forward, as embodying his contention, a claim to lands which, even by all

prior British surveys, were Venezuela's. He also mentioned the fact that some 40,000 British settlers were now within the province claimed by Venezuela, intimating that this made it impossible for Great Britain to give it up. In other words, because the long delay in adjusting the boundary—a delay for which Great Britain was largely responsible—had led Englishmen to enter lands that were known to be in dispute, therefore the title to those lands must be vested in Great Britain. From this time, Venezuela argued, protested, and appealed in vain. The British Foreign Ministers held back their answers as before. They would agree to nothing. At last (February 20, 1887) diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off. Great Britain had refused to submit the question to arbitration, and Venezuela withdrew her Minister from London, publishing a protest “before all civilised nations, against the acts of spoliation which the Government of Great Britain has committed.”

During the last fourteen years of this controversy, the Government of the United States had endeavoured, in a spirit of amity, to bring about some equitable adjustment. Under President Arthur's administration, the American Minister to England—Mr. James Russell Lowell—had informed Lord Granville that the United States was “not without concern as to whatever may affect the interest of a sister Republic of the American Continent.” During Mr. Cleveland's first presidency, the matter had been pressed with much more urgency. At last, in 1886, the American Minister, Mr. Phelps, was directed to offer the good offices of the United States in settling the difficulty and to propose its arbitration, if acceptable.<sup>21</sup> To this offer and suggestion, Lord Salisbury somewhat curtly replied that arbitration was at that time impossible. Under

<sup>21</sup> Despatch of December 20, 1886.

President Harrison, Secretary Blaine had continued the policy of his predecessors, and had again pressed upon Lord Salisbury some action which would be a preliminary step to arbitration, and to the termination of a wearisome dispute.<sup>22</sup> Lord Salisbury made to this suggestion a wholly non-committal answer, postponing any decision upon the subject. Other communications passed, but to them all no definite or satisfactory reply was given. The tone of the British Foreign Office was one of civil indifference, with just a suggestion of boredom and an intimation that while the United States might be listened to out of courtesy, that country was regarded as thrusting itself into an affair with which it had no concern.

Such was the situation when President Cleveland took office for the second time. A weak South American Republic had been trying for fifty years to secure from Great Britain a determination of its boundary. The question at issue was purely geographical and historical—one to be settled properly by a commission of impartial experts. Venezuela was willing to abide by the decision of such a board of arbitrators. On the other hand, Great Britain had practically refused to submit her claims to any arbitration, and had at the same time suggested no other way of ending the dispute. In July, 1894, Secretary Gresham sent a despatch<sup>23</sup> to Mr. Bayard (then Ambassador to England), which contained some very pertinent and pungent sentences. Mentioning the fact that the British Foreign Office had, since 1881, turned a deaf ear to all offers of arbitration, Mr. Gresham went on to say:

“In the meantime, successive advances of British settlers in the region admittedly in dispute, were followed by similar advances

<sup>22</sup> Despatch of May 1, 1890.

<sup>23</sup> July 13, 1894.

of British colonial administration, contesting and supplanting Venezuelan claims to exercise authority therein. . . . Toward the end of 1887, the British territorial claim, which had, as it would seem, been silently increased by some 23,000 square miles between 1885 and 1886, took another comprehensive sweep westward."

This "comprehensive sweep" was taken in order to include the district in which the gold mines had been lately found. Mr. Gresham's despatch ended with a strong statement of the President's desire to see the respective rights of the two countries settled by arbitration. By this time, general attention in the United States had been drawn to the question, even outside of diplomatic circles; and after President Cleveland had made a direct allusion to it in his message of December 3, 1894, Congress passed a joint resolution (February 3, 1895) urging "that Great Britain and Venezuela refer their dispute as to boundaries, to friendly arbitration." On the following day, Lord Salisbury sent a despatch to the British Ambassador in Washington, containing the assertion that "although Her Majesty's Government were ready to go to arbitration as to a certain portion of the territory, . . . they could not consent to any departure from the Schomburgk line."

Now when it is remembered that the Schomburgk line was originally drawn only as a tentative one; that at the time when it was drawn the British Foreign Minister, Lord Aberdeen, had disclaimed its permanency; and that he had specifically called it "a preliminary measure to discussion,"—a mere *ex parte* survey, in fact—one can measure the assurance of Lord Salisbury in declaring that the absolute acceptance of this line must be an indispensable preliminary to any negotiation whatsoever. "First give me everything I want, and then I will arbitrate as to the

things which I care nothing about." Thus might Lord Salisbury's position be not unfairly summarised. At this point, President Cleveland and his new Secretary of State, Mr. Olney, felt their patience breaking down. Hitherto, the attitude of the United States had been entirely disinterested. The American State Department had given Venezuela a helping hand, out of compassion for a weak and struggling Republic; but as to the merits of the controversy no opinion had been held. It was for a court of arbitration to pass upon the facts. But now Great Britain refused a genuine arbitration. Its Government coolly asserted that a large and immensely valuable expanse of territory was British soil, although for fifty years the title had been admittedly uncertain. "It is ours now, because our people have settled there. We shall hold it by force, if necessary, and we refuse to allow our claim to be examined and adjudicated."

This, in the view of President Cleveland and his Secretary of State, was to traverse directly the doctrine of Monroe. As to whether their view was historically correct, there has been an immense amount of discussion. Mr. Cleveland summed up his contention in a sentence written long afterward:

"We had seen her [Great Britain's] pretensions in the disputed regions widen and extend in such manner and upon such pretexts as seemed to constitute an actual or threatened violation of a doctrine which our nation long ago established, declaring that the American continents are not to be considered subjects for future colonisation by any European power."<sup>24</sup>

As the President understood the Venezuelan case, Great Britain by arbitrary assertion of sovereignty over territory

<sup>24</sup> Cleveland, *Presidential Problems*, p. 254.



to which an American Republic had a *prima facie* claim, was extending her system over American soil, and colonising new portions of the American continent. At once, Secretary Olney, at the direction of the President, began the draft of a long and most elaborately reasoned argument, tracing the history of the Monroe Doctrine, asserting its direct application to the Venezuelan question, declaring the deep concern which the United States felt in the issue as it had now shaped itself, and concluding with a strong request that Great Britain submit the whole case to arbitration—not as before, out of regard to Venezuela's interests alone, but because the dispute now touched the rights, the honour and the dignity of the United States. The language of this despatch<sup>25</sup> was very firm. There was in its tone that which ought to have warned Lord Salisbury of the stern purpose back of it. Mr. Olney wrote that “the United States may and should intervene in a controversy primarily concerning only Great Britain and Venezuela.” The United States is “to decide how far it is bound to see that the integrity of Venezuela is not impaired by the pretensions of its powerful antagonist.” The United States is “entitled to resent and resist any sequestration of Venezuelan soil by Great Britain.”

These were not the smooth words of European diplomacy. They smacked of gunpowder. Indeed, had they emanated from the chancellery of a great European power, Lord Salisbury would most certainly have recognised their gravity. But British Foreign Ministers had been taught to believe (and with some reason) that American state despatches are not to be judged by the standards of Old World diplomacy—that a certain rhetorical vehem-

<sup>25</sup> Despatch of July 20, 1895.

ence in them is to be expected and allowed.<sup>26</sup> In the second place, Lord Salisbury, like all European statesmen, made the fatal error of imagining that the Monroe Doctrine is a mere *panache* of American diplomacy—something to flutter in a popular harangue or a newspaper article or a presidential message; in fact, a meaningless though effective catchword, good always for a round of unintelligent applause. He did not know that, next to the passionate devotion which the American people give to their ideal of national unity, there is no political sentiment so deep-rooted and so intense among them as that which centres in the doctrine first explicitly enunciated by President Monroe. Foreigners may ignore this feeling. They may speak of it as a superstition, and of the object of it as a fetish. Some denationalised Americans may even sneer at it. But that the great masses of the people cling to it with an ever-strengthening tenacity cannot be denied by any one who knows them well. The sagacious student of political psychology may, indeed, find in this phenomenon evidence of that popular instinct which is often more profoundly wise than the reasoned arguments of statesmen. The extraordinary hold which the Monroe Doctrine has always exercised upon the imagination of Americans may well be due to a vague and still unformulated stirring of the national consciousness which discerns, however dimly, a future wherein the whole of the Western Hemisphere

<sup>26</sup> Mr. Cleveland's English biographer expresses the then current European view in the following words: "Were it possible to conceive a despatch of this character sent by one European power to another, there can be little doubt that the result would have been the transmission of his passports to the Ambassador who presented it. The foreign despatches of an American Secretary of State have only an occasional international significance. They are generally compiled with a view to home consumption."—Whittle, *President Cleveland*, p. 212 (London, 1896).

shall be held under the flag of the United States. If this be so, then no wonder that a principle first enunciated under special circumstances should have been expanded and perpetuated to bar all influences which might prevent that splendid dream from coming true.

But to Lord Salisbury, the Monroe Doctrine was merely an old-time bit of diplomatic rubbish, of which a few paragraphs from his pen could readily dispose. And he made a third blunder in the estimate which he had formed of President Cleveland and Mr. Olney. He evidently thought that, like certain of their predecessors, they were now engaged in the periodical performance popularly known as "twisting the lion's tail." Lord Salisbury remembered Mr. Cleveland's dismissal of Sir Lionel Sackville-West because of the exigencies of a political campaign. No doubt, he felt that Secretary Olney's stand in the Venezuelan matter was taken to offset the administration's general unpopularity, and to win a little cheap applause. The British Premier had not forgotten his correspondence with Secretary Blaine over the Bering Sea fisheries. In that correspondence, Mr. Blaine had used undiplomatic language and had beaten the big drum; but at the critical moment he had yielded rather than take the responsibility of an open rupture with Great Britain.<sup>27</sup> These Americans are all alike, the noble Marquis doubtless told himself; treat them firmly and they will not go beyond "tall talk." Little did he know the two men with whom he now had to do—Americans of the older stock, of New England ancestry, as dogged and as stiff-necked as any of their race who had remained in Britain.

Lord Salisbury, then, wholly failed to recognise the seriousness of the issue which confronted him. He took his time about composing a reply to Mr. Olney's note;

<sup>27</sup> See pp. 191, 192.

and, indeed, when Congress met on December 2d, no answer had yet come from him. In the President's message of that date, this fact was noted; and the promise was made that the British note should be submitted to Congress when received. When it did come, Lord Salisbury's communication was in the form of two separate despatches addressed to the British Ambassador in Washington, but meant to be submitted to the American State Department. The first note dealt with the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the Venezuelan question and also the matter of arbitration; the second discussed the whole previous history of the boundary dispute.

The tone of both these notes was intensely, if unintentionally, irritating. Something of conscious patronage was there,—the air of an intellectual superior trying to make a simple matter plain to an inferior understanding. There was also subtly suggested the attitude of the great nobleman listening with patient condescension to the demands of some intrusive, persistent person whom it would be undignified to treat uncivilly. It was, in short, the pose of Sir Leicester Dedlock submitting to an interview with Mr. Rouncewell, the ironmaster. Lord Salisbury graciously explained that the Monroe Doctrine was a highly respectable principle originally enunciated by a "distinguished statesman"; but that it long ago became obsolete. It bore "no relation to the state of things in which we live at the present day." Furthermore, even if it did, Her Majesty's Government could not accept it as sound and valid, for it had no place in the law of nations.

"No statesman however eminent, and no nation however powerful, are competent to insert into the code of international law a novel principle which was never recognised before, and which has not since been accepted by the Government of any other country."

Again, his lordship was not prepared to admit that the United States had any concern whatever in disputes which might arise between the States having possessions in the Western Hemisphere. Still less could he accept the doctrine that the United States possessed the right to demand the arbitration of such disputes. In other words, the sum and substance of this note might be expressed as "Mind your own business and we will mind ours." Regarding arbitration itself, as a mode of settling international differences, Lord Salisbury read Mr. Olney a little lesson,—a sort of political essay on the subject,—ending in another very obvious snub. Arbitration, said his lordship, is not free from defects. It is hard to find an impartial arbitrator. It is not always easy to enforce the award when made. In short, whether or not to arbitrate in a given case is "generally a delicate and difficult question." "Only the two parties to the controversy can decide this question."

"The claim of a third nation. . . to impose this particular procedure on either of the two others cannot be reasonably justified, and has no foundation in the law of nations."

Finally, Great Britain had at times offered to arbitrate her claims to a part of the territory in dispute; but she absolutely refused to submit to arbitration the status of lands on which British subjects had for years been settled.

Some years after, an intimate friend of Mr. Cleveland's was asked how the President felt when he read these two despatches. "Felt?" was the reply, conveyed in an expressive Americanism; "why he felt mad clear through!" On December 17th, he sent to Congress a message accompanied by the entire correspondence. It had become

generally known in Washington that something out of the ordinary was impending; but no one was prepared for so stirring and uncompromising a missive. As the reading of it proceeded, a dead silence settled upon the House, and every ear was strained to catch the slightest word.

The message began by a brief recapitulation of the facts; the nature of the controversy between Venezuela and Great Britain; the direct interest of the United States in resisting unproved claims of any European power to American territory; the request of the United States that Great Britain submit its alleged rights to a court of arbitration; and the absolute refusal of Great Britain to do so, or even to admit that the United States had any just concern in the affair at all. Having thus summed up the facts, the President declared the duty of the United States to be a very plain one. Since Great Britain refuses to allow the true boundary to be determined by disinterested arbitration, this Government must for itself ascertain that boundary through a commission. When the commission shall report that certain territory belongs of right to Venezuela, "it will be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain" of such territory. And then occurred these ominously weighty words:

"In making these recommendations, I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred, and keenly realise all the consequences that may follow."

The reading of this message was received in each of the two Houses with a tumult of wild applause from Republicans and Democrats alike. The former, if anything, were

the more enthusiastic. They had long taunted the President with what they called his subserviency to England and to English interests; and so they dared not now appear less strenuous than he in behalf of a warlike policy. Yet it is unnecessary to ascribe their attitude at the moment to motives such as this. A vigorous defence of the Monroe Doctrine appeals to all Americans; and in any sudden crisis that pits the United States against a foreign power, party divisions vanish. Therefore, at once, Mr. Hitt of Illinois, the Republican leader of the House, introduced a bill appropriating \$100,000 for the expense of such a commission as the President had suggested. This bill was passed in the House without delay; and though in the Senate, Mr. Sherman of Ohio suggested that it be referred to a committee, it became a law within three days.<sup>28</sup> Not a single vote in either House was cast against it. Republicans vied with Democrats in praising the boldness and patriotism of the President. From all over the country came messages of congratulation and approval. The most partisan of Republican newspapers, such as the *New York Tribune*, eulogised the President's action. Governor McKinley of Ohio telegraphed of the message: "It is American in letter and spirit; and, in a calm, dispassionate manner, upholds the honour of the nation and ensures its security."

When a brief summary of the message was cabled to London on the afternoon of the 17th, the British public refused to take the matter seriously. They had not heard a word of this Venezuelan dispute. What on earth did it all mean? What was it all about? Men rubbed their eyes and puzzled over the cabled news with utter amazement

<sup>28</sup> It was introduced in the Senate by Mr. Chandler (Republican) of New Hampshire.

and incredulity. Surely this was only some bit of American nonsense—a political dodge—a touch of sorry buncombe. On the following morning, certain members of the London Stock Exchange sent a cablegram to the New York Exchange to express their notion that the affair was wholly humorous. The allusion in it was to the yacht races for the American cup. The cablegram read:

“When our warships enter New York harbour, we hope that your excursion boats will not interfere with them.”

Perhaps there was conveyed in this (besides the obvious jest) a hint that the American defences were practically limited to excursion-boats. The New York brokers were prompt with their reply. They cabled:

“For your sake it is to be hoped that your warships are better than your yachts.”

But by this time the full text of the President's message had been published in England, and something like a panic followed. It was impossible to doubt the gravity of the situation after reading those grimly measured sentences. In them there was no touch of bluster, no suggestion of anything like jingoism. An unfaltering sense of duty, a profound conviction of right, and the note of an inflexible purpose—these were what men found in the words which an English writer described as being “full of stateliness and force.” When the true meaning of the message dawned upon the British people, a wave of consternation swept over the country. Not because England shrank from war as war, but because the very thought of war with their own kindred affected Englishmen with a moral horror. “War with America is unthinkable!” was said



again and again. Clergymen spoke from their pulpits of the criminality of such a thing. The newspapers declared it to be quite impossible.<sup>29</sup> The man in the street, puzzled and confused, experienced a feeling of bewilderment. Then a most unprecedented incident occurred. On New Year's Day, 354 members of the House of Commons signed and sent to the President and to Congress a memorial asking that in the future all questions at issue between Great Britain and the United States be referred to arbitration. There was an amusing lack of logic shown in sending this memorial to the President and Congress, inasmuch as both had striven earnestly to have the Venezuelan question arbitrated. That it might better have been addressed to Lord Salisbury was fairly obvious. Yet the meaning of it was clear enough. It was indirectly a disclaimer of the Premier's action, and also an appeal for peace. In like manner an address was prepared and largely signed by British authors to their American brothers of the pen, deprecating the thought of war, and asking their influence in behalf of international good will.

Of course, not all Englishmen were anxious for an amicable settlement of the dispute. The jingo and the fire-eater were here and there in evidence. When the British authors were preparing their address, Mr. Morley Roberts wrote and published a very characteristic letter in which he voiced the secret thoughts of many Tories. Said he :

"No Englishman with imperial instincts can look with anything but contempt on the Monroe Doctrine. The English, and not the inhabitants of the United States, are the greatest power in the two Americas; and no dog of a Republic can open its mouth to bark without our good leave. . . . Those who sign this

<sup>29</sup> See Kraut, *A Looker-on in London*, pp. 184-195 (New York, 1899).

precious paper go on to say that we are proud of the United States. Sir, we *might* be proud of them, but to say that we *are* proud of them is to speak most disingeniously. Who can be proud of a politically corrupt and financially rotten country, with no more than a poor minority vainly striving after health? ”

And the *Saturday Review*, while declaring over and over again (as though to keep its courage up) that, of course, there would be no war, professed to think that if war came, the humiliation of the United States would be instantaneous and bitter. Discussing the military resources of the two nations, it declared: “ America is now at a greater disadvantage, compared with Great Britain, than it was in 1812.<sup>30</sup> ”

As a purely academic question, it may be permitted to hazard a conjecture as to the probable course and issue of such a war as then seemed for a moment possible. President Cleveland’s message, with its implied threat, has been often spoken of as a colossal “ bluff ”; and both then and afterwards men said that the United States must have yielded had the verge of war been actually reached. It is true that the national military establishment in 1896 was wretchedly inadequate for any war whatever, and most of all for war with the greatest naval power in the world. For a number of years, the creation of a system of modern coast-defences had been slowly going on; but as yet nothing had been completed. There existed only the nucleus of works which it would still take years to finish. When the President sent his bold message to Congress, there had been actually mounted only one high-powered modern gun of really formidable calibre. So far as permanent defences and scientific fortifications were concerned, every city on the entire American seaboard was

<sup>30</sup> *Saturday Review*, December 28, 1895.

practically unprotected against the attack of a powerful fleet. Portland, Boston, New York, Baltimore, Charleston and Savannah in the East, and San Francisco in the West, together with a score of smaller cities, invited capture by their weakness and their wealth. Many an English naval captain and many an English soldier must have thought longingly of this enormous mass of riches, echoing, perhaps, old Blücher's greedy exclamation, "Was für Plunder!"<sup>31</sup> Nor as yet had the new American navy reached a growth sufficient to make it a factor in the problem of defence. Not a single first-class battleship had been completed, and the cruisers alone were neither numerous enough nor powerful enough to meet the armoured squadrons of Britain.<sup>32</sup> These facts must have been care-

<sup>31</sup> See a characteristic chapter in Kipling's *American Notes* (New York, 1891) on the American coast defences.

"Try to believe an irresponsible writer when he assures you that China's fleet to-day, if properly manned, could waft the entire American navy out of the water and into the blue. The big, fat Republic that is afraid of nothing, because nothing up to the present date has happened to make her afraid, is as unprotected as a jelly-fish. . . . From five miles out at sea a ship of the power of H. M. S. *Collingwood* would wipe out any or every town from San Francisco to Long Branch; and three first-class ironclads would account for New York, Bartholdi's Statue and all.

"They could not, with an ordinary water patrol, despatch one regiment of men six miles across the seas. There would be about five million excessively angry, armed men pent up within American limits. These men would require ships to get themselves afloat. The country has no such ships; and until the ships were built, New York need not be allowed a single wheeled carriage within her limits.

"Behold now the glorious condition of this Republic which has no fear. There is ransom and loot past the counting of man on her seaboard alone—plunder that would enrich a nation—and she has neither a navy nor half a dozen first-class forts to guard the whole."

<sup>32</sup> The effective navy of the United States in 1896 consisted of 2 second class battleships, 12 cruisers, 9 gunboats, 6 double-turreted monitors, 1 armored ram, and 1 torpedo boat. There were also 6 iron vessels of an obsolete type still in commission.

fully conned over in the British War Office during the last days of 1895. Perhaps there was a moment when those whose touch could turn the scale may have been tempted to let it incline to war, feeling, as an Englishman afterwards expressed it, that "we are likely to suffer in our self-respect, our sense of personal security, and in our pockets, until we have succeeded in convincing some nation of the first class that . . . we are ready for war."<sup>33</sup>

On the other hand, there were some considerations to offset the disparity of immediate resources. There can be no doubt that in the first months of such a war, the American seaboard would have suffered most severely. Some, at least, of the cities mentioned would have been laid under heavy contribution, and some would possibly have been shelled or burned. Yet the military experience of later years has shown that even improvised or hastily constructed means of defence may suffice to hold a fleet in check, and even to destroy a part of it. The torpedo, the floating mine, and all the other deadly implements of naval warfare would have been developed and used with terrible effect by a people so ingenious, so inventive, and so daring as the Americans; and these devices, supported by the heavily armoured, double-turreted monitors (*Terror*, *Puritan*, *Amphitrite*, *Miantonomoh*, *Monadnock* and *Monterey*) would probably have saved New York, and no doubt other cities; for the fortune of war does not usually give all the successes to one side.

But, granting that the British fleet might have dealt ruin and devastation to the entire Atlantic seaboard, this would have been only the beginning of the war. The vast interior of the country would have still remained untouched, its resolution unimpaired, its resources unexhausted. Meanwhile, the whole of Canada would have been over-

<sup>33</sup> Whittle, *op cit.*, pp. 227, 228.

run by American armies. It has been many times asserted and as many times denied, that in the event of hostilities, the British troops in Canada, heavily re-enforced, were to have commenced a campaign which Sir Redvers Buller had been chosen to direct. The subsequent career of this officer and his proved weakness and incompetence in South Africa give one a criterion by which to judge what he would have done against enemies a hundred-fold more numerous than the Boers, and ten thousand-fold more able to sustain a long and wasting war. Indeed, ere a single troopship could have sailed from England, an army of half a million men would have swarmed across the Canadian frontier. The permanent conquest of all British America, with the flourishing cities of Victoria, Vancouver, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal, Quebec, St. Johns and Halifax, would have been a more than adequate compensation for the hasty plundering of a few American seaports. Moreover, the loss to Great Britain would have been tremendously augmented by the destruction of her commerce with the United States, by the paralysis of her shipping trade, which carried so large a share of American products, by the cutting off of her abundant food supplies, and, perhaps, by the confiscation of the hundreds of millions of British capital invested in American enterprises. Again, as the war went on, the American navy would have swiftly gained the power of taking the offensive. In navy yards inaccessible to attack, the battleships and formidable cruisers and torpedo-boats already half completed would have been finished and new ones rapidly laid down, until at last a mighty fleet would have issued to give battle on the open seas; while swarms of commerce destroyers would have swept the ocean clean of British merchantmen. Already, in 1895, at the opening of the German ship-

canal at Kiel, two of the new American cruisers, the *New York* and the *Columbia*, had won the instant notice of foreign naval experts. The *Columbia*, in particular, both for the strength of her armament and her extraordinary speed, was an object of curiosity and of some disquietude. Her speed became apparent on her return voyage, when she made the passage from Southampton to New York under natural draught and in heavy weather, in six days and twenty-three hours, distancing the English-built liner *St. Louis* and the German-built liner *Augusta Victoria*. A score of cruisers such as the *Columbia*, able to escape from the more sluggish battleships and fitted to destroy all smaller craft, would have put an end to ocean trade in British bottoms and would thus have ruined the great shipping interests of Glasgow, Liverpool, and London.

But there still remained another element which must have been seriously pondered by the British Cabinet. Lord Salisbury at the time may well have repeated Bismarck's saying after Sadowa, in 1866—"We are not living alone in Europe." Involved in a gigantic war with the United States, how would imperial Britain have safeguarded her prestige in other quarters of the globe? Germany stood ready to grasp eagerly at the sceptre of commercial supremacy. France would have extended her African possessions without the humiliation of a Fashoda. Russian armies could have occupied Constantinople or pushed back the frontiers of India. The Boers might have secured their independence without a blow, or, by setting forward the time for their great struggle, have won it gloriously. Indeed, had England and the United States engaged in war, they would have taken quite unequal risks. Upon the latter nation, the contest must have inflicted vast

material losses. Its prosperity would have been crippled and its expansion checked for many a year; yet in the end, the Republic would have emerged with no impairment of its power or prestige. But to Great Britain, which had so many hostages to give to fortune, defeat would have spelled instant ruin; while even victory (if we concede that victory was possible) must have been purchased at a price of which no Englishman could think without a shudder.

Fortunately, so appalling a catastrophe was averted, never, perhaps, again to be so imminent. In the end, public opinion in Great Britain came to recognise that no strip of South American territory, even were it piled knee-deep with gold, was worth a war between the two great English-speaking peoples. The blame of the whole unfortunate imbroglio was very justly laid upon Lord Salisbury, for allowing what was in itself an unimportant question to drift into the magnitude of a *casus belli*. Yet the *impasse* still continued. However great the blunder which he had committed, the British Premier could scarcely cry "Peccavi" and ask the American President to forgive him. It was then that the way to peace was made smooth by the American Commission which Mr. Cleveland had promptly appointed on January 1st. This body, through Secretary Olney, asked the governments of Great Britain and Venezuela for such documentary evidence as would aid it in its investigation. In each case a most courteous assent was given. A month later,<sup>34</sup> Ambassador Bayard, in view of the public demonstrations in both England and the United States, proposed to Lord Salisbury that the Venezuelan question be discussed at Washington, with a view to ultimate arbitration. This was a decided proffer of the olive-branch, and Lord Salisbury responded

<sup>34</sup> February 27, 1896.

five days later in a note in which he cordially agreed to Mr. Bayard's suggestion, and concluded with this significant sentence:

"I have empowered Sir Julian Pauncefote to discuss the question either with the representative of Venezuela *or with the Government of the United States acting as the friend of Venezuela.*"

This little sentence conceded the whole question at issue. It recognised the United States as entitled to interfere on behalf of an American Republic as against a European power, and it tacitly withdrew the prior British declaration that such interference had no warrant in the law of nations. In other words, Great Britain accepted President Cleveland's new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as a principle to be recognised thereafter in Anglo-American relations. Soon after, Lord Salisbury, not to be gracious by halves, withdrew his insistence upon the Schomburgk line, and agreed to submit the whole question to arbitration. A formal treaty to that effect was signed in Washington on February 2, 1897.<sup>35</sup>

It would be difficult to exaggerate the profound impression which the Venezuelan affair produced upon the statesmen of Continental Europe,—an impression that was reflected in the press and in many monographs and special publications. The prestige of the United States was enhanced immensely,—a fact of which Americans abroad were made aware in many ways. Their country

<sup>35</sup> It provided for a reference of the whole dispute to a tribunal which met in Paris in June, 1899. This was composed of two American and two English judges and was presided over by Professor Maartens, the Russian authority on international law. The decision finally rendered on October 3d of the same year represented a compromise, and this was, on the whole, favourable to Great Britain.



was now spoken of in a tone of grave respect that was altogether new. A thoughtful observer who had carefully studied the drift of European opinion, wrote that

“The best informed French and German journalists, though they acknowledge the equity and prudence of the compromise which has been reached, think it necessary to point out that it involves possibilities of considerable gravity, not merely to England and the United States, but also to the civilised world in general.”<sup>36</sup>

And he cited the very able *Kölnische Zeitung* as saying:

“A precedent has been established by the joint action of the two Anglo-Saxon powers, the effects of which are likely to be felt long after the British Guiana boundary question has been forgotten.”

But the most explicit statement of just what Lord Salisbury's concession meant, was made by the *London Times* in these pregnant sentences:

“From the point of view of the United States the arrangement is a concession by Great Britain of the most far-reaching kind. It admits a principle that in respect of South American republics the United States may not only intervene in disputes, but may entirely supersede the original disputant and assume exclusive control of the negotiations. Great Britain cannot, of course, bind any other nation by her action, but she has set up a precedent which may in the future be quoted with great effect against herself, and she has greatly strengthened the hands of the United States Government in any dispute that may arise in the future between a South American Republic and a European power, in which the United States may desire to intervene.”<sup>37</sup>

In the United States, many and various were the opinions then expressed regarding President Cleveland's

<sup>36</sup> *Nineteenth Century*, December, 1896.

<sup>37</sup> *London Times*, November 14, 1896.

bold and somewhat startling course. Of the unfavourable criticisms uttered at the time, it will be necessary to speak hereafter. But perhaps the matured judgments of two able men who were not of Mr. Cleveland's party may be cited as embodying the final verdict of his countrymen. Dr. Edward Stanwood, a close student of American political history and long an intimate friend of Mr. Blaine, summed up very briefly the outcome of the Venezuelan episode as "the most signal victory of American diplomacy in modern times."<sup>38</sup> And Mr. John W. Foster, an experienced and sagacious diplomat, who succeeded Mr. Blaine as Secretary of State in President Harrison's Cabinet, gave his deliberate opinion in these words: "I regard the President's action as a consistent, judicious and necessary application of the true intent and spirit of the [Monroe] Doctrine."<sup>39</sup>

But whatever opinion may be held regarding the wisdom of President Cleveland's action, or the accuracy with which he then defined a fundamental doctrine of American policy, one impressive fact cannot be questioned. The interpretation which he gave was instantly accepted by his countrymen and has been confirmed and extended by his successors. In less than a decade, indeed, its far-reaching significance was to receive a practical demonstration. Had nothing else occurred to make his administration memorable, this Venezuelan incident would have sufficed; since through it President Cleveland left an ineffaceable mark upon the history, not of the United States alone, but of the whole Western Hemisphere and of the world.

<sup>38</sup> Stanwood, *A History of the Presidency*, p. 520 (Boston, 1898).

<sup>39</sup> Foster, *A Century of American Diplomacy*, p. 473 (New York, 1900). See also a similar expression of opinion by another eminent Republican, Mr. Andrew D. White, in his *Autobiography*, ii. pp. 381 (New York, 1905).

## CHAPTER X

### THE RISING IN THE WEST

THE universal chorus of applause which in the United States greeted President Cleveland's Venezuela message, continued for precisely three days. At the end of that brief period, discordant notes were heard, so harsh and so insistent as to put an end to what had seemed to be a perfect political harmony. It was, indeed, Mr. Cleveland's fate never to taste in public office the sweets of popularity for any length of time; and he was now to enter upon the most trying year of all. The praise which he had lately won alarmed the Republican leaders. They had perforce commended the bold front which he had shown to England; yet this sudden popularity seemed likely to upset their plans. Was the President thinking of a third term? Mr. Chauncey M. Depew in a published interview suggested this hypothesis, and it created something like a panic among the gentlemen who were asserting that they could elect even a yellow dog in 1896. Therefore, almost immediately, the Republican press began to qualify its praise of Mr. Cleveland and to forget its enthusiasm of a day or two before. The *New York Sun*, which once again had drifted into the anti-Cleveland ranks, disclosed a new line of criticism in an editorial remark:

“ If the eccentric statesman and instinctive antagonist of the more vital American sentiments, who now occupies the White House, had dealt with the Venezuelan affair from the beginning in the

creditable spirit shown in his message, it is a question whether the situation would not now be satisfactory and without danger of war." <sup>1</sup>

The *Sun's* lead was quickly followed by the *Tribune*, which had at first spoken of the President's "straightforward, manly words," but which now called his diplomacy that of a "self-opinionated tyro."

But it was not the political, so much as the financial aspect of the situation that raised a storm of disapproval, and this, curiously enough, in those quarters where the President had hitherto found strong support, as well as in a section where he was already hated. The possibility of a war with England had frightened Wall Street. On the day after the message, stocks dropped several points, and the market was decidedly weaker at the close. On the 19th, when the full gravity of the situation had become known, there was something very like a panic. The soundest securities declined in value. It was said that European holders of American stocks and bonds were preparing to sell them in large blocks. According to an estimate generally accepted at the time, the depreciation in values, consequent upon the prospect of war, amounted to at least \$400,000,000. It was then that Wall Street turned on Mr. Cleveland. Hitherto, the bankers and brokers and other financiers had lauded him for having, as they said, preserved the national credit and saved the country from repudiation. But now that stocks were down, these same men cursed his very name. Whether his policy was brave and honourable or the reverse, was nothing to them. "Margins" had been wiped out, money had been lost. That was all they cared about. And so it came to pass that the President was wounded in the house of his friends.

<sup>1</sup> New York *Sun*, December 18, 1905.

It was then that he lost for a while the support of one who had been among the most devoted, the most consistent, and the most able of all his advocates in the press,—Mr. Edwin Lawrence Godkin, the editor of the *New York Evening Post*.

Mr. Godkin at that time divided with Mr. Dana the honour of pre-eminence in American journalism. No two men could have been more utterly unlike in temperament, in training, or in character. Mr. Godkin was an Anglo-Irishman by birth, and as a young man he had been the correspondent of the *London Daily News* during the Crimean War. In the East he had made the acquaintance of men of great distinction in many fields of effort, from whom, no less than from his reading, he acquired an invaluable fund of knowledge relating to politics, diplomacy, economics, history, and, incidentally, human nature. During the American Civil War he acted in the dual capacity of correspondent for the *Daily News* and for the *New York Times*, thus establishing a definite connection with American journalism. In 1865 he was made editor of the *Nation*, and in 1881 he became one of the two editors of the *Evening Post*, his colleague being Mr. Horace White.

Mr. Godkin's comprehensive knowledge of the great world, his cosmopolitanism, and his personal associations gave him a distinct advantage over those American editors who became famous in spite of their early disadvantages. Such men as Weed and Raymond and Greeley were possessed of natural force, but they lacked breadth of view and liberality of thought. They were infinitely keen at detecting the drift of each cross-current of popular opinion; but they were deficient in the qualities which would have enabled them to guide that drift and to mould and shape opinion for wise and worthy ends. Mr. Godkin's

editorial ideals were entirely at variance with those of every other great American editor. He did not set himself directly to appeal to the masses of his adopted countrymen. He never wrote down to the intellectual level of the man in the street. His appeal was rather to men of intelligence and cultivation—men who were really representative of the best elements in American life—professional men, scholars, authors, lawyers, clergymen, great merchants, experts in their own subjects—and for these he wrote in a style that was wonderfully effective. His leading articles presupposed in their readers not merely natural intelligence, but education. They were full of allusions of the kind that are heard in the familiar intercourse of men of culture. Yet nothing could have been further removed from pedantry or pose. The manner was ease and simplicity itself. The sentences were short and to the point; the phrasing was crisp and neat and oftentimes colloquial. The whole tone was that of an accomplished gentleman conversing with a set of intimates at his club. And Mr. Godkin had also a delightful wit at his command,—an appreciation of the comic which made his persiflage delicious and which also tipped his delicate irony with destructiveness.<sup>2</sup> This last quality—his irony—was a weapon that he used with consummate skill. Its touch was light; yet it could make the apparently invulnerable argument of an adversary shrivel like a leaf. Anything more intensely exasperating than some of his ironic strokes cannot well be imagined; and he was the only one of Dana's editorial contemporaries who could rouse that seasoned veteran to serious wrath.

Mr. Godkin, unlike Dana, had a high regard for prin-

<sup>2</sup> Some of the best of Mr. Godkin's editorial essays were collected by him and published in a book—*Reflections and Comments* (New York, 1896).

ciple; and his championship of any cause was as conscientious as it was courageous. Many, indeed, were the causes for which he seemed at times to fight almost alone, yet of which at last he lived to see the triumph. To that triumph his steady hammering, in season and out of season, very powerfully contributed. It is not too much to say that nearly all the most important questions of American political history from 1881 to 1896 got their first public hearing largely through the influence of Mr. Godkin. They were, of course, bound to arise and to clamour for solution; but it was Mr. Godkin's clear prevision which perceived their imminence, as it was his vigorous pen that won for them attention. The reform of the civil service, the introduction of the Australian ballot, the enactment of rigorous election laws, the revision of the tariff, the divorce of municipal government from partisan politics, and the establishment of a stable monetary system—all these issues were fairly forced upon the public mind through Mr. Godkin's influence.

And as the whole spirit of his work was different from Dana's, so was his reward a different one. Dana must still perhaps remain in popular remembrance the greatest of all American editors. He was read by more people, his personality was the best known, he amused and entertained and furnished an infinite number of "quotable bits" and passages for comment. But he exercised no lasting influence, for he was utterly devoid of any real beliefs. His admirations were sham admirations. His enthusiasms were sham enthusiasms. He was sincere only in his hatreds; and the spectacle of an old man shrieking forth an expression of his hatreds was in the end more repellent than edifying. Mr. Godkin, on the other hand, was never very widely known. Yet through his selected *clien-*

*tête* of readers he exercised a power of persuasion beyond that of any other publicist in the United States. Each of those whom he convinced became a propagandist and an intellectual leavener of the community where he lived. And so, if Mr. Godkin himself was never famous with the sort of fame that Greeley and that Dana won, it may be said of him, as Mr. W. D. Howells once most aptly wrote of a greater man than Mr. Godkin: "What he had taught had become part of the life of his generation, and was thus far alienated from any consciousness of him in those whose conduct he had largely shaped."

As might have been expected, a personality so marked as that of Mr. Godkin, possessed the defects inseparable from its qualities. In declaring his opinions, he was wont to adopt the tone and manner of the superior person, and to assume an air of absolute infallibility such as few are quite prepared to recognise as attainable in this imperfect world. A lack of fairness was another mental characteristic of the man. Editorially he would seldom or never admit that he had erred, even when the proof of error was incontestable. Again, his censure was at times so bitter and so unsparing as to create a certain sympathy with those who suffered from it. Indeed, among his victims were many who had once been Mr. Godkin's friends and fellow-workers, but who had had the reprehensible temerity to differ with him as to public questions. On such as these he always poured the choicest vials of his wrath, and showed himself intolerant beyond belief. They had, in his eyes, committed the unpardonable sin. Having once seen the light of the pure Godkinian revelation, they had sinned against it. Hence it was that the most persistent readers of the *Evening Post* were the very men who spoke of it with gibes. They read it and were influenced by it, yet at



the same time they felt themselves continually irritated by its tone. One of these gentlemen—a very eminent New Yorker who had sometimes felt the touch of Mr. Godkin's chastening rod—is said to have spoken of the *Post* as "that pessimistic, malignant and malevolent sheet—which no good citizen ever goes to bed without reading!" And to the same gentleman was ascribed another and very widely quoted epigram, uttered in answer to a friend who was deploring the general demoralisation of New York. "But what can you expect," broke in his hearer, "of a city with two such leading newspapers—the *Sun* in the morning making vice attractive, and the *Post* in the evening making virtue odious!"

Perhaps the most marked of Mr. Godkin's mental attributes was his inability to appreciate the power of sentiment and the force of human passion. For these things, like one of his favourite philosophers, J. S. Mill, he seemed unable to make any allowance whatsoever; but he took a cold-blooded, commercial view of almost every public question. Had he remained in England, he would have been a Little Englander of the strictest sect, improving even upon Mill and Cobden and the prophets of the Manchester School. As an American editor he applied the same standards to American affairs. In his eyes, no war could be justifiable, because it cost money. No threat of war was ever to be made, because it depreciated the value of stocks and bonds. National honour was a thing to be written of in derisive quotation marks, and to be regarded as a word belonging only to the vocabulary of the political swash-buckler.

With such beliefs it may be readily conceived that Mr. Godkin read the President's Venezuela message with a mixture of horror and disgust—horror because it might

mean actual fighting, and disgust because it seemed to evince so much ingratitude to Mr. Godkin. Ever since the name of Cleveland had been heard in national politics, the *Evening Post* had been his thick and thin supporter. It had defended him against the scandal-mongers in 1884; it had praised the achievements of his first administration; it had urged persistently his second candidacy; it had made his financial policy its own. And now he had dared to break away from all the Cobdenite-Godkinian traditions and to show himself as pugnacious in an international dispute as though he had been a Cass, a Marcy, or a Blaine! Small wonder, then, that the *Evening Post* declared, as soon as the message had reached its office, that "the President's fulmination has no moral support whatever." On the 19th, it pronounced his action "criminally rash and insensate."

"The national finances, already in a perilous condition, will be shaken as they have not been since the Civil War. Mr. Cleveland has frustrated his own wise attempts to adjust them on a sound basis."

"The President's message is a standing and very insulting threat to a first-class power."

The *Post* quoted against the President his own dictum, that "patriotism is no substitute for a sound currency." It spoke of his "Jingo insanity"; it declared his policy to be marked by "insolence, abusiveness and brutality." Every one who favoured it came in for a share of Mr. Godkin's wrath; and he even accused a well-known administration Senator of appearing at a public banquet in a state of intoxication, and of delivering a speech which was "hic-coughed out to a deriding, hooting and insulting audience,"—though what this had to do with the Venezuelan ques-

tion it would have been hard for even Mr. Godkin to explain. The *Evening Post's* especial following took up the same parable. Clergymen preached against the righteousness of war. Some college professors gave their verdict to the effect that the President's view of the Monroe Doctrine was all wrong.<sup>3</sup> A convocation of Baptist missionaries passed resolutions declaring that the United States might better go to war with Turkey on behalf of the Armenians than with Great Britain on behalf of the Venezuelans. There was, in fact, in the United States, something of the same divergence of opinion as existed in Great Britain. But the country as a whole soon ceased to think of this particular issue, because of the immediate revival of an older one.

The uneasiness of Wall Street was speedily reflected in a new drain upon the gold fund in the Treasury. The Morgan-Belmont syndicate had carried out its promise; and for nine months the reserve had been efficiently protected. But in November there was felt a slow but steady outflow, which brought the fund to less than \$80,000,000; and in December the hoarding of gold once more began. The menace of war led bankers to ship gold to Europe. Only three days after his Venezuela message, and on the eve of the usual adjournment for the Christmas holidays, the President sent a brief communication to Congress urging it to take some action for the betterment of financial conditions. As this advice was utterly ignored, Secretary Carlisle was directed to issue (January 6, 1896) a circular asking for subscriptions to a new loan of \$100,000,000.<sup>4</sup> This was the fourth and last of the bond issues

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, in the *Political Science Quarterly* for March, 1896, papers by Professor J. W. Burgess and Professor J. B. Moore.

<sup>4</sup> Four-per-cent. coin bonds to run for thirty years.

made by Mr. Cleveland in order to protect the gold reserve, as it was also the largest. Unlike the two preceding ones, this loan was offered for popular subscription. Bonds of a denomination as low as fifty dollars were engraved, so that the most modest investor might have an opportunity to bid; and an entire month was to elapse before the sealed proposals were opened. In deciding to offer the loan in this public way rather than once more to make a bargain with a syndicate, the President was undoubtedly influenced by the scathing criticism which had been visited upon him. He would never admit this, either then or afterwards; yet one cannot well think otherwise. Moreover, Congress had taken the matter up with serious intention. A House bill provided that no bond sales should be made thereafter save by popular subscription. Senator Elkins had offered a resolution declaring that bonds should not be sold at all by private contract. On the whole, the President must have felt the sting of an almost universal censure. Therefore, he now arranged a loan before the Treasury was actually in distress,<sup>5</sup> and he went directly to the people rather than to Wall Street. As it turned out, there were 4635 bidders for the bonds, and the loan was oversubscribed by \$400,000,000. It was a triumph for the advocates of the open sales. To be sure, of the bids received, only 828 were accepted; and in the allotment of the bonds, Messrs. J. P. Morgan and Company, who had offered to take the entire issue, received some \$62,000,000, while the other bidders received \$38,000,000. But it is to be noted that the lowest bid which the Treasury now considered was at the rate of  $110\frac{7}{10}$  as against the  $104\frac{1}{2}$  paid by the Morgan-Belmont syndicate

<sup>5</sup> On the day when the circular calling for bids was issued, the gold reserve stood at \$61,251,000.

in the preceding February. This fact alone would seem to be a sufficient condemnation of the syndicate transaction, though Mr. Cleveland never would admit the justice of this criticism.<sup>6</sup>

Reviewing the whole series of bond issues after the lapse of many years, and regarding all the circumstances connected with them, there appears not to be the slightest reason for impugning the good faith, the integrity, or the patriotism of President Cleveland. All through those trying times, he acted as he believed the highest interests of his country bade him act. But in the matter of the bond-contract with the Morgan-Belmont syndicate, there can be little doubt that he was guilty of a serious mistake—not in the arrangement which necessity drove him into making, but because he delayed so long as to create the unfortunate necessity. That he learned the lesson of his error was shown by his management of the fourth and last bond issue. During his final year of office, the Treasury suffered no more from speculative raids upon it. Wall Street had found that the siphon-process could be no longer made a source of private gain.

But the fact that the President had again sold bonds to keep the gold reserve intact fanned the already fierce resentment of the silver party into a more furious flame. The Western silver men cared nothing for the effect of the Venezuela message upon Wall Street. If it caused a panic there, so much the better. If stock gamblers had been ruined by it, well and good. If securities had dropped four hundred millions in value, this was a cause for grim rejoicing. The prospect of a war with England was very popular all through the West, not upon patriotic grounds alone, but as likely to bring an era of easy money and good times. A writer in the *Oregonian*, published in Portland,

<sup>6</sup> See Cleveland, *Presidential Problems*, pp. 162-169.

Oregon, undoubtedly expressed a widely prevalent feeling when he declared that the people of his State and many other Americans wished a war because

“they all know that the wealth of the world has got into the hands of a few, and that there is no relief for the masses. Business is at a standstill and will remain so until something happens. . . . We are at the mercy of England, as far as our finances go, and this [war] is our only way out.”

Such was the prevailing sentiment in the Western States, so far as the Venezuelan incident was immediately concerned. But the new gold loan, with its great addition to the public debt, made for the sole purpose of “insulting silver,” was the last straw upon the back of the far from patient Populists. By this time, men had formed the habit of speaking of gold and silver as though the two metals were possessed of human attributes. They were not only animified, but personified; and both vices and virtues were ascribed to them. A thousand hoarse-throated orators depicted the infamy of gold and the rectitude of silver. Gold was the coward metal which basely sneaked out of the country when times were troublous. It was the accomplice of money-sharks and usurers, the enemy of labour; the traitorous propagator of poverty and want. Silver, on the other hand, was brave and honourable, too noble to desert the people in their hour of need. It was the debtor’s ally, the benefactor of the poor. To it were addressed words of as passionate adoration as ever lover lavished upon mistress, or devotee upon divinity. In truth, at this period, a large portion of the American people was touched by something very like emotional madness over one of the most prosaic questions of pure economics. The tide of Populism which had begun to rise in 1889, which had

swollen to a flood in 1890, and which in 1892 had temporarily been diverted into Democratic channels, was now roaring through the West with a fury that swept everything before it. In all the silver-producing States it seemed to be wrecking the older parties; while in Kansas and Nebraska, men, women and even children turned away from the ordinary vocations of life, and gave themselves up body and soul to the politics of unrestrained emotion. The fact that women had the ballot in these States may account in part for the extraordinary scenes that were enacted there. Certain it is that during the year 1896, entire communities seemed to be afflicted with a strange obsession, resembling the hysteria which swept over Europe at the time of the First Crusade. This comparison did, in fact, suggest itself to a very keen though unsympathetic observer, who has left a vivid picture of the time:

“It was a fanaticism like the Crusades. Indeed, the delusion that was working on the people took the form of religious frenzy. Sacred hymns were torn from their pious tunes to give place to words which deified the cause and made gold—and all its symbols, capital, wealth, plutocracy—diabolical. At night, from ten thousand little white schoolhouse windows, lights twinkled back vain hope to the stars. For the thousands who assembled under the schoolhouse lamps believed that when their Legislature met and their Governor was elected, the millennium would come by proclamation. They sang their barbaric songs in unrhythmic jargon, with something of the same mad faith that inspired the martyrs going to the stake. Far into the night the voices rose,—women’s voices, children’s voices, the voices of old men, of youths and of maidens rose on the ebbing prairie breezes, as the crusaders of the revolution rode home, praising the people’s will as though it were God’s will and cursing wealth for its iniquity. It was a season

of shibboleths and fetishes and slogans. Reason slept; and the passions—jealousy, covetousness, hatred—ran amuck, and whoever would check them was crucified in public contumely.”<sup>7</sup>

These people honestly believed that their happiness and prosperity were being sacrificed unpitifully to the greed and money-lust of the rich men in the East; that the President of the United States was the pliant tool of a plutocracy without bowels of compassion; and that in obedience to his masters he was barring out the blessings of free silver, which meant independence and wealth and ease to every toiler in the land. No wonder that for a time there was madness in the very air.

As is the case in all great popular convulsions, the human scum and driftwood first came hurtling to the surface. There was a wild cry for a leader; and in response a thousand leaders, self-appointed, leaped into sudden though ephemeral prominence. Strange figures these; for the widespread distrust and hatred of all professional politicians became at last a hatred and distrust of every man who possessed the ability and training which make leadership effective. And so there came forth from the obscurity of incompetence and failure a crop of demagogues in whom were fearfully combined the irrational and the grotesque. Itinerant preachers, broken-down country editors, farmers who had failed to make a living on their farms, eccentrics whose peculiarities at any other time would have classed them with the insane, and leather-lunged fanatics with a gift for raving hour after hour,—these were the guides and prophets who for a while exercised an absolute control over one of the most intelligent and most purely American communities. A leading

<sup>7</sup> White, *Stratagems and Spoils*, pp. 207-208 (New York. 1901).



article which appeared in a Western newspaper at about this time was widely quoted all over the United States, because of its pungent diagnosis of conditions in the State of Kansas. One paragraph may be quoted here, since its nervous, slangy phrases are like flashlights in their brief intensity.

“What’s the matter with Kansas?”

“We all know; yet here we are at it again. We have an old moss-back Jacksonian who snorts and howls because there is a bath-tub in the State House. We are running that old jay for Governor. We have another shabby, wild-eyed, rattle-brained fanatic who has said openly in a dozen speeches that ‘the rights of the user are paramount to the rights of the owner.’ We are running him for Chief Justice, so that capital will come tumbling over itself to get into the State. We have raked the ash-heap of failure in the State and found an old human hoop-skirt who has failed as a business man, who has failed as an editor, who has failed as a preacher, and we are going to run him for Congressman-at-large. He will help the looks of the Kansas delegation at Washington. Then we have discovered a kid without a law practice and have decided to run him for Attorney-General. Then for fear some hint that the State had become respectable might percolate through the civilised portions of the nation, we have decided to send three or four harpies out lecturing, telling the people that Kansas is raising hell and letting the corn go to weeds.”<sup>8</sup>

Some of the early protagonists of Populism and of the silver school of Democracy won a temporary notoriety beyond the limits of their respective States. A very few were destined to play a part in national politics. Among the former were Governor Pennoyer of Oregon and Governor Waite of Colorado, who may be cited as types of

<sup>8</sup> *Emporia Gazette*, August 15, 1896.

the erratic leaders in the new movement. Pennoyer had been elected as a Democrat in the reaction following upon the passage of the McKinley Bill. He first became known by his boorishness in refusing to meet President Harrison on the borders of Oregon at the time of the President's journey through the West. During the Coxe demonstration, a part of Kelly's "army" came into conflict with the officers of the law, and Governor Pennoyer was besought to send military assistance to the latter. To this appeal he replied by telegram:

"Let them fight it out. I don't care a whoop which side wins."

Governor Waite of Colorado gained demagogic honours by the violence of his public speeches, in one of which he spoke of the impending war between the capitalists and the down-trodden people. "I am prepared," said he, "to ride in blood up to my bridles!" As Mr. Waite had never been noted as a fighting man, this sanguinary intimation served rather to amuse than to alarm; but it won for the Governor the sobriquet of "Bloody Bridles Waite." Another erratic though much cleverer personage was "Jerry" Simpson (so he wrote his name), a convert from Republicanism, whom the Kansas Populists had sent to Congress. In Washington, and at last all over the country, he became known as "Sockless Jerry," from a popular legend to the effect that he cultivated simplicity by wearing nothing besides shoes upon his feet. Among the women who shared with men the prestige of political leadership, the most interesting figure was Mrs. Mary Elizabeth Lease, who may be styled the Anna Dickinson of Populism, for she had all the vehemence and much of the wild eloquence of the once famous abolitionist. Mrs. Lease

was a native of Pennsylvania, who, in 1885, was admitted to practice at the Kansas bar. She was drawn into the Union Labour movement, became a member of the Farmers' Alliance, discovered a gift for extemporaneous speaking, and in 1890 was one of the most important political leaders in the State. She headed the forces that were opposed to the re-election of Senator Ingalls; and the "whirlwind" campaign which she conducted against him was a notable event of the year 1890. The vitriolic oratory of Ingalls was fairly outdone by the amazing vocabulary of vituperation which Mrs. Lease had at her command and which she poured forth with a fury and an intensity of passion that thrilled her listeners and fired them with her own emotions. This Kansan Pythoness defeated Ingalls, and in 1893 came measurably near securing for herself a seat in the Senate of the United States. To her was ascribed the admonition already referred to—"Kansas had better stop raising corn and begin raising hell!"

The doctrine of free silver had not only its prophets and its orators, but also its literary propagandists. The history of political pamphleteering contains few more curious incidents than the vogue enjoyed by one of the pro-silver tracts, which in 1895 became to the West what the Drapier Letters of Dean Swift were to the Irish people in 1724. A young man named William Howard Harvey, a native of West Virginia, began the publication in 1893 of an illustrated paper called *Coin*, devoted to the cause of free silver coinage. Mr. Harvey was fairly educated and had dipped into a large number of treatises on bimetallism, from which he had gleaned a variety of arguments in support of the silver party's chief tenet. At last he wrote and published a little volume with the title *Coin's Financial*

*School*, presenting his arguments partly in the form of a dialogue,<sup>9</sup> accompanied by some explanatory narrative. The book opened with a brief account of the existing financial stringency and of the business depression noticeable throughout the country. It then went on to tell how

“Coin, a young financier in Chicago, established a school of finance to instruct the youths of the nation. . . . The school opened on the 7th day of May, 1894. One of the largest halls in the Art Institute was comfortably filled. . . . Coin stepped out on the platform, looking like the smooth little financier he is.”

Coin's lectures and demonstrations were supposed to have been continued for six days. On the first day, there were present a number of well-known young men, sons of Chicago editors and other leading citizens. On subsequent days, the audience increased, and finally included United States senators, university professors, bank presidents, and economic experts, all of whom were specifically named, and most of whom interrupted Coin's lucid exposition and endeavoured to refute his arguments. Of course Coin easily disposed of them, silencing them by apt illustrations, pertinent facts, or pointed wit. On the last day of his lectures, he had convinced the majority of his hearers and had become a popular idol; so that the book ends with an account of a brilliant reception given him at the Palmer House by a large and distinguished company.

This veracious chronicle, with its interspersed dialogue and easy repartee, was cheaply printed, while its text was illustrated by a series of rude wood-cuts appealing partly to popular prejudice and partly to the almost universal love of false analogy. “Analogy,” says Charles Reade somewhere, “is not argument—which is the reason why so many persons use it as such.” Both the text and the

<sup>9</sup> Harvey, *Coin's Financial School* (Chicago, 1894).

wood-cuts in *Coin's Financial School* admirably exemplified the truth of this remark. One of his hearers asks Coin whether the Government by putting its stamp on silver could make fifty-three cents' worth of that metal equal to a dollar in gold.

"Certainly," says Coin, in substance. "If the Government were to buy 100,000 horses, wouldn't the price of horses go up?"

And to persuade the reader that a double metallic standard is preferable to a single standard, a picture is given of a one-legged man, moving painfully along on crutches. Two legs are better than one; hence two metals are better than one. Another cut illustrates Jevons's famous metaphor of the two reservoirs connected by a pipe. In fact, the creator of Coin had got together every sort of argument, ranging from scientific induction to the most obvious fallacy and the cheapest claptrap, all tending to show that national prosperity could never return until the Government mints were reopened to the free coinage of silver at the old ratio of 16 to 1.

The success of this little book was extraordinary. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of copies were sold and circulated. It was the Silver Party's Bible, and every word in it was accepted as literally true. The farmer studied it by his fireside. The shopman in the intervals between serving customers took hasty glances at it. It was read aloud at country gatherings. Its arguments were cited as unanswerable. Those who studied it were able to chatter volubly about "primary money," "medium of exchange," "circulation per capita," and other topics which they came to imagine that they understood. Most of its readers believed that Coin was a real person, that everything narrated in the book had taken place precisely

as narrated there, and that the distinguished senators, economists and publicists had actually been silenced and put to confusion by the "smooth little financier." So widespread an influence did the book exert that even serious periodicals, like the *Nation*, felt it worth while to expose the inaccuracy of Coin's "facts" and the fallacy of his deductions.

Not without significance were such of Coin's wood-cuts as appealed to prejudice and passion. No doubt to thousands these were as effective as the arguments. Silver was depicted as a beautiful woman whose head was stricken off by the malignant Senator Sherman. "The Assassination of Silver" was the legend under another wood-cut. In another, the nation is represented as a cow, which the farmers are busily engaged in feeding, while a fat capitalist comfortably milks it. In still another, Mr. Sherman and President Cleveland are shown in the guise of burglars, secretly digging out the foundation (silver) of a well-built house. For whoever else was now held up to odium, the President was certain to be made a sharer in it. The ties which had bound him to a majority of his party were practically sundered. In Congress he had few supporters and many bitter enemies. There were senators who personally hated him so much that they opposed and hampered legislation which they themselves approved, if only they believed that he was favourable to it. In the House, now that the Democrats were in a small minority and were not steadied by responsibility, many cast off all pretence of decorum, and ceased to speak of Mr. Cleveland with ordinary respect. A group of these refractory Democrats won for themselves the nickname of "The Wild Horses," because they could not be kept within the party traces. Chief among them were Mr. Sibley of

Pennsylvania, Mr. Johnson of Ohio, and Mr. Bland of Missouri. Mr. Sibley had, in fact, never pretended to follow the avowed policy of his own party. He had voted against a revision of the tariff; he had opposed the administration's financial measures; and he was in general more hostile to the President than was the bitterest Republican. On January 8, 1896, he made in the House a coarse and violent speech which was remarkable as being the utterance of a Democrat regarding his party's chief. In it he accused the President of giving offices in return for votes. He repudiated all party responsibility for the administration's policy. He wound up by declaring that what the country needed was a Government which was "something more than a combination of brains, belly, and brass."

The administration, moreover, could no longer count upon the solid support of the Southern members of Congress, who had long been a bulwark of conservatism and party loyalty. In many of the Southern States the Democratic party had suffered a transformation. Hastened by the influence of Populism, the change had, nevertheless, been different in character from that which was effected in the West. It took the form of a revolt of the so-called "poor whites," or non-slaveholding persons, against the aristocratic leaders who had for generations been supreme. The Civil War had not at once broken the power of that semi-feudal system which had flourished in the time of slavery and which produced and perpetuated an oligarchic governing class. But now the masses began to demand control.<sup>10</sup> They set up leaders of their own; and gradually the older type of Southern statesman gave way to a far less admirable substitute. The most striking exemplification of the new order at the South was found in

<sup>10</sup> See Murphy, *The Present South*, pp. 3-27 (New York, 1904).

the person of Benjamin Ryan Tillman of South Carolina. Tillman did not, strictly speaking, belong to the class of "poor whites." He was a man of some position and education. But he was not of the governing caste, and he placed himself at the head of the "poor whites" in a political movement which resulted in the partial elimination of the governing caste from a position of local and national importance. Tillman was a very extraordinary figure, both as a man and as a politician. His personality was more than forceful. Lurking in his nature, and easy to be roused, was something of the savage, something even which suggested the ferocity of the wild beast. When stirred, he was violent almost beyond belief. He put absolutely no restraint upon his tongue, but hurled abuse at all who differed from him, denouncing them as "hell-hounds," "traitors," and "foul-mouthed liars." He had lost one eye, and this mutilation gave to his face a peculiarly truculent aspect even in repose—an aspect which became indescribably sinister and terrifying when the man was convulsed by one of his furious outbursts of passion. In 1890, by the aid of the Farmers' Alliance, he was elected Governor of South Carolina, wresting the control of the State from that gallant soldier and gentleman, Wade Hampton. As Governor, Mr. Tillman established the so-called State dispensary system, a semi-Socialistic plan, under which the manufacture and distribution of intoxicating liquors were monopolised by the State.<sup>11</sup> Tillman's supremacy was not easily or peacefully acquired. He had to face the opposition of an extremely influential section of society. In the cities his name was execrated. Attempts were made to disperse the meetings of his follow-

<sup>11</sup> See a detailed account in the *Review of Reviews*, ix., p. 523 *fol.*, and x., p. 669 *fol.*



ers. He was vilified in every possible fashion. Riots broke out in several towns. His life was often threatened. Yet in spite of everything, by his fearlessness, his energy, and his strong appeal to the passions and prejudices of the ignorant, he became the political master of South Carolina and was for many years a conspicuous figure in national affairs. In 1892 he was again elected Governor, and in 1895 a Senator of the United States.

It was during his canvass for the latter office that he blazed out into relentless antagonism to President Cleveland, whom he attacked in speeches, the very outrageousness of which won him a wide hearing. "Send me to Washington," he would yell to the frantic mobs that cheered him, "and I'll stick my pitchfork into his old ribs!" Even when speaking in his official capacity at the Atlanta Exposition, and before a dignified assemblage, he could not refrain from coarse and insulting language:

"There are some so infatuated that they think that all the financial wisdom of the country is monopolised by the East; and they say 'Me, too,' every time Cleveland grunts. I should not have said anything about the President, as I expect to get a better chance at him with my pitchfork in Washington; but it did my heart good to hear the Governor of Georgia say that the two crank reformers from South Carolina had evoked more applause than the President of the United States."<sup>12</sup>

It was not, however, merely the Tillmans and Sibleys, nor even the Gormans and Brices in Congress, who were ranged in opposition to Mr. Cleveland. During the last year of his administration he seemed to live under a cloud

<sup>12</sup> Report in *New York Sun*, November 29, 1895. This and other speeches like them won for their author the nickname of "Pitchfork Tillman."

of obloquy, blacker and more nearly unrelieved than that which any other elected President had ever known. The Republicans were never weary of pointing out what they described as the disastrous failure of his policies. A majority of his own party believed him not only to have wrecked it, but to have betrayed it. The free-silver men held him responsible for the financial depression. The capitalists called him rash and utterly unsafe because of his Venezuela message. The labour element detested him for breaking the great Chicago strike by the use of troops. Only here and there was a voice raised in his defence, and the defence was nearly always worded like a half apology, ascribing to him only what was called "success in defeat." One would have said, in view of all this bitter opposition and unrestrained contumely, that Mr. Cleveland was destined to live in history only as that President who, beginning with the most splendid opportunities, had most completely wrecked and ruined his own hope of an honourable fame.

Two very diverse opinions regarding President Cleveland's public career have been held by students of American politics. According to his eulogists, he was in no respect to blame for the partial failure of his policies. It is said that the whole responsibility of this failure must ultimately rest upon the Congress which deliberately thwarted and rejected his wise counsels. In the face of such corruption, incompetence, ignorance, and malice as were said to exist in both houses of the national legislature, how could any President have done more than Mr. Cleveland did? In the very opposition which he encountered, many find but one more tribute to his political purity and uncompromising integrity of character. On the other hand, his critics have asserted that the very terms in which he

is most often praised constitute an impeachment of his statesmanship. A great party leader, they say, must do his work with such instruments as he has at hand. A statesman who is worthy of the name will master difficulties, overcome obstacles, adapt his methods to his instruments, prevail by management, by tact, and by judicious compromise, until in the end he attains a lasting and complete success. He will make no unnecessary enemies. He will allow for prejudice, for human frailty of every kind, and he will not expect the walls of Jericho to fall at a single blast of his trumpet. The example of Lincoln is often cited as embodying the true art of statecraft; and his patience and genial wisdom are contrasted with Mr. Cleveland's blunt and robust tactlessness. Success, it is said, is the measure of a statesman's fame; and Mr. Cleveland did not achieve success.

It is probable that the truth is to be found somewhere between these two opposing views. The manner in which President Cleveland forced the repeal of the Sherman Act did undoubtedly so far alienate a powerful faction in the Senate as to make that body permanently hostile to him for the rest of his term of office. He treated senators of the United States precisely as he had, when Governor of New York, treated the petty politicians at Albany. He gave orders where a more tactful politician would have made requests. He displayed arrogance instead of conciliation. He cracked the whip and shouted, instead of using the milder influences of persuasion. Those who received the patronage which he dispensed were secretly as hostile to him as those who angrily refused it, and far more humiliated. To say "No" gracefully is a difficult accomplishment; but even Mr. Cleveland's "Yes" was often irritating. And so, had he possessed Lincoln's toler-

ance and worldly wisdom, he might, like Lincoln, have avoided personal hostility. But the conditions of the time were so unusual that he must still have met with political opposition within his own party even as Lincoln did. For in 1864, Lincoln was of all men the least commended by the Republicans in Congress. On one occasion an editor visiting Washington, asked Thaddeus Stevens to introduce him to some members of Congress who were favourable to Lincoln's re-election. Stevens led him to the desk of Mr. Arnold of Illinois. "There," said he, "is the only Lincoln member of Congress that I know!" Stevens regarded Lincoln as incompetent and weak. Henry Wilson (afterwards Vice-President) spoke of him as politically a failure. Greeley had a low opinion of his ability. His personal friends, such as Washburn, Raymond, and Thurlow Weed, believed his re-election an impossibility. Even Lincoln himself at one time doubted it.<sup>13</sup> And, therefore, the example of Lincoln is not convincing when cited as embodying a rebuke to Mr. Cleveland. For what would it have profited the latter to retain the personal good will of senators and representatives, if they were still politically hostile to him, driven on by forces of disorder and disunion too strong for them to master? In 1864, it was not Lincoln's tact and statesmanship that brought him a final triumph; but rather the brilliant victories won in the field by Sherman, Sheridan, and Grant.

And the mention of Mr. Lincoln brings to mind another circumstance which makes any parallel between him and Mr. Cleveland most unfair to the Democratic President.

<sup>13</sup> See Arnold, *Lincoln*, p. 385 (Chicago, 1885); Riddle, *Recollections of War Times*, p. 267 (New York, 1895); Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln: A History*, ix., p. 250 (New York, 1890); and the contemporary evidence cited by Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, iv., ch. 23 (New York, 1902).

Lincoln embodied, to the mind of the people, two great issues that were really only one—the preservation of the American Union and the abolition of slavery. At the root of both there lay a moral principle, and both appealed with overwhelming force to sentiment. They were so plain, so vividly defined, that no sophistry could obscure them, no shrewd debater reason them away. And so, back of the supercilious politicians at the Capitol were the masses of the people, their eyes fixed with pathetic faith and loyalty upon that tall, gaunt, stooping, homely man, who to their minds meant everything that makes a cause worth dying for.

But to President Cleveland it was given to deal with issues that made no such simple and direct appeal. The questions that were his to solve were economic questions, replete with technicalities which only a comparatively few could rightly understand, and as to which even these comparatively few were not agreed. Catchwords and clever phrases and garbled facts, when rolled forth glibly by a smooth-tongued speaker, sufficed to make the worse appear the better reason, and confuse the wits of half the nation. Hence the task which Cleveland took upon himself was harder in its way than Lincoln's, and one which in its very nature could have been completed only after the weariness of many years and the bitterness of many failures. So far as his own hand could perform what he attempted, he was splendidly successful. He was like a giant facing a terrific tempest. If he could not advance, he would, at least, not yield nor take a backward step. His old-time foes assailed him without ceasing, and his one-time friends betrayed him. He encountered such malignity of hatred as would have terrified and sickened a weaker soul than his. There are signs that within his heart even he often

wincing at the cruel falsehoods which assailed him. Yet none the less, he stood unmoved and magnificently unafraid—a superbly virile figure, holding fast to what he felt to be the right, and looking all opponents squarely in the eye. In the end, he came to know that it was his, not to achieve what he had hoped, but to save that which had been entrusted to him; and he did it bravely, grimly, powerfully. Opinions may differ as to his conception of his duty; but the memory of his devotion to high principle, his strength of will and his dauntless courage must remain to all Americans a source of patriotic pride and an enduring inspiration.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE ELECTION OF 1896

As the time for holding the national conventions drew near, both the Republican and the Democratic parties were in a state of feverish anxiety. The free-silver agitation had divided both; and no one could with confidence predict the effect of this division upon either of them. Yet the Republicans were seemingly in a far better position than the Democrats. The latter, now that President Cleveland's guidance had been practically repudiated, were without any leadership whatever. There had as yet arisen no strong, dominant personality such as could compel obedience to his will. The Pennoyers and Waites and Tillmans had often a numerous local following; but they were not of the stuff which goes into the making of national leaders. On the other hand, whatever differences of opinion might divide the Republicans on questions of policy, there was among them no lack of experienced and able party chiefs to arouse strong popular enthusiasm. Of these, the two who received the most earnest support as candidates for the Presidential nomination were Mr. Thomas B. Reed of Maine and Mr. William McKinley of Ohio.

Mr. Reed's energetic and almost revolutionary course as Speaker of the House <sup>1</sup> had made him a very conspicuous and striking figure. His forceful personality, his intellectual acumen, his iron will, and his effectiveness as a debater gave him a definite title to the highest political preferment. He was known to be fairly conservative in

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 199-201.

his financial views, and he was, therefore, acceptable to the Republicans of New England and the Middle States. But this very fact militated against his candidacy with the party as a whole, and especially with the party managers. In view of the intense sectional feeling which was then influencing the West, the nomination of a New England candidate seemed to many to be politically inexpedient. Furthermore, precisely in proportion to the definiteness of Mr. Reed's financial views was his availability as a harmoniser generally questioned. What was sought by the shrewdest politicians in the party was a candidate who should come from a Western State, who was identified with some other issue than the money question, whose record would neither alarm the gold men nor exasperate the "friends of silver," and who was personally liked by representatives of every faction. Such an individual was Mr. McKinley, who seemed to be an almost ideal leader from the standpoint of "availability." In his behalf, moreover, there were enlisted forces, the extent and power of which were not generally recognised in the early months of 1896, but which were soon to prove quite irresistible.

Mr. McKinley was a kindly personage of winning manners and unblemished character. He had served in the army during the Civil War; and had afterwards acquired a wide experience of practical politics and of politicians, as a member of Congress. During that time he had been a strong protectionist; and the high tariff act which bore his name and which became law in 1890, had made him known all over the civilised world. This measure had, in fact, led to his own defeat for re-election to the House in the same year, and had caused the Republican disaster of 1890;<sup>2</sup> yet in view of Democratic incompetence and the failure of President Cleveland's tariff policy, there had

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 214-215.



now come about a strong reaction, which was favourable to high protective duties. But it was Mr. McKinley's past and present attitude toward the financial question which made him seem especially well fitted to succeed in 1896. In the early part of his congressional career, he had been emphatically numbered among the "friends of silver." He had voted for the Bland-Allison Bill on its first passage through the House, and he had again voted to enact that measure in disregard of the veto of President Hayes. Later, in many public speeches, he had defended the freer use of silver. At the same time, his utterances were far from radical, and he had recently appeared rather to advocate bimetallism through an international agreement, than to approve the policy of letting the United States attempt the dangerous experiment alone.<sup>3</sup> Therefore Mr. McKinley, while not antagonising the silver wing of his own party, was regarded as "a safe man" by the gold monometallists. His own desire, if nominated, was to relegate the financial question to an inconspicuous place in the campaign, and to fight the battle once more upon the issue of the tariff.

<sup>3</sup> In a speech delivered at Niles, Ohio, on August 22, 1891, during his canvass for the governorship, Mr. McKinley had said:

"I do not want gold at a premium. I do not want silver at a discount. I want both metals side by side, equal in purchasing power and in legal-tender quality, equal in power to performing the functions of money with which to do business and to move the commerce of the United States. To tell me that the free and unlimited coinage of the silver of the world, in the absence of co-operation on the part of other commercial nations, will not bring gold to a premium, is to deny all history and the weight of all financial experience. The very instant that you have opened up our mints to the silver of the world, independent of international action, that very instant, or in a brief time at best, you have sent gold to a premium, you have put it in great measure into disuse, and we are remitted to the single standard, that of silver alone. We have deprived ourselves of the use of both metals."

During four of the years of his absence from Congress, Mr. McKinley had been Governor of Ohio, to which office he was elected in 1891. As Governor, he had in some respects exposed himself to serious criticism. In the second year of his term, he had become deeply involved in debt, through endorsing the notes of a personal and political friend. Owing sums which amounted in the aggregate to more than \$100,000, and having only the modest salary of his office with which to meet the obligation, his position was one of great embarrassment. In these straits, he accepted gifts and loans from several wealthy friends, whose names are variously given, but who rescued the Governor from bankruptcy and secured his lasting friendship. A little later, men began to censure Governor McKinley for his very marked unwillingness to favour any legislative action that interfered with the great corporate interests in the towns and cities. The State of Ohio was in financial difficulties from insufficiency of revenue. That the street railways had never paid an adequate tax upon their earnings was a notorious fact. Yet all legislative attempts to make them yield a reasonable sum to the State's exchequer were viewed so coldly by the Governor as to prevent their passage. On the other hand, a bill to extend the franchises of these companies from twenty-five to ninety-nine years received his countenance; and the persons engaged in the promotion of the measure were permitted to use Governor McKinley's executive offices as their headquarters. Special favours were granted to railway corporations, one of which secured from the State a piece of public property for a sum amounting only to one-half of the official valuation. Very grave scandals were exposed in connection with the penal and charitable institutions of Ohio. Governor McKin-

ley's opponents cited these and other circumstances of a like character as the basis for a charge of neglect of duty, if not of actual collusion with persons whose interests were in serious conflict with the interests of the State. The financial favours which he had received from wealthy men were significantly mentioned in connection with his alleged unwillingness to interfere with these same men and their friends, as corporation officers.<sup>4</sup>

The implications involved in the recital of these facts, so far as they concerned Mr. McKinley, were, in the main, unjust. The Governor of Ohio has no veto power, and therefore can exercise no direct control over proposed legislation. Many of the abuses brought to light during the years from 1891 to 1895 were of earlier origin and were in no way directly connected with the functions of the State Executive. Moreover, Governor McKinley's personal character was known to be above reproach. At the same time, his official attitude was undoubtedly marked by a certain passivity with regard to the occurrences already mentioned, and it afforded at least a negative support to the measures upon which hostile criticism was so freely lavished. Mr. McKinley entertained a respect amounting almost to reverence for the opinions of a majority. His political course was always directed by an anxious desire to be in harmony with the leaders of his party. He was not at all the type of statesman who is to be found at the head of a forlorn hope. He shaped his conduct, and to a great extent his opinions, by what he thought to be the wishes and the welfare of his immediate supporters. Being under great personal obligations to a

<sup>4</sup> A detailed summary of the attacks then current upon Mr. McKinley can be found in a pamphlet entitled "McKinley's Record," published at the office of the *Evening Post* (New York, 1896).

number of men who were rapidly acquiring political power in his State, a sense of gratitude no less than a shrewd perception of expediency led him to accept their aid and to find in them his closest friends and chosen monitors. Among them was a comparatively recent figure in the field of politics, whose fame, such as it was, still remained wholly local, though within a few months it was to be almost as widely trumpeted as Governor McKinley's own. The personality and character of this man deserve a somewhat careful study. He is rightly to be regarded less as an individual than as a very accurate exemplification of new and powerful forces which for many years had been acquiring strength, but which now for the first time emerged from a half-obscurity, and revealed themselves to the nation as laying claim to an almost despotic dominance.

Marcus Alonzo Hanna, or Mark Hanna, as men usually spoke of him, was a native of Ohio, the son of a prosperous wholesale grocer. From his father he inherited keen business instincts and a guiding motive which some have called ambition and others greed. His early training successfully directed all his exceptional energies towards one definite end—to get and to keep. He was soon known as a bold and active trader, who fought his commercial rivals without giving or asking quarter, and without caring whether the means he used were fair or foul so long as he came forth a winner in the struggle. His activities were multifarious, his energy inexhaustible. He dealt in coal and oil and iron and stone, he chartered ships, he manufactured stoves, he bought mining shares and he established banks. He even added a newspaper and a theatre to his possessions. There was, in short, no conceivable enterprise or speculation upon

which Hanna would refuse to enter, if only he saw in it the prospect of sufficient gain. Business with him was warfare, and it was warfare *à outrance*. In his commercial strife he presented an analogue, not to the duellist nor even to the champion of the prize-ring, both of whom are governed by a rigorous code, but rather to the savage rough-and-tumble fighter who bites and gouges when body blows are found to be of no avail. Moral considerations did not enter into his scheme of life. He was a pure materialist, respecting nothing but superior force, and his sole gospel was the gospel of success. Having no purely intellectual diversions, he long regarded the fierce pursuit of money as both an occupation and a thrilling game. Only by chance did he discover that there was an even keener pleasure to be found in a still greater game, whereof the winner might lay his grasp upon political power. This knowledge came to Mr. Hanna after he had tried to add a system of street railways to his already complicated interests, and had found that the grant of franchises depended upon the favour of the politicians. And so Mr. Hanna, purely in the way of business, acquired aldermen and local legislatures, just as he had previously secured clerks and managers and agents for his other enterprises. He felt no scruples as to the means which he employed. Here, again, his one criterion was success. He was at least no hypocrite. He professed no creed save that which he was daily practising. He was often brutal, but he was wholly frank in his brutality. A striking instance of this frankness is afforded in a letter which he wrote in 1890. In that year, the Attorney-General of Ohio, Mr. David K. Watson, had brought suit against the Standard Oil Company for the dissolution of its trust agreement.<sup>5</sup> Hanna had relations with the Rockefellers which induced him to

<sup>5</sup> See p. 138.

interfere with the progress of the suit. Accordingly he wrote to the Attorney-General a personal note, in which occurred this memorable sentence:

“You have been in politics long enough to know that no man in public life owes the public anything.”<sup>6</sup>

Such was the cynical view which Mr. Hanna always took of politics, both national and local; and in practice he lived up to the full measure of its implications. He got control of the political machine in the city of Cleveland. A majority of the councilmen were his agents. The mayor was his creature. The other officials of the city were obedient to him and to his friends. It was not long before the legislature of the State had felt the power of the peculiar influences which Hanna exercised; and in 1891, it was Hanna more than any other individual, who, having espoused the cause of Mr. McKinley in the hour of his congressional defeat, had made him Governor of Ohio.

But here one must in fairness take into consideration the more personal side of this interesting character, since otherwise the man as a whole will not be rightly understood. Hanna, though utterly devoid of even the most rudimentary morality where “business” was concerned, had still a nature that was able to attract and win the liking of his associates. He was intensely human, though his humanity was that of the primeval man. Big and strong and coarse, he had the primitive instincts developed almost in excess. He was frankly appetitive,

<sup>6</sup> Tarbell, *History of the Standard Oil Company*, ii. pp. 142-148 (New York, 1904). For the use subsequently made of this letter by Mr. Hanna's political opponents, see the *New York World* for August 11, 1897, and succeeding issues.

robustly esurient—a mass of mighty longings and unconcealed desires. It was said of him that every want of his became at once a lust, to be sated greedily and in the very moment of its birth. Not all the lusts of the flesh, however, mastered him. In his family relations and as a husband and a father, his life was irreproachable; yet in the wider sense of the word, one may apply to him the striking phrase of a recent English novelist, and say that he was as sensual as a mutton chop. He lusted after wealth and got it. He lusted after power and he got that also. And all through his life, his minor appetites were forever making themselves felt and seen. But he was so wholly natural with regard to them, his desires were so openly avowed and his enjoyment in their gratification was so hearty and spontaneous, as to induce in those who knew him a genuine cordiality. The simplicity and even homeliness of his tastes, while they often amused, were on the whole attractive. When he was at the height of his career, and had at his command every luxury that wealth could give, he used to boast of but one thing, and that was of a superior kind of corned-beef hash, of which he said his cook alone possessed the recipe; and whenever he wished to pay the highest possible compliment to a friend, he sent him an invitation to a breakfast at which this corned-beef hash was served. Such things as this tickled the fancy of his associates; and most men found it hard to think much ill of one who could talk with boyish glee of a treat so innocently plebeian. His younger acquaintances used to speak of him as “Uncle Mark”; and this familiar title affords a clue to the sort of affectionate familiarity which he inspired. Hanna was, in fact, of the earth, earthy; but there was something of the wholesomeness of the earth about him, and a stock of

manliness as well. He spoke out the thing he really thought. If he was displeased, he grunted and swore. But he could be generous, and he was afraid of no man. Mr. Lincoln Steffens tells the story of how Hanna once undertook to make a political speech to a crowd of Welshmen who had no mind to listen to him. Every sentence that he spoke was interrupted by their jeers, until Hanna's blood grew hot.

"There's a lot of American in me," he shouted. "There's some Scotch. Somewheres way back there's Irish blood. But by G—, there's no Welsh! If there was, I'd go down there and lick the whole lot of you!"

This, says Mr. Steffens, won the Welshmen; and they cheered Mark Hanna and listened to him willingly while he finished what he had to say.<sup>7</sup>

One of the most marked of Hanna's attractively human qualities was the warmth of his personal friendships. When he hated, he hated with all the strength of his masculinity; but he also set no bounds to the ardour of his likings. This coarse-fibred man had something of the gentleness of a woman where friendship was concerned, and also something of the unrestraint of a child. When his confidence had been fully won, his cynicism and the hardness of his character seemed to disappear. Singularly lacking in complexity, his emotions in private life were as little controlled as were his appetites in public matters. At the success of a friend, he would caper clumsily. Over the bereavement of a friend, he would blubber like a schoolboy. He had no reverence for any one; but he did possess an unusual capacity for affection, and there can be no doubt that for Mr. McKinley his

<sup>7</sup> See a paper by Mr. Steffens entitled "Ohio: a Tale of Two Cities," in *McClure's Magazine* for July, 1905.



affection was sincere and that it did him honour. Between the two there existed what it is no exaggeration to call a genuine fondness. Psychologically this is to be explained as based upon the attraction of opposites, for no two men could have been more unlike. Curiously contrasted, indeed, were McKinley's suavity and Hanna's bluntness, McKinley's caution and Hanna's courage, McKinley's vacillation and Hanna's almost insolent tenacity of purpose. McKinley respected all of life's conventions. Hanna hooted at them. McKinley believed that the will of the majority was the will of God. Hanna was sure that majorities could be manufactured, and that their will was only the reflection of the far stronger will of the few able men who played upon the motives of human passion and self-interest. It is probable that McKinley never really understood Mark Hanna; but there can be no question that Hanna rightly understood McKinley, and that he admired in him those qualities of which he was himself completely destitute. At the close of the St. Louis Convention, speaking to a newspaper correspondent, Hanna burst out with the enthusiastic exclamation, "I love McKinley! He is the best man I ever knew."<sup>8</sup> We may be sure that these words and the feeling back of them were entirely sincere.

The close and intimate friendship between the two men had most important political results. Their personal liking for each other was strengthened by the consonance of their ambitions. Mr. McKinley desired to be President of the United States; Mr. Hanna had set his heart upon becoming one of the two Senators from Ohio. In fighting the battle for his friend, Hanna was opening up a path to the fulfilment of his own long-cherished hope. So successful had he shown himself in making Mr. McKinley

<sup>8</sup> Report in *New York Tribune*, June 21, 1896.

twice Governor, so keenly practical had been his management of men and of affairs, so vast were the resources which he had at his command, and so undoubted was his loyalty, that to him Mr. McKinley's political fortunes were unreservedly entrusted in this crucial year of 1896. Whatever the chief Republican aspirant for the Presidency did or said or wrote, was done or said or written only after the approval of Mark Hanna had been given to it. Few knew this at the time; but it began to be understood as the months wore on, though even then, and for a long while afterwards, the full significance of the fact was only half appreciated. What it really meant was that behind the candidacy of a very amiable, dignified, and upright gentleman there was advancing into a place of almost unlimited power and opportunity a dominant influence which was seriously to modify the character of American public life. Here, in fact, one sees the initial appearance of what came to be known as "the business man" in the highest sphere of national politics. For it was as a "business man" that Hanna always described himself. Politics with him were an adjunct to his "business"; and the esoteric interests of "business" such as his were for a while to direct the course of American history. Before this time, in the United States as in all other nations of the first rank, men of wealth had often gained political power, and it was frequently their wealth which had enabled them to do so. But in general, and with most of them, wealth was the means, and political office was the end. Again, as has been already shown in the course of this narrative, wealth has been often wrongly and unscrupulously used for the furtherance of political ambition. But in 1896 a novel phenomenon was exhibited, the result of many causes, all of which, however, had

tended towards one result. Now for the first time, a party, if such it can be called, had arisen which was not devoted to any definite political principles at all, but rather to the furtherance of private interests that were commercial and financial. This party, though not recognised as a party, was neither Democratic nor Republican, but was the party of wealth—consolidated, highly organised, directed by men of rare ability, and using political power no longer as an end, but as a means, its real object being the private advantage of moneyed men, the safe-guarding of corporations from legal interference and control, and the exploitation of official influence for the benefit of individuals who were unknown to public life. All this was implied in the mention of “the business man in politics.” The business man in politics was the capitalist who needed political favours or protection in his “business”; and whether he were nominally a Republican or a Democrat, his allegiance to either party counted as nothing when compared with the sympathetic solidarity of interest which bound him to all other men of the same class. The representatives of wealth—manufacturers, bankers, mine-owners, railway managers, and heads of great financial institutions in general—had by this time come to constitute what was in reality another party which did not, indeed, appear to be such, which had no name, and which did not hold conventions and openly nominate candidates of its own, but which loomed large behind the two older parties, endeavouring to play off one against the other, and to use indifferently the machinery of each for the esoteric welfare of consolidated wealth. The most far-sighted of the men who gave, as it were, the *mot d'ordre* to this formidable association, had perceived with dread a growing tendency among the American peo-

ple to expect from the Federal Government, rather than from the States, that redress for many a wrong, which only far-reaching centralised power could give. The particularism of earlier years was disappearing. The old-time doctrine of States' Rights was fast losing its hold upon the American people. Republican rule and the arguments of the Protectionists had gradually fostered a belief that if the Government at Washington was to be the source of prosperity, so must it also be the fountain-head of justice. Many events of the preceding decade had stimulated and enhanced the intensity of this feeling, but perhaps the most significant of all was the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act, the debates over which had revealed the immense powers conferred by the clause in the Constitution permitting the Government to regulate commerce between the States. The particular Act in question had as yet imposed no serious check upon the operations of the various Trusts; but the principle which it had established was pregnant with possibilities of disaster to those corporations which had successfully defied the common law and had found it easy to control the legislative action of individual States. A shiver must have passed through many a directorate when Congress actually set upon the statute-books even an imperfect law invoking so great a power against the lawlessness of wealth. President Cleveland's vigorous assault upon the overprotection of special industries must likewise have made a deep impression. That one attack had practically failed; yet another might succeed. On the whole, the temper of the times and a steady drift towards something like State Socialism were becoming plain to many, and to none more so than to those persons who now came to the surface of affairs, bearing the euphemistic name of "business men

in politics." It was because Mr. Hanna was a perfect type of the class which has been here described, that his personality and his character assume so much importance. It was an unerring instinct which led the cartoonists and caricaturists in the press to draw his likeness and let it symbolise predaceous capital. And just as Mr. Hanna had formerly got control of the city government of Cleveland in order to secure franchises for his street-railways, so now both he and his associates began a vigorous campaign for the control of the national administration, because it, too, had become essential to the future safety of their "business." The very audacity of their scheme almost excites one's admiration; nor did it necessarily imply the presence of corruption in its grosser forms. Theirs was a far more scientific game, as it was also a far bolder one, than that of the old-time purchasers of legislation. Those who played it kept, for the most part, within the letter of the law. The persons with whom they had to do were no longer the cheaply venal creatures to whom money bribes could be safely offered. Men of reputation and honour must be influenced and used through what were apparently legitimate rewards. But the effect upon American life, both public and private, of the entrance of this new caste or party was deplorable, in that it meant the enervation of civic morality and the exaltation of social ideals that were debasing.

During the early months of 1896, Mr. Hanna as the chief McKinley manager, undertook a very difficult rôle. The Republicans in the Eastern States were almost solidly in favour of maintaining the gold standard and of establishing it by law. In most of the Western States, on the other hand, the party was honeycombed by what was

styled the "silver heresy." The money question was forcing its way insistently to the front and demanding a solution. Neither element of the party must be repelled. A majority of the delegates from both sections of the country must cast their votes for Mr. McKinley in order to secure his nomination and make his election possible. Mr. Hanna's management was masterly, and revealed a rare genius for political strategy. Above and beyond his already well-known shrewdness, courage and resourcefulness, he now exhibited a rare discretion and a diplomatic taciturnity, which few had ever thought this rough impulsive person to possess. The story of how Mr. Hanna brought about the nomination of McKinley has never yet been fully told. His course, at the time, was utterly misunderstood. A reading of the contemporary newspapers will serve to show that even the surface facts were ludicrously misrepresented. The narrative that is now to be set forth is that which Mr. Hanna himself was afterwards wont to tell in private conversation; and it is in complete accord with all the circumstances which are matters of both personal and public record.

Mr. Hanna was himself a thorough believer in the gold standard. Furthermore, he intended that the Republican Convention should make an unequivocal declaration in favour of such a standard. But for the time he kept his purpose to himself and bent his energies to the single task of securing delegates favourable to McKinley. The Western States were his chief concern. New England was practically a negligible quantity and was in any case committed to the support of Mr. Speaker Reed. The greatest of the Middle States, New York and Pennsylvania, had candidates of their own, who stood no chance of nomination, but whose appearance in the

field would at the outset neutralise the influence of those States in the Convention. The West and the South were, therefore, the object of Mr. Hanna's immediate solicitude. Both sections had a leaning towards the doctrine of free silver; and, hence, Mr. McKinley must be represented for a while as a genuine "friend of silver." Yet this point must not be too strongly pressed, and the currency question must be treated as one of subsidiary interest and importance. Such is a brief outline of the situation as it appeared to Mr. Hanna; and his able campaign was conducted in accordance with its exigencies. As early as January of 1896, the Republican newspapers throughout the country began to display a remarkable enthusiasm for Mr. McKinley's nomination,—not, however, because of his past or present attitude towards the money question, but because he was the exponent of high tariff duties and easy times. The lean years of the Cleveland administration were explained as wholly due to the repeal of the McKinley Act of 1890. Voters have short memories, and they had long since forgotten that the Treasury deficits, the lowered wages, and the shutting down of mills and factories had begun during Mr. Harrison's presidency. All that they were permitted to remember was the fact that at least 3,000,000 men were now out of work, and that a Democratic President had been in office for three years. The days of Harrison were lauded as an era of abundance; and the election of McKinley on the tariff issue was declared to be the only way of bringing back that glorious period. The old cry of "Bill McKinley and the McKinley Bill!" was supplemented by the new and taking catchword, "McKinley and the Full Dinner-Pail!" Someone described the Ohio statesman as "the advance agent of prosperity," and this

phrase went from mouth to mouth and was caught up by the newspapers. Never was a press campaign more skillfully conducted. It seemed to reflect in the great Republican strongholds a spontaneous demand for the nomination of Mr. McKinley. Yet the silver question would not down, but everywhere distracted men's attention from the tariff cry. The gold men in the East and the silver men in the West were equally clamorous to know just where the "advance agent of prosperity" himself stood. When the Ohio State Convention met on March 11th, its pronouncement on the financial issue was eagerly awaited; for surely Mr. McKinley's own State might be expected to give the watchword to his party throughout the land. But Mr. Hanna was too shrewd to show his hand just yet; and so the Convention adopted that sort of Delphic utterance which the vocabulary of American politics expressively denominates a "straddle." The State platform said: "We contend for honest money; for a currency of gold, silver, and paper . . . that shall be as sound as the Government and as untarnished as its honour." To that end, the Ohio Republicans favoured "bimetallism," and demanded the use of "both gold and silver as standard money."

Of course, this declaration under all its sounding phrases was ambiguous to a degree. Everybody—Democrats, Republicans and Populists—desired "honest money"; they were all agreed that "gold, silver and paper" ought to constitute the currency of the United States. But as to what was "honest money," and as to what were to be the relative values of the "gold, silver and paper," opinions were everywhere as widely divergent as those of President Cleveland and "Coin" Harvey. The effect of this Ohio declaration was, on the



whole, however, just what Mr. Hanna had intended. It left things in the West precisely where they were and enabled the McKinley agents to explain their candidate's opinions in whatever way was most likely to please their auditors in each section. As for Mr. McKinley himself, he remained at his home in Canton, refusing with much dignity to be interviewed, but making from time to time a brief address on the subject of the tariff. In New England, and above all in New York, his reticence excited both alarm and indignation. Was Mr. McKinley still a silver man at heart as he had been in 1878, when he voted for the Bland-Allison Bill, and as he had seemed to be when later he reproached President Cleveland for having "struck down silver"? Many and vehement were the demands that he come out frankly and say just what he thought about the most vital issue of the day. Mr. Hanna and his associates treated this demand as though it were impertinent and almost insulting. Mr. Grosvenor of Ohio said with a show of solemn indignation:

"No man's friends have a right to call upon him to foreshadow the party's platform. . . . Major McKinley will respond to the platform, but he will not dictate what the platform shall be."<sup>9</sup>

Perhaps through the minds of some of the anxious Republicans who read these words, there may have flitted a recollection of Mr. Cleveland's blunt letter to the Reform Club in 1892,<sup>10</sup> when he spoke out just what he thought, even though he felt that in doing so he was forfeiting the presidency. Their fears, at any rate, led them to work hard for delegations favourable to the gold

<sup>9</sup> Interview in the *New York Times*, May 18, 1896.

<sup>10</sup> See pp. 274-276.

standard. Early in June, it was evident that Mr. Hanna had in all probability secured a majority in support of McKinley's nomination, while it was also probable that the silver men would be outvoted. Twenty-two Republican State conventions had, in fact, pronounced openly against the free coinage of silver. Yet it still seemed possible that the National Convention in St. Louis would repeat the Ohio "straddle," and thus continue the traditional policy of evasion and equivocation.

The Convention met on June 16th, with little show of genuine enthusiasm among the delegates.<sup>11</sup> Even before the formal opening, the money question had dwarfed all other topics of discussion. There were rumours of dissension and threats of actual bolting. Senator Platt of New York openly attacked Mr. McKinley for his secretiveness and "duplicity," and spoke of withdrawing from the Convention if it failed to make a specific declaration for the gold standard. The New York delegation, of which Mr. Platt was chairman, passed resolutions condemning the free coinage of silver. On the other hand, Senator Henry M. Teller, who headed the Colorado delegation, made it plain that if a gold "plank" were adopted, he and his followers would secede. The delegations from the other Western mining States were equally emphatic. Mr. Hanna had secured most of the Southern delegates for his candidate, but some were still in doubt. One of the Texan delegates received by every mail postcards on which large and vivid characters in red admonished him: "If you vote for McKinley you need not come back to Dallas!"<sup>12</sup> The New England representatives still warmly urged the claims of Mr. Reed, whose

<sup>11</sup> New York *Tribune*, June 16 and 17, 1896.

<sup>12</sup> *Id.*, June 16, 1896.

foremost champion was Senator Lodge of Massachusetts. The New York delegates were favourable to the candidacy of Mr. Levi P. Morton, who had been Vice-president during the Harrison administration. Mr. Quay of Pennsylvania showed how completely he was master of his own State by the fact that the Pennsylvania delegates were pledged to give him at least a complimentary vote. The Iowa delegation had been directed to put Senator Allison in nomination. Thus, when the first session of the Convention began, under the temporary chairmanship of Mr. Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana, all was confusion, and rumours of every sort were rife.

Meanwhile, Mr. Hanna was solidifying the strength of the McKinley forces and hourly adding to their numbers. In his pocket he had a draft of the "money plank" which he meant to have the Convention finally adopt, and it was explicitly and unequivocally in favour of the gold standard. He had shown it to Mr. McKinley, who had approved it and who had himself prepared the draft of a tariff plank. But not even yet was Mr. Hanna ready to declare himself. He meant to manœuvre in such a way as to make his final move appear to be a concession, in return for which he could ask a substantial equivalent. In other words, he was to receive a reward for doing the very thing that he had all along intended to accomplish. The Committee on Resolutions found it difficult to reach an agreement as to the financial declaration to be made. Senator Teller, who was a member of that Committee, held out for a free silver plank, and his colleagues were slow to antagonise him. Mr. Hanna let them discuss the question for nearly two days, during which time the business of the Convention was at a standstill, the members listening to speecmaking, to the argu-

ments of woman suffragists, and to patriotic music. On the first day, the session lasted for little more than an hour. The wildest stories were circulated regarding the coming action of the Platform Committee. This delay and the resulting rumours seriously alarmed the advocates of gold. They feared lest in the end some sort of compromise might be made. Finally, several of the most influential of their number decided to take the bull by the horns. They went to Mr. Hanna's rooms in the hotel where he was staying, and delivered a sort of ultimatum. They demanded that he accept a gold-standard plank for the platform, or else they would carry the fight to the floor of the Convention and thus precipitate an open conflict between themselves and the supporters of Mr. McKinley. They gave Mr. Hanna just one hour in which to accede to their demand.<sup>13</sup> That wily leader must have smiled grimly as they left him to reflect upon the threat which they had made. They had quite unconsciously played his game, and victory was now assured. Needless to say, in less than the prescribed hour Mr. Hanna announced himself to be a gold man; and the plank which he had brought with him to St. Louis was incorporated in the platform to be reported. Apparently he had yielded under strong compulsion; and the gentlemen who had seemingly forced their will upon him now thought of him with that kindness which generous victors feel towards a vanquished foe.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> McClure, *Our Presidents*, p. 366 (New York, 1905). Colonel McClure tells this as of his own personal knowledge.

<sup>14</sup> The credit of having forced the gold plank upon the Convention has been claimed by many persons—especially by Senator Platt, by Senator Lodge of Massachusetts and by Mr. Edward Lauterbach of New York; but there is no reason for thinking that Mr. Hanna's own statement regarding the matter is inaccurate. What influences may have

And so it came to pass that on June 18th the platform was read to the Convention by Senator Foraker. It described the Cleveland administration as responsible for "a record of unparalleled incapacity, dishonour, and disaster." It renewed Republican allegiance to "the policy of protection as the bulwark of American industrial independence and the foundation of American development and prosperity." "Protection and Reciprocity are twin measures of Republican policy and go hand in hand. Democratic rule has recklessly struck down both, and both must be re-established." It declared for a "firm, vigorous and dignified" foreign policy; for American control of the Hawaiian Islands; for the purchase of the Danish West Indies; and for the construction, operation and ownership of the Nicaraguan canal by the United States. The Monroe Doctrine was reaffirmed, and American intervention in Cuba was mentioned with approval. "We favour the continued enlargement of the navy, and a complete system of harbour and sea-coast defences."

Amid breathless silence, the part of the platform relating to the money question was read out:

operated upon Mr. Hanna himself earlier in the year, it is difficult to say. There exists a strong belief that he decided in favour of an explicit declaration for gold because of the insistence of Mr. H. H. Kohlsaat, the editor and publisher of the *Chicago Record-Herald* (then the *Times-Herald*). Mr. Kohlsaat had long been an intimate friend of Mr. McKinley and Mr. Hanna, and it is certain that he very strongly urged the insertion of the gold plank in the St. Louis platform. There is no good reason for thinking that Messrs. Platt and Lodge played any important part in the episode. Mr. Hanna speaking of them, soon after the Convention, said: "I do not desire to detract from the efforts made by these gentlemen for the cause of sound money, but I do wish to state most emphatically that the plank defining the party's position was advocated by Western men, drawn up by Western men, and approved by me before any man from the East reached St. Louis."

“The Republican Party is unreservedly for sound money. . . . We are unalterably opposed to every measure calculated to debase our currency or impair the credit of our country. We are therefore opposed to the free coinage of silver, except by international agreement with the leading commercial nations of the world, which we pledge ourselves to promote; and until such agreement can be obtained, the existing gold standard must be preserved. All our silver and paper money must be maintained at parity with gold; and we favour all measures designed to maintain inviolably the obligations of the United States, and all our money, whether coin or paper, at the present standard, the standard of the most enlightened nations of the earth.”

No sooner had the platform been reported to the Convention, than Senator Teller of Colorado rose and offered a substitute for its gold-standard declaration. Mr. Teller's substitute was one which he had tried in vain to induce the Committee to adopt. It declared that “the Republican Party favours the use of both gold and silver as equal standard money”; and it pledged the party to secure “the free, unrestricted and independent coinage of gold and silver” in the mints of the United States “at a ratio of 16 parts of silver to 1 of gold.”

This embodied the extreme demand of the free-silver men and it was certain to be rejected. Many delegates might have favoured the device of a “straddle,” as a measure of expediency; but Senator Teller had forced the monetary issue in a way which admitted of no compromise. In support of his substitute he spoke with intense feeling, his voice often faltering, and tears of unaffected emotion in his eyes. For him it was a solemn moment. He had been a Republican all his life, and to part with his old associates was unspeakably bitter.

“When the Republican Party was organised, I was there. It has never had a national candidate since it was organised that my voice has not been raised in his support. It has never had a great principle enunciated in its platform that has not had my approbation until now. With its distinguished leaders I have been in close communion and close friendship. I have shared in its honours and in its few defeats and disasters. Do you think that we can sever our connection with a party like this unless it be a matter of duty—a duty, not to our respective States only, but a duty to all the people of this great land?”

The Convention respected Mr. Teller's emotion and listened to his address in sympathetic silence. But when the roll was called, his substitute was rejected by a vote of 818 to 105, and the platform as reported from the Committee was adopted by a vote of 812 to 110. Those delegates who were in full accord with Mr. Teller then rose and left the convention hall. They were only thirty-four in number, yet among them were four Senators of the United States and two members of the House of Representatives.<sup>15</sup> The Convention then proceeded to the nomination of a candidate for the presidency. The nominating speeches were beneath the level even of convention oratory, and neither Senator Foraker's oration in behalf of Mr. McKinley, nor Senator Lodge's in support of Mr. Reed, nor Mr. Depew's for Mr. Morton, showed any great rhetorical ability. The result was already known to all, even before the delegates had been polled. Mr. Reed's following melted away, even the delegates from his own State wavering.

<sup>15</sup> The four senators were Messrs. Teller (Colorado), Dubois (Idaho), Cannon (Utah), and Pettigrew (South Dakota). The States represented in the secession were Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Montana and South Dakota.

“Joe, God Almighty hates a quitter!” roared Mr. Fessenden of Connecticut to Mr. Manley of Maine. But expostulation was useless. A test of Mr. McKinley’s strength as against the united opposition had previously been made upon a question of sustaining the Committee on Credentials, and the vote showed the Ohio candidate to have a large majority (545 to 359.) This was vastly increased when the Convention voted directly on the nomination. Mr. McKinley received 661 votes; Mr. Reed, 84; Senator Quay, 61; Mr. Morton, 58; and Senator Allison, 35. The choice of Mr. McKinley was then made unanimous amid the first genuine enthusiasm that had been shown. The cheering was vociferous and prolonged; and it reached a climax when a delegate raised upon the point of a flagstaff a cocked hat such as one associates with the portraits of Napoleon. It was a harmless whim on the part of Mr. McKinley to fancy that he bore a certain physical resemblance to the victor of Marengo; and a knowledge of this fact lent vigour to the cheering which greeted the Napoleonic emblem. Unsympathetic Democrats noted that the nomination had been made on June 18th, the date of the battle of Waterloo; and they professed to see in the coincidence an omen of disaster to the Republican Napoleon.

For the vice-presidency, the Convention nominated on the first ballot Mr. Garret A. Hobart, a wealthy lawyer and man of affairs, whose home was in New Jersey.

Mr. McKinley’s nomination was well received by Republicans throughout the country; and the Convention’s explicit utterance in favour of the gold standard satisfied those capitalists and business men who had previously opposed him as a trimmer. But his selection on a gold platform had also the effect of consolidating the advo-



cates of silver and of making the election turn inevitably upon the financial question. Even before this, the Democratic party in the West and South had become practically a free-silver party. The conventions of thirty States had passed resolutions approving the free coinage of silver at a ratio of 16 to 1. Only ten States had declared for the maintenance of the gold standard. The convention of one State alone (Florida) had ignored the money issue altogether. It was so plain that the approaching National Convention of the Democratic Party would be controlled by the free-silver men, that many conservative Democrats (or "Cleveland Democrats," as they were called) were at first inclined to take no part in the Convention's counsels, but to break openly with their party in advance of its assemblage. From this course, however, they were dissuaded by President Cleveland himself, who, on June 16th, caused a letter to be published which may be considered his last official utterance as the head of the Democratic party. In it his faith in the ultimate good sense of the people was still apparent. His tone was still both confident and courageous. A National Convention, wrote he, is a gathering for conference and reflection. No Democrat should refuse to take part in it from sheer faint-heartedness or with the belief that its conclusions are predetermined. On the contrary, every one should do all within his power to guide its deliberations to wise and salutary ends. "A cause worth fighting for is worth fighting for to the end."

This spirited summons rallied the conservative leaders of the party; and when the Convention met at Chicago, on July 7th, both factions were fully represented there. But as soon as the delegates began to arrive, it was plain that only a miracle of management could stem the tide

that had set in for free silver. As Mr. Richard P. Bland expressed it in a published interview, the Democracy of the West were convinced that "the gold standard meant bankruptcy," and that the Convention would declare for the "free coinage of silver at 16 to 1 and d—n the consequences!"<sup>16</sup> A correspondent of the *New York World*, which was the organ of the Cleveland Democrats, described the situation in Chicago very accurately in these words: "The Silverites will be invincible if united and harmonious; but they have neither machine nor boss. The opportunity is here; the man is lacking."

Such was, indeed, the case. There were present men who in former years had exercised almost dictatorial power in Democratic conventions; but they were now swept aside unheeded, or made to feel that they were distrusted and disliked. Senator Hill, Mr. Whitney and ex-Governor Flower of New York were there, and so were ex-Governor W. E. Russell of Massachusetts and General Bragg of Wisconsin; yet they were lost in the swirling mob that marched and shouted and sang, without leadership or any definite purpose save a desire to "smash things" and to shake off the domination of the East. Fanatics like Altgeld and Tillman rode the crest of this human deluge, and their wild talk harmonised with the reckless mood of those who listened to them eagerly. One finds it interesting to speculate upon the feelings with which Senator Gorman of Maryland must have watched the strange scenes that were taking place on the eve of this Convention of his party. At the Convention of 1892, he had been an honoured leader. The cause for which he then contended had triumphed at the polls. A Democratic President and a Democratic Congress had sought to keep their pledges to the nation by

<sup>16</sup> Interview in *New York World*, July 1, 1896.

wise and moderate counsels, by the remission of unjust taxation, and by shaking off the grasp of the money power. But Mr. Gorman and those who acted with him had turned that great victory to naught. They had humiliated their chosen leader, and made the professions of their party seem dishonest and ridiculous. Yet in doing this, they had sown the wind, and they were now blasted by the whirlwind of political retribution. Who in all this vociferous multitude cared for what Mr. Gorman and his associates wished or thought? The most uncouth delegate from a mining camp was here of more importance than the smooth Senator from Maryland, who, having by his machinations sapped the strength of the conservative Democracy, had thus unbarred the flood-gates of a furious torrent which was already far beyond control.

How completely the great majority of the delegates had cast away their old allegiances was made evident when the Convention first assembled on July 7th, in a vast structure, styled the Coliseum, under whose spreading roof of glass and iron fifteen thousand human beings were crowded together in the heat of a summer sun. The National Committee was still controlled by the conservative element of the party; and this Committee now presented to the Convention the name of Senator Hill of New York as its selection for the temporary chairmanship. Both usage and etiquette required that their choice should be ratified by the delegates as a matter of ordinary courtesy. But not even for a temporary office would the majority accept an Eastern man who was also an opponent of free silver. A debate, remarkable for its bitterness, at once began; and in opposition to Mr. Hill, Senator John W. Daniel of Virginia, an ardent silver advocate, was put in nomination, and was elected to the temporary chair-

manship by the decisive vote of 556 to 349. A preliminary test of strength had now been made; and from this moment the silver men were exultantly aware of their supremacy. An eye-witness of the scene thus noted its significance: "The sceptre of political power has passed from the strong, certain hands of the East to the feverish, headstrong mob of the West and South."<sup>17</sup> During the debate, a delegate had casually spoken the name of President Cleveland. Many of the spectators at once rose to their feet and cheered; but it was an ominous circumstance that not a single delegate joined in the cheering, even those from New York remaining silent in their places. Mr. Altgeld, on the other hand, was greeted with yells of unrestrained delight.

Having won this victory, and having listened to an address by Senator Daniel, the Convention adjourned until the following day. When it reassembled on the morning of July 8th, it was plain that the silver faction meant to use its power to the full. By a sweeping majority, the representation of each Territory was augmented from two members to six. The delegation from Nebraska, which was pledged to support the gold standard, was unseated, and a contesting delegation of silver men, with Mr. William J. Bryan at its head, was admitted to the Convention. Four gold delegates from Michigan were rejected, and four silver delegates were substituted in their place, thus giving to the silver faction, under the unit rule, the solid vote of Michigan. Having effected these changes, all of which greatly increased the strength of the majority, Senator S. M. White of California was made permanent President of the Convention.

On July 9th, the Committee on Resolutions reported a platform devoted almost wholly to the money question,

<sup>17</sup> *New York World*, July 8, 1896.

which was declared to be "paramount to all others at this time." The platform, after denouncing the demonetisation of silver as being the cause of the prevalent financial distress, went on to say:

"We are unalterably opposed to monometallism, which has locked fast the prosperity of an industrial people in the paralysis of hard times. Gold monometallism is a British policy, and its adoption has brought other nations into financial servitude to London. . . . We demand the free and unlimited coinage of both silver and gold at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1 without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation. We demand that the standard silver dollar shall be a full legal tender, equally with gold, for all debts, public and private; and we favour such legislation as will prevent for the future the demonetisation of any kind of legal-tender money by private contract."

The resolutions were made to condemn "the issuing of interest-bearing bonds of the United States in time of peace and . . . the trafficking with banking syndicates"; and to denounce "arbitrary interference by Federal authorities in local affairs," and especially "government by injunction," which was described as "a new and highly dangerous form of oppression, by which Federal judges become at once legislators, judges and executioners." "Life tenure in the public service" was also disapproved in favour of appointments for fixed terms of office. The Monroe Doctrine was reaffirmed; sympathy was expressed for the people of Cuba in their struggle for independence; and an enlargement of the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission was demanded, together with such "control of railroads as will protect the people from robbery and oppression."

It will be noted that, contrary to all usage, (the plat-

form as reported by the majority contained no word of approbation for President Cleveland. More than that, it condemned every important policy with which he had been identified. It was, indeed, precisely what those who wrote it meant that it should be—a repudiation of him and of his administration. A minority of the Committee, however, presented a protest to the Convention signed by sixteen members representing sixteen different States.<sup>18</sup> These gentlemen pronounced some of the declarations in the platform, as reported by the majority of the Committee, to be “wholly unnecessary.” Others were called “ill-considered and ambiguously phrased,” while still others were “extreme and revolutionary.” The minority, therefore, offered in place of the free silver declaration, a substitute to the effect that any attempt on the part of the United States alone to establish free silver coinage would both imperil the national finances and retard or prevent the success of international bimetallism. “It would place this country at once upon a silver basis, impair contracts, disturb business, diminish the purchasing power of the wages of labour, and inflict irreparable evil upon our nation’s commerce and industry.” Finally, the minority offered the following resolution as an amendment to the majority’s report:

“We commend the honesty, economy, courage and fidelity of the present Democratic national administration.”

Both reports were now before the Convention, and the climax of the struggle had been reached. At once Senator Tillman leaped upon the platform. To him the minority

<sup>18</sup> Among the signers of the protest were Senator Hill of New York, Mr. Vilas of Wisconsin, Mr. Gray of Delaware, and Messrs. Lynde Harrison, C. V. Holman, John E. Russell, John Prentiss Poe, William R. Steele, Robert E. Wright and Charles D. Rogers.

report, with its praise of President Cleveland, was like a red rag to a bull. He fronted the multitude, dark and savage-featured, his face flushed, his hair unkempt, "the incarnation of the mob, vengeful and defiant." There was a strange gleam in his one eye. (When he began to speak, his fury rose to a fierce crescendo. He paced the platform like a madman, clenching his fists, hissing out his words, tossing his hands high above his head, and snapping his jaws together.<sup>19</sup>) So completely had passion mastered him, that much of what he said was unintelligible; but those who heard him gathered that he was denouncing Mr. Cleveland as "a tool of Wall Street," a tyrant, and one who richly deserved to be impeached and driven from his high office. Oddly enough, the vehemence of Mr. Tillman defeated its own object. Intense as was the feeling of the multitude to which he spoke, such raving did not touch its sympathies. Though applause was given to him by many, in his violence he had overshot the mark. Senator Hill, who spoke in behalf of the minority report, failed in another way to meet the mood of the vast audience. His face was ashen white and his manner glacial. Mr. Hill entirely lacked the oratorical temperament. Wholly unimpassioned at all times, the emotion of those about him seemed to make him colder and still more unbending. "I am a Democrat," he began, "but I am not a revolutionist." Then he proceeded with a discourse that was wholly argumentative, an appeal to reason, which, if pronounced before a purely deliberative body, might well have carried conviction in its words. It was, however, no deliberative body that he now addressed, but a surging mass of men frantic with excitement, upon whom mere argument was thrown away. He might as well have spoken to a cyclone; and

<sup>19</sup> Report in *New York World*, July 10, 1896.

when he took his seat, he knew that he had failed. Mr. Vilas of Wisconsin and Mr. Russell of Massachusetts, who followed and supported Mr. Hill, were no less ineffectual. Weakness of voice, an evident consciousness of coming defeat, and an unpopular cause, all combined to make their efforts unavailing.

Until now there had spoken no man to whom that riotous assembly would listen with respect. But at this moment there appeared upon the platform Mr. William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska, who came forward to reply to the three preceding speakers. As he confronted the twenty thousand yelling, cursing, shouting men before him, they felt at once that indescribable, magnetic thrill which beasts and men alike experience in the presence of a master. Serene and self-possessed, and with a smile upon his lips, he faced the roaring multitude with a splendid consciousness of power. Before a single word had been uttered by him, the pandemonium sank to an inarticulate murmur, and when he began to speak, even this was hushed to the profoundest silence. A mellow, penetrating voice that reached, apparently without the slightest effort, to the farthest recesses of that enormous hall, gave utterance to a brief exordium:

“MR. CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN OF THE CONVENTION: I should be presumptuous, indeed, to present myself against the distinguished gentlemen to whom you have listened, if this were a mere measuring of abilities; but this is not a contest between persons. The humblest citizen in the land, when clad in the armour of a righteous cause, is stronger than all the hosts of error. I come to speak to you in defence of a cause as holy as the cause of liberty—the cause of humanity.”

Mr. Bryan had in these three sentences already won his auditors. The repose and graceful dignity of his man-



ner, the courteous reference to his opponents, and the perfect clearness and simplicity of his language, riveted the attention of every man and woman in the Convention hall. As he continued, it was with increasing earnestness and power. He spoke briefly of the issue which was there to be determined. He held it to be an issue based upon a vital principle,—the right of the majority to rule and to have its firm convictions embodied in the declaration of the party.

“It is not a question of persons; it is a question of principle; and it is not with gladness that we find ourselves brought into conflict with those who are now arrayed upon the other side. . . . When you [turning to the gold delegates] come before us and tell us that we are about to disturb your business interests, we reply that you have disturbed our business interests by your course.

“We say to you that you have made the definition of a business man too limited in its application. The man who is employed for wages is as much a business man as his employer. The attorney in a country town is as much a business man as the corporation counsel in a great metropolis. The merchant at the cross-roads store is as much a business man as the merchant of New York. The farmer who goes forth in the morning and toils all day—who begins in the spring and toils all summer—and who, by the application of brain and muscle to the natural resources of the country, creates wealth, is as much a business man as the man who goes upon the board of trade and bets upon the price of grain. The miners who go down a thousand feet into the earth, or climb two thousand feet upon the cliffs, and bring forth from their hiding places the precious metals to be poured into the channels of trade, are as much business men as the few financial magnates who, in a back room, corner the money of the world. We come to speak for this broader class of business men.”

Mr. Bryan's delivery of this passage was remarkable for its effectiveness. (He spoke with the utmost deliberation, so that every word was driven home to each hearer's consciousness,) and yet with an ever-increasing force which found fit expression in the wonderful harmony and power of his voice. His sentences rang out, now with an accent of superb disdain, and now with the stirring challenge of a bugle call.

“We do not come as aggressors. Our war is not a war of conquest; we are fighting in the defence of our homes, our families, and posterity. We have petitioned, and our petitions have been scorned. We have entreated, and our entreaties have been disregarded. We have begged, and they have mocked when our calamity came. We beg no longer; we entreat no more; we petition no more. We defy them!”

As Mr. Bryan pronounced these spirited words, the great hall seemed to rock and sway with the fierce energy of the shout that ascended from twenty thousand throats. When he flung out the sentence “We defy them!” the leaderless Democracy of the West was leaderless no more. In that very moment, and in that burst of wild applause, it was acclaiming its new chief.

“You come to us and tell us that the great cities are in favour of the gold standard. We reply that the great cities rest upon our broad and fertile prairies. Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your cities will spring up again as if by magic; but destroy our farms, and the grass will grow in the streets of every city in the country. . . .

“We go forth confident that we shall win. Why? Because upon the paramount issue of this campaign there is not a spot of ground upon which the enemy will dare to challenge battle. If

they tell us that the gold standard is a good thing, we shall point to their platform and tell them that their platform pledges the party to get rid of the gold standard and to substitute bimetallism. If the gold standard is a good thing, why try to get rid of it? I call your attention to the fact that some of the very people who are in this Convention to-day and who tell us that we ought to declare in favour of international bimetallism—thereby declaring that the gold standard is wrong and that the principle of bimetallism is better—these very people four months ago were open and avowed advocates of the gold standard, and were then telling us that we could not legislate two metals together, even with the aid of all the world. If the gold standard is a good thing, we ought to declare in favour of its retention and not in favour of abandoning it; and if the gold standard is a bad thing, why should we wait until other nations are willing to help us let go? Here is the line of battle, and we care not upon which issue they force the fight. We are prepared to meet them on either issue or on both. . . .

“It is the issue of 1776 over again. Our ancestors when but three millions in number had the courage to declare their political independence of every other nation. Shall we, their descendants, when we have grown to seventy millions, declare that we are less independent than our forefathers? No, my friends, that will never be the verdict of our people. Therefore, we care not upon what lines the battle is fought. If they say bimetallism is good, but that we cannot have it until other nations help us, we reply that, instead of having a gold standard because England has, we will restore bimetallism, and then let England have bimetallism because the United States has it. If they dare to come out into the open field and defend the gold standard as a good thing, we will fight them to the uttermost. Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world, the labouring interests, and the toilers everywhere, we will answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to them: You shall not press down upon the brow of labour this crown of thorns—you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold!”

The scene enacted in the Convention, as Mr. Bryan finished speaking, was indescribable. Throughout the latter part of his address, a crash of applause had followed every sentence; but now the tumult was like that of a great sea thundering against the dykes. Twenty thousand men and women went mad with an irresistible enthusiasm. This orator had met their mood to the very full. He had found magic words for the feeling which they had been unable to express. And so he had played at will upon their very heart-strings, until the full tide of their emotion was let loose in one tempestuous roar of passion, which seemed to have no end. When order was partially restored, the substitute resolutions offered by Senator Hill were rejected with cries of derision, as were two other amendments afterwards proposed by him; and then the free-silver platform was adopted by a vote of 628 to 301. Having taken this action, the delegates, exhausted by the day's exciting scenes, adjourned until the following afternoon.

Over night, the question of the candidate to be nominated was earnestly discussed. It was evident that Mr. Bryan had suddenly leaped into a prominence which made him a formidable competitor for the highest honours. Before his address, no one had thought of him as a presidential candidate. Mr. Bland of Missouri, who was popularly styled "the Father of Free Silver," possessed the largest following. But now there were many who believed that their true leader had been revealed to them in Mr. Bryan. Mr. Bland was able and experienced; but he lacked the fire and the genius for command which the young Nebraskan had so strikingly exhibited. Hence, when the Convention reassembled, and proceeded to the selection of a candidate, although the first ballot showed

Mr. Bland to have received 235 votes, Mr. Bryan came next with 119, the number necessary to a choice being 502. Thirteen other gentlemen<sup>20</sup> received scattering votes. On the second and third ballots, both Mr. Bland's and Mr. Bryan's following was increased; but on the fourth, Mr. Bryan led with 280 to 241 for Mr. Bland. When the roll was called for the fifth time, Mr. Bryan lacked only 12 votes of a nomination, and at once 78 delegates changed their votes from other candidates to him, thereby making him the choice of the Convention. Subsequently, Mr. Arthur Sewall, a wealthy ship-builder of Maine, was nominated for the Vice-Presidency.<sup>21</sup>

The action of the Chicago Convention was received in the West with immense enthusiasm, in the South with doubtful approbation, and in the East with anger and dismay. Over the offices of some Democratic newspapers, flags were hoisted at half-mast. Many journals expressed strong disapproval.<sup>22</sup> Not a few openly avowed their purpose of supporting the Republican candidates. The Western silver men were described by these papers as being

<sup>20</sup> Among them were Senators Hill, Turpie, Tillman and Teller; Mr. Boies of Iowa, Mr. Russell of Massachusetts, Vice-President Stevenson, Mr. Blackburn of Kentucky and Mr. Pennoyer of Oregon. Of the gold delegates, 178 refused to take part in this ballot; and 162 abstained from voting further.

<sup>21</sup> Five ballots were taken before Mr. Sewall was chosen, his chief competitors being Mr. J. C. Sibley, Mr. J. R. McLean (Ohio), Mr. G. F. Williams (Massachusetts) and Mr. Bland. More than 250 gold delegates refused to take part in the balloting for a vice-presidential candidate.

<sup>22</sup> The following comments in the *New York World* of July 11th are sufficiently characteristic of conservative Democratic sentiment at the time:

"Lunacy having dictated the platform, it was perhaps natural that hysteria should evolve the candidate. . . . There is no doubt as to the result of the election, except as to the size of McKinley's popular and electoral majority."

really Populists who had stolen the name of Democrats. The gold delegates, returning from the scene of their defeat, set themselves to stimulate this feeling, where they did not take refuge in significant silence. "Are you still a Democrat?" an intimate friend asked of Senator Hill. "Yes," replied the Senator; "I am a Democrat still;" adding after a significant pause—"very still." Naturally, the Republicans rejoiced at these evidences of Democratic dissension. It appeared for a few days as though a victory over Mr. Bryan might be won almost without a struggle. But very soon this view was seen to be erroneous, and Mr. McKinley's managers perceived with genuine alarm that the contest was to be one of the fiercest ever fought in American political history. For though in New England and New York, Mr. Bryan was certain to lose many votes, this loss would be offset by the thousands of ballots which would be cast for him by the "Silver Republicans" and by the Populists in the Western States. On July 22d, these two parties held conventions in St. Louis, and each of them nominated Mr. Bryan for the Presidency, though the Populist Convention substituted the name of Mr. Thomas E. Watson of Georgia for that of Mr. Sewall as its candidate for the Vice-Presidency.<sup>23</sup> Already a section of the Prohibition Party, known as the "broad gaugers," had adopted a platform favouring the free coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1. It was plain, therefore, that Mr. Bryan would receive a very heavy vote from sources outside the pale of the regular Democracy. (Moreover, as time went on, many conservative Democrats who had earnestly opposed the silver movement were still so far affected by their sentiment of party

<sup>23</sup> Those Populists who opposed a direct alliance with the Democratic Party were styled "Middle-of-the-road men."

loyalty as to prefer any Democratic candidate to a Republican. It was for the purpose of drawing the votes of these men away from Mr. Bryan that the gold Democrats summoned a convention which met at Indianapolis<sup>24</sup> on September 2d, and, adopting the name of "National Democratic Party," nominated for the Presidency General John M. Palmer of Illinois, and for the Vice-Presidency General Simon B. Buckner of Kentucky. This Convention, to which forty-one States and three Territories sent delegates, adopted a platform condemning "the Populist Conventions of Chicago and St. Louis," urging the maintenance of the gold standard, and highly commending "the fidelity, patriotism, and courage" of President Cleveland in fulfilling "his great public trust," in maintaining "civil order and the enforcement of the laws," and in upholding "the credit and honour of the nation."<sup>25</sup>

The Democratic nominations were no sooner made than the whole country perceived the supreme issue of the campaign to be the silver question. Even Mr. McKinley ceased to discourse upon the tariff, and addressed his visiting delegations on the one subject of the currency. The Republicans took up the cry of "sound money," and made that the party slogan. Active canvassing began at an unprecedentedly early date. There was no interval of rest and apathy. Mr. Bryan himself forced the fighting, and made the first aggressive move by journeying in August to New York City in order that he might receive the formal notice of his nomination in the Madison Square Garden. As he expressed it, in a phrase

<sup>24</sup> Ex-Governor Roswell P. Flower of New York was temporary chairman of the Convention, and Senator Caffery of Louisiana its permanent president.

<sup>25</sup> See Hopkins, *Political Parties in the United States* (New York, 1900).

that was much criticised at the time, he wished first to present his cause "in the heart of what now seems to be the enemy's country."<sup>26</sup> His intention created a genuine panic among the Republicans. Although in their public prints they had sneered at Mr. Bryan's oratorical powers, although they had derisively dubbed him "the Boy Orator of the Platte," and although they had absurdly described the famous peroration of his convention speech as "blasphemous," they were secretly afraid lest his eloquence should produce the same effect in New York as it had in Chicago. But Mr. Bryan himself knew better. He was wise enough to understand that the conditions in Chicago could not possibly be reproduced in New York. He was aware that public expectation had been worked up to so extravagant a pitch that were he Demosthenes and Cicero in one, he must inevitably fail to satisfy it. He therefore very sensibly declined to attempt what would have been impossible—in other words, he refused to compete against himself. When he appeared before the immense audience in New York, he read a very carefully prepared address, well reasoned, temperate, and persuasive, but with no attempt at eloquence whatever. His opponents at once set up a howl of derision, and even many of his own supporters were for the moment much chagrined. Nevertheless, he had acted wisely, and he had followed an excellent precedent; for Mr. Lincoln, when he first came to New York after receiving the Republican nomination in 1860, had also read his speech and had declined to trust to his gift of improvising. But the circumstances of the meeting at the Madison Square Garden were undoubtedly unfortunate for Mr. Bryan. The

<sup>26</sup> Speech at Lincoln, Nebraska, August 8th. See Bryan, *The First Battle*, p. 300 (Chicago, 1897).



night was one of intense midsummer heat. The sweltering audience was kept waiting in extreme discomfort. The notification speech of Governor W. J. Stone of Missouri was inexcusably long, while Mr. Bryan himself spoke for nearly two whole hours. A feeling of relief was experienced by the Republicans when they found that their formidable adversary had at least performed no miracle of eloquence in "the enemy's country."

But Mr. Bryan gave them no cause to relax their efforts to defeat him. With astonishing energy, he planned and carried out four long journeys through the country, speaking at every place of importance in the doubtful States. On a single one of these progresses, he travelled more than twelve thousand miles, and was everywhere received by enormous gatherings and with intense enthusiasm. The funds for his campaign were slender. All the financial interests of the country were arrayed against him. His managers had no great sums to lavish in subsidising newspapers, in circulating documents, in hiring bands, and in decorating whole cities with political banners. Mr. Bryan, in fact, fought single-handed against the party of wealth; yet though almost alone, he made his foes strain every nerve to compass his defeat. It was estimated<sup>27</sup> that not less than 5,000,000 persons heard him speak, and among them there were few who showed him anything that savoured of discourtesy. Almost the only exception was found in an incident at New Haven, where the students of Yale University interrupted his address with yells for McKinley and jeers for Mr. Bryan and his cause. But this was an exceptional incident and one which only the *New York Sun* had the hardihood to defend. It would, indeed, have been very difficult for

<sup>27</sup> By Mr. R. F. Rose of the Associated Press. See Bryan, *op. cit.*, p. 618.

any fair-minded person, after hearing Mr. Bryan, to feel aught but a sincere personal respect for him. (The tone of all his speeches was most admirable. He dealt with principles alone and not with persons.) Although showered with abuse by the Republican and Gold Democratic newspapers, he never condescended to reply in kind; and for his chief political adversary he had only words of courteous consideration. Speaking in the town of Canton, Mr. McKinley's home, he said—and the sentences were very characteristic of his manliness:

I am glad to meet the people of this city, the home of my distinguished opponent, and I am also glad in their presence to testify to his high character and great personal worth. I shall be satisfied if, as an individual, I may be able to stand beside him in public esteem. . . . I tell my neighbours at home that I shall bear them no ill-will if they believe that my opponent should be elected; and I have so high an opinion of my opponent that I know he will say to his townsmen here that every one should be free to make his ballot represent a freeman's will, although it may result in keeping your distinguished citizen among you as a neighbour still."

Very different from this was the treatment accorded Mr. Bryan by his adversaries. They could find nothing in his private life to censure; but they circulated absurd and absolutely baseless stories, besides misrepresenting the whole tenor of his political teaching. They professed to believe that he had once been a strolling actor; they denounced him as an anarchist and an enemy of public order. Some phrases in the Democratic platform relating to the income tax decision were so garbled as to make it appear that Mr. Bryan desired to abolish or discredit the Supreme Court. Thousands of men, women and children were led

to think of him as the incarnation of riot, revolution and ruin. Some of the bitterest of the attacks upon him were made by the organs of the gold-standard Democracy. Thus, after Mr. Bryan had delivered an address in Louisville, the *Courier-Journal* of that city, edited by Mr. Henry Watterson, said of him:

“ Mr. William J. Bryan has come to Kentucky, and Kentuckians have taken his measure. He is a boy orator. He is a dishonest dodger. He is a daring adventurer. He is a political faker. He is not of the material of which the people of the United States have ever made a President, nor is he even of the material of which any party has ever before made a candidate.”

Popular preachers harangued their congregations on the despicable character and evil purposes of Mr. Bryan. In Brooklyn, the Rev. Cortland Myers, in a sermon, said of the Chicago platform: “ That platform was made in hell! ”<sup>28</sup> The Rev. Dr. C. H. Parkhurst in New York spoke of the silver movement as inimical to credit, and as an attempt, “ deliberate and hot-blooded, to destroy what little of it still remains. I dare, in God’s pulpit, to brand such attempts as accursed and treasonable! ”<sup>29</sup> Mr. Thomas Dixon, Jr., cried aloud to a New York congregation that Mr. Bryan was “ a mouthing, slobbering demagogue whose patriotism is all in his jaw-bone! ”<sup>30</sup> From these citations it will be seen that the violence of language which in the Populist orators had so amused the people of the East, was now fully matched by the ranting of the gold men. Even some of the Catholic clergy were induced to speak in opposition to Mr. Bryan’s cause, though of course

<sup>28</sup> September 13, 1896. Report in *Brooklyn Eagle*.

<sup>29</sup> September 27, 1896. Report in *New York Tribune*.

<sup>30</sup> October 4, 1896. Report in *New York World*.

they did so in terms of moderation and decorum. Governor Culberson of Texas had written to Prince Bismarck a letter asking for an expression of opinion as to the merits of bimetallism as against gold monometallism. The ex-Chancellor replied from Friedrichsruhe, under date of August 24, 1896, to the effect that he had always personally had a preference for bimetallism, "without considering myself infallible over against experts on the subject." He added:

"The United States are commercially freer in their movements than any single one of the European nations; and if North America should find it compatible with its interests to take an independent step in the direction of bimetallism, I do believe it would have an appreciable influence upon the establishment of an international agreement and the co-operation of the European States."

The silver orators made much of Bismarck's letter, and Archbishop Ireland of St. Paul took occasion to refer to it in a statement which he made in answer to a request from a number of prominent merchants and bankers. The Archbishop wrote:

"Herr von Bismarck counselled the United States to go ahead and make the experiment all alone. Yes, and some Americans quote his advice as an authority. The sly old fox would, indeed, be pleased to see America make the experiment and go to the bottom of the sea."<sup>31</sup>

It was not, however, upon newspaper discussion, or platform oratory, or the influence of the clergy that the Republican managers placed their main reliance. The whole vast machinery of commerce, of business and of

<sup>31</sup> Letter of October 2, 1896. See the leading journals of that date.

finance was set in motion to create a general impression that Mr. Bryan's success would mean disaster to every section of the American people. As the month of November drew near, capitalists resorted to the very effective device of giving large orders to manufacturers, on condition that these orders should be executed only in case of Mr. McKinley's election. In this way notice was served upon the artisans that if they voted for Mr. Bryan they would be voting to deprive themselves of work. Agents of some of the great insurance companies of New York and New England, which held mortgages upon Western farms, intimated to the mortgageors that, if Mr. McKinley were elected, the mortgages would be extended for five years at a low rate of interest. At the end of the week preceding the election, many employers of labour, in paying off their workmen, gave them notice that they could not return to work in the event of Mr. Bryan's success.<sup>32</sup> The city banks brought to bear upon their country correspondents such powerful pressure as they could readily exercise; and these correspondents transmitted that pressure to their depositors. In fact, the myriad influences which Mr. Hanna understood so well were all directed with astonishing effectiveness to the single end of defeating Mr. Bryan at any cost. These means were doubtless more certain in their operation than the mere use of money; yet money, too, was spent with a profusion hitherto unknown even in American political campaigns. A member of the Republican Committee subsequently admitted that the campaign expenses of his party in 1896 amounted to not less than \$25,000 a day from August 1st until the eve of the election. This

<sup>32</sup> See, for example, the news columns of the *Wilmington (Delaware) News* for November 3, 1896; and a letter published by an acute observer of American conditions, in the *St. James Gazette* (London), November 6, 1896.

money came from capitalists and business men in general, and even from fiduciary institutions.<sup>53</sup>

Yet the result of an election so bitterly contested as was that of 1896 can scarcely have been decided by the use of money or by influences more insidious and no less discreditable. How did the cause for which Mr. Bryan so brilliantly contended commend itself to the sober judgment of intelligent Americans? In what way did the majority of these men sum up their verdict at the close of the campaign? Let us review the main contentions of the silver party and then endeavour to point out alike their weakness and their strength. Until 1873, either gold or silver bullion might be taken by any one to the mints of the United States to be coined into standard dollars at a ratio of 16 to 1 (exactly 15.988 to 1). By 1873, however, the immense production of silver had cheapened the market value of that metal, so that the old ratio of coinage was no longer an exact one. The price of silver was continually falling and fluctuating; and hence, as early as 1870, President Grant's Secretary of the Treasury had drafted a bill to demonetise the silver dollar and to establish the single gold standard for the United States. This bill was passed by the Senate in 1871; and two years later, in 1873, it was passed by both Houses and became law. It had been before Congress for nearly three years, and it had met with scarcely any opposition. Presently, the world's annual

<sup>53</sup> Some light was thrown upon the sources of this fund when, in October 1905, the investigations of a committee of the New York Legislature brought out the fact that Mr. John A. McCall, President of the New York Life Insurance Company, had, in 1896, ordered the sum of \$50,000 paid to the Republican National Committee, and this without the knowledge or consent of his board of directors or of his financial committee. The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York contributed, in the same secret way, the sum of \$15,000.

production of gold diminished, so that the value of the gold dollar appreciated, as the supply of that metal shrank in proportion to the growth of the population, thus causing what some described as a "contraction of the circulating medium." This brought several results to pass. Prices, being measured in terms of gold, continually fell, while debts contracted under the other system were now payable in dollars of a greater intrinsic value than before. Presently it began to be asserted that the Act of 1873 had been passed by a conspiracy of the capitalists, who had smuggled it through Congress by craft and stealth. It was spoken of as "the crime of 1873," and was cited as an example of the wickedness of the financiers. Of course, the facts as just given show that the charge was false. In one of the later debates in the Senate, Mr. Stewart of Nevada, after violently denouncing the "crime of 1873," was put to confusion by Senator Sherman, who showed by the record that Mr. Stewart had himself spoken and voted for the "crime." In truth, all the Senators from California, Oregon and Nevada had supported the demonetising Act. Nevertheless, it had unquestionably worked a hardship to the debtor class throughout the country, just as did the resumption of specie payments in 1879.<sup>34</sup> Yet this hardship was in reality due to natural causes, and chiefly to a decrease in the world's gold supply. What Mr. Bryan proposed to do, was to expand the currency by opening the mints once more to free silver coinage at the old ratio. He believed that this would increase the volume of money in circulation, raise prices, and perform an act of simple justice to the debtor class. That is, he believed that an act of legislation could at once effectually correct an inequitable condition which was the result of purely natural causes. That

<sup>34</sup> See p. 15.

he was perfectly right in his diagnosis of the financial situation few will now deny. But that his proposed remedy was perilous in the extreme remains the opinion of the ablest students of financial problems. The dangers which it seemed to threaten finally rallied to the support of Mr. McKinley that mass of thoughtful citizens who in effect always hold the balance of political power.\* Mr. Bryan's definition of a debtor class was, indeed, too limited to be convincing. His thought was mainly of the farmers of the West who had mortgaged their lands to Eastern creditors. But the true debtor class was a much larger one than this. To it in reality belonged every person who had deposited his savings in a bank, or who had taken out a policy of life insurance, or who had made any small investment as a provision against illness or old age. These persons dreaded the possibility of receiving in place of their hard-earned money some form of depreciated currency; and they did not draw any fine distinctions between the so-called "fiat paper money" of the old Greenback Party and the fiat silver money of the new Democracy. And so, in the end, the prudence, or caution, or timidity of this large class turned the scale against the party of free silver.<sup>35</sup>

The excitement which marked this whole extraordinary contest increased in its intensity until the very end. An imposing demonstration in New York City signalled the close of the campaign on the Saturday before election day. More than 150,000 voters marched up Broadway, under a forest of flags and vivid decorations which covered nearly every building on that famous thoroughfare. Thou-

<sup>35</sup> For a brief criticism of both the gold and the silver arguments from the standpoint of one who accepted neither as convincing, see Fonda, *Honest Money*, ch. viii. (New York, 1895).



sands of them were men who had never, perhaps, taken part in a political parade before. Lawyers, merchants, clergymen, bankers, university professors, authors—all marched shoulder to shoulder, cheering lustily for “sound money” and incidentally for the Republican candidates. The demonstration had no great political significance, for New York was known to be safely Republican; yet the outpouring was one of the most picturesque as well as one of the most impressive incidents in a contest that was full of life and colour.

The election was unexpectedly decisive. Before midnight on November 3d, it was known that Mr. Bryan had been defeated and that he would receive in the Electoral College only 176 votes to 271 for Mr. McKinley. He had carried all the Southern States except West Virginia; and had also received the votes of Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, while California and Kentucky had each given him one electoral vote. But the solid opposition of the East, the Northwest and the Middle West had overborne his loyal following in the more thinly settled mining and agricultural States.<sup>36</sup> Yet Mr. Bryan had given the Republican party a shock of extreme severity. The extent of its fright may be measured by the ferocity with which its newspaper organs referred to Mr. Bryan even after the election. The following passage from the *New York Tribune* is sufficiently illustrative to deserve citation:

<sup>36</sup> In the popular vote, Mr. McKinley received 7,111,607 votes, and Mr. Bryan, 6,509,052—a majority for Mr. McKinley of 602,555. General Palmer, the candidate of the Gold Democrats, received 134,645 votes.

“The thing was conceived in iniquity and was brought forth in sin. It had its origin in a malicious conspiracy against the honour and integrity of the nation. It gained such monstrous growth as it enjoyed from an assiduous culture of the basest passions of the least worthy members of the community. It has been defeated and destroyed because right is right and God is God. Its nominal head was worthy of the cause. Nominal, because the wretched, rattle-pated boy, posing in vapid vanity and mouthing resounding rottenness, was not the real leader of that league of hell. He was only a puppet in the blood-imbued hands of Altgeld, the anarchist, and Debs, the revolutionist, and other desperadoes of that stripe. But he was a willing puppet, Bryan was,—willing and eager. Not one of his masters was more apt than he at lies and forgeries and blasphemies and all the nameless iniquities of that campaign against the Ten Commandments. He goes down with the cause, and must abide with it in the history of infamy. He had less provocation than Benedict Arnold, less intellectual force than Aaron Burr, less manliness and courage than Jefferson Davis. He was the rival of them all in deliberate wickedness, and treason to the Republic. His name belongs with theirs, neither the most brilliant nor the most hateful in the list. Good riddance to it all, to conspiracy and conspirators, and to the foul menace of repudiation and anarchy against the honour and life of the Republic.”

Mr. Bryan himself set an example of dignity and generous feeling which his newspaper assailants might well have tried to emulate. No sooner was the result of the election a certainty than he telegraphed to his successful rival a message of cordial congratulation, to which Mr. McKinley at once replied in terms of equal courtesy and personal good will.

Thus terminated the most eventful political struggle which the people of the United States had witnessed since

that which ended in the first election of Abraham Lincoln. Looking back upon it with a true perception of its significance, one finds in it the temporary failure of a noble cause through a faulty adaptation of means to end. For the underlying issue was not that of the money question at all. The money question served only to obscure the vital question and to postpone its ultimate decision. The people of the West, and indeed the people of the whole country, were suffering from the innumerable abuses which the lawlessness of corporate wealth had brought upon them. Unwisely they sought a remedy through an attempt to establish an unsound economic principle. The result was their defeat, and for a time the defeat of the cause for which they were contending. The way to deliverance was not to be opened to them through the door of the national finances. Mr. Bryan resembled a champion who rushes forth to meet a powerful antagonist, and who has armed himself with a sword of which the blade is flawed. At the very crisis of the combat, his weapon was shattered in his grasp, and the victory was given to his adversary.

## CHAPTER XII

### PRESIDENT M'KINLEY AND THE NEO-REPUBLICANISM

THERE was something symbolically significant in the pageant which accompanied the inauguration of President McKinley. Such displays in other years had exhibited the haphazard easy-going lack of management with which Americans are wont to improvise their public ceremonials. But on the fourth of March, 1897, the scene in Washington was one that might have fitly graced a European capital. Every detail had been studied carefully beforehand, and was carried out with absolute precision. The great avenues were well policed. The crowds were efficiently controlled. There were no delays, no moments of embarrassment, no awkward pauses. The military review was especially effective. Instead of masses of raw militiamen, marching often awkwardly and producing a bizarre effect by the diversity of their motley uniforms, there now defiled before the President, column after column of regular troops, whose perfect discipline and training made the sight of them a splendid spectacle. The finest cavalry regiments in the service had been drawn upon to render this inaugural review exceptionally brilliant; while the artillery and infantry were not inferior in the precision of their evolutions. The civic part of the parade was subordinated to the military; but even the "marching clubs" swung by the presidential stand with something of the *élan* of veteran troops. The Republican party was coming back to power as the party of organisation, of discipline, of unquestioning obedience to leadership; and the

spirit of this new régime was easily perceptible, even in the ceremony which marked the day of its beginning.

Mr. Cleveland remained at the side of his successor until the formalities were all concluded. He had spent the last few hours of his presidency in a most characteristic fashion, examining and signing bills; and the marks of ink upon his ungloved hands bore witness to his diligence. His face was ruddy, and he chatted and laughed with Mr. McKinley as the two were driven slowly to the Capitol. At last, the burden was lifted from his shoulders, and he could again enjoy the tranquil life of a private citizen. Though the reins of power were passing from his hands to those of a political opponent, he probably felt no regret. It was his financial policy which the Republicans, after bitterly assailing, had been forced to make their own. The great battle of the preceding year had been fought over this one question. And so the victory which Mr. McKinley had gained was, in a very real sense, a victory for Mr. Cleveland.

President McKinley's inaugural address contained, as might have been expected, an earnest commendation of high protective duties. In it he also expressed a strong desire for peace with foreign nations. He recalled his own consistent attitude as a defender of the reformed civil service; and he intimated that the currency system of the United States should be placed upon a definite and satisfactory basis. There was nothing very noteworthy in his remarks. They were received by the press with a general, if somewhat perfunctory, approval. Perhaps the comment of an English writer best expressed what most persons really thought. "It is a mild and not unpleasant effusion. The tone is a little smug and goody-goody, but kindly."<sup>1</sup> In truth, the country had for a

<sup>1</sup> London *Standard*, March 5, 1897.

time grown weary of political strife, and was disposed to give to the new administration a free hand.

The President showed his conservative cast of mind by appointing a Cabinet of rather elderly men, only one of them being less than sixty years of age. The oldest of them all, Mr. John Sherman, lately Senator from Ohio, was also the most distinguished in the length and value of his public service. He now became Secretary of State, though under circumstances which made the appointment by no means a source of unmixed pleasure to his friends. Mr. Sherman had long been one of the foremost leaders of the Republican Party. As a member of the lower House, before the Civil War, he had ably advocated the free-soil cause; and as Senator during President Lincoln's administration he had upheld the hands of the great Liberator. As Secretary of the Treasury under President Hayes, he had brought about the resumption of specie payments in so masterly a manner as not to cause the slightest ripple on the financial waters. Twice—in 1880 and again in 1888—he seemed likely to be his party's chosen candidate for the presidency. Ten years afterwards his name was permanently associated with two highly important measures—the Silver Purchase Act of 1890 and the so-called Anti-Trust Law of the same year.<sup>2</sup> He was now an old man of seventy-four, and had richly earned the right to finish his remaining years in the dignified and useful place which he had long held in the Senate. But, unhappily for Mr. Sherman, his own desires clashed with the strong-willed purpose of Mark Hanna. That appetitive person now demanded his reward. He had gained the presidency for Mr. McKinley, and in return he wished to be a Senator of the United States. He was not a man to be put off, and therefore Mr. Sherman was

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 220-222.

sacrificed to Hanna's urgency. The open humiliation of so conspicuous a statesman would have been too much for even Hanna to attempt; but the desired end was reached by indirection, and Senator Sherman experienced the sort of honorific elimination which an English party leader once described as being "kicked upstairs." Mr. McKinley offered to make Mr. Sherman his Secretary of State, and the aged Senator knew that he must accept. He felt no especial interest in diplomacy. Querulous and feeble and already verging upon senility, he shrank from taking up new duties for which he felt himself no longer fitted. Yet he was well aware that he had no choice. He must make way for Mr. Hanna; and hence he resigned the post of Senator to become the nominal chief of the new Cabinet—a pathetic figure, destined very soon to pass away entirely from public life.

The other Ministers were men of good executive ability, although of no especial prominence. In recognition of the aid given to Mr. McKinley by the Gold Democrats, one of their number, Mr. Lyman J. Gage, a Chicago banker, was made Secretary of the Treasury.<sup>3</sup> The war portfolio went to General Russell A. Alger of Michigan, a veteran of the Civil War, who had subsequently become known as an adroit politician and successful man of business. President McKinley's Secretary of the Navy was Mr. John D. Long of Massachusetts, a gentleman of scholarly tastes, who had had, however, no slight experience in public life, and who was soon to show himself to be an unusually capable administrator. The rest of the Cabinet, as originally constituted, may be dismissed with a mere mention. The Attorney-General was

<sup>3</sup> In 1892 President Cleveland had offered the Treasury portfolio to Mr. Gage, who declined it.

Mr. Joseph McKenna of California; the Postmaster-General was Mr. James A. Gary of Maryland; the Secretary of the Interior was Mr. Cornelius N. Bliss of New York; and the Secretary of Agriculture was Mr. James Wilson of Iowa.

President McKinley's first important official act was the issuance of a proclamation convening Congress in special session on March 15th, for the purpose of providing additional revenue for the Government, and to revise the tariff. Although the tariff question had been entirely subordinated in the late campaign, and although Mr. McKinley had secured his great majorities wholly as a defender of the gold standard, it was plain that for the present he intended to ignore the money issue, and to use his power to restore the high protective duties of 1890. The Democratic opposition criticised this purpose, asserting that it involved an element of duplicity. It was declared that Mr. McKinley could not have been elected merely as a protectionist; yet his first concern was now a reversion to the very policy which the country had condemned in 1892. This criticism was unfair. The President fully intended to secure salutary legislation for the reform of the currency; but the time was not yet auspicious for such legislation. Although the Republican party had more than a working majority in both Houses of Congress,<sup>4</sup> there were still so many Republican Senators favourable to the cause of free silver as to prevent concerted and successful action toward legalising the gold standard. The President knew that the defeat of Mr.

<sup>4</sup> In the Senate there were 46 Republicans, 34 Democrats, 5 Populists, 2 "Silver Republicans" and 3 Independents. In the House there were 206 Republicans, 134 Democrats and 16 Populists.



Bryan had put an end to all anxiety in the world of finance; and so, naturally enough, he turned to the revision of the tariff—a policy with which his name had been so long associated. But when he argued that a new tariff act was necessary to augment the revenues of the Government, he was on more debatable ground. The Wilson Act of 1894, though in many respects imperfect from the point of view of the tariff reformer, was not justly chargeable with the falling off in revenue during President Cleveland's term of office. In fact, had not President Harrison's Secretary of the Treasury forced a balance,<sup>5</sup> the year 1892-93 would have shown a deficiency of nearly \$48,000,000 for that period. Furthermore, the heaviest deficit under President Cleveland's administration (\$69,000,000 in 1893-94), occurred while the McKinley Act was still in force and before the Wilson Act had become operative. Indeed, each succeeding year witnessed an improvement in the Treasury balances; and in the very month when Mr. McKinley called Congress together to restore the high protective tariff, the Treasury report showed an actual surplus of nearly \$9,000,000, the customs receipts for that month having been exceeded only twice in a period of more than forty years. It was plain enough, then, that the Wilson Act was in no wise responsible for the temporary loss of revenue from 1893 to 1895; and that if left alone it would now provide an ample income for the ordinary needs of the Government.

But in reality the question was not one of revenue at all. The old protected industries were clamouring for the

<sup>5</sup> In 1893, Secretary Charles Foster, in his report, included among the Treasury's assets the bank-note redemption fund of \$54,000,000, which had always been regarded by other Secretaries as a trust fund. In this way he converted an actual deficit into a nominal surplus.

full favours which they had formerly enjoyed. Not from altruistic motives had the manufacturing interests contributed heavily to the funds of the Republican party in the late campaign. Their gifts had, on the contrary, been a strictly business investment; and the time had now come for them to receive full payment of their claims. When Congress met in extra session, a remarkable and quite unprecedented condition of affairs was at once made known. It showed more clearly than ever the wonderful compactness and machine-like efficiency of the Republican organisation since that party had passed under the control of "business men in politics." The elections of the preceding November had determined the composition of the new Congress; and so the leaders of the Republican majority, after conferring together, agreed upon a plan of action which took slight heed of precedent or of constitutional forms. It was planned that Mr. Reed should be re-elected Speaker of the House; and Mr. Reed in his turn indicated the Republican representatives whom he would appoint to membership in the Committee of Ways and Means. These gentlemen, therefore, in advance of their actual appointment and before the new Congress was convened, had already framed a tariff bill. As soon as the extra session of March 15th began, the programme was carried out to the letter. Mr. Reed again became Speaker. He appointed the Committee precisely as he had agreed to do; and its chairman, Mr. Nelson Dingley, Jr., of Maine, at once reported to the House the bill which he and his Republican associates had prepared. Never did a controversial party measure so quickly pass the lower Chamber. Although the Dingley Bill, as it was called, filled one hundred and sixty-three printed pages, only twenty-two pages of it were con-

sidered and discussed upon the floor of the House. Mr. Reed's rigorous rulings made short work of the disheartened opposition; and in less than two weeks the bill was transmitted to the Senate,<sup>6</sup> where it was referred to the Committee on Finance.

In the Senate, its schedules were carefully examined and amended.<sup>7</sup> The bill, as reported by the Finance Committee, was by no means so very radical a measure as might have been expected. Though it was essentially protectionist in its general character, it contained some duties that were intended solely to produce revenue; and in many items the purely protective duties had been appreciably lowered. But in the open Senate a different tendency was seen. Here was, in part, a repetition of the history of the Wilson Bill.<sup>8</sup> Now, as in 1894, there was an attempt on the part of disinterested Senators to make the measure a rational one from an economic and financial standpoint. But now, as in 1894, a number of Senators, who represented the great corporations and the manufacturers, interposed on behalf of their friends and benefactors. For more than two months the schedules were discussed item by item, and when the bill passed the Senate (July 7th) it contained 870 amendments. Like the Wilson Bill, it was then sent to a conference committee of both Houses. There, however, its fate was very different from that of its Democratic predecessor. Republican organisation and party discipline were far too good to permit an open rupture between the conflicting interests. The influence of President McKinley and the

<sup>6</sup> March 31, 1897.

<sup>7</sup> The Committee on Finance held the bill until May 8th, before reporting it.

<sup>8</sup> See pp. 355-368.

firmness of Speaker Reed compelled an agreement; so that on July 24th, all details having been adjusted, the Dingley Bill passed both Houses of Congress and became a law.

On the whole, it resembled the McKinley Act of 1890, though the average rate of duty on imports was slightly lowered. Some features, however, deserve attention. The Wilson Act had remitted the duties upon wool; the Dingley Act not only restored them, but even made them higher, in spite of the fact that the increase was earnestly opposed by manufacturers of woollen goods. The Secretary of the Wool Manufacturers' Association had said to the Committee of the House:

“ Never until he had experience under free wool did the manufacturer realise the full extent of the disadvantages he suffers by reason of the wool duty ”<sup>9</sup>

The reason why the tax on wool was restored in spite of so strong a protest is curiously illuminating as an example of the complexities of tariff-framing. Free wool had so stimulated the manufacture of woollen goods as to create an exceptional demand for the raw material. This demand had led ranch-owners in the far Western States to raise sheep instead of cattle, and it was found that they could produce wool cheaper than could the Ohio farmers. The latter, therefore, demanded a high tariff upon wool so as to limit the American manufacture of woollen goods and thus to keep down the demand for wool to the amount which they could themselves supply.<sup>10</sup> In other words, the heavy duty upon wool imposed by the

<sup>9</sup> *Bulletin of the Wool Manufacturers* for March, 1897, p. 84 (quoted by Taussig, *Tariff History*, p. 329).

<sup>10</sup> *Bulletin of the Wool Manufacturers* for June, 1897, p. 133.

Dingley Act was not intended to protect Americans against foreign competitors, but to favour one set of Americans, who lived in a Republican State, against another set of their own countrymen. The wool duty, therefore, both hampered the woollen manufacturers of the United States and at the same time actually killed the new wool-growing industry west of the Mississippi River. This fact was pointed out as an ideal illustration of the essential selfishness and economic folly of protective legislation. It certainly emphasised the truth of General Hancock's declaration in 1880 that "the tariff is a local issue."

The duties on silks and linens were also considerably augmented; those on cottons were somewhat lower than in the McKinley Act. On most metals the rates of the Wilson Act were not greatly altered, while copper was even retained upon the free list. But on manufactured articles of iron and steel, the McKinley rates were practically restored. Of more interest were the sugar schedules, over which in 1894 the action of the Senate had created so much scandal, because of the favour shown to the Sugar Trust.<sup>11</sup> While the Dingley Bill was under consideration, the "sugar Senators" had in committee sought to secure new advantages for the Trust, and had reported "an entirely new scheme of sugar duties, partly specific and partly *ad valorem*, complicated in its effects and difficult to explain, except as a means of making concessions under disguise to the refiners."<sup>12</sup> This complicated scheme was rejected by the Senate itself, which, however, amended the House schedule in such a way as to increase the "differential" to the advantage of the Trust. But upon this point the House stood firm. It would take away none of the privileges which the Trust

<sup>11</sup> See pp. 361-364.

<sup>12</sup> Taussig, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

already enjoyed; but it would not augment them. In the end, the Senate was obliged to yield, thus leaving the existing situation substantially unchanged.

One other feature of the Dingley Bill was not without significance. As originally reported, it imposed a tax of 25 per cent. upon books and scientific instruments imported for the use of schools, colleges and other institutions of learning, and it also levied an import duty of 20 per cent. on foreign works of art. This called out some very sharp criticism. Wrote one critic:

“The Dingley tax on books and instruments for libraries and colleges, along with the renewed tax on art, shows the country how much the Republican party really cares for the intelligence of the nation to which it so earnestly appealed in the last campaign. It was never tired of boasting of the way the educated men of the land had rallied to its support, irrespective of former party preferences. . . . By making it difficult for us to take advantage of the discoveries and improvements of the leaders of thought and investigation in other lands, we simply condemn ourselves to be losers in the race. Taxing knowledge of this kind is both a mark and a cause of barbarism. Free art, of course, had to go. Paintings in oil and water-colours, admitted free by the Wilson Bill, have made it dangerously easy for our artists and the visitors to our public galleries to become familiar with foreign masterpieces. What has protection to do with education or art? Nothing, except to cripple them in every way.”<sup>13</sup>

So much opposition was aroused by these clauses in the Dingley Bill as to lead to their modification. The duty on books and instruments was stricken out. The tax on works of art, however, still remained, in spite of the fact that nearly all American artists were opposed to it, and that no one, outside of Congress, had any interest in its retention. Taken as a whole, the Dingley Act made

<sup>13</sup> *The Nation*, March 25, 1897.

it plain that the extreme protectionists were still in control of the Republican Party, and that they had in no wise been affected by the experience of the past. This act, indeed, in several of its provisions carried the protective principle further than it had ever been extended. The anomaly was presented of gigantic industries, which were actually underselling foreign competitors in foreign markets, yet which were at the same time demanding from Congress a duty to protect them against competition in the United States. Such a duty enabled them to compel Americans to pay more for certain American goods than the foreigner paid for precisely the same articles. This was the *reductio ad absurdum* of the Neo-Republican doctrine which had been rapidly developed since 1883. The "business man in politics," of whom Senator Hanna was a type, was not, however, disturbed by this economic monstrosity in its practical results. He knew that his own class reaped immense benefits from it, and perhaps he entertained a pious hope that it might in some way incidentally benefit the people as a whole. But his first thought was for himself alone, since this was "business"; and it gave him no concern if the tariff system of his time embodied a concrete defiance of all the principles which the early Republican protectionists—Lincoln, Morrill, Chase, Fessenden and Stevens—had avowed.<sup>14</sup>

If the people of the United States felt but a languid interest in an economic measure so important as the tariff act of 1897, the fact is easily explained. For ten years, American politics had turned almost exclusively upon

<sup>14</sup> See *Taussig, op. cit.*, pp. 258-360: and for a discussion of the Dingley Act, mainly from a Republican standpoint, Stanwood, *American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century*, ii., pp. 360-394 (Boston, 1903).

questions of finance; and the culminating struggle of 1896 had left the great body of citizens wearied to the point of exhaustion. Nations, like individuals, are capable of being bored; and just as the salutary but uninteresting domestic reforms of Gladstone finally made Englishmen out of sheer *ennui* turn to the brilliantly spectacular foreign policy of Disraeli, so after a decade of controversy over bimetallism and free silver and tariff schedules, most Americans were eager for some less prosaic theme of public interest. The economic era had itself represented a reaction from the long agonies of the Civil War; and now the swing of the pendulum found a younger generation impatient of the commonplace, and avidly alert for a new and stimulating national issue. There has been noted in the course of the present narrative, a growing tendency on the part of the United States to concern itself with its international relations. The intervention in Samoa against the aggression of the Germans was the first evidence of this new drift. The Chilean imbroglio was another; the Venezuelan incident was still another.<sup>15</sup> Not without significance, also, was the fact that in the American diplomatic service, the rank of Ambassador had been created by act of Congress in 1893, and that this rank had been conferred upon the Ministers Plenipotentiary to Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Italy. The Republican Convention of 1896 had, as already recorded in these pages, urged an increase of the navy, the annexation of Hawaii, and the purchase from Denmark of her West Indian possessions. All these circumstances served to show very plainly that the national activities would not long be confined to matters of purely domestic interest, but that the United States, grown conscious of its strength, was already stirred by an imperial

<sup>15</sup> See pp. 180-189, 229-242, 412-436.



ambition and the spirit of adventure. As it happened, a situation existed at its very gates, which quickened this new restlessness into an aggressive mood.

In February, 1895, the native inhabitants of Cuba, driven to desperation by the long misrule of their Spanish masters, rose in a revolt which gradually reduced the island to a condition resembling one of anarchy. Unable to defeat the disciplined troops of Spain in open battle, the rebels resorted to a guerrilla warfare—cutting off small detachments, burning plantations, raiding villages, and endeavouring by incessant activity to sap the energy and exhaust the resources of their opponents. A Cuban Republic had been proclaimed; but it had no capital and had organised no government. It had not even an army, in the proper sense of the word; and its prowling bands of ill-armed peasants appeared and disappeared like phantoms. Nevertheless, although Spain had sent out to Cuba no less than 200,000 troops, the insurgents, under the leadership of Maximo Gomez and Antonio Maceo, fairly held their own, until by the end of 1896 they “roamed at will over three-fourths of the inland country.”<sup>16</sup> The colours of Spain still floated above the cities, but the *insurrectos* were practically masters of the interior.

Meanwhile, Cuba, one of the richest and most fertile islands in the world, was being swiftly ruined. The furious devastation of property continued. Plantations and villages were laid waste, while it seemed as though any definite end to the destructive process might be deferred for years. The revolution in Cuba passed through two distinct stages. In 1895, the Spanish Governor-General was Martinez Campos, a high-souled, chivalrous soldier, who waged war in accordance with the usages of high civilisation. His ill success, however, led the Span-

<sup>16</sup> Message of President Cleveland, December 7, 1896.

ish Government to replace him by General Valeriano Weyler, a harshly tyrannical commander of the type of the infamous Baron Haynau. Weyler was directed to crush the insurrection at any cost; and on October 21, 1896, he issued an order which put into effect his so-called policy of "reconcentration." From this moment the war ceased to be merely a war of repression and became a war of extermination. As the great body of the Cuban peasantry sympathised with the rebellion and gave aid and comfort to the rebels, Weyler's order directed that these people be driven in herds to the vicinity of the fortified towns. There they were penned in like cattle, and were compelled to subsist under conditions which no cattle could have endured. Deprived of their homes and with little clothing, they lay upon the earth, with foul air, foul water, and foul food, until, emaciated and diseased, they died like flies. In all, there were some 400,000 of these *reconcentrados*, and their condition excited at once the pity and the indignation of the world.

When the war in Cuba first broke out, American sympathy was very naturally extended to the insurgents. A little later it was seen that American interests were directly involved. As President Cleveland said to Congress in his last annual message: <sup>17</sup>

"It [Cuba] lies so near to us as to be hardly separated from our territory. Our actual pecuniary interest in it is second only to that of the people and Government of Spain. It is reasonably estimated that at least from \$30,000,000 to \$50,000,000 of American capital are invested in plantations and in railroad, mining and other business enterprises on the island. The volume of trade between the United States and Cuba, which in 1889 amounted to about \$64,000,000, rose in 1893 to about \$103,000,000, and in 1894 (the year before the present insurrection broke out) amounted to nearly

<sup>17</sup> December 7, 1896.

\$96,000,000. Besides this large pecuniary stake in the fortunes of Cuba, the United States finds itself inextricably involved in the present contest in other ways both vexatious and costly."

The last sentence here quoted refers to the fact that many American citizens resident in Cuba had been arrested and ill-treated by Spanish officials on the charge of aiding the Cuban rebels, and that these arrests had led to incessant friction between the Government of the United States and that of Spain. In 1895, a Spanish ship had even fired upon an American passenger steamer, the *Alliança*, when the latter was beyond the three-mile limit. Furthermore, in the exercise of its neutrality, the United States was compelled to guard its long line of sea-coast against filibustering expeditions and to endure the recriminations directed against it by the Spanish press and people. Nevertheless, for the space of a year and a half, Mr. Cleveland, following the example of President Grant during the so-called Ten Years' War,<sup>18</sup> had studiously abstained from interference with Spanish operations in the island. While offering, from time to time, his friendly mediation to secure a cessation of hostilities, he had respected the rights of Spain, and had so strictly enforced the statutes against filibustering expeditions as to make himself exceedingly unpopular among American sympathisers with Cuba. Finally, however, after Weyler's reconcentration order had been issued, and after it was fairly evident that Spain could not repress the revolution, President Cleveland, in his annual message of December 7, 1896, showed plainly that

<sup>18</sup> This war was waged in Cuba from 1868 to 1878, and was terminated by the promise of Spain (in the Treaty of Zanjón) to grant autonomy to Cuba. The promise had not been kept. See the section, "A Century of Cuban Diplomacy," in Hart, *The Foundation of American Foreign Relations* (New York, 1901).

the Government of the United States would not much longer maintain a passive attitude. Recapitulating the facts with regard to Cuba, he wrote some sentences of ominous import. He said:

“Neither has Spain made good her authority, nor have the insurgents made good their title to be regarded as an independent State. Except in towns, the whole island is given over to anarchy. . . . It cannot be reasonably assumed that the hitherto expectant attitude of the United States will be indefinitely maintained. . . . When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest . . . a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations which we can hardly hesitate to recognise and to discharge. . . . The United States is not a nation to which peace is a necessity.”

Apart from the natural sympathy with which Americans regarded any struggle for political independence, and apart also from any commercial interests which were threatened by the Cuban insurrection, there was still another reason for American resentment against Spain. Thousands of citizens recalled a grievous outrage against the dignity of the United States for which Spain had been responsible in the past and which had never been avenged. This was the notable affair of the *Virginius*. On October 31, 1873, during the former revolution in Cuba, an American merchant vessel, the *Virginius*, was forcibly captured on the high seas by the Spanish gunboat *Tornado*. The American flag was hauled down and trampled upon, with every possible sign of derision, and the *Virginius* itself, with its captain, passengers, and crew, of whom nine were American citizens, were taken to the port of Santiago de Cuba. Captain Fry and the ship's company were cast

into prison, and by order of the Spanish Governor, General Burriel, were tried by drum-head court martial. Fifty-three of the fifty-nine were condemned and shot, and the survivors also were sentenced to be executed. At this moment, however, there steamed into the harbour of Santiago the British man-of-war *Niobe*, commanded by Captain (afterwards Sir) Lambton Lorraine. When he learned of what had been done and of what was then impending, he wasted no time in official correspondence. Swinging his ship about, broadside on, he sent a curt note to General Burriel intimating that unless the order of execution were suspended, the *Niobe's* guns would at once open fire upon the city.<sup>19</sup> General Burriel revoked his order immediately; but, none the less, fifty-three unarmed persons had been taken from under the protection of the American flag and had been shot to death. Indignation in the United States was extreme. President Grant took measures to place the navy upon a war footing and caused a strong protest to be made to the Spanish Minister, who with true Castilian haughtiness refused to receive it. On the following day (November 4th), the American Minister at Madrid (General Sickles) was notified by cable: "In case of refusal of satisfactory reparation within twelve days from this date, you will at the expiration of that time close your legation and leave Madrid." Spain still gave no satisfactory reply; and, therefore, on November 15th, Secretary Fish again cabled: "If Spain cannot redress these outrages, the United States will." Nevertheless, when the twelve days expired, Spain had not yielded, nor did General Sickles leave Madrid. As a

<sup>19</sup> This spirited act received the full approval of the British Government. Sir Lambton Lorraine was afterwards entertained, and presented with a service of plate by the people of the city of New York.

matter of fact, the United States was in a most humiliating position. Its navy, under the corrupt administration of Secretary Robeson, had so degenerated that it did not possess a single fighting ship which could have met successfully the Spanish armoured cruisers with their modern guns. Even the antiquated hulks still in commission were scattered and ill-equipped, and time was necessary to collect them. The Spaniards knew this very well and sneered at all American protests. Finally, however (November 25th), President Grant resolved on war, if war were necessary. Whatever losses the United States might at first sustain, in the end there could be no doubt of the result. Hence, another cablegram was sent to General Sickles at Madrid: "If no accommodation is reached by the close of to-morrow, leave." When the morrow came, Spain proposed a sort of compromise. She would surrender the *Virginius* and would proceed against her own officials, if it should be found that they had violated the treaty rights of the United States. She would not, however, in surrendering the *Virginius*, salute the flag of the United States nor offer any compensation for the men who had been done to death. This compromise was accepted by the American Government,<sup>20</sup> partly because a war was then most undesirable, and partly because there was some serious doubt as to the regularity of the papers which the *Virginius* carried. It is now, indeed, quite certain that the *Virginius* was engaged in an unlawful errand and was conveying both men and ammunition to the Cuban rebels. Yet this circumstance did not justify her capture on the high seas or the execution of her crew and passengers by the sentence of a court-martial. When

<sup>20</sup> See President Grant's annual Message of December 1, 1873, and his special Message of January 5, 1874.

the Spaniards came to surrender the ship to American naval officers, they did so in a fashion that was full of insult. The surrender took place, not in the harbour of Santiago, but in the secluded and lonely port of Bahia Honda, where few could witness it; while before the delivery of the *Virginius*, the interior of the ship had been knocked to pieces, and its decks smeared with excrement and other filth.

This mortifying incident had not been forgotten by the American people; and the memory of it gave poignancy to the anger with which they viewed the barbarities of Weyler. In 1896, both the Democratic and the Republican platforms had expressed sympathy with the Cuban people; and the Republican declaration had even hinted at actual intervention by the United States. Such was the situation when President McKinley took office, and before long that situation became acute.

The continuance of General Weyler's cruelties swelled from week to week the rising tide of American anger, which was also increased by many special incidents. The frequent arrest of American citizens in Cuba, the ill-treatment often accorded to them, and the insults directed against American consular officers in the island, all of which received a sensational publicity in the press, aroused public sentiment in the United States to a pitch of dangerous irritation. A definite desire for intervention in Cuba became more manifest. In Congress a majority of both Houses were willing to recognise the Cuban rebels as belligerents. Even under President Cleveland it had been proposed to grant this recognition by joint resolution. Secretary Olney, however, had bluntly declared that even should such a joint resolution be adopted by Congress, the President would entirely ignore it. In

truth, the Cubans had not yet gained the status of belligerency; and this was President McKinley's opinion, as set forth in his first annual message (December 6, 1897). Nevertheless, events were drifting dangerously toward a definite crisis. The Spanish Government was still unwilling to consider even friendly mediation on the part of the United States. The Spanish people believed that Americans were secretly aiding the Cuban rebels; and this, in fact, was true, although President McKinley, like President Cleveland, honestly endeavoured to prevent it. He felt obliged, however, to make, in September, 1897, a peremptory demand for the release or speedy trial of all American citizens under arrest. He had previously<sup>21</sup> asked Congress to appropriate the sum of \$50,000 for the benefit of indigent Americans in Cuba, and this help had been promptly given. All recognised that the situation was becoming unendurable. On September 18, 1897, General Stewart L. Woodford, the new American Minister to Spain, once more tendered to the Spanish Government the friendly offices of the United States. In doing so he wrote a sentence of which the language, although guarded, was full of meaning.<sup>22</sup>

A new ministry had been formed in Madrid under the premiership of the Liberal leader, Señor Sagasta. He replied to General Woodford's note by announcing that Spain would grant to the Cubans the right of self-government under Spanish sovereignty. General Weyler was recalled and General Blanco was appointed in his place. The reconcentration order was modified, and for

<sup>21</sup> May 17, 1897.

<sup>22</sup> "I cannot disguise the gravity of the situation, nor conceal the conviction of the President that should his present effort be fruitless, his duty to his countrymen will necessitate an early decision as to the course of action which the time and the transcendent emergency may demand."



a time it seemed as though the crisis had passed. Such, however, was not the case. The Cubans, remembering the promises which Spain had broken in 1878, refused to lay down their arms. The *reconcentrados* experienced no real relief. Finally, the Spanish loyalists in the island bitterly resented even a nominal grant of self-government to the Cubans. Mobs in Havana threatened the authorities, and marched through the streets cheering for Weyler and cursing President McKinley and the United States.

So formidable were these outbreaks that the American Consul-General, Fitzhugh Lee, appealed to his Government to send a naval force to Cuban waters. The same request had been often made before, but now at last it was heeded. In January, 1898, orders were issued in Washington for the North Atlantic squadron to rendezvous at the Dry Tortugas, within six hours' steaming distance of Cuba; and on the 25th of the same month, the second-class battleship *Maine* was ordered to Havana.<sup>23</sup> The despatch of the *Maine* was officially declared to be a friendly act. The Spanish Government was notified; and it consented, somewhat reluctantly, to the presence of the American warship. Señor Sagasta, in a courteous note, informed the American Government that Spain would reciprocate by sending the Spanish armoured cruiser *Vizcaya* to visit the harbour of New York. The *Maine* was received with punctilious attention by the Spanish authorities in Havana. She was conducted to her anchorage by a Spanish officer, and her commander, Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, became the official guest of the Spanish Governor-General. The people and the press of

<sup>23</sup> The cruiser *Montgomery* was at the same time ordered to touch at the Cuban ports of Santiago and Matanzas.

Havana were, however, far less amiable.<sup>24</sup> Meanwhile a powerful squadron of battleships and cruisers was gathering at Key West, under the command of Captain William T. Sampson, who kept himself in communication with the commander of the *Maine* by means of the torpedo-boat *Cushing*.

This was the situation at the beginning of February 1898, when an incident occurred to strain still further the relations between the United States and Spain. The Spanish Minister at Washington, Señor Dupuy de Lome had written a private letter to a friend of his in Havana, one Señor Canalejas. This letter fell into the hands of a Cuban sympathiser, who gave it to the American press, and it was published in translation on February 9th. The letter spoke cynically of Spain's grant of self-government to Cuba. It suggested bad faith in Spain's dealings with the American Government, and it contained one passage which was grossly disrespectful to the American President. Señor de Lome wrote of Mr. McKinley's message:

“Besides the natural and inevitable coarseness with which it repeated all that press and public opinion in Spain have said of Weyler, it shows once more that McKinley is weak and a caterer to the rabble, and, moreover, a cheap politician (*debil y populachero y ademas un politicastro*) who wishes to leave a door open to himself and to stand well with the jingoes of his party.”

The publication of this letter led to de Lome's immediate

<sup>24</sup> On one occasion, Captain Sigsbee, while ashore, had a small printed sheet thrust into his hand. It contained, among others, the following paragraph:

“These Yankee pigs who meddle with our affairs, humiliate us in the last degree; and as an even greater provocation, send us a man-of-war of their rotten squadron, after insulting us in their newspapers with articles sent from our own home.”

diate resignation, though the Spanish Government disclaimed all sympathy with its sentiments. Popular excitement, both in the United States and in Spain, increased daily. Spain protested against the presence of the American squadron at Key West, and against the action of the Red Cross Society in collecting subscriptions for the relief of the *reconcentrados*. In the United States, a section of the press published the most inflammatory appeals in behalf of Cuba. In the Senate, the question of intervention was debated from day to day; and many influential leaders of both Houses urged aggressive action upon President McKinley. The President, however, showed great firmness and self-control. A member of his Cabinet afterwards wrote:

“During the consideration of the notes exchanged, I was often struck by the concern manifested by President McKinley and his advisers of the Cabinet to be considerate of the susceptibilities of the Spanish people, and at the same time to attain the one object in view—the permanent pacification of Cuba.”<sup>25</sup>

Then occurred an event of momentous and far-reaching consequences. At a little before ten o'clock on the evening of February 15th, the battleship *Maine*, as she lay at anchorage in the harbour of Havana, was blown up by an explosion which wrecked the ship, with a loss of two officers and two hundred and sixty-four enlisted men. The news of this appalling catastrophe reached Washington soon after midnight, in the form of a telegram from Captain Sigsbee, in command of the *Maine*. After briefly narrating the loss of his ship, he added the words: “Public opinion should be suspended until further

<sup>25</sup> Long, *The New American Navy*, i., p. 133 (New York, 1903).

report." A thrill of horror and indignation, unparalleled since the firing upon Sumter, swept over the American people. Nevertheless, there was no violent demand for vengeance. The gravity of the situation gave steadiness and poise to public opinion. The nation displayed a universal willingness to suspend judgment until a full and rigorous inquiry should be made. The tone of the press throughout the country was admirable, and is well exemplified in an editorial which appeared in the *Philadelphia Press* on February 18th:

"With the continued tension of feeling and the uncertainty respecting the catastrophe to the *Maine*, there rests unabated the continued duty to sobriety and reserve of judgment. This is due to truth, to reason and to ultimate justice."<sup>26</sup>

Mr. Henry Watterson wrote in the *Louisville Courier-Journal*:

"We are the people of common sense as well as of high spirit. Hence we have never yet gone into a war that was not justified. Hence, too, we await some definite reports as to the disaster which befell the *Maine* before asserting any other sentiment than horror at the calamity and grief for its victims."

And the *Kansas City Star* well said that the United States was not seeking war, but was endeavouring to ascertain whether an act of war had already been committed against it. "A great nation can afford to take time to be perfectly just."

Telegrams of sympathy from the governments of foreign countries poured in upon the President. The Spanish

<sup>26</sup> See also the *Cincinnati Commercial Tribune*, the *Baltimore Sun*, the *Providence Journal*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Memphis Commercial Appeal* of the same date.

Prime Minister spoke words of profound sympathy and sorrow, as did also Governor-General Blanco in Havana; while the high-minded and womanly Queen Regent of Spain cabled an expression of her personal feeling of horror and regret. The honour of Spain as a civilised power was indeed at stake. That so terrible an event should have happened in a time of peace to the warship of a friendly nation while its commander was a guest of Spain, jeopardised her place in the family of nations. There were many, however, who believed that the disaster to the American battleship had been an accident, due either to the carelessness of the officers and crew or to the spontaneous combustion of high explosives stored within her hull. This view was tentatively held by not a few Americans, while it was almost universally adopted in such European nations as sympathised with Spain in her controversy with the United States.

President McKinley immediately ordered a naval court of inquiry to investigate the cause of the disaster. This court was composed of officers whose high professional standing was unquestioned, its president being Captain W. T. Sampson, who had served as chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. After a very careful examination of the circumstances, based in part upon the work of divers who examined the wreckage underneath the water, the court of inquiry made its report to the Secretary of the Navy on March 21st. The report showed conclusively that the *Maine* had been destroyed from without, apparently by a submarine mine. This was made evident by the circumstance that the plates of the ship had been blown inward and its keel driven upward through its deck—the reverse of what would have happened had the explosion been an internal one. The court confined itself to

a detailed statement of the facts and of its own conclusions. It did not attempt to fix the responsibility. Subsequently a Spanish court of inquiry made an independent examination, and reported that the explosion had been an internal one; but it gave no facts such as would amount to a justification of this opinion.

It was now obvious to those in power that war could not be long averted. The temper of the people both in the United States and in Spain became distinctly belligerent. The Spanish press teemed with insults directed against the "Yankee pigs." One influential journal, *El Globo* of Madrid, remarked:

"As a matter of fact, the United States is at present very much like an immense *Maine* floating between the Atlantic and the Pacific; and some of her crew have evidently lost their heads. . . . President McKinley, the commander, does his best to restore order among his undisciplined crew. The real *Maine* was lost in consequence of the slipshod manner in which the enormous quantities of explosives were stored, and to the undue haste which caused these war preparations to be made on board a vessel manned by an ill-disciplined crew. The ruin of the United States will also probably be caused by an explosion. In this case, however, it will really be 'external.'"

In the United States a no less bitter feeling now prevailed. Meetings were held in the great cities to urge a declaration of war and the recognition of the Cuban Republic. The tone of the press became more and more warlike. Spanish flags were burned by great crowds which cheered for Free Cuba, and reproached the Government for its apparent inactivity. President McKinley, however, and his advisers were far from deserving this reproach. They knew that war was unavoidable, yet

they were desirous of gaining time for preparation. The navy-yards and arsenals worked night and day. Messages, speeding under the sea, directed the rapid concentration of ships of war at important strategic points. Unfinished vessels were hastily completed. Repairs were made with all possible expedition. A naval officer was sent to Europe to purchase men-of-war from foreign nations. An immense number of torpedoes and submarine mines were bought or manufactured for the defense of American harbours. Guns were mounted on the sea-coast fortifications. On March 8th, Congress unanimously voted an appropriation of \$50,000,000 to be placed at the disposal of the President "as an emergency fund for national defence." Spain responded to this measure by securing a loan of 200,000,000 pesetas (\$40,000,000) from the Bank of Spain. On April 1st, Congress appropriated for the navy a further sum of \$39,000,000. Negotiations still continued between Spain and the United States with regard to the Cuban situation, but with no satisfactory results. The recall of General Fitzhugh Lee from Cuba was demanded by the Spanish Government and was refused by the United States. Spain proposed to submit to arbitration its alleged responsibility for the destruction of the *Maine*; but this offer was declined. The issue between the two countries had now passed far beyond that isolated subject of dispute.

Meanwhile, the attitude of certain foreign Powers to the controversy had assumed a serious importance. Three European nations of the first rank were anxious either to prevent the outbreak of a war or, if it were possible, directly to intervene on behalf of Spain. These three

nations were Austria, France and Germany. The motives animating their governments were quite diverse. The Austrian Emperor had a dynastic interest in the welfare of the Spanish kingdom; for the Queen Regent of that country was a Hapsburg, the daughter of the Austrian Archduke Karl Ferdinand, and personally admired and loved by the aged Kaiser. The interest of France in the dispute was a financial one. French citizens had invested large sums of money in Spanish bonds, while French bankers had financed a great number of Spanish commercial enterprises. A war between Spain and the United States must necessarily depreciate the value of these investments; and, therefore, France was eager to give the strongest possible support to its Iberian neighbour.

The case of Germany was different from that either of Austria or France. There was no ill-will between the American people and the people of the German Empire. They were friends, as they had always been. But the official class in Germany disliked all that was American—the easy-going ways, the democratic manners, and, above all, the material success of the American Republic. The German military caste had been humiliated by the stubborn resistance offered to German ambition in Samoa, and by the subsequent defeat of Bismarck in his negotiations with American commissioners at Berlin. The German Kaiser, with his colonial ambitions, had long been vexed to find that the sturdiest of his subjects refused to go on any terms to Kamerun or to New Guinea; while every ship that sailed from German ports to the United States bore hundreds away to that Republic whose strength they made still stronger and whose loyal sons their sons became. Hence, to the German Junker, to the arrogant



representatives of militarism, and to the monarch who believed in the divine origin of his own power, America seemed a land that existed only to unsettle the minds of the lowly and to mock by its prosperity and contentment the basic principles of autocratic rule. For many years, therefore, the official German feeling towards the United States had been one of smouldering dislike. Moreover, the General Staff at Berlin entertained the lowest possible opinion of American military power. The mighty contest which was waged on American soil during the four years of civil war made no impression upon the German experts. It was a German chief-of-staff of whom a visitor once inquired: "Have you given much attention to the battles of the American war?" And he replied, with an icy stare: "I have no time to waste in studying the struggles of two armed mobs." So spoke the Prussian military expert, and so thought all the disciples of von Moltke. Americans were highly prosperous. They were good at trading and at slaughtering hogs; but they deserved serious notice only when they made themselves offensive to the *Hochwohlgeboren*.

In 1898, a new motive swayed the restless mind of William II. He was now carrying out with vigour his favourite project of a great colonial empire and of a navy able to defend it.<sup>27</sup> His attempts at colonisation in Africa had not met with much success. His subjects could not be induced to go out as settlers to lands so utterly unlike the land in which they had been born. In the Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul, however, many Germans had found homes and had formed the nucleus of what might with careful nursing become a German State. Brazil

<sup>27</sup> See von Schierbrand, *The Kaiser's Speeches*, pp. 179-197 (New York, 1903); Anon., *German Ambitions*, pp. 34-51 (London, 1903).

was weak. What, then, stood in the way of finding in South America an outlet for German emigration, in a country over which the flag of imperial Germany might be ultimately raised? Nothing, save the fixed purpose of the United States that no part of the American Continent should be regarded as subject to future colonisation by any European power. But how far, so queried the Kaiser, was a nation of traders and money-grubbers able to maintain this doctrine in the face of a great military State like Germany? Of how much importance was the new American navy? What fighting power was there in the sort of "armed mob" which Americans were satisfied to call an army? These questions doubtless flitted through the Kaiser's mind at the moment when war seemed to be impending between the United States and Spain. Here was a rare opportunity for testing the American capacity for war against the fleets and armies of a European nation. The theoretical soldiers at Berlin knew that Spain had two hundred thousand regular troops in Cuba. They knew, also, that Spain possessed on paper a navy not much inferior to that of the United States. They argued, therefore, that the war must be a fairly long one, and that if the Americans invaded Cuba with their motley forces, equipped with small arms that were obsolete, and unprovided with siege artillery, they must inevitably be defeated by the Spanish regulars. As to the navy, the Germans were not so sure; but at least they thought that the contest on the sea would be fairly even. Hence the Kaiser looked for a prolonged struggle, with the odds somewhat in favour of Spain, at least at the beginning of the war. In order that these odds might be quite overwhelming, the officials in the Wilhelmsstrasse conceived the plan of a diplomatic demonstration by the

chief Continental Powers, which should hint at intervention on behalf of Spain. This scheme to embarrass the American Government appears to have found a ready acceptance at the French Foreign Office and undoubtedly at Vienna. Its consummation must, however, be carried out in Washington.

There remained one factor in the situation with which these three pro-Spanish Powers had still to reckon. This was the attitude of Great Britain, as to which nothing as yet was known, but which was of the very last importance. If that nation, with its mighty fleet, should give even a passive support to the scheme of intervention, then the United States might well be forced to halt and to recede from aggressive action. Lord Salisbury had sent explicit instructions to Sir Julian Pauncefote in Washington; but the purport of these instructions was unknown. On April 6th, Sir Julian, as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, received at the British Embassy the representatives of France, Austria, Germany and Italy. Just what took place at this gathering is not definitely known. It is practically certain, however, that the Continental diplomats suggested that a joint note be addressed to President McKinley, couched in such terms as to imply a cordial understanding between the signers of the note on behalf of their respective governments. It was intended so to word this letter as to make it in effect a protest against the attitude of the United States, and an intimation that the five great Powers would not view with indifference an attack upon the sovereignty of Spain in Cuba. To the consternation of the plotters, the British Ambassador gave a flat refusal. Great Britain would not, by word or deed, do anything to mar the very cordial relations which now existed between her and the United

States. Back of this plain assertion there lurked something even more significant—a veiled intention on the part of her Majesty's Government to secure to the United States an entirely free hand. When these words had been spoken, intervention became at once impossible, and it was hastily agreed that the joint note should contain only a friendly and humane expression of a general desire for peace. Such a note was then prepared, and was read to the President on April 7th by Sir Julian Pauncefote, who was accompanied to the White House by Dr. von Holleben, the German Ambassador, M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador, Baron von Hengelmüller, the Minister of Austria-Hungary, and the Chargés d'Affaires of Italy and Russia. The text of the note communicated to the President was as follows:

“The undersigned, representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, duly authorised in that behalf, address in the name of their respective governments a pressing appeal to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President and of the American people, in their existing difficulties with Spain. They earnestly hope that further negotiations will lead to an agreement, which, while securing the maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guarantees for the re-establishment of order in Cuba. The Powers do not doubt that the humanitarian and purely disinterested character of this representation will be fully recognised and appreciated by the American nation.”

To the reading of this note, President McKinley made the following reply:

“The Government of the United States recognises the good will which has prompted the friendly communication of the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain,

Italy and Russia, as set forth in the address of your Excellencies, and shares the hope therein expressed that the outcome of the situation in Cuba may be the maintenance of peace between the United States and Spain by affording the necessary guarantees for the re-establishment of order in the island, so terminating the chronic condition of disturbance there which so deeply injures the interests and menaces the tranquillity of the American nation by the character and consequences of the struggle thus kept up at our doors, besides shocking its sentiments of humanity.

“The Government of the United States appreciates the humanitarian and disinterested character of the communication now made on behalf of the Powers named; and, for its part, is confident that equal appreciation will be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavours to fulfil a duty to humanity by ending a situation, the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable.”

The note and the reply were rather neatly summarised by an editorial writer as follows:

“Said the six Ambassadors: ‘We hope for humanity’s sake you will not go to war.’ Said Mr. McKinley in reply: ‘We hope if we do go to war, you will understand that it is for humanity’s sake.’ And the incident was closed.”<sup>28</sup>

The failure of this diplomatic plot lent venom to the comments which Continental journals published with regard to Spanish-American affairs. The Paris *Temps* predicted that a war would have “grave international consequences” to the United States and might even “produce a revolution and lead to the development of

<sup>28</sup> The New York *World*, April 8, 1898. Some interesting facts regarding the inner history of this episode, are given by the well-known English publicist, Mr. A. Maurice Low in a paper entitled “An Unwritten Chapter of Diplomatic History,” published in *McClure’s Magazine* for July, 1900.

Cæsarism, an evil which gnaws the vitals of every democracy." The *Journal des Débats* spoke of American intervention in Cuba as "an act of international piracy, without a shadow of justice about it." The *Libre Parole* in a vituperative article made clear the fact that Great Britain's attitude was thoroughly well understood upon the Continent. It said:

"Great Britain is the hypocritical partner of the United States. Their alliance against Spain is a disgrace; but it is just as well to have them work together now, since together they will have to render an account to international justice. The time is coming when Europe will no longer tolerate such miscreants and assassins as John Bull and Brother Jonathan."

In Austria the comments of the press were equally unfavourable. The *Fremdenblatt* of Vienna declared that a war with Spain would be "criminal," and asserted that only an infinitesimal minority of the Cubans favoured annexation to the United States. But it was in Germany that anti-Americanism took on its most offensive form. Thus the Berlin *Echo* remarked:

"A great deal of noise is made about the \$50,000,000 voted for warlike preparations; but this means very little, since the armament of the United States was at zero. Moreover, one cannot tell how much of this money will stick in dirty hands. In short, European opinion generally supports the view that the American people yell loudest for war and are least prepared, while the Spaniards are more anxious for peace, but are better armed."

Prince Bismarck's organ, the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, compared the behaviour of the Americans to that of an incendiary "who pretends to help extinguish the flames in

order to hide his own guilt." "This notoriously disreputable Republic has the assurance to pose as a censor of the morals of European monarchies." *Die Nation* of Berlin said that if war came, it would be due to "the low politicians of democracy." General Bronsart von Schellendorf, formerly Prussian Minister of War, was quoted as saying that in German military circles the fighting capacity of the American army was not rated highly, and that the American navy was not sufficiently powerful to destroy the Spanish fleet. A widely read Dutch paper, the *Nieuws van den Dag* of Amsterdam, which drew its inspiration from Paris and Berlin, was particularly bitter. Spain, it said, has proved itself a nation of men capable of any sacrifice in behalf of their national honour.

"The corruption of the Spanish officials will have to become a great deal worse before it can rival in rottenness the administration of Tammany-ridden New York or of Porkopolis. . . . The meanest thing of all is that the Americans try to avoid the responsibility of declaring war, and seek to insult Spain so grossly that the proud Spaniard loses patience. But there is danger for the rich pork-butchers of Chicago and the corrupt debauchees of New York, who speculate *à la baisse* in war."

The Continental press teemed with the grossest caricatures, in which Americans were drawn as swine. It was declared again and again that the navy of the United States was utterly devoid of discipline and training and that the army would be put to flight by the Spanish regulars. In England both press and people were heartily in sympathy with the United States. Only one conspicuous exception was found, and this was in the *Saturday Review* of London, which maintained to the full its old traditions of hostility to everything American. It de-

scribed the United States as "socially sordid to the last degree," and as having "contributed nothing to the self-respect of humanity. On the contrary, it has shown all the world to what a depth of public depravity civilisation is capable of descending." Of President McKinley it said: "Mr. Pecksniff rebuking vanity and selfishness never struck a more beautiful attitude. America is not ready for war; the authorities at Washington know how much all this pot-valiant bragging is worth." Then it proceeded to forecast the result of a war between the United States and Spain. It described the American seamen as "the sweeping of the quays of New York and New Orleans—men who deserted their own ships, attracted by the high pay and easy life of the American marine, to whom in most cases fighting is the last thing thought of. . . . The Spaniards, on the other hand, are still capable of sublime heroism and daring on the high seas, and it is not at all clear that Chile and Peru and Mexico may not . . . discover that they, too, have a moral sense which is capable of being outraged by oppression and injustice."<sup>29</sup>

As the weeks went by, American preparation took on the aspect of completeness. The naval militia was mobilised. Swift ocean steamers were chartered and equipped with modern guns. Two protected cruisers, a gunboat and two torpedo boats were bought in England.<sup>30</sup> Of the regular naval force, a strong fleet had now assembled at Key West under Captain Sampson; a flying

<sup>29</sup> *Saturday Review*, April 23, 1898.

<sup>30</sup> In all, more than one hundred merchantmen and swift steamers were purchased and transformed into auxiliary cruisers, gunboats and colliers. Upon these transformed vessels more than five hundred guns were mounted.



squadron under Commodore Schley lay at anchor in Hampton Roads; while a patrol squadron under Commodore Howell cruised in the vicinity of the northern sea-coast cities. In Asiatic waters, Commodore George Dewey collected at Hong Kong the ships under his command; and to him were despatched large quantities of ammunition on the cruiser *Baltimore*. More than fifteen hundred torpedoes and mines were placed in the principal harbours of American sea-coast cities.<sup>31</sup> The Spanish War Office also displayed activity. A Spanish squadron was ordered to St. Vincent, and rumour said that another naval force was assembling at the Cape Verde Islands. The moment for decisive action had arrived. On April 11th, the President sent to Congress a special message in which, after a recapitulation of recent events, he asked that he be empowered

“to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba . . . and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes. . . . In the name of humanity, in the name of civilisation, in behalf of endangered American interests, which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.

“The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action.”

To this message, Congress responded on the 19th,<sup>32</sup> by

<sup>31</sup> See Long, *op. cit.*, i., p. 125-164; Alger, *The Spanish-American War*, pp. 15-28 (New York, 1901).

<sup>32</sup> The delay was due to a difference of opinion between the Senate and the House as to the wording of the joint resolution.

adopting a joint resolution declaring that the people of Cuba were, and of right ought to be, free and independent; authorising the President to demand that Spain relinquish her sovereignty over Cuba and withdraw her forces from that island; directing him to employ the army and navy to enforce this demand; and finally asserting on the part of the United States a determination to leave the government and control of Cuba to its people.

Pursuant to this mandate, the President caused to be cabled to General Woodford, the American Minister to Spain, the text of an ultimatum. But already the Spanish Minister in Washington had demanded and received his passports, and had departed for Canada. Before General Woodford in Madrid could communicate with the Foreign Office, he received a note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, informing him that diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain had already terminated. General Woodford thereupon left Madrid. Under very trying circumstances, he had borne himself with great dignity and circumspection. For a long while, he and his family had been subjected in Madrid to something like a social ostracism; yet he had made no sign, and had compelled the personal respect, both of the diplomatic corps and even of the Spanish officers of state.

Events marched fast. The Queen Regent of Spain, attended by her son, the King—then a boy of twelve years—addressed the assembled Cortes in a speech<sup>33</sup> animated by a noble yet pathetic courage; and the people of her capital greeted her with frenzied cheers as she made eloquent appeal to their devotion. On the following day, Captain Sampson, now raised to the rank of acting Rear-

<sup>33</sup> Translation in Wilcox, *A Short History of the War with Spain*, pp. 87, 88 (New York, 1898).

Admiral, was directed to blockade the coast of Cuba. The President, almost simultaneously, called by proclamation for 125,000 volunteers. Already detachments of regular troops were moving southward. Erelong they began to pitch their tents in Key West. On April 25th, Congress, by a unanimous vote of both Houses, made a formal declaration of war.

It was with a feeling of relief that Americans received the tidings of this momentous step. At last the long expected hour had come. The nation entered upon the struggle *à cœur léger*. Curiously enough, there was expressed no hatred of the Spanish people. The war appeared to the multitude in the light of a romantic episode, a picturesque adventure. In the cities, at the theatres and restaurants, orchestras played patriotic airs, intermingling "The Star Spangled Banner" with the strains of "Dixie." Men and women leaped to their feet and sang the words. An air of buoyant gaiety pervaded every gathering. Once more the nation was truly and inseparably one, and patriotism was not merely dominant,—it was the fashion.

Far more remarkable was the manner in which the news was greeted in Great Britain. Within six hours after the cable had told the story, all London burst out into the rainbow hues of the American national colours. Thousands of American flags floated from shops, hotels and private houses; while streamers of red, white and blue effected a brilliant contrast with the smoky walls of the metropolis. A great multitude of people assembled before the American Embassy, cheering heartily for the United States. No such demonstration in behalf of another country had ever before been witnessed in the British capital. It banished from the hearts of all Ameri-

cans who witnessed it the memory of other days, when the ties of blood and language had been nearly sundered.

But history was already making. From Washington, on the preceding day, a brief despatch had flashed around the world to Commodore Dewey at Hong Kong:

“War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavours.”

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE WAR WITH SPAIN

COMMODORE DEWEY, on the Asiatic station, had his squadron well in hand. The vessels which composed it were not reckoned among the most powerful ships of the new navy, but they were in a state of high efficiency, and in their class they were as good as any in the world. Lying at Hong Kong was the flagship *Olympia*, a protected cruiser of 5800 tons and carrying a fine armament of modern guns. With her were the *Baltimore*, a protected cruiser of 4600 tons, and the *Raleigh*, a protected cruiser of 3217 tons. At Mirs Bay, on the Chinese coast, thirty miles distant from Hong Kong, were the protected cruiser *Boston*, of 3000 tons, the gunboats *Concord* and *Petrel*, and the armed revenue-cutter *McCulloch*, together with a collier and a supply-ship.<sup>1</sup> Every one of these vessels had received the last touch necessary to the perfection of preparedness. The complicated machinery had been overhauled under the keen eyes of the Commodore himself; the ammunition-hoists had been tested. All the bunkers were filled with coal, and the magazines were stored to their full capacity. Finally, the crews were superbly disciplined, devoted to their officers, and eager for any duty, however hazardous, that it might be theirs to undertake. As the vessels lay at anchor with steam up, they resembled a group of perfectly trained athletes, impatient for the summons to

<sup>1</sup>The collier was the *Nanshan*; the supply ship was the *Zafiro*.

glorious action. They had been stripped of every inch of superfluous woodwork; and their hulls, no longer snowy white, were painted a sullen slate-colour, which transformed their graceful jauntiness into a suggestion of something grim and terrible.

Commodore Dewey had assumed command on January 3d; and during the months that followed, he had not merely shown himself to be a naval chief of rare ability, but he had indirectly served his country in other and less obvious ways. Here were illustrated once more the force and value of personality in the conduct of great affairs. Dewey was by birth a Vermonter, of the very best New England stock, and had superimposed upon the sturdy qualities of his ancestry all the tactfulness, the courtesy of bearing, and the clear sanity of judgment which mark the man who has had long experience of the great world. He was now in his sixtieth year, alert and vigorous, and combining the energy of youth with the sagacity of age. Professionally, his career had well fitted him for great responsibility. In the Civil War he had served under Farragut in some of the hottest fights of that fierce struggle. Later he had been chief of the Naval Bureau of Equipment and a member of the Board of Inspection and Survey. Altogether he was at one and the same time a cultivated gentleman, a scientific expert in naval affairs, and a sailor who in battle would be inspired by the example of the great captain with whom he had once faced the flaming forts and batteries on the lower Mississippi.

Hong Kong is one of the most intensely British of all the British dependencies in the East. It is strongly garrisoned, and is an important naval station. In 1898, the goodwill of its people, and especially of its official society, was of immense importance to any combatant whose

field of action lay in Asiatic waters. Spanish agents swarmed there, and in a thousand subtle ways endeavoured to win British sympathy for their cause and to create a feeling of antipathy towards the United States, by appealing to an underlying strain of dislike and jealousy which they imagined to exist in Englishmen. That they failed utterly and hopelessly must be ascribed, in part at least, to the impression which Commodore Dewey and his staff created during their stay at Hong Kong from January until the end of April. The Anglo-Saxon type of sailor is the same in both of the great English-speaking nations; and from the acting Governor down to the youngest midshipman on shore-leave, every Briton recognised in the chiefs of the American squadron, blood-brothers who fulfilled even the exacting standard which Englishmen apply to those who claim to be officers and gentlemen. What service was rendered to the American cause by the character and personality of the American commander at Hong Kong will presently appear.

The despatch of April 24th from Washington reached Commodore Dewey in the nick of time. An hour or two before, Great Britain's proclamation of neutrality had been issued, and he must depart at once. The despatch therefore relieved him of all doubt and made his course of action plain. There was no delay. Signals fluttered from the flagship, and soon the *Olympia*, followed closely by the *Raleigh* and the *Baltimore*, steamed out to sea to the music of the national anthem. As the cruisers swung into the channel, thousands of British soldiers, sailors, and civilians swarmed down to the shore, cheering lustily for Dewey and wishing him godspeed. "Good luck to you! Smash the Dons!" was the shout that reached him as a final parting.

At Mirs Bay he picked up the other vessels of his squadron, and on April 27th, headed for the island of Luzon. As soon as the open sea was reached, the crew of each ship was mustered upon deck.<sup>2</sup> Then was read to them a proclamation issued on the 23rd by the Spanish General, Basilio Augustin, Military Governor of the Philippines. This proclamation is a curiosity in the literature of war. It began:

“Spaniards! Between Spain and the United States of North America hostilities have broken out.

“The North American people, constituted of all the social excrescences, have exhausted our patience, and provoked war by their perfidious machinations. . . . The struggle will be short and decisive. The God of victories will give us one as brilliant and complete as the righteousness and justice of our cause demand. Spain . . . will emerge triumphantly from this new test, humiliating and blasting the adventurers from those States which, without cohesion and without a history, offer to humanity only infamous traditions and the ungrateful spectacle of a Congress in which appear united insolence and defamation, cowardice and cynicism.

“A squadron manned by foreigners, possessing neither instruction nor discipline, is preparing to come to this archipelago with the ruffianly intention of robbing us of all that means life, honour, and liberty.”

The proclamation went on to say that the Americans were endeavouring to substitute Protestantism for the Catholic faith, to plunder and despoil, and to kidnap such of the inhabitants of the islands as were needed to man ships or to labour in the fields. General Augustin surpassed himself in the concluding sentences:

<sup>2</sup> Long, *The New American Navy*, i. p. 183 (New York, 1903).



“Vain designs! Ridiculous boastings! Your indomitable bravery will suffice to frustrate the attempt to carry them into realisation. . . . The aggressors shall not profane the tombs of your fathers; they shall not gratify their lustful passions at the cost of our wives’ and daughters’ honour, or appropriate the property your industry has accumulated as a provision for your old age.

“Filipinos! Prepare for the struggle; and, united under the glorious Spanish flag, which is ever covered with laurels, let us fight with the belief that victory will crown our efforts; and to the calls of our enemies let us oppose, with the decision of the Christian and the patriot, the cry of *Viva España!*”<sup>3</sup>

After this proclamation had been read to the crews by the division officers, the announcement was briefly made: “The squadron is bound for Manila. Our orders are to capture or destroy the Spanish fleet.” Cheer after cheer rang out with a deep note of martial exultation; and when the ships’ bands struck up the national anthem, “the chorus spread from forecabin to cabin with an enthusiasm that carried the hearts of all on board.”<sup>4</sup>

For a long while, both the naval and consular authorities of the United States had been trying to acquire authentic information as to the Spanish land and naval forces in the Philippines. So far back as the end of President Cleveland’s administration, this secret inquiry began. Commodore Dewey had learned much, yet much was still uncertain. He knew that in the vicinity of Manila lay a Spanish fleet commanded by Admiral Montojo. He also knew just what vessels composed this fleet; but he

<sup>3</sup> Long, *op. cit.* i. pp. 183-185; Wilcox, *Short History of the War with Spain*, pp. 103, 104 (New York, 1898); see also the letter from a correspondent of the *New York Herald* of June 19, 1898.

<sup>4</sup> Correspondence of the *New York Herald*, June 19, 1898.

had been unable to gain any trustworthy information as to their armament and general condition. Nor was he certain as to the place where the Spanish Admiral intended to give battle. From the mass of conflicting reports, it seemed likely that Montojo's command was now stationed in Subig Bay, to the northwest of Manila, where the Spaniards had some time before begun to equip a naval station. Commodore Dewey had endeavoured to learn the exact nature of the land fortifications around Manila. In 1897, they had consisted of batteries at the entrance of the bay, a formidable earthwork at Sangley Point, and stone redoubts and walls near the city itself. These works mounted many obsolete cannon, but they also had in battery a number of Armstrong breech-loading rifles, and several Palliser muzzle-loaders, with an unknown number of Ordonnez and Hontoria rifled guns of modern make. How much had been done to strengthen the defences in the preceding six months, Commodore Dewey was unable to discover. Spanish agents in Hong Kong spread reports of formidable additions to the artillery, and spoke of mines as having been laid at the entrance of the harbour.

In after years it became the fashion to speak lightly of the danger attending the enterprise in which amid those distant seas, the American squadron was engaged. But it must be remembered that when Dewey moved out of Mirs Bay he was facing perils the extent of which was totally unknown. The Spanish fleet was numerically much superior, and it had the support of batteries on land, equipped with powerful cannon. If the American ships should fail to destroy their adversaries, they would themselves be in a perilous position. All foreign ports were closed to them; and the nearest American harbour was

eight thousand miles away. Hence, they must either win a decisive victory or else retire to some Chinese or British station, there to remain interned until the conclusion of the war. It was, then, no holiday excursion for the Commodore and his captains, but a warlike venture containing so many elements of the unknown as to justify the utmost vigilance and the most serious concern. In the United States, public expectation was keyed to a high pitch when the cable reported that Dewey was proceeding to the Philippines. What might befall him there no one could venture to predict.

These thoughts may have flitted through the mind of the American commander as he steamed across the China Sea towards the island of Luzon; but he was essentially a man of action, and his energies and reflections were given first of all to the task immediately in hand. At daybreak on April 30th, low-lying hills clothed with tropical verdure were sighted by the lookouts; and soon the squadron approached the entrance of Subig Bay, where Dewey believed the Spanish Admiral to be awaiting him. But the *Boston* and the *Concord* searched that port in vain. Montojo had reached Subig on the 24th, but finding the land defences incomplete, he had hastened back to Manila exactly one day before the Americans arrived. Calling in his scouts, Commodore Dewey summoned his captains to the flagship for a council of war. It was quickly decided to run the batteries at Manila and to strike the Spanish fleet under the very guns of the protecting forts. As the squadron turned its prows towards the scene of the impending battle, the last touch was given to the work of preparation. Chain-cables were coiled about the ammunition hoists, splinter-nets were stretched along the front of the wooden bulkheads, and

even the mess-tables, chests and chairs were flung into the sea.<sup>5</sup>

It was Commodore Dewey's purpose to force an entrance to Manila Bay by night. Of the two channels which lead to it, he chose the larger (Boca Grande). He reached its mouth at ten o'clock in the darkness of a tropical evening. Clouds obscured the light of a young moon, and only now and then to the eyes of the watchful navigators did the land loom dimly into view. On each side lay the Spanish batteries. Ahead was a huge grey rock, El Fraile, where, unknown to the Americans, were mounted guns of formidable calibre. Beneath the black waters were mines which the closing of an electric circuit would explode with frightful power. But Dewey's purpose was unalterable. With the batteries, if necessary, his guns would reckon; while as to the mines, he may have recalled the vigorous order of his old commander, Farragut, at Mobile Bay: "Damn the torpedoes! Full steam ahead!"

No bugle sounded as the men were sent to their respective stations, but whispered orders passed from mouth to mouth. In complete darkness, save for a single white light at the stern, the vessels fell into line and passed slowly up the channel, the *Olympia* leading, and after her, in order, the *Baltimore*, the *Raleigh*, the *Petrel*, the *Concord*, the *Boston*, the *McCulloch* and the colliers. As they approached the giant rock, El Fraile, a Spanish sentry sighted the gleaming stern-light of the *Olympia*. Signals flashed amid the darkness; a rocket hissed upwards and burst high overhead. Then from the battery on the south shore, a long stream of fire shot out, followed by the crash of cannon. El Fraile of a sudden was circled by flames, as its guns joined in the deadly chorus. Then

thundered in reply an American broadside. The *Raleigh*, *Concord*, *Boston*, and *McCulloch* hurled a tempest of projectiles at the forts on shore. One six-inch shell from the *Concord* exploded in the midst of the Restinga battery, silencing it in less than three minutes after it had gone into action. Two mines burst with a terrific roar ahead of the *Olympia*; but she received no harm, and soon the squadron, uninjured and once more silent, had passed on into the broad waters of Manila Bay.

The city lay twenty miles ahead. From the American squadron its clustered lights could be seen twinkling in the distance. With speed reduced to four knots, the invaders moved slowly up the bay; and at a little before five o'clock, the dawn of a tropical morning revealed a long grey line of Spanish ships, made more conspicuous by their contrast with the snow-white walls of the arsenal at Cavité before which they were lying.

Admiral Montojo had been kept informed of Dewey's movements since the latter left Mirs Bay on April 27th. He knew that the Americans had entered Subig harbour, and that they had then headed their ships in the direction of Manila. But, as he viewed the situation, Manila and his own fleet were safe from immediate attack. The "unwarlike and undisciplined Yankees" would not dare to attempt the passage through the Boca Grande and receive the fire of its forts. They would doubtless blockade the entrance, and try to pick off a few Spanish merchant vessels, as affording a safe and easy conquest. Therefore Admiral Montojo's officers and men had leave freely granted them, and many of them were in bed on shore when the distant booming of cannon came faintly up the bay in the midnight stillness. A few minutes later, and word reached the Admiral that not only had the

audacious American Commodore entered the channel, but that he had safely passed the forts and was even now moving up the bay to grapple with the Spanish fleet. Then there was wild excitement in Manila, bugles sounding, drums beating, and a hasty muster of all who were ashore.

Admiral Montojo's entire command consisted of a score of vessels, including two swift liners<sup>6</sup> which had been converted into auxiliary cruisers. But of this number, several were only "mosquito gunboats,"<sup>7</sup> while others were not in condition for service.<sup>8</sup> To meet the American squadron there were drawn up in a long, crescent-shaped line of battle seven ships of war—the *Reina Cristina* (flagship), *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, *Don Juan de Austria*, *Isla de Cuba*, *Isla de Luzon*, *Cano*, and *Marques del Duero*. Of these ships, the *Reina Cristina* was the most powerful, being of 3500 tons displacement and carrying a battery of 6-inch and 2-inch modern guns, with a secondary battery of rapid-firing three-pounders. The other Spanish vessels were smaller than the flagship, ranging from 3000 to 500 tons, but with excellent guns. There were also four torpedo-boats, two of which took part in the action. In tonnage and in armament, this fleet was decidedly inferior to the American squadron; yet it was supported by land batteries at Cavité, and at Sangley Point, and by the guns mounted at the naval arsenal behind it. From the point of view of the military theorist, the odds were, on the whole, decidedly in favour of the Spaniards.

At a few minutes after five there fluttered from the

<sup>6</sup>The *Isla de Mindanao* and the *Manila*.

<sup>7</sup>Some of the mosquito fleet were on duty in other parts of the Philippines.

<sup>8</sup>The *Velasco*, *Lezo*, and *Argos*.

signal-mast of the *Olympia* the order, "Prepare for general action"; and a moment later, on all of the American ships the Stars and Stripes were broken out. At once the gaudy colours of Spain flew from the opposing line, and the guns of the shore-batteries blazed, followed shortly by a broadside from the Spanish fleet. Commodore Dewey and his flag-officer, Captain Gridley, stood on the bridge of the *Olympia*, tranquilly observing the shell-fire of the enemy which lashed the waters about them into yellow foam. Presently the Commodore, turning quietly to his companion, remarked in a casual tone: "You may fire when you are ready, Gridley." An eight-inch forward gun roared from the *Olympia's* turret, and soon every American ship had found the range and was smothering its doomed antagonists with projectiles. Five times did Dewey pass slowly up and down the Spanish line, lessening the distance at each turn. The Spanish gunners could not stand the terrific storm of steel that burst about them. Their shots flew wild, for they fired without aim. At half-past seven, Commodore Dewey, having been erroneously informed that his supply of five-inch shells was running low, drew off his ships to take account of his remaining ammunition. During this interval, the men at the guns were served with breakfast. Misunderstanding the manœuvre, the Spanish Governor cabled to Madrid a message announcing that the Americans had been repelled with heavy loss.

When the order to withdraw was given, Dewey did not know how badly his fire had damaged his opponents. But observation soon revealed the fact that the Spanish squadron had been practically wiped out of existence. The *Reina Cristina* was heeled over so that her bulwarks were awash. The *Castilla* was on fire. Two torpedo-

boats had been sunk. Of the other vessels, only one, the *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, was fit to continue fighting; and presently when its captain, disobeying Montojo's orders, sallied out to renew the battle, the gallant little gunboat was smashed and sunk by the concentrated fire of three American cruisers. The Spaniards were not only beaten—they were annihilated; and only the shore-batteries remained. Commodore Dewey sent a brief message to the Governor-General that unless the shore fire from Manila ceased at once, the city would be shelled. The threat was effective; and the squadron steamed back to Cavité, where after a brief and brilliant action, the forts and earthworks were knocked to pieces and the gunners driven out by a hail of bursting shells. It was now high noon, and the battle of Manila had been fought and won.<sup>9</sup> In the space of seven hours the United States had conquered a footing in the Orient.

Commodore Dewey now sent a message to the Governor-General asking that the cable be neutralised, and that both Spaniards and Americans be allowed to use it. General Augustin refused; whereupon Dewey ordered it to be fished up and cut, thereby severing the Philippines from telegraphic communication with the world. The *Zafiro* hastened to Hong Kong and thence cabled the following historic despatch to Washington:

“Manila, May 1.—Squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately engaged the enemy and destroyed the

<sup>9</sup> See Long, *op. cit.* i. pp. 165-200; Wilcox, *op. cit.* pp. 102-117; Barrett, *Admiral George Dewey*, pp. 74-86 (New York, 1899); correspondence of the New York *Herald* for June 19, 1898; and especially the detailed report of Admiral Dewey to the Navy Department under date of May 3, 1898. The Spanish account of the battle is given in the official report by Admiral Montojo (translation in Barrett, *op. cit.* Appendix, pp. 265-274).



following vessels: *Reina Cristina*, *Castilla*, *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, *Isla de Luzon*, *Isla de Cuba*, *General Lezo*, *Marques del Duero*, *Cano*, *Velasco*, *Isla de Mindanao*, a transport and a water-battery, at Cavité. The squadron is uninjured and only a few men are slightly wounded. Only means of telegraphing is to American Consul at Hong Kong. I shall communicate with him.

“DEWEY.”

And a second despatch added (May 4th):

“I have taken possession of naval station at Cavité. . . . Have destroyed the fortifications at bay entrance, paroling the garrison, I control bay completely and can take city at any time.”

The first of these despatches reached Washington on May 7th and was at once made public. Popular enthusiasm was unbounded. So swift and so complete a victory thrilled the entire nation. A decisive naval battle in far-distant waters appealed to the imagination of Americans as possessing an element of the romantic. Commodore Dewey's portrait was everywhere displayed. Within a few hours he had become a popular hero. President McKinley at once advanced him to the rank of acting Rear-Admiral, and cabled him the thanks of Congress and his countrymen. The war was now more popular than ever, and both President and people felt that this great success on sea must be followed up by operations on land. Dewey's second telegram had declared that he could take the city at any time; but it was obvious that he had not men enough to hold it<sup>10</sup> should Spain despatch an expedition to the Philippines. Hence General T. M. Anderson was designated to command the first of several relief expeditions; and he set sail from San Francisco on

<sup>10</sup> The number of men in Dewey's squadron on May 1st was 1780.

May 24th, with a body of 2500 troops, carried by three transports and escorted by the cruiser *Charleston*.<sup>11</sup>

The news of the battle of Manila Bay was heard with very diverse emotions in the various countries of Europe. Before the cable was cut by Dewey, Governor-General Augustin had telegraphed to Madrid the tidings of disaster, declaring, however, that the Americans had suffered heavy losses. Even his euphemistic language, however, could not conceal the essential facts. It was plain that the American squadron had won a brilliant victory. In London another great demonstration took place in favour of the United States. The last vestige of doubt as to American prowess was swept away; and such pro-Spanish journals as the *Globe* and *Morning Post* took refuge in a sulky acquiescence. The other London dailies reflected the popular admiration for the United States. A leading article in the *Times* (May 9th) declared:

“The destruction of the Spanish fleet was as complete as any achievement in naval annals. Dewey showed himself worthy alike of the finest traditions of the United States navy and of his kinship with the race that produced Nelson.”

Said the *Daily News* of the same date:

“Dewey’s despatches, in their conciseness and modesty, are in accordance with the best naval traditions. The battle establishes a record among contests of the kind; for one of the combatants destroyed the whole fleet of the other without himself suffering any loss whatever. . . . It is especially worth noting that the discipline on the American ships is reported to have been perfect; for many Spanish authorities and some independent critics thought

<sup>11</sup> Even before the official news of the battle had reached Washington, it had been decided (May 4th) to despatch a military expedition to the Philippines.

that this might be a weak point on the American side. The excellence of the American tactics and the superiority of marksmanship are certain to be a prominent feature of this war."

But it was not only from the British press that expressions of friendship came. On May 13th, the Rt. Hon. Joseph Chamberlain, speaking to an immense audience in Birmingham, declared amid prolonged cheering that "though war be terrible, it would be cheaply purchased, if, in a great and noble cause, the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance." And even more significant were some sentences uttered by the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, at the annual meeting of the Primrose League. Referring to Spain and China, he said: "Those States are becoming weaker, and the strong States stronger"; and he drew a contrast between "living nations" and "dying States." So frank a declaration from a responsible statesman had a meaning of its own; and ere long the importance of Great Britain's attitude was to become apparent to the world.

In Spain, Governor-General Augustin's illusive despatch of the morning of May 1st set Madrid ablaze with joy. Houses were decorated and flags flew. For a few hours Spanish pride was gratified to the full. Then came the crushing truth, and with it a feeling of anger and despair. The press cried out for revenge; but even the Government organ could find few words of hope. It said:

"Yesterday was a sad but glorious day for Spain. Let the people be calm, and allow nothing to shake their confidence in the future triumph of Spain."<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *El Liberal* (Madrid), May 2, 1898.

But the depression in Madrid was more than matched by the chagrin and deep resentment excited in Paris and Berlin. The French had welcomed the despatch of Augustin with glee. The Parisian press had been predicting a Spanish triumph, and the people believed for a time that such a triumph had occurred. Even Augustin's later report was received with incredulity. Spanish agents still asserted that Montojo had led Dewey into a trap. But conviction could not be long withheld. On May 3d the *Temps* editorially remarked:

“The United States put into the balance so crushing a superiority of resources and of force as to leave no doubt of the result. As soon as Castilian honour has received the satisfaction which it requires, will not the moment come for Europe to speak its word?”

The notion that Europe or some European power should interfere in the progress of events at Manila was one that found warm support in official Germany. The press of Berlin had on May 2nd received from Spanish sources the news of Dewey's victory, but it was either suppressed or published with expressions of doubt as to its being exaggerated or false. A little later the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* remarked editorially:

“We do not favour intervention in this war, but we are of the opinion that the European Powers ought to exert strong diplomatic pressure at the first opportunity in order to shorten the struggle. The Yankees are already swollen with pride. If they win another decisive victory, scarcely any European nation will be able to associate with them diplomatically. In view of the unfriendly sentiments entertained in the United States towards Germany, and the many economic disputes between the two countries, it is very possible that Germany may be made the next victim of American impudence.”<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, May 7, 1898.

Actual intervention was, however, hardly contemplated by the German Foreign Office. The Kaiser, whose unfavourable opinion of the United States was not a spontaneous impression of his own, but had been inherited by him as one of the Junker traditions, openly expressed admiration of American prowess at Manila. When the news reached him he is reported to have exclaimed:

“There is evidently something besides ‘smartness’ and commercialism in the Yankee blood! Those fellows at Cavité fought like veterans!”<sup>14</sup>

Nor were his most reckless advisers ready to suggest a course of action that would certainly plunge Germany into a transatlantic war. Yet there were reasons why, without a resort to arms, German policy demanded that the attitude of the Empire toward the United States, especially in the East, should be one of unfriendliness if not of actual menace. In the preceding year, Germany had coerced China into giving up the port of Kiau-Chau with some adjacent territory in the northerly province of Shan-Tung. This was intended to be the starting-point for a vast extension of German influence, both commercial and military. It marked another step in the Kaiser’s colonial policy, which was to end by making Germany the rival of Great Britain in the Orient. If the Philippines were to fall from Spain’s enervated hand, they would be a rich prize for the Power that might be ready and waiting to receive them. Why should not this Power be Germany? The Americans, in their new-born ambition, would possibly consider the retention of the Islands. If so, they must be made to drop the project. In plain language, they must be bullied out of it. Germany must display so marked a show of force, and must carry

<sup>14</sup> Cable despatch to New York *Tribune*, May 8, 1898.

things off with so high a hand, as to make the Yankees glad to abandon the Philippines so soon as the first fighting should be over. The scheme was essentially Bismarckian in its arrogance. Its execution was begun with Bismarckian promptness.

On May 13th, Admiral Dewey, in a despatch to the Navy Department, mentioned the fact that certain foreign warships had arrived in Manila Bay and were observing his operations. These vessels consisted of a British gunboat, a small Japanese cruiser, a French cruiser (the *Bruix*), and two German vessels. Presently the German contingent was rapidly augmented until it reached the proportions of a squadron. On June 13th there were four German ships of war "observing operations." On June 23d there were five of them.<sup>15</sup> These were the newly built, first-class steel cruiser *Kaiserin Augusta*, the battleship *Kaiser*, the swift second-class cruisers *Irene* and *Prinzess Wilhelm*, and the gunboat *Kormoran*. It was announced that another battleship, the *Deutschland*, and the cruiser *Gefion* were soon to join the squadron,<sup>16</sup> thus concentrating at Manila the entire naval force maintained by Germany in Asiatic waters. In tonnage, in guns, and in armour this squadron outclassed the ships which Admiral Dewey had at his disposal, and its mere presence involved at once a problem and a menace. No such number of vessels was necessary, since in Manila Germany had no obvious interests to protect; and hence, upon any pacific hypothesis this naval display was quite inexplicable.

There were peculiar reasons why Admiral Dewey and

<sup>15</sup> Despatch of Admiral Dewey from Cavité, June 23, 1898.

<sup>16</sup> Cable despatch to New York *Herald* (June 28) from Manila (dated June 23, 1898).

his command should view the presence of the Germans with distrust and even positive displeasure. Before the declaration of war between the United States and Spain, but while hostilities seemed more than probable, Prince Henry of Prussia had arrived at Hong Kong in command of several German ships of war. Prince Henry had been despatched to the Far East by his brother the Kaiser, who in taking leave of him had announced in a highly rhetorical speech that this expedition was sent out for the purpose of displaying Germany's "mailed hand" in the Orient. Prince Henry arrived at Hong Kong in the month of March. His officers were not at all reticent in publicly expressing their sympathy with Spain; and the Prince himself committed a breach of etiquette which seemed to show distinct unfriendliness to the United States. He gave a banquet to the officers of the foreign warships then at Hong Kong, among them being Commodore Dewey and several members of his staff. In the course of the banquet, the Prince proposed a series of toasts to the great Powers, naming them in alphabetical order, according to the French form. Thus, first of all, he raised his glass to Germany (*Allemagne*), then to England (*Angleterre*), although that nation should have been toasted as Great Britain (*Grande-Bretagne*), and then to Spain (*Espagne*). Then should have come a toast to the United States (*États-Unis*), but the name was omitted by Prince Henry, who next drank to France. At this open affront to his country, Commodore Dewey made a sign to his officers, and with him they at once left the banquet-hall, quietly, but without ceremony. The affair caused a marked sensation; and naval sentiment at Hong Kong, even among foreigners, censured the discourtesy of Prince Henry. Therefore, on the following

day, one of his staff was sent to make a roundabout verbal apology to the American Commodore. Dewey, however, refused to receive it in that form. The slight, he said, was not personal to himself, but had been offered the country which he had the honour to serve. It had come from the Prince, and publicly. Hence, the apology must also come from him, either in person or in writing. Prince Henry thereupon did call upon Commodore Dewey and made a formal apology, saying that he had forgotten to keep to the French order of names and had carelessly thought of the United States in the German form (*Vereinigte-Staaten*).<sup>17</sup>

When the *Kaiserin Augusta* reached Manila early in June, she brought with her Vice-Admiral von Diederich, who was in command of the German naval force in Asiatic waters. This officer was thoroughly imbued with a dislike for everything American, and his personal prejudice seems to have led him to go further than even his instructions warranted. Not merely were his official acts of an unfriendly and at times threatening character, but he exhibited a certain boorishness and gratuitous incivility which could not have been justified in an open enemy. By the usages of international law, a blockaded port is under control of the blockading force, and the officer in command of such a force is entitled to make and to maintain regulations governing all vessels which may enter the waters dominated by his guns. Admiral Dewey, knowing that there were Spanish gunboats in other parts of the Philippines, very properly required that no ships should enter the harbour of Manila after nightfall,

<sup>17</sup> See an interview with Mr. Charles N. Post, in the *New York Herald* of June 2, 1898. The account in the text differs slightly from that of Mr. Post, but is given on what is believed to be excellent authority.



guarding in this way against possible attack upon his own squadron by torpedo-boats and other hostile craft. The German Vice-Admiral chose to consider such a regulation unwarranted. His own ships, therefore, moved about from point to point without notice to Admiral Dewey, and they did so in the night as well as in the daytime. When this occurred within the harbour, the American ships directed their searchlights full upon the German vessels, thus keeping them always under a brilliant glare. But on several occasions German cruisers after leaving the harbour, entered it by night in defiance of the American Admiral's orders. After this had happened twice, Admiral Dewey desisted from further verbal protest and decided upon vigorous action. Presently a German ship came stealing in under cover of the darkness. As she neared the inner waters, a shell was fired directly across her bow, and the blaze of a searchlight revealed the *Baltimore* with decks cleared, and her crew at the guns ready to follow up the monitory shell with a full broadside. Admiral von Diederich was furious, but thereafter this particular regulation was not broken.

Another like incident, however, was still more serious in its possible results. One evening, in the dusk, a strange launch was descried making its way silently towards the *Olympia*. Though twice hailed, it made no answer. Both Admiral Dewey and his flag captain were on the *Olympia's* deck. Through the darkness they saw the launch still steaming rapidly in the direction of the flagship. The Admiral at once ordered a shot to be fired in warning; and when even then the launch continued on its way, a gunner was directed to "fire again and fire to hit." A cannon roared, and a solid shot struck within three feet of the launch, drenching it with water. Immediately the

intruder stopped and displayed the German colours. An American launch darted out from the side of the *Olympia* and overhauled the stranger, which was found to be in command of a staff officer of the German Admiral. This person was taken aboard the *Olympia* ashen white with fear and anger. He was ordered into the presence of Admiral Dewey, who said to him with ill-concealed indignation:

“Do you know what you have done? Do you know that such a rash act on your part is against all the rules of war and might have brought serious trouble to your country and mine? It would have been easy for a Spanish boat to hoist a German flag and sink the *Olympia* if we failed to stop it. There is no excuse for such carelessness! Present my compliments to your Admiral and ask him to direct his officers to be more careful in the future.”<sup>18</sup>

In many other ways the Germans' attitude was vexatious and annoying. They held constant communication with the Spaniards on shore. They had an irritating habit of following the American vessels about the harbour. Again and again they violated the minor requirements of the blockade. In every possible fashion they made evident an unfriendly spirit, and at times it seemed as though they were eagerly awaiting an opportunity for actual hostilities. Admiral Dewey kept his temper wonderfully well, and though his ships were inferior to those of von Diederich, he took as firm a tone as though he were backed by a great fleet. Yet he and all his command longed for the reënforcements which he knew were coming, and especially for the great monitor, *Monterey*, whose heavy armour and twelve-inch guns made her more than a match for the most powerful of the German ships.

<sup>18</sup> Barrett, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-112.

The *Kaiser* and the *Deutschland*—the two German battleships—were, in fact, not very formidable vessels in their own class. They had been launched nearly twenty-five years before, and one of the new American battleships could have blown them out of the water in five minutes. Yet they carried modern ten-inch guns, and Dewey's unarmoured cruisers were no fit antagonists for them.

In estimating the conduct of the Germans throughout this trying period, it must in fairness be remembered that the German navy was a new creation. It lacked those traditions which are a part of the training of the naval officers of other leading Powers. Von Diederich knew nothing either of international law or of naval etiquette. In maritime language he had no "sea manners." In this respect his conduct was in sharp contrast to that of the French naval officers at Manila. They were pro-Spanish in their sympathies. Yet their official attitude was absolutely correct. But von Diederich was, from the point of view of British and American sailors, a parvenu of the sea, and this is why he played his unpleasant part with unnecessary offensiveness. He simply knew no better. His ignorance, in fact, was so complete as to make one doubt whether he even recognised the neat rebukes which were administered to him by an English officer whose name will always be associated with the long American blockade of Manila. This was Captain (afterwards Sir) Edward Chichester, of Her Majesty's navy, to whom Americans owe a lasting debt of gratitude. When the German squadron at Manila began to assume formidable proportions, there had appeared upon the scene three British warships under the command of Captain Chichester, whose flag flew from the belted cruiser *Immortalité*. His vessels steamed well

in toward the city and took their station not far from where the American squadron lay. Captain Chichester was a fine type of the English gentleman and sailor. Off duty he was a jovial comrade; on his quarter-deck he was a genuine son of battle. He greeted Admiral Dewey as an old friend, and the two maintained an intercourse which, both officially and personally, was one of cordial intimacy. After Dewey had put an end to the German violation of the blockading orders, von Diederich wrote to Captain Chichester asking him to join in a formal protest. Presently von Diederich had himself conveyed to the *Immortalité*. Captain Chichester received him in his cabin, where von Diederich found the Englishman poring over a number of volumes on international law. Von Diederich verbally repeated his request of the day before.

“Ah,” said Captain Chichester, shaking his head with seeming grief, “I don’t see how I can join you in your protest. I’ve been looking up all the authorities, and I find that this American Admiral is so deadly right in everything he does that if we make a protest we shall only show that we know nothing at all about international law.”<sup>19</sup>

On another occasion, when von Diederich called, he saw displayed upon the British Captain’s writing table a large red book. In course of the conversation he chanced to inquire what the book might be.

“That,” said Captain Chichester, “is a book on naval etiquette.”

“Indeed,” remarked the German. “I wasn’t aware that such a book existed.”

“Ah,” cried Captain Chichester, with suspicious eagerness, “let me present you with it. You really ought to

<sup>19</sup> Long, *op. cit.* ii. pp. 112-113.

read it. I'm sure you must need it awfully. You will learn an immense deal from it."

It was probably the attitude of the British commander which kept von Diederich from actually going to the point at which shots must have been exchanged between the American and German ships. Nevertheless, more than once the situation became so strained as to be almost unendurable. On June 30th, however, the first American relief expedition reached Manila, with the 2500 troops who had sailed from San Francisco on May 25th, convoyed by the cruiser *Charleston*. It was a small force, yet its arrival was most welcome. It added another cruiser to Dewey's squadron, and it enabled General Anderson, who came with it, to man the captured Spanish forts. It brought also a detachment of heavy artillery. Its arrival, however, gave the Germans an opportunity once more to exhibit an insolence which was not only exasperating, but extremely stupid, in that it accomplished nothing. When the *Charleston* and the three transports entered Manila Bay, the *Kaiserin Augusta* got up steam and followed close behind them, dogging their heels after a fashion that could be explained only as an attempt to be gratuitously offensive.<sup>20</sup> This same intention was shown in a graver form when Admiral Dewey learned that a German cruiser had landed a supply of provisions for the Spanish in Manila. This was not only a breach of the blockade, but a breach of neutrality as well, amounting practically to an act of war. Dewey's patience now broke down completely. That the Germans should be actually furnishing the Spaniards with supplies was something not to be condoned or overlooked. Calling his flag-lieutenant, he directed him in level tones to present the Admiral's compliments to von Diederich and inform

<sup>20</sup> Lodge, *The War with Spain*, p. 205 (New York, 1899).

him "of this extraordinary disregard of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse," which was also a gross breach of neutrality. Then, changing his tone to one of sharp command, he said:

"And say to Admiral von Diederich that if he wants a fight, he can have it now!"<sup>21</sup>

Admiral von Diederich quickly betook himself to the British flagship and descended into Captain Chichester's cabin. With a flustered air he asked:

"Have you instructions as to your action in case of actual hostilities between myself and the American squadron?"

"Yes," replied Captain Chichester, "I have."

"May I ask then," continued the German, "to be informed as to the nature of those instructions?"

"There are only two persons here," said the British Captain, "who know what my instructions are. One of those persons is myself, and the other is—Admiral Dewey."

The German retired, pondering this answer; and presently he disavowed the action of his subordinates in provisioning the Spaniards, declaring that they had acted without his authority.

Another episode must be narrated, and this is one which has received the most general attention, though in reality it was no more significant than many others. A body of Philippine insurgents were threatening the Spanish naval post at Isla Grande in Subig Bay. They could readily have captured it, had not the German cruiser *Irene* appeared and threatened to open fire upon them if they advanced. When news of this was brought to

<sup>21</sup> J. L. Stickney, quoted by Long, *op. cit.* ii., pp. 111-112; and Lodge, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

Admiral Dewey, he hastily despatched the *Raleigh* and the *Concord*, with instructions to see that Isla Grande was taken at any cost. It was thought that the *Irene* would offer forcible resistance. Hence, the two American cruisers, as they steamed towards the entrance of Subig Bay, were stripped for battle. No sooner, however, were they sighted by the commander of the *Irene*, than he cut his cable, crowded on all steam, and rapidly departed, leaving Isla Grande an easy conquest to the Americans and Filipinos.

Captain Chichester's goodwill was only a reflection of the goodwill of the great nation that he served. Officially, Great Britain maintained a correct attitude of neutrality between the United States and Spain. Yet neutrality may be of many kinds, and Great Britain's neutrality was, to express it mildly, benevolent to American interests. A score of anecdotes might be narrated to emphasise this assertion, but one may serve as typical of all the rest.

Towards the end of May, the supply of fresh provisions on the American squadron was quite exhausted. In the tropical climate of the Philippines this was a very serious consideration. Both officers and men were in sore need of fruit and vegetables and fresh meat. Without them, disease was certain to occur. Yet no available sources of supply existed on that side of the Pacific Ocean. The strict laws of neutrality forbade the provisioning of a belligerent in any neutral port. The American despatch boat, *Zafiro*, plied back and forth between Manila and Hong Kong. More than once its captain had endeavoured to purchase in the latter place a few supplies, but the port officials had intervened to forbid it. The British Governor of Hong Kong was General Wilson

Black, a fine old soldier with a sense of humour. To him went Mr. John Barrett, at one time American Minister to Siam.

“General,” said Mr. Barrett, “the *Zafiro* is in port for a short stay under the neutrality rules. Before returning to Manila the Captain would like to purchase a few delicacies for the Admiral and his staff. Have you any objection?”

The shrewd old Governor looked intently at Mr. Barrett and smiled a long, slow smile.

“Delicacies for the Admiral?” he repeated. “Why, certainly I have no objection. Just a few delicacies, of course, for his staff. That is all right. I will give instructions for them to be passed—but, of course, only delicacies.”

An hour later, a small fleet of junks was towed out to the *Zafiro*. As they moved along, a Spanish consular agent rushed up to a British officer crying out:

“Stop those boats! They are taking off supplies for the American fleet at Manila! I protest!”

The officer, a gigantic Irishman, looked benignly down upon the Spaniard, and said with an indescribable drawl:

“Please don’t be disturbed. These boats are only taking off a few delicacies for the American Admiral.”

It may be added that Admiral Dewey thereafter never suffered from any lack of delicacies; and if he and his staff alone enjoyed these accessories to their ordinary fare, they must have personally consumed several hundred tons of excellent provisions.<sup>22</sup> And the humour of General Wilson Black was matched by that of Admiral Dewey himself, who sent with his compliments some of the choicest of these “delicacies” to the doughty Admiral von Diederich.

<sup>22</sup> Barrett, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-69.



Mention has been made of an insurrection among the native Filipinos against the Spanish Government. The movement was one which, although for a time it was of service to the United States, soon added to the perplexities of Admiral Dewey, and finally developed into a serious problem for the American Government. Spanish misrule in the Philippine Islands had been almost as harsh as in Cuba; and two years before the war between the United States and Spain, it had led to a brief revolt (August, 1896).

The leader of this outbreak was a young native named Emilio Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo was of mixed blood. He had been educated at a Dominican college in Manila and was exceptionally intelligent and energetic. His personal qualities made him a chosen leader of his own people, over whom he exercised a peculiar influence. In after years, some of his eulogists in the United States were wont to liken him to Washington or, at the very least, to Bolivar, though the extravagance of the comparison passed the limits of the ludicrous. Aguinaldo was at bottom a shifty Oriental, with all an Oriental's vanity and with the treachery inherent in his Malay blood. The brief revolt which he headed in 1896 had been brought to an end when the Spanish Government bribed Aguinaldo and his chief associates to leave the Islands and retire to Hong Kong. The bribe-money paid them amounted to \$400,000, and this sum was in Aguinaldo's possession when Admiral Dewey won the battle of Manila Bay. The keen-witted Filipino, seeing his opportunity, now sought to return to the Philippines, that he might organise a new rebellion and put an end to Spanish domination. The American Consul-General at Hong Kong, Mr. Wildman, regarded Aguinaldo's scheme with favour. At

Mr. Wildman's request, Admiral Dewey transported Aguinaldo to Manila, and there the natives flocked around his standard until he had under his command a force large enough to surround the city by land and to keep the Spanish troops within the line of their entrenchments. On June 20th, the Filipino insurgents formally declared the independence of the Islands and chose Aguinaldo as their President.

Admiral Dewey was wise enough to withhold any official recognition of the Filipino Republic. So far as the military action of the insurgents helped the American cause, the Admiral and General Anderson coöperated with them; but no promises of future recognition were ever made. Aguinaldo finally came to view the Americans with suspicion and dislike; and so far as he dared, he showed them something like hostility. Meanwhile a second relief expedition commanded by General F. V. Greene and numbering some 3500 men had reached Manila on July 17th. On the 30th, came the third expedition with 4600 men, and bringing General Wesley Merritt, who had been made Military Governor of the new Department of the Pacific. On August 4th, from the lookouts on the walls of Cavité was heard the cry: "Here comes the *Monterey!*" and soon afterwards the huge floating fortress, lying low in the water and with her gigantic guns frowning from her turrets, moved slowly into the smooth waters of Manila Bay.<sup>23</sup> The long weeks of suspense and of hourly anxiety had now ended for the American Admiral. Ashore there were assembled 10,000 fighting men under his country's flag, supplied with artillery and munitions. Afloat, his squadron was more than a match for the vessels of von Diederich. It remained, however, for the Germans to give a final exhibition of

<sup>23</sup> Lodge, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-214.

their stupid insolence, which, like all the others, ended only in their absolute humiliation.

On August 7th, Admiral Dewey and General Merritt sent word to the Spanish Governor-General that an attack would be made upon Manila. The boastful Augustin at once slipped away from the city. He was taken on board a German launch and carried to the *Kaiserin Augusta*. His second in command was unwilling to surrender Manila without fighting, though it was well understood that the Spaniards would resist simply as a matter of honour. On August 13th, General Merritt's troops began to move upon the city, while Dewey's squadron at Cavité got under way to shell the batteries. As they passed out from their anchorage, the band on the *Immortalité* struck up, "See, the Conquering Hero Comes"; and when the battle-flags were broken out on Dewey's cruisers, there came from the English flagship the thrilling strains of "The Star-Spangled Banner." Then occurred a curious incident of which only a conjectural explanation can be given. The German squadron weighed anchor and steamed after the Americans, so close behind them as to make its purpose seem a hostile one. Some have held that this was merely a final insult from a now impotent foe. Others believe that it was the design of the Germans to fire upon the American ships from the rear so soon as the Spanish batteries should open on them with a frontal fire. Whatever may have been their purpose, it was defeated. Near Manila, the British men-of-war steamed swiftly in between the Germans and the Americans and then stopped. The hint was one that could not be mistaken, and the German Admiral drew off.<sup>24</sup> A day or two afterwards, three

<sup>24</sup> Long, *op. cit.* ii. p. 112. The story has been told to the author in a slightly different fashion by an officer attached to the *Monterey*.

of the German vessels departed in the night and they were seen no more. Meanwhile the *Olympia* and her sister ships opened fire upon the forts with shell and rapid-fire projectiles; while on land the American infantry advanced upon the Spanish lines, sweeping their defenders backward, until at last a flag of truce appeared and the city was surrendered with its garrison of 13,000 troops and more than 20,000 stand of arms. An Oregon regiment marched into the great Plaza, where Admiral Dewey's flag-lieutenant hauled down the Spanish standard and hoisted in its place the colours of the United States, while a national salute thundered from the guns of the *Olympia*. Spanish rule in the Orient was at an end forever.<sup>25</sup>

We must now turn to the naval and military operations in the vicinity of the United States. President McKinley's proclamation of April 23d, calling for 125,000 volunteers, was followed by a second call on May 25th for 75,000 more. The response to both these calls was satisfactory. Before the end of May, more than 120,000 recruits had been mustered in. They came from all sections of the country, South as well as North, and they were admirable raw material for a fighting army. Yet as a whole, they were untrained and undisciplined, and time was required to convert them into soldiers effective for work in the field. For a while, reliance must be placed mainly upon the regular army, the available regiments of which were massed at Tampa in Florida, while the volunteers were distributed among three camps—one at Chickamauga Park, one near Washington (Camp Alger), and

<sup>25</sup> See Lodge, *op. cit.* pp. 214-220; Alger, *op. cit.* pp. 332-342; Wilcox, *The Santiago Campaign*, pp. 82-86 (Boston, 1898), and Morris, *The War with Spain* (Philadelphia, 1900).

one at Hempstead (Camp Black) on Long Island. As the work of mobilisation and equipment proceeded, it became obvious that the system long established in the War Department was inadequate; and it did, in fact, break down completely under the strain imposed upon it by the exigencies of the time. This fact is not to be ascribed to Secretary Alger, whose efforts to cope with the situation were heroic. The fault lay rather with the parsimony of Congress during the preceding decade, and with the dry rot which was the result of thirty years of peace. But at the moment confusion reigned supreme; and ere long it was to endanger the success of a brief yet brilliant campaign in the field.

The financial demands of the war were pressing, and were met by Congress with commendable promptness. The month of May showed a treasury deficit of nearly \$19,000,000. Hence, in June, Secretary Gage was authorised to issue bonds to the amount of \$200,000,000, and a revenue act was passed which became operative on July 1st, extending the system of internal taxation by an increased excise on beer and tobacco, and by a reversion to the scheme adopted during the Civil War of requiring cheques, drafts, telegraphic messages, railway tickets, and many legal and commercial documents to be stamped.

Meanwhile, Admiral Sampson was blockading the western coast of Cuba. He bombarded the Spanish works at Matanzas with some effect, but his fleet was kept carefully in hand and out of range of the shore-batteries, since the approach by sea of a formidable enemy was momentarily expected. This enemy was the Spanish Admiral, Pascuale de Cervera, who, on April 29th, had departed from the Cape Verde Islands, heading westward. Under his orders were four armoured cruisers—the *Almirante*

*Oquendo*, the *Vizcaya*, the *Cristóbal Colon*, and the *Maria Teresa*—and three destroyers, the *Terror*, *Furor*, and *Pluton*. All these vessels were of the most modern type, and the main batteries of the cruisers were very formidable. The destination of Admiral Cervera remained a mystery for some three weeks. He was steaming westward, but where he meant to strike no one could tell. An incipient panic spread among the inhabitants of the Atlantic seaboard. Cities and towns from Portland to Savannah appealed to Washington for special protection. It was the beginning of the summer season, and thousands of persons who usually spend the months of summer near the ocean hesitated to expose their families to the perils of a Spanish raid. The rents of cottages were temporarily lowered. The business of hotels in many watering-places languished. At any moment, Cervera's sailing ships might be descried, ready, like the old-time buccanners of the Spanish Main, to burn and plunder. In Washington, however, the experts knew how idle were these fears. Cervera must of necessity direct his course to some Spanish port in order to renew his supply of coal, exhausted by a long sea-voyage. Four points were noted, one of which would probably be his objective—San Juan, in Puerto Rico, or else Havana, Cienfuegos, or Santiago, in Cuba. Two American fleets were therefore set in motion to intercept the Spaniards or to discover the port to which they had actually repaired.

Cervera first appeared off the French island of Martinique (May 11th). The people of this place were so Spanish in their sympathies as to hold back the news of his arrival until after he had sailed away. He next touched at the Dutch port of Curaçao (May 14th), and then made his way uncertainly to Cuban waters. He

could not reach Havana without a fight with the American blockading ships; Cienfuegos was not strongly fortified; and so he entered the well-protected harbour of Santiago with all his ships save the destroyer *Terror*, which he had left behind him at San Juan. Rumours of his presence in Santiago reached Washington on May 19th, and Commodore Schley was ordered to verify the fact and to blockade the port. With what appeared to be a grievous lack of energy and prompt decision, Schley carried out his orders in a hesitating fashion, and thus might easily have given Cervera a chance to coal his ships and once more put to sea. Nor was Admiral Sampson's order to blockade Santiago obeyed immediately by Schley.<sup>26</sup> But on June 1st, Sampson with his fleet of battleships and cruisers arrived, and from that moment the escape of Cervera without fighting was impossible. On June 3rd, before daylight, a young naval constructor, Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson, with seven volunteers, undertook to sink the collier *Merrimac* in the narrowest part of the channel, thereby blocking it against the exit of Cervera's ships. The attempt was made under a terrific fire of the Spanish batteries, and the *Merrimac* was sunk, though unfortunately not where Hobson had intended. His exploit was superb in its cool daring; yet had it proved successful, it would have served merely to add Cervera's heavy guns and disciplined seamen to the forces which were massed in Santiago against an American attack by land.

Such an attack had already been devised. On June

<sup>26</sup> For a statement of the case against Commodore Schley, see Long, *op. cit.* i. pp. 254-283; ii. pp. 189-194; and for Schley's own defense, Schley, *Forty-five Years Under the Flag*, pp. 263-272, and 408-418 (New York, 1904).

16th, a long line of thirty-five transports, convoyed by a battleship and a dozen other men-of-war, steamed out of Key West, bound for the eastern coast of Cuba. They carried an army corps of about 16,000 men, under the command of Major-General W. R. Shafter. The object of the expedition was the reduction of Santiago by land in coöperation with the naval forces under Admiral Sampson. Precisely why General Shafter was chosen for this important task it is not easy to explain. His previous military service had not been conspicuously brilliant. Originally a farmer, he had enlisted as a volunteer during the Civil War and had ultimately reached the rank of brigadier-general. In 1898 he was physically unfitted for an arduous campaign in a semi-tropical country. Excessively corpulent, he was afflicted by the gout so that he could seldom mount a horse, nor could he even follow closely the movements of the force over which he exercised command. The troops assigned to him, however, were the flower of the regular army, perfect in discipline and well seasoned by service on the Western plains. Three volunteer regiments also formed a part of this expedition—the Second Massachusetts, the Seventy-first New York, and the First Volunteer Cavalry, popularly known as the Rough Riders.

Disembarking at Daiquiri and Siboney, near Santiago,<sup>27</sup> Shafter's command immediately advanced upon the Spanish entrenchments. The country was by nature almost impenetrable because of the dense undergrowth of vines and shrubs, while the humid heat was very trying to the Northern soldiers. General Joseph Wheeler with a detachment of cavalry drove back a Spanish column after a fierce fight at Las Guasimas (June 24th). On July 1st, practically the entire American army moved upon the

<sup>27</sup> June 23d.



complicated outer line of defences that circled Santiago. Three general actions were fought almost simultaneously, at El Caney, at San Juan, and at Aguadores. In the first two the Americans were brilliantly successful. The third resulted in a failure, though an unimportant one. At El Caney and at San Juan, the works were stormed in a series of impetuous rushes; and though the Spanish troops fought gallantly, they were swept away by the irresistible *élan* of the American attack. The American soldiers felt no hatred for their enemies. It would be unfair to say that they entertained a contempt for them. Their feeling resembled an amused tolerance which, even in the shock of battle, made them refuse to take the Spaniards seriously. In the army's vernacular, Spaniards were "dagoes"; and few soldiers felt any hesitation about attacking "dagoes" under all circumstances and without reference to odds. Hence it was that the Spanish fortified positions, protected by a tangle of barbed wire, by almost impenetrable jungle, and situated on high ground, were carried through frontal attacks made by troops without artillery support and in the face of a galling fire from small arms superior to their own. To the Spaniards this sort of fighting seemed to violate the accepted rules of war. One Spanish infantryman subsequently gave his impressions in language that was most naïve.

"We saw the Americans running towards us," he said; "and we rose and fired at them; but instead of retreating, they actually ran towards us all the faster!"

There was, in fact, a saying among the American troops: "We will take these Spaniards with our bare hands"; and in the battles of July 1st, the boast was almost literally carried out.

The entire credit of the victories at Santiago is due to

the soldiers of the regular army. The war with Spain is the only war waged by the United States that was fought out by regulars and not by volunteers. Of the three volunteer regiments in General Shafter's army, the Second Massachusetts was withdrawn from the firing line because the smoke from its black powder gave the enemy the range. The Seventy-first New York became demoralised through the inefficiency of some of its officers, and took no serious part in the operations of the day.<sup>28</sup> The third volunteer regiment, the Rough Riders, fought bravely and did admirable work.<sup>29</sup> It numbered, however, only five hundred men in an army of fifteen thousand, and had it been absent the result would have been the same. The truth is that of necessity the volunteers could not compare with the disciplined and seasoned troops of the regular army. They lacked steadiness and self-control, and their shooting was often wild. Many of them were individually good marksmen, but not with the service rifle; while many others of them had never practised marksmanship at all.<sup>30</sup>

It is a subject for regret that the administration and commissariat of so fine an army should have been so utterly unworthy of its achievements. Supplies were insufficient. The food provided was not merely unwholesome but nauseating. There was a lack of transport waggons. The clothing of the men was unsuited to the climate. Smokeless powder was scarce, and the old-fashioned Springfield rifles of the volunteers were almost useless as against the

<sup>28</sup> See the report of General J. F. Kent (July 7, 1898); and the account by Captain Marcotte, in the *Army and Navy Journal*, of September 17, 1898.

<sup>29</sup> See Roosevelt, *The Rough Riders* (New York, 1899).

<sup>30</sup> See the opinion of General Joseph Wheeler as given in his book, *The Santiago Campaign*, pp. 82-86 (Boston, 1898).

long-range Mausers with which the Spanish troops were armed. Although the purpose of the Americans was to take a fortified city, no siege artillery had been provided; and in the fight at El Caney, only four small field-pieces were present to support the American attack. After the battle of July 1st, there set in a reaction of feeling which threatened to impair both the *morale* and the physical fitness of the army. The trenches were full of water from the tropical rains; malarial fever began to spread among the troops, and there were reported some cases of the dreaded *vomito*. The army at no one time had rations sufficient for more than twenty-four hours, while medicine and surgical attendance were shockingly inadequate to its needs.<sup>31</sup> Two days later (July 3d), General Shafter, far in the rear of the army, sweltering in the heat and tortured by gout, felt the effect of these depressing conditions so strongly that he telegraphed his belief that Santiago could not be taken with his present force. Nevertheless, he sent to the Spanish General a demand for the surrender of the place, to which a curt refusal was returned.<sup>32</sup>

On that same day, however, and even while Shafter was telegraphing in terms of marked despondency, the *coup de grâce* was given to the Spanish cause. At nine in the morning, Admiral Cervera's six ships emerged from the harbour entrance, and under a full head of steam sought to break through the blockading fleet. In a running fight of four hours every one of his vessels was destroyed by the terrific fire of the American battleships and cruisers, which in their turn suffered scarcely any loss. The Spanish Admiral and more than 1700 of his officers and men

<sup>31</sup> See Bigelow, *Reminiscences of the Santiago Campaign*, pp. 138-146 (New York, 1899).

<sup>32</sup> Wilcox, *op. cit.* p. 191.

were captured. The victory was as complete as that of Dewey at Manila. It was less glorious, because at Santiago the odds were overwhelmingly against the Spaniards. They were outnumbered three to one, and it was a fight of cruisers against battleships. By an unhappy chance, Admiral Sampson, whose far-seeing sagacity had planned the battle just as it was actually fought, took no part in it. On board the *New York*, he had gone to Siboney to confer with General Shafter, and he returned in time to fire only a few long distance shots and to be a mark for the Spanish batteries on the shore.

From this moment the fall of Santiago was assured. General Toral, in command of the city, delayed surrendering it, with true Spanish procrastination making demands and asking concessions which the Americans refused. Finally Admiral Sampson moved some of his larger ships within range and began dropping shells with mathematical precision into the centre of the town. This proved to be an effective argument; and on July 17th a formal surrender was made to General Shafter. At high noon on the same day a detachment of American cavalry, infantry, and artillery entered the city and hoisted the national flag over the municipal buildings. More than 10,000 Spanish soldiers were given up as prisoners, and after a brief detention were sent to Spain. An unusual incident marked their departure. They published an address "To the Soldiers of the American Army" in which they said:

"We should not be fulfilling our duty as men in whose breasts there exist both gratitude and courtesy, should we embark for our beloved Spain without sending you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and farewell. . . . You fought us as men, face to face, and with great courage. . . . You have complied exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognised by the armies of

the most civilised nations of the world; you have given an honourable burial to our dead; you have treated our wounded with great humanity; and lastly, to us whose condition was terrible, you have given freely of food, of your stock of medicines, and you have honoured us with distinction and courtesy. With this high sentiment of appreciation from all of us, it remains to us only to utter our farewell; and with the greatest sincerity, we wish you all happiness and health in this land which will no more belong to our dear Spain.”<sup>33</sup>

The downfall of Santiago gave to the Americans control of the whole eastern end of Cuba. Yet this of itself did not necessarily involve the termination of hostilities. Havana was still untaken. It was garrisoned by a very strong force and was protected by powerful fortresses. Its people were intensely loyal to the Spanish cause and were eager for the Americans to make an attack upon the place. Reverses elsewhere had no effect upon the Havaneese. Women's garments were suspended in conspicuous places throughout the town, bearing placards inscribed: "To be worn by those who are willing to surrender." The war, however, was ended through considerations which had nothing to do with the condition of affairs in Cuba. One powerful factor in bringing Spain to terms was found in action taken by the Navy Department in Washington. Early in June, Spain had got together at Cadiz a second squadron commanded by Admiral Cámara. It consisted of the battleship *Pelayo*, an armoured cruiser, six converted cruisers, and four destroyers, with a number of auxiliary vessels.<sup>34</sup> On June 18th a report reached Wash-

<sup>33</sup> Alger, *op. cit.* pp. 280-281.

<sup>34</sup> Rumors that this force was to make a dash upon the American coast caused a panic in the United States. See the *New York World* for June 14th, 18th, and 19th; and the *New York Herald* for June 14th and 23d, 1898.

ington that Admiral Cámara was under orders to proceed to the Philippines by way of the Suez Canal, and to fall upon Admiral Dewey's squadron ere it could be reinforced. For a moment the news aroused a feeling of anxiety. The *Pelayo* was supposed to be a very formidable vessel; and, on paper at least, the cruisers assigned to accompany it were more than equal to those which Dewey had at his disposal. Many were the plans suggested to check this threatening expedition. Mr. William Randolph Hearst, the wealthy proprietor of a newspaper in New York, cabled an order directing one of his agents in London to purchase a merchant vessel, load it with coal, and proceed to the Suez Canal with the purpose of there sinking the ship so as to block the canal against Cámara's squadron.<sup>35</sup> But meanwhile an effective counterstroke had been planned in Washington. On June 27th, Commodore J. C. Watson was put in command of a squadron consisting of the battleships *Iowa* and *Oregon* and four cruisers; and the announcement was officially made that this squadron was to sail immediately for the coast of Spain.

The manœuvre worked effectively. It was perfectly well known in Madrid that the great Spanish seaport cities, such as Barcelona and Cadiz, were practically defenceless. Their old-fashioned fortifications would have crumbled like chalk before the huge guns of Watson's battleships. To send Cámara away would be simply to invite attack. Nevertheless, Cámara began his voyage, passing through the Suez Canal on July 2nd. The Anglo-Egyptian Government forbade him to take on coal at Port Saïd. He lingered for a while; but presently, after he had received the news of Cervera's defeat at Santiago, he turned the prows of his vessels homeward. All that he

<sup>35</sup> See the account in Creelman, *The Great Highway* (New York, 1902).

had accomplished was to enrich the treasury of the Canal by the sum of \$280,000, which he was compelled to pay in tolls. The menace of Watson's squadron had accomplished, however, even more than at first sight was apparent. Those European Powers which had been unfriendly to the United States were aghast at the thought of American ships of war carrying on hostile operations in European waters. The immense energy and the naval prowess of the United States inspired nervous apprehension in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin. Hence, strong pressure was brought to bear upon the Spanish Government to end a war in which no hope for Spain could be discerned. This pressure was supplemented by an appeal from Spain's commercial interests and by the condition of the Spanish Treasury. Spanish securities since the beginning of the war, had fallen in value from a little more than 60 to a little less than 30. Spanish commerce was at a standstill. The Atlantic seaports dreaded an American invasion. Hence, on July 26th, the French Ambassador at Washington, M. Jules Cambon, on behalf of the Spanish Government, opened negotiations for peace. Through M. Cambon, President McKinley announced the terms on which the United States would consent to suspend hostilities. On August 12th, a protocol was signed at Washington as a preliminary to a treaty of peace to be afterwards negotiated. The war was practically at an end.

The news was at once telegraphed to the American commanders in different parts of the world. It reached Puerto Rico just in time to end a campaign which had only then begun. A force of 3500 American troops under Major-General Miles had been landed in that island, and had advanced upon the capital. Only slight resistance was made by the Spaniards, while the inhabitants of the

various towns and villages welcomed the invaders with triumphal arches and by strewing flowers in their path. This nineteen days' campaigning was therefore the source of considerable raillery in the United States, where it was described as "a military picnic." When, however, the news of the signing of the protocol arrived, the American troops were in line of battle and a really serious engagement was impending. It was not fought out because of telegraphic orders from Washington and from Madrid.

To all intents and purposes the war was over. It had lasted less than four months, yet in that time the power of Spain had been completely humbled. Her possessions in Asia and in the Western Indies lay at the mercy of the United States, which, by reason of this fact, now ceased to be reckoned merely as a North American Republic and assumed its rightful place as a great world power.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>36</sup> No complete history of the war with Spain has yet been written. In addition to the works already cited in the present chapter, reference may be made to the following narratives, written by those who were either participants in the events described, or else eye-witnesses: Sigsbee, "The Personal Narrative of the *Maine*" (*Century*, December, 1898); McCutcheon, "The Surrender of Manila" (*Century Magazine*, April, 1899); Spears, "The Chase of Cervera" (*Scribner's*, August, 1898); Lee, "The Regulars at El Caney" (*Scribner's*, October, 1898); Chadwick, "The Navy in the War" (*Scribner's*, November, 1898); Hobson, "The Sinking of the *Merrimac*" (*Century*, December, 1898, and January, 1899); Kelly, "An American in Madrid during the War" (*Century*, January, 1899); Shafter, "The Capture of Santiago" (*Century*, February, 1899); Cook, "The *Brooklyn* at Santiago" (*Century*, May, 1899); Staunton, "The Naval Campaign of 1898" (*Harper's*, January, 1899); Eberle, "The *Oregon's* Great Voyage" (*Century*, October, 1899); also Wilson, "The Naval Lessons of the War" (*Harper's*, January, 1899); Russell, "Incidents of the Cuban Blockade" (*Century*, September, 1898).



## CHAPTER XIV

### THE LAST YEARS OF PRESIDENT M'KINLEY

PEACE negotiations between the United States and Spain were conducted and concluded in Paris by representatives of the two nations.<sup>1</sup> From October 1st until early in December, the sessions continued, at first harmoniously, but later with so great a divergence of opinion as to threaten an end of all discussion, and a renewal of the war.<sup>2</sup> The abandonment of Cuba and Puerto Rico was, of course, expected, and was granted by the Spanish envoys, as was also the cession to the United States of the island of Guam, one of the Ladrones group, over which the American flag had been raised by the *Charleston* on its voyage to Manila.<sup>3</sup> But there were two questions over which the controversy was long and bitter. Spain wished the United States, in taking Cuba, to assume the whole or part of the Cuban debt. The American plenipotentiaries absolutely refused to agree to any such arrangement. This debt had been incurred by Spain in her efforts to crush the Cubans in their

<sup>1</sup> The American plenipotentiaries were Judge William R. Day, Senator Cushman K. Davis, Senator William P. Frye, Senator George Gray and Mr. Whitelaw Reid. The head of the Spanish envoys was Señor Don Eugenio Montero Rios, President of the Spanish Senate.

<sup>2</sup> Senator Frye cabled to Assistant Secretary of State Adee: "It seems to me that the most undesirable happening would be our return without a treaty of peace. Yet that is probable in my opinion." (November 2, 1898.)

<sup>3</sup> When the *Charleston* entered the harbour of Guam on June 21st, and began shelling the Spanish fort, the local officials had not yet heard of the declaration of war, but supposed the guns to be fired as a salute. See Davis, *Our Conquests in the Pacific*, pp. 44-87 (New York, 1899).

revolt against oppression, a revolt which Americans had justified and applauded, and which had at last compelled the United States to intervene in Cuba. Spain must, therefore, still bear the burden which her own unwisdom had imposed upon her; and to this her envoys in the end reluctantly agreed.

But the crucial question was that which related to the Philippines. Were these islands to be handed back to Spain in their integrity? Would the United States retain, perhaps, a single island as a naval station? Or, finally, would the whole archipelago pass into the possession of that Western Power whose flag already floated proudly over the captured city of Manila where lay its victorious ships of war, and about which was encamped its triumphant soldiery? Spain's representatives at Paris were intensely earnest in their plea that the Islands should be restored to the sovereignty of their King. The war, they urged, was begun because of Cuba. The surrender of Cuba ought therefore logically to satisfy the demands of the United States. Hostilities in the Philippines had been merely an incident of the war; and to exact from Spain the surrender of even a portion of the archipelago would be unreasonable and oppressive. Such was the Spanish view. In the United States, public opinion exhibited a gradual and very interesting change which was reflected in the policy of the Government and therefore in the attitude of the American negotiators at Paris. During the period of actual warfare, there had been no general wish to acquire Asiatic territory. Such a thing was opposed to all the national traditions and to the national habits of thought. Few persons knew or cared anything about those distant islands. But when the question was presented sharply to the popular intelligence, it crystallised

itself into the problem of accepting one of several definite lines of policy. If the American forces were to be withdrawn, this action would not in reality restore the *status quo ante*. It would not re-establish Spain's authority. That authority had been irretrievably lost. The destruction of Spanish prestige and the weakening of Spain's resources by the war, had given to the Filipino insurrection such an impetus as made it clear that Spain could never reconquer even the precarious hold upon the Islands which she had possessed before the battle of Manila. Her envoys at Paris tacitly admitted this when they asked the United States not only to recognise Spain's sovereignty but to restore it by the use of military force.<sup>4</sup> Hence, the mere withdrawal of the American army from Manila would lead only to a bloody and protracted civil war, of which the outcome would doubtless be the cession of the Philippines by Spain to one of the great Powers<sup>5</sup>—perhaps and very probably to Germany. With what favour the American people would view such an issue of the affair, it is unnecessary to explain. The insolence of von Diederich at Manila was only just becoming known in the United States; and the popular resentment which it excited forbade any line of action from which Germany might reap advantage. To take a single island and restore the rest to Spain,<sup>6</sup> was open to the same objection, still more forcibly presented;

<sup>4</sup> Despatch of October 1, 1898, from Judge Day in Paris to President McKinley.

<sup>5</sup> Early in November, rumours were current in Europe to the effect that Spain was to sell the Philippines to France. Spanish securities rose in the market on the strength of this report. As a matter of fact, soon after the negotiations in Paris had ended, Spain did sell to Germany the three Pacific groups—the Carolines, the Pelews, and the Ladrones, except Guam.

<sup>6</sup> This had at one time been considered, and President McKinley had directed Admiral Dewey to select one of the islands for permanent occupation. The Admiral chose the island of Luzon.

for then there would be created a far distant American possession, partly surrounded and continuously menaced by a hostile neighbour.

But why not give the Islands over to Aguinaldo and let him rule them as a Philippine Republic? This course would have exactly paralleled what the United States proposed to do in Cuba. If Cuba were for the Cubans, why not the Philippines for the Filipinos? Such a solution was not regarded as necessarily impossible; but President McKinley and his advisers were not yet convinced that Aguinaldo could be trusted to maintain a form of government under which the lives and property of foreigners would be properly safeguarded. Too little was known of the Filipinos to warrant the unqualified committal to them of so great a trust. Aguinaldo himself had already impressed the Americans at Manila most unfavourably. He had drawn his followers off into separate cantonments, and was maintaining an attitude of sullen unfriendliness toward the American commanders. His followers made no secret of their intention to kill every Spaniard whom they should capture. It would, indeed, be taking a serious responsibility to surrender the control of civilised towns and cities to men of mixed breeds, whom Admiral Dewey characterised as "passionate semi-savages."

Hence, as the weeks wore on, the duty of the President became every day more clear to him. The ultimate disposal of the Philippines was still an open question; but the determination of that question must lie with the United States, and must be reached in accordance with the dictates both of political wisdom and of humanity. The demand was therefore made that Spain cede the Islands unreservedly to the United States, which would in turn and by way of a solatium, pay into the Spanish Treasury a sum of

money to be afterwards agreed upon. The Spanish envoys in Paris were moved to strong emotion by this demand.<sup>7</sup> With passionate Castilian eloquence they argued against the right of the United States to ask this of them. With their plea, all Europe sympathised. Here was seen the passing of an old and gallant nation, a kingdom which had once ruled half the world, and whose chivalry had been the pride of Christendom, but which was now suing hopelessly for grace at the hands of a raw republic of the New World. Even Americans could feel the pathos of that moment. Yet Spain had no choice except submission. She could not continue fighting even if she would. Her treasury was bankrupt, her armies beaten, her ships destroyed. Not one of the European Powers that wished her well dared go beyond mere words to show its friendship. And so with unspeakable bitterness of heart, but with that grave dignity which the Spaniard has inherited from the Moor, the envoys of Queen Cristina accepted the inevitable. On December 10th, the Treaty of Paris was signed, and the United States became the possessor of Cuba, of Puerto Rico, of Guam, and of the Philippine Islands. In return for the cession of the Philippines, Spain was to receive the sum of \$20,000,000.<sup>8</sup>

The islands conquered from Spain were not the only new possessions acquired by the United States at this time. After the battle of Manila Bay, the little Republic of Hawaii had openly violated international law in order to show its friendliness to the American cause. American

<sup>7</sup> See the long cable despatch to the Secretary of State from Mr. John Bassett Moore dated at Paris, November 18th, 1898, and summarising the Spanish argument.

<sup>8</sup> The payment of this sum made the cost to the United States of the war with Spain aggregate about \$300,000,000. The actual expenditures of Spain were estimated at a somewhat larger amount.

ships of war were allowed to take on coal at Honolulu and, in fact, to make of that port a naval base. The new importance of Hawaii from a strategic point of view became so obvious that a strong sentiment for annexation was created in the United States. The Hawaiian Congress invited a union of the two countries, and this was actually effected, on President McKinley's recommendation, by joint resolution of both Houses.<sup>9</sup> A later act of Congress (April 30, 1900), made Hawaii a fully organised Territory and declared its citizens to be citizens of the United States. To the new Territory were extended the general provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States. The first Governor of Hawaii was Mr. S. B. Dole, who had been President ever since the overthrow of Queen Liliuokalani in 1892.<sup>10</sup>

The American people regarded the immense expansion of their national responsibilities resulting from the Spanish war with a certain proud self-confidence that was characteristic of their robust optimism. While many may have shared the feeling of President McKinley that these new obligations were to be assumed as a solemn duty which circumstances and considerations of humanity had forced upon the United States, it is likely that Americans as a whole took a much less philosophic view. The brilliancy of their achievements in the war had quickened their imaginations, and greatly broadened out their aspirations and ambitions. To rule distant lands, to hold colonies and dependencies, to have their country figure largely on the vast

<sup>9</sup> The joint resolutions, known as the Newlands Resolutions, passed the House (June 15th) by a vote of 209 to 91, and the Senate (July 6th), by a vote of 42 to 21.

<sup>10</sup> See Willoughby, *Territories and Dependencies of the United States*, pp. 60-70 (New York, 1905).

stage of international affairs, appealed to their national love of bigness. When foreign writers and some native pessimists declared the United States incompetent to administer distant possessions,<sup>11</sup> this only piqued the pride of most Americans, and made them eager to accept the challenge. It was really the instinct for national growth, the ambition for new achievement, which now, like a flame, was fanned by the spirit of successful conquest. Nor was the phenomenon a new one. It was as old as the American colonies themselves. As the sturdy pioneers had hewn their way through the forests, and subdued the Indians; as their descendants had crossed the mountains and then traversed the great Western plains; as they had secured the Louisiana Territory from France, and wrested an empire on the Pacific from Mexico, so now in an even more magnificent westward sweep, they passed beyond the limits of the encircling ocean, and set their standard in the islands of the sea. It was inevitable, because it was in the blood of the race. Mr. Seward, many years before, had expressed a vital truth and uttered a boldly pregnant sentence when he said: "Popular passion for territorial aggrandisement is irresistible. Prudence, justice, cowardice, may check it for a season; but it will gain strength by its subjugation. It behooves us to qualify ourselves for our mission. We must dare our destiny."<sup>12</sup>

And a foreign political philosopher, von Holst, had observed with equal truth:

"It is as easy to bid a ball that has flown from the mouth of a gun to stop in its flight and return on its

<sup>11</sup> Even the London *Spectator*, though friendly to the United States, remarked after the battle of Manila Bay, in speaking of the Philippines, "Of course, the Americans can not keep them."

<sup>12</sup> Seward, *Works*, edited by G. E. Baker, iii. p. 409 (New York, 1890).

path, as to terminate a successful war of conquest by a voluntary surrender of all conquests, because it has been found that the spoil will be a source of dissension at home." <sup>13</sup>

That the questions raised by the war would cause dissension was of course to be expected. While hostilities were actually in progress, factional strife had been hushed. Both Republicans and Democrats had strongly favoured intervention in Cuba, and the initial war measures had received the unanimous approval of Congress.<sup>14</sup> Mr. Bryan himself had accepted the colonelcy of a Nebraska regiment, which remained under arms until peace was thoroughly assured. But no sooner had the Treaty of Paris been laid before the Senate for ratification (January 4, 1899), than the lines of cleavage between the two great parties became again apparent. The Democratic leader, Senator Gorman, opposed the treaty because, as he said, it practically annexed the Philippines to the United States. In this opposition he was followed by nearly all his party associates, and by two eminent Republican Senators,—Mr. Hoar of Massachusetts and Mr. Hale of Maine. The Philippine clauses of the treaty were highly obnoxious to a small but very active body of citizens in New England who became known as "Anti-Imperialists," or in contemporaneous political slang, as "Antis." An association calling itself the Anti-Imperialist League was formed in Boston, and began an active propaganda directed against the establishment of a colonial system by the United States. The Anti-Imperialists urged that to acquire foreign possessions by conquest and to hold them by force in the position

<sup>13</sup> Von Holst, *Constitutional History of the United States*, iii. p. 304 (Chicago, 1876-92).

<sup>14</sup> See pp. 556-7.



of colonial dependencies was unconstitutional, a departure from the traditions of the American government, and in itself criminal and unjust.<sup>15</sup> Senator Hoar would have had the President yield the control of the Islands to the rule of Aguinaldo which, he declared, represented the will of the Filipinos. Many of the old-time abolitionists took the same view, and said that any other course would be oppressive and tyrannical.

But President McKinley, pending a final disposition of the question, had by proclamation on January 5, 1899, ordered General E. S. Otis, to extend the military rule of the United States over the whole of the Philippine Islands. The American army in the Far East was steadily augmented until it numbered nearly 50,000 men, and the War Department planned a still further increase. This action moved the Anti-Imperialists to bitter denunciation of the President as a military despot who was bent upon crushing out the liberties of a free people. Americans then became divided into "Expansionists" (called by their adversaries "Imperialists"), and "Anti-Expansionists" or "Anti-Imperialists." For a time it seemed as though the Treaty of Paris might be rejected by the Senate; for while the Republicans had a bare majority, a two-thirds vote was necessary for the ratification of the treaty. The discussion was prolonged and often animated. When the day arrived for the final vote (February 6th), the result still seemed more than doubtful. Sixty votes were needed for ratification, and only 58 were surely pledged. Three o'clock was the hour that had been set; and at half-past two, the Administration still lacked one vote. This was finally secured only after the hour of three had struck and

<sup>15</sup> See a long and very ably written letter in the *Nation* for February 2, 1899, pp. 87-88.

while the roll was actually being called. The Expansionists had won.<sup>16</sup>

The result was due in part to the attitude of Mr. Bryan, who had used his personal influence in urging the acceptance of the treaty. Mr. Bryan very wisely held that peace with Spain should be formally and speedily assured; and that the United States might fitly assume the temporary control of the Philippines. But he agreed with the Anti-Imperialists in believing that the Islands should ultimately be independent, after the United States, as a guardian Power, should have effected the creation in them of a stable government. It was, however, Aguinaldo himself who worked most effectively against an immediate recognition of Filipino independence. His oriental vanity had already obscured his natural intelligence. He styled himself "Dictator of the Philippines," and assumed the airs of an Eastern potentate, decorating his person with various insignia of rank, and decreeing to himself with childish delight a golden whistle as a badge of supreme authority. All this was unimportant though characteristic. But on January 20th, the body which styled itself the Congress of the Filipino Republic, then in session at Malolos, Aguinaldo's "capital," authorised him at his discretion to make war upon the American forces in the island of Luzon. On February 4th—two days before the Senate voted on the Treaty of Paris—Aguinaldo's armed levies tried to "rush" the American lines under cover of darkness. The Filipinos were hurled back with heavy loss; yet they returned again and again to the attack, fighting steadily until

<sup>16</sup> Lodge, *op. cit.* p. 232. The final division was as follows:—For the treaty: Republicans, 42; Democrats, 10; Populists, 3; Silver Senators, 2. Against the treaty: Republicans, 2; Democrats, 24; Populists, 2; Silver Senators, 1. These figures do not take account of Senators who were paired.

daybreak. By that time, General Otis had the situation well in hand, and ordered an advance which drove the Filipinos from the immediate vicinity of Manila. The news of this encounter very naturally hardened the hearts of the American people against abandoning the Philippines to a declared enemy; and the ratification of the treaty was undoubtedly helped by Aguinaldo's wanton act of violence. Only the extreme among the Anti-Imperialists applauded him as a hero and a patriot. Soon afterwards, the Filipino Congress ordered the assassination of all foreigners residing in Manila; and an effort was made to burn the city. Both attempts were thwarted by the vigilance of the American commanders; though, with a certain poetic justice, the plot to burn Manila did result in wiping out the purely Filipino section of that city. From this time there was waged a desultory and protracted warfare, an account of which does not lie within the scope of the present narrative. Suffice it to say that the Filipinos, after successive and severe defeats in open battle, betook themselves to a species of jungle-fighting marked by treachery and at times by savage acts which often drove the American soldiers into harsh reprisals. The reports of these regrettable occurrences were eagerly caught up in the United States and were grossly exaggerated by the opponents of "imperialism." A commission appointed by the President in January, 1899,<sup>17</sup> to investigate conditions in the Philippines, made a report in November of the same year.<sup>18</sup> In essence it justified the course of the Administration, and made it plain that Aguinaldo's following rep-

<sup>17</sup> Its members were Dr. J. G. Schurman, Admiral Dewey, Professor Dean C. Worcester, Mr. Charles Denby, and General Otis.

<sup>18</sup> The final report was rendered in December, 1900. It is contained in four large volumes (Washington, 1900).

resented only a comparatively small part of the heterogeneous population of the Philippines.

It was the report of this Commission no less than the violence of Aguinaldo's soldiery which convinced President McKinley that the United States must, for some time at least, assume the full responsibility of governing the Philippines. The very first necessity was the restoration of order by military force. In his message of December 5, 1898, the President had asked Congress to increase the regular army to 100,000 men. His request was met by an increase of the regular establishment to 65,000 men,<sup>19</sup> with permission to enlist 35,000 volunteers for service until July 1st, 1901.<sup>20</sup> The army in the Philippines was thereupon augmented to more than 60,000 troops, and all local authority was vested ultimately in the President, who exercised it through his military commanders. This, on the face of it, seemed to many the rankest kind of "imperialism," and Mr. McKinley was denounced unsparingly as a despot who ruled over conquered millions, through satraps and by the terror of his bayonets. Yet nothing could have been further from the truth. President McKinley's own cast of mind and the character of his whole public life inclined him in all things to take the civilian's point of view; and it was really by an ingenious interpretation of his military prerogatives that he ultimately worked out a scheme for the non-military administration of the Philippines. Through his constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief, he was for the present governing the conquered Islands by martial law. Technically his powers were military powers, and thus they merged in one person

<sup>19</sup> At the outbreak of the war with Spain, the regular army had numbered only 28,000 men.

<sup>20</sup> Act of March 2, 1899.

executive, judicial, and legislative functions. The President's purpose, however, as ultimately set forth in a remarkable message to Congress,<sup>21</sup> provided for a separation of these functions and for their exercise by different individuals. "As it is well settled that the military power of the President may be exercised through civil agents . . . it was determined that the part of the military power which was legislative in its character should be exercised by civil agents proceeding in accordance with legislative forms; while the judicial power should be exercised by particular establishments and regulated by the enactments of legislative authority."<sup>22</sup> Under this plan the way was prepared for a gradual change from military to civil methods of administration.<sup>23</sup> The first definite step toward this end was the appointment of a second Commission (April 7, 1900) of five gentlemen headed by Judge W. H. Taft of Ohio, who were directed to develop in the Philippines a system which should give to the people of the Islands the largest measure of self-government which they were fitted to exercise. It may be said here by way of anticipation, that on July 4, 1901, civil government took in part the place of military rule, Judge Taft becoming Civil Governor, with a Council and a Supreme Court in which native Filipinos were represented. Just one year from that date (July 4, 1902) the President by proclamation declared the Islands pacified and subject thereafter to the civil authorities alone. To subdue the insurrection had cost the United States nearly \$170,000,000.

<sup>21</sup> Annual message of December 3, 1900.

<sup>22</sup> Annual report of the Secretary of War, 1901.

<sup>23</sup> Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-223. See Atkinson, *The Philippine Islands* (New York, 1905).

The cession of Puerto Rico to the United States under the Treaty of Paris raised some interesting constitutional questions. For a few months following the close of the war, military government continued in that island. But in his annual message of December 3, 1899, President McKinley recommended the establishment of civil rule. What, however, was the legal status of Puerto Rico? Was it an integral part of the United States? If so, then the Constitution and laws of the United States must already be in force there, and the inhabitants of Puerto Rico must be already citizens of the United States. This point was brought out sharply in a debate over the question of applying the Dingley Tariff Act to imports into the United States from Puerto Rico. The President himself declared: "Our plain duty is to abolish all customs-tariffs between the United States and Puerto Rico." But the representatives of the protected interests in Congress took alarm at this sentence. Especially did the agents of the Sugar Trust dislike it, since their masters dreaded competition from the Puerto Rican sugar-growers. Congress debated the question at great length while considering the so-called Foraker Bill, providing a system of civil government for Puerto Rico. The Democrats crystallised their view in the much-quoted words: "The Constitution follows the flag." But they and the few Republicans who agreed with them were outvoted; and the Foraker Bill, as enacted, treated Puerto Rico as being neither a State nor a Territory, but a "possession" of the United States acquired by the treaty-making power, and one which could be incorporated into the United States only by act of Congress.<sup>24</sup> Hence, for the time being, a tariff was laid upon

<sup>24</sup> This theory was sustained by a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of *Dooley vs. the United States*.

goods imported from Puerto Rico. Thus the President was overruled; and the country witnessed the anomalous spectacle of the supreme champion of protectionism pleading for free trade and being flouted by his own party, which was in this case *plus royaliste que le roi*. The Foraker Act,<sup>25</sup> in its final form gave to Puerto Rico an appointive Governor, an Executive Council composed half of Americans and half of Puerto Ricans, but chosen by the President, and finally a House of Delegates elected by the people of the Island.<sup>26</sup>

The relations of the United States with Cuba were, of course, different in essence from those with the other territories ceded by Spain. In the resolutions of Congress (April 19, 1898) which had declared that the people of Cuba were "and of right ought to be free and independent," the following explicit assertion had been made:

"The United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the Island to its people."<sup>27</sup>

In the face of this unqualified and spontaneous pledge, it was clear that the United States was bound by every possible obligation of honour to give over to the Cuban people the full and free control of their own political destinies. Nevertheless, there were not a few Americans who made light of this solemn promise. The nation had

<sup>25</sup> The Foraker Act became law on April 12, 1900.

<sup>26</sup> For a detailed account of the system of general and local government in Puerto Rico, see Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-170.

<sup>27</sup> This resolution was known as the Teller Resolution, from Senator Teller of Colorado.

experienced, in fact, a certain revulsion of feeling as to the Cubans, who not long before had been extravagantly lauded as patriots and heroes. Close contact with them during the war had not tended to perpetuate this admiration and respect. American soldiers in Cuba found the ragged levies of Garcia and Gomez to be worthless as allies in the field, and not altogether agreeable as near companions. The one military operation entrusted to them, they had failed utterly to accomplish.<sup>28</sup> For the rest they seemed to the hardy, vigorous fighters of the North more like a swarm of enervated mendicants than a host of heroes struggling to be free. They accepted as a matter of course all that was given them. They flocked into the camps when rations were served out, and they were conspicuously absent when the rifle-balls were singing. Hence, there was little enthusiasm in the United States in response to the cry of "Cuba for the Cubans." Many newspapers advocated the annexation of Cuba to the United States. They spoke of the resolutions of Congress as a mere sentimental outburst devoid of any binding force. They asserted and with some truth that those who represented the moneyed interests in Cuba, and the foreign residents as well, would much prefer American to Cuban government.

Fortunately, however, President McKinley took no heed of such sophistical arguments as these. For weal or for woe the honour of the nation had been plighted; and Cuba must be left to the enjoyment of political independence. Hence, it was decided temporarily to occupy the Island until certain reforms could be effected, and after that to

<sup>28</sup> This was at Santiago, where Garcia was charged to prevent a relieving force under General Pando from uniting with the Spaniards in that city.



## THE LAST YEARS OF M'K

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coloured fires, while every vessel in the harbour was strung with lights. It was the apotheosis of American valour.<sup>30</sup>

This pageant was only the first of many others in which the Admiral was the central figure. Every great city in the land sent delegations to him begging him to become the people's guest. Congress revived for him the office of Admiral, which had heretofore been held only by Farragut and Porter. It was provided also that he need not retire when he reached the age prescribed by law for such retirement, and that even after doing so of his own volition, his emoluments should not be diminished.

Admiral Dewey was far more fortunate than many of the other officers who served their country with distinction in the war. When the fighting had actually ceased, something like a reaction of feeling swept over the entire country. After all, when compared with many other conflicts, the war with Spain, from a military point of view, had not been a very great one. That the United States with its enormous wealth, its teeming population, and its vigorous youth should defeat a decrepit and almost bankrupt kingdom was not a matter for excessive wonderment and exultation. Individual exploits, such as that of Dewey, deserved the full measure of admiration which they received. But for the rest, popular enthusiasm had gone too far, and a reaction was inevitable. This was strengthened by some unpleasant incidents and revelations which followed hard upon the fighting. The record of the War Department was one which filled Americans with chagrin and something like disgust. A commission appointed by the President in December, 1898, brought out many facts that were most discreditable, and that led to personal contro-

<sup>30</sup> See the *New York Sun*, *Times*, *Tribune*, and *Herald*, for September 30 and October 1, 1899.

versies between various officers of high rank. Major-General Miles charged that much of the food furnished to the troops in Cuba was not only unpalatable but unwholesome. Large quantities of refrigerated beef purchased from the Beef Trust had been despatched to Cuba; and this beef was said to have been treated with chemicals which made it nauseous and even poisonous. General Miles, using a phrase current in the army, described it as "embalmed beef." For this he was attacked in terms of foul vituperation by the Commissary-General, Charles P. Egan, who wrote a letter to General Miles<sup>31</sup> couched in such language as to prevent its publication. Egan was court-martialed and sentenced to dismissal from the service;<sup>32</sup> but the investigating committee also censured General Miles. Its final report was what is popularly known as a "whitewashing report"; but the country formed its own opinion of the discreditable facts made public during the investigation, and many sneers were heard in foreign countries over the alleged corruption and inefficiency of the American War Department. Thus, the London *Saturday Review* remarked editorially:

"There is a figure of the American eagle over the War Office in Washington. With slight alteration it might be made into a reminiscence of the war. It would not take much to change it from the figure of an eagle into that of a vampire, unpelican-like, feeding on its own children, who, under a strange delusion, and not realising the nature of their Frankenstein mother, are content to sweat and groan under the most heartlessly tyrannical government on earth—the tyranny of democracy."<sup>33</sup>

<sup>31</sup> New York *World*, December 25 and 26, 1898.

<sup>32</sup> President McKinley commuted this sentence to one of six years suspension from duty.

<sup>33</sup> *Saturday Review*, October 31, 1898.

And the *St. James's Gazette* of London observed:

“ Before the Americans make up their minds definitely to extend the empire of the United States, it may be as well for them to realise how they have managed an army in their own country and the adjacent islands during the late crisis. . . . After the glamour of victory has passed, the scandals in their War Department have proved a very unpleasant reverse to patriotic citizens; and the worst of it is that the Congressmen, who ought to make a strict inquiry, form themselves a large part of the scandal they naturally shrink from investigating.”

Even more unfortunate was a bitter controversy between the friends of Rear-Admiral Sampson and those of Rear-Admiral Schley in which it may be said, to the honour of both these officers, that neither took any active part.<sup>34</sup> At the beginning of the war, the former had been promoted to the chief command of the fleet in Cuban waters although previously he had been of rank inferior to Schley. This promotion was in accordance with the prevailing sentiment of naval experts. Admiral Sampson represented the type of naval officer who is above all else strictly and most commendably professional. Cold in temperament, clear-headed, dispassionate and self-controlled, he had many of the traits that were to be found in Moltke, and that contributed so largely to that soldier's phenomenal success. His one thought was to perform with absolute efficiency the tasks assigned him, and in so doing to spare no pains and to leave no details unnoticed or unprovided for. He had a high degree of scientific knowledge, and he

<sup>34</sup> Admiral Schley generously wrote of Admiral Sampson: “ Victory was secured by the force under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic Squadron, and to him the honour is due.” (Despatch of July 10, 1898.) See also a despatch from Sampson of the same date regarding Schley.

represented what was best in the traditions of the old navy and in the aspirations of the new. He cared nothing for popular applause and never suffered any thought of it to influence his actions. Those who did not know him well, criticised him as too reserved, too austere, and, in fact, as too professional. His tactlessness, indeed, was at times almost repellent. When upon his tardy arrival at the battle of Santiago, Commodore Schley signalled him a message of enthusiastic congratulation, Sampson made the coldly curt reply: "Report your casualties." But in the navy he was regarded with profound respect, and his promotion was marvellously justified by the event. The smashing of Cervera's fleet was just as much his work as though his own hand had fired every gun upon that memorable day of victory.

Rear-Admiral Schley was a very different type of man. He was, first of all, a man of impulse, of eager action—in fact, more typically French than Anglo-Saxon. He was far more easy-going than Admiral Sampson, less intellectual, less steady, less sure of himself in any sudden emergency, as was shown by his hesitating and dilatory course when ordered to blockade Cervera in Santiago. Admiral Schley kept an eye upon the public and he loved the approval of the public. Applause was very sweet to him, and he knew something of the ways and arts of the politician. His impulsiveness, his urbanity, and his lack of reserve made him liked by many whose standards of judgment were personal and not professional. To these he seemed delightfully human, while Admiral Sampson was possibly regarded as a naval martinet. After the war, his friends very unwisely ascribed to him the chief honours of the victory at Santiago, declaring that he was actually in command, while Admiral Sampson had arrived only at

the conclusion of the fight. This nettled the latter's friends, and they retorted by pointing to Schley's disobedience of orders, by criticising his manœuvres in the battle, and at last, by accusing him in naval phrase, of being "gunshy." Accusation was met with counter accusation, until at last Admiral Schley very properly demanded a naval court of inquiry, which was granted. The court was composed of Admirals Dewey, Ramsay, and Benham; and after a patient consideration of all the facts, it rendered a report to the effect that Admiral Sampson had been really in command of the fleet at the battle of Santiago, and at the same time that there was no ground for any aspersions on the courage and coolness of Admiral Schley while under fire. The Court declined to consider Admiral Schley's alleged disobedience of orders prior to the blockade of Santiago, holding that whatever his conduct may have been at that time, it had been condoned by the Navy Department in failing to relieve him of his command, and by Congress in advancing him to the rank of Rear-Admiral. The findings of the Court were approved by President McKinley, and the unpleasant controversy gradually came to an end even in the press. A striking tribute was paid to Admiral Sampson by his fellow officers on his retiring from command. The scene has been described by a well-known man of letters in these words:

"When the time arrived for Admiral Sampson to surrender the command of the fleet he had brought back to Hampton Roads, he came on deck to meet there only those officers whose prescribed duty required them to take part in the farewell ceremonies as set forth in the regulations. But when he went over the side of the flagship he found that the boat which was to bear him ashore was manned by the rest of the officers, ready to row him themselves and eager to render this last personal service; and then from every

other ship of the fleet there put out a boat also manned by officers, to escort for the last time the commander whom they loved and honoured.”<sup>35</sup>

Few of those who became conspicuous by their achievements in the war escaped some measure of detraction or neglect. General Shafter's name was soon forgotten. Other generals of the regular army who, in spite of the blunders of the Department, fought so brilliantly in Cuba and the Philippines, received only a grudging recognition from the nation as a whole. Lieutenant Hobson whose gallant exploits on the *Merrimac* made him for the moment a popular idol, became afterwards the target of almost universal ridicule. Some foolish girl, among a throng of those who welcomed him on his return, threw her arms around him and kissed him; and other women still more foolish, tried from time to time to follow her example, until the comic papers turned the whole thing into a cheap joke and coined the verb “to hobsonize,”—that is, to kiss a man against his will. One exception to the list of those who were neglected or even vilified was found in the person of Mr. Theodore Roosevelt of New York. Mr. Roosevelt at the opening of the war was Assistant Secretary of the Navy. His active, forceful, and impulsive nature, coupled with an intense enthusiasm, had done much to stimulate the activities of the Department in which he served. When war was formally declared, Mr. Roosevelt raised the regiment known as the Rough Riders (the First Volunteer United States Cavalry) and went to Cuba as its Lieutenant-Colonel, the Colonel being Dr. Leonard Wood, until that time an army surgeon. Colonel

<sup>35</sup> Brander Matthews in the *Columbia University Quarterly* for March, 1906, p. 110.



Roosevelt's personality was such as readily attracted the attention of newspaper writers in search of the picturesque. His spectacular performances at the battle of San Juan gained for him a vast amount of public notice, so that to the popular mind he seemed to have won the day almost single-handed like an old-time hero of romance.<sup>36</sup> Returning home he narrated his adventures in various magazine articles and public speeches, and no one was permitted to forget him. Not long after his regiment had been mustered out, Mr. Roosevelt became the Republican candidate for the Governorship of New York and was elected by a plurality of 18,000 votes, his success being very largely due to the prestige of his military service.

When peace was finally declared, the nation leaped at once into an era of unprecedented prosperity. As is always the case, a brilliantly successful foreign war stimulated commercial activity in every quarter. The American people no longer suffered from that intangible ailment which during the second administration of Mr. Cleveland had been styled a general "lack of confidence." Now they were, if anything, over-confident, with the result that the year 1899 became an *annus mirabilis* in the records of American commerce and finance. Capital, which had long been locked up by its timid owners, now came forth and reaped abundant profits. All the staple products of the country were in keen demand, and prices soared almost from day to day. For the first time in American economic history, the volume of foreign trade for the single year amounted to more than two billion dollars. In the iron and steel trade, prices increased more than 100 per cent. during the year. The growth in textile manufactures was almost equally remarkable.

<sup>36</sup> See Roosevelt, *The Rough Riders* (New York, 1899).

“Agriculture shared in the general prosperity, mortgages being rapidly cleared off, savings banks’ deposits increasing, new and improved buildings and implements being used, while comforts and even luxuries hitherto unknown were now enjoyed. The price of raw cotton rose, within the year, 30 per cent., while the price of wool almost doubled in the same period.”<sup>37</sup> On October 12th, the stock of gold in the United States Treasury amounted to \$258,000,000,—the highest figures since the foundation of the Government; while the gold in actual circulation reached the enormous sum of \$703,000,000. Mr. James T. Woodward, President of the New York Clearing House Commission, wrote:

“All trade reports show that our factories are taxed to their utmost capacity in filling their orders. The railroads are unable to cope with the traffic that is offered, not having sufficient equipment to haul the raw materials to the factories and mills or to carry the finished product to the wholesaler and jobber; and on every hand we hear of a record-breaking business and constantly increasing wages, the latter in many cases as much as 10 and 15 per cent.”<sup>38</sup>

The winning of a foothold in Asia stimulated American trade throughout the East. Imports from Asia showed an increase in this one year of \$40,000,000, as against a smaller increase in exports of about \$6,000,000. With the West Indies there was an increase in imports of \$14,000,000, and in exports of some \$15,000,000. In exports generally, the most noticeable circumstance was the volume of manufactured goods sent abroad. The United States began to compete successfully with British iron-

<sup>37</sup> Financial Review in the *New York Times*, January 1, 1900.

<sup>38</sup> *Times* l. c.—See an article entitled “The New Prosperity,” by R. S. Baker, in *McClure’s Magazine* for May, 1900, pp. 86-94.

masters not only in distant parts of the world, such as India and Australia, but in Great Britain itself. On the whole, the year 1899 saw an almost furious commercial activity, a steady rise in the prices of staple goods, and an unprecedented confidence in the immediate business future of the country.

There were, of course, many causes for this revival of prosperity. In the first place, the people had pinched and saved for years and had, therefore, in a measure diminished the burden of their debts. Again, the surplus stock of manufactured goods had been gradually consumed,—the more speedily, because so many mills and factories had either been shut down or had been working on half time. Still further, as has been already noted, there was the stimulus of the war and the lavish expenditures by the Government for supplies of every sort and for transportation. But back of all these causes there was another even more important of which, however, only scientific economists recognised the profound significance. The demonetisation of silver and the practical adoption of the gold standard in the preceding decade had limited the medium of exchange for commercial purposes and had tended to cause an increasing contraction in the money market. The enhanced value of the dollar, as measured in gold, would in consequence have sent prices lower and lower and would thus have steadily increased the burdens of the debtor class not <sup>only</sup> in the United States, but throughout the entire world. As Mr. Charles Francis Adams expressed it, in speaking of the adoption of the gold standard:

Thereafter, in the great system of international exchanges, silver ceased to be counted a part of that specie reserve on which draughts

were made. Thenceforth, the drain, as among the financial centres, was to be on gold alone. In the whole history of man, no precedent for such a step was to be found. So far as the United States was concerned, the basis on which its complex and delicate financial fabric rested was weakened by one-half and the cheaper and more accessible metal,—that to which the debtor would naturally have recourse in discharge of his obligations,—was made unavailable. It could further be demonstrated that, without a complete readjustment of currencies and values, the world's accumulated stock and annual production of gold could not, as a monetary basis, be made to suffice for its needs. A continually recurring contest for gold among the great financial centres was inevitable. A change which, in the language of Lecky, "beyond all others affects most deeply and universally the material well-being of man," had been unwittingly challenged.<sup>39</sup>

This contraction of the currency would naturally have been hastened with the increase of the world's population and with the growing demand for gold for use in the arts. The disastrous result of such conditions could have been averted in only one of two ways,—either by restoring silver to its former place as was proposed by Mr. Bryan, or by an unforeseen and unexpected addition to the world's stock of gold. It was the second solution which was actually arrived at, and this was due to the achievements of the explorer and the man of science.

In August of 1896, a roving miner named Cormack found himself near the Klondike Creek in the remote Canadian Territory of Yukon, a region thirteen hundred miles northwest of the city of Seattle and almost within the Arctic Circle. In this desolate and nearly unknown spot, Cormack discovered indications of rich gold deposits.

<sup>39</sup> Address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, December 27, 1901; enlarged and reprinted in Adams, *Lee at Appomattox and other Papers*, pp. 274-338 (Boston, 1902).

At that time even the rudest habitation had not yet been erected there. A year later, some fifteen thousand fortune-seekers had reared a ragged sort of city in this barren waste and were enduring the horrors of an Arctic winter for the sake of the precious metal which the frozen earth reluctantly gave up to them.<sup>40</sup> Still larger deposits were subsequently discovered in the Nome district of Alaska; while the beach-sands and river-gravels at the head of Cook's Inlet proved also to be richly auriferous. During the few years which immediately followed upon these discoveries, the districts mentioned yielded not far from \$140,000,000 worth of gold. Almost coincidentally, the production of the South African gold mines increased so rapidly as to bring forth nearly \$100,000,000 annually. The unexpected, therefore, actually happened. The end which Mr. Bryan had had in view was accomplished in another way—not by the appreciation of silver, but rather by the depreciation of gold, or at least, by the operation of causes which prevented gold from becoming scarcer.

This fact explains the comparatively slight friction attending the passage of a very important financial measure in the year 1900. The Congressional elections of 1898 had somewhat reduced the size of the Republican majority in the House; but it had also eliminated from the Senate a number of the silver advocates; so that the upper Chamber for the first time contained a working majority of Senators favourable to the gold standard. What had hitherto been in practice the financial policy of the Government was now embodied in formal legislation. A so-

<sup>40</sup> See Heilprin, *Alaska and the Klondike* (N. Y., 1899); and a paper entitled "Voyage Minier au Nord-Ouest Canadien," by J. M. Bel in the *Mémoires de la Société des Ingénieurs Civiles de France*, pp. 580-648 (Paris, 1904).

called Currency Bill was introduced into the House on December 4, 1899, and with some amendments became law on March 14, 1900. It declared the gold dollar to be the standard unit of value, and all other forms of money in use to be redeemable in gold. It established a gold reserve of \$150,000,000 and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to sell bonds to replenish this reserve whenever it should fall below \$100,000,000.<sup>41</sup> The Currency Act carried out the pledges made in the Republican platform of 1896; and both at home and abroad it strengthened the financial credit of the United States.

The buoyant feeling which was perceptible in the business world found instant expression in the centres of speculation. Hundreds of millions of dollars had been added to the market value of the shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange alone, with the result that speculation assumed extraordinary proportions. New enterprises and new combinations of capital were almost daily announced to an interested and eager public. The business done in Wall Street during the first three months of 1899 was greater by nearly 15,000,000 shares than during the first three months of 1898. There was a keen demand for the so-called industrial stocks, and this demand was supplied and over-supplied by the flotation of new companies which were capitalised at sums ranging from \$150,000,000 down to \$50,000,000. Existing companies also greatly increased their capital, or in popular language, "watered their stock," in order to form combinations which in effect were Trusts. "Money was easy; profit-

<sup>41</sup> Another clause of the Act provided for the refunding of Government bonds, then bearing a larger rate of interest, into two per cent. bonds. It allowed national banks to issue their notes to the full par value of the bonds deposited by them as security for their circulation.

making easier; the speculative disposition developed with rushes; the industrial fever was high. Promoters crowded into Wall Street and madly rolled out gigantic capitalisations. The era of consolidation was on all sides proclaimed as present and as full of blessings."<sup>42</sup> Even a sharp reaction which occurred late in the year was treated lightly, and was optimistically called a "prosperity panic."

At this time there came conspicuously into public notice a number of bold financiers who, being already possessed of great fortunes, amazed the country and, in fact, the world, by the magnitude of their operations. The promoter and the underwriter were continually forming new Trusts or "holding companies" into each of which were merged a large number of smaller properties. Thus, the Corporation Trust Company of New Jersey became the agent of seven hundred corporations with an aggregate capital of \$1,000,000,000. The New Jersey Corporation Guarantee and Trust Company represented five hundred corporations with not less than \$500,000,000 capital. The combined capital of such combinations as were actually Trusts amounted to more than \$4,000,000,000. A scientific economist has estimated that the addition to the capitalisation of the country in the brief period which is now under consideration exceeded the total capitalisation of all the manufacturing companies established in the United States during the thirty years between 1860 and 1890.<sup>43</sup> The underwriters and promoters who effected these combinations reaped huge profits. Thus, Messrs. J. P. Morgan and Company who promoted the United States Steel Corporation and advanced it \$25,000,000 in cash, received in return \$106,800,000 in its preferred and

<sup>42</sup> *New York Times*, January 1, 1900.

<sup>43</sup> Montague, *Trusts of To-day*, p. 101 (New York, 1904).

common stock. For promoting the American Tin Plate Company, Mr. W. H. Moore received \$10,000,000 in the common stock of that concern. The persons who promoted the Distilling Company of America were paid in stock amounting to \$24,000,000. The disproportion between the capital of some of these companies and the market value of their securities was startling to conservative financiers. Thus, the United States Leather Company was capitalised at \$125,000,000, while the market value of its stock was about \$50,000,000. The United States Steel Corporation was over-capitalised to the extent of about \$830,000,000.<sup>44</sup>

The bigness of these extraordinary figures and the rapidity with which such profits were made, dazzled men's minds, so that they became drunk with the passion of money-getting and blind to all other standards and ideals. They thought and spoke in millions; and the Napoleons of Wall Street became, in a sense, heroes and demi-gods. Men and women and even children all over the country drank in thirstily every scrap of news that was printed in the press about these so-called "captains of industry," their successful "deals," the off-hand way in which they converted slips of worthless paper into guarantees of more than princely wealth, and all the details concerning their daily lives, their personal peculiarities, their virtues and their vices. To the imagination of millions of Americans, the financial centres of the country seemed to be spouting streams of gold into which anyone might dip at will; and every Wall Street gutter figured as a new Pactolus.

The men who represented the achievements of this era were of varied types. Most conspicuous among them all was Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan, whose bold conceptions, successfully wrought out, attracted the attention of both

<sup>44</sup> Montague, *op. cit.*, p. 112.



hemispheres. Mr. Morgan was a gentleman of cultivated tastes who as a young man had inclined for a time toward the scholar's life. He pursued his studies at the Boston Latin School, where he read the classics leisurely and was grounded thoroughly in the old-fashioned education. Later, in Germany, he spent some time at the University of Göttingen where he heard lectures in history and political economy, and won such distinction by his mathematical work as to receive the offer of a professor's chair in that historic institution. He became in after years a connoisseur of the fine arts, a collector of rare books and manuscripts, and a patron of science and learning. But these were only the diversions, the *parerga*, of an extraordinary career. Wall Street and Lombard Street both spoke of him and of his achievements with bated breath. His schemes for multiplying ordinary fortunes into colossal accumulations of wealth made him appear to the small fry of finance a modern Midas whose magic touch turned everything to gold. Haughty and often arrogant in bearing, he asserted an irresistible influence over all he met, and he justified their belief in him by the inviolability of his plighted word, no less than by the great success which seemed for a time to be inseparable from his enterprises. It was he who organised in 1901 the United States Steel Corporation, capitalised at \$1,404,000,000,—a company which swallowed the plants, the bonds and the stocks of ten of the largest corporations in the world.<sup>45</sup>

Of an entirely different type was Mr. Andrew Carnegie, who came to the United States from Scotland when

<sup>45</sup> Montague, *op. cit.*, pp. 26, 36, 97, 105, 106, 110; Wilgus, "U. S. Steel Corp." xii. *Ind. Com.* pp. 448-487; and an article by Professor R. T. Ely entitled "Analysis of the Steel Trust" in the *Cosmopolitan* for August, 1901, pp. 428-431.

a mere child, and at the age of twelve was set to work in a Pennsylvania cotton mill on a weekly salary of \$1.20. Subsequently he became a telegraph operator employed by the Pennsylvania Railroad, and after some years the superintendent of an important division of that road. Mr. Carnegie was "canny" even beyond the proverbial caniness of his countrymen; and little by little through the judicious purchase of stocks, he secured an interest in oil-producing concerns. Mr. Carnegie's investments presently netted him a comfortable fortune, with which in 1865 he began the manufacture of iron. Protected by the high tariff, his ventures proved remarkably successful, and he very shrewdly acquired valuable coal and ore beds. His relations with the railroads also gave him great and special advantages. When the United States Steel Corporation was formed, Mr. Carnegie's company had to be bought out; and it is said that in the negotiations attending this sale the Scotchman outmanœuvred even Mr. Morgan. He did, at any rate, receive in exchange for bonds and stock valued at \$217,000,000, an allotment of five per cent. bonds in the Steel Trust of a par value of \$304,000,000, constituting a mortgage not only upon the former Carnegie works, but upon all the other plants absorbed by the new corporation. Mr. Carnegie then retired from active business, devoting himself to the building of libraries, to fostering education by his munificence, and to posing as an authority upon almost every subject of human interest, from Homeric criticism to spelling reform, and becoming rather famous for his dictum to the effect that "to die rich is to die disgraced."<sup>46</sup>

<sup>46</sup> See the autobiographical notes in Carnegie, *The Gospel of Wealth* (New York, 1900); and Bridge, *Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Company* (New York, 1902).

Mr. John D. Rockefeller and Mr. Philip D. Armour, the respective organisers of the Standard Oil Company and the so-called Beef Trust, were men who laid the foundations of their colossal fortunes first of all by the minutest attention to small savings. Mr. Rockefeller studied carefully every possible method of avoiding waste in the handling of oil, while Mr. Armour contrived to convert every part of each slaughtered animal—horns, hoofs, hide, hair, bones, and bristles—into a marketable product. Yet their fortunes would never have exceeded moderate limits had they not been able to secure secret advantages as against their rivals, from the railways. Other exponents of the New Wealth were Mr. H. H. Rogers, the audacious and powerful manager of Mr. Rockefeller's company; Mr. J. W. Gates, who came out of the West at this time and who was a sublimation of the reckless, speculative type of financier; and Mr. August Belmont, Mr. Charles T. Yerkes and Mr. Thomas F. Ryan, who by ingenious management absorbed valuable franchises for street railways in New York and Chicago, which paid their owners immense annual sums while yielding next to nothing to the cities which had improvidently granted them such favours.

These and scores of other capitalists consolidated not only the related parts of particular industries and enterprises, but they massed together unrelated interests. Thus, Mr. Rockefeller, in control of the Standard Oil Company, absorbed also the Amalgamated Copper Company, and in time linked with these corporations two powerful "chains" of banks. Through the National City Bank of New York the combination assumed practical control of more than fifty other banking institutions in various parts of the country, and at least a dozen trust companies,

together with the Mutual Life Insurance Company. It was estimated that they could influence within New York City alone not less than \$108,000,000 of banking capital, \$474,000,000 of deposits, and \$323,000,000 of loans. In like manner, Mr. Morgan was practically the master of another "chain" of banks and trust companies, of the New York Life Insurance Company, and of the Equitable Life Assurance Society, commanding an equal aggregation of capital.

"Together, these two alliances have at their disposal nearly one-half of the banking capital of New York City. Not only are they ready at a moment's notice to loan millions and to undertake any vast enterprise for the favoured Trusts, but by their preponderance in the money market they are able to force the rivals of the Trust to borrow at disadvantageous rates."<sup>47</sup>

It is not surprising that the same wave of materialism which was in full flow elsewhere, should submerge every department of the national Government. The "era of consolidation" which was declared to be a blessing, was ascribed wholly to the Dingley Tariff Law and to the dominance of the Republican party. Mark Hanna was now the spokesman of the Administration and already one of the leaders in the Senate. That body, naturally conservative, looked somewhat askance at the prominence of one who had but just entered the senatorial order. Mr. Hanna, however, while not obtrusive, broke through the unwritten laws which repress the activities of new Senators. His hard-headed, indomitable business sense, and his great force of character, made it impossible to ignore him. Though not an orator, he could speak with force

<sup>47</sup> Montague, *op. cit.*, p. 54; Clark, *The Problem of Monopoly*, pp. 3-24 (New York, 1904).

and point upon many questions. He was never abashed, and he had a fund of tough, dry humour at his command. At first, one or two of the older Senators attempted to teach this neophyte his proper place; but none of them cared to make the attempt a second time. Mr. Hanna met all thrusts with imperturbable serenity, and never failed in his *riposte*. Whenever he spoke, his colleagues, and the galleries as well, paid him the unusual compliment of an appreciative silence. Little by little, too, it came to be known that, because of his practical good sense, his services were really valuable upon committees and in the everyday work of Congress of which the public knows and cares but little. Moreover, he was a man of his word, direct, and upright in all personal relations, and courteous to the many strangers with whom he came in contact. It was only because he embodied and typified all the forces of materialism that he was still assailed by a part of the press and by the Opposition. The multiplication of Trusts, the absorption of franchises by the favoured few, and the building up of special interests by special legislation—these things Mr. Hanna honestly believed to be in essence good. And therefore, he favoured subsidies for American shipping, and every other form of bounty which would artificially make some classes of Americans more prosperous than others. His spirit was, in truth, the spirit of the day. The nation, for the moment, dazzled by the evidences of material prosperity, accepted the new gospel, and the voice of opposition was little heeded.

In 1899, the Government of the United States had an opportunity to requite, though in a very small degree, the friendliness which Great Britain had displayed during the war with Spain. The Transvaal Republic and the

Orange Free State had challenged the British Empire to a contest in which the disparity of the contending forces seemed at first sight almost ludicrous. The bravery of the Boers, however, coupled with their skill in adapting their warlike operations to the physical conditions of the country, led at first to severe reverses to the British arms. Those Continental nations which had sympathised with Spain and which, but for Great Britain's attitude, might have attempted intervention on her behalf, now sneered and mocked at English valour. In several chancelleries there were concocted sinister schemes which under some conditions might have been transmuted into action still more sinister. In the United States there no doubt existed a certain sympathy with the Boers, springing from an admiration of their fighting qualities and from the natural good will which goes out to the weaker of two antagonists. But the American Government had not forgotten what Lord Pauncefote had done for the American cause in Washington and what Captain Chichester had done in Manila Bay. Its neutrality in the Boer War was modelled on the neutrality of Great Britain in 1898. It was frankly benevolent toward the latter power. British agents were allowed to purchase in the United States great numbers of horses and mules for the use of the Queen's army in South Africa, and even to make enlistments in a quiet way. Later, when a number of Boer delegates came to Washington with an appeal for either mediation or actual intervention, President McKinley consented to receive them at the White House only as private individuals. Though he chatted with them pleasantly, he said no word about the war; and when they approached the subject, he blandly called their attention to the beautiful view which could be seen from the windows of his draw-

ing-room. The enemies of England received neither aid nor comfort from the American Government, and presently the crisis passed. Another link, however, had been forged in the chain of interest and understanding which united the two English-speaking nations.

In the early months of the year 1900, the impending presidential election began to arouse the interest of politicians. Yet even among politicians this interest was but a languid one. That President McKinley would be re-nominated without opposition had long been a foregone conclusion. That he would be elected was regarded as almost equally inevitable. The country was so prosperous, and the government had on the whole been so well administered, as to give the Democrats no popular issue, not even the issue of discontent. The four years which had elapsed since 1896 had done very little to unite the demoralised Opposition. No new leader had come to the front. Mr. Bryan, in spite of the defeat which he had suffered in 1896, was still the dominant figure in his party, and it was held that he might have the nomination if he chose to lead what was likely to be the forlornest of forlorn hopes. When the Republican Convention assembled in Philadelphia on June 20th, the only topic of animated discussion was the question whether Governor Roosevelt of New York would accept a nomination for the Vice-Presidency. Mr. Roosevelt's position was somewhat peculiar. As Governor he had alienated the sympathy of the great corporate interests by securing the passage of a much-needed law imposing a tax upon corporation franchises. He had also estranged the so-called "machine politicians" of his State, the chief of whom was Senator Thomas C. Platt. Governor Roosevelt strongly desired

to serve a second term as Governor in order to carry out the reforms which he had instituted. Mr. Platt was anxious to get Mr. Roosevelt out of the way. The Vice-Presidency of the United States was popularly supposed to be an innocuous and purely ornamental office, the occupant of which passed through it to a species of political oblivion. Senator Platt, therefore, did all in his power to foster a sentiment in favour of Mr. Roosevelt's nomination at Philadelphia. In this he found supporters who, unlike Mr. Platt himself, were enthusiastic friends of the New York Governor. Mr. Roosevelt had lived long on the Western plains. His ardent and unconventional manners endeared him to the people of that section. Hence, the delegates from the Far Western States came to Philadelphia bent upon making him the candidate who was to divide the electoral honours with President McKinley. It is now well understood that President McKinley by no means shared this feeling, though he made no open signs of disapproval. Both he and Senator Hanna had a certain distrust of Mr. Roosevelt, whom they regarded as too impetuous a person to be wholly safe. Perhaps in President McKinley's heart of hearts there was a slight lack of cordiality based upon reasons that were purely personal. When Mr. Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he had often fretted over what he held to be the extreme conservatism of the President; and in accordance with his natural impulsiveness he had voiced his opinion to many persons in language that was by no means consistent with respect. "McKinley has no more backbone than a chocolate éclair!" was a favourite saying of his at that time; and doubtless there were many tale-bearers to carry this and other like expressions to the presidential ear. But the very fact that Mr.



Hanna was opposed to Mr. Roosevelt brought to the Governor friends with whom he would otherwise have had no natural affiliations. Senator Quay detested Mr. Hanna; and therefore, in order to displease him, he threw his influence in favour of Mr. Roosevelt's candidacy.

Governor Roosevelt himself was quite sincere in his unwillingness to take the nomination. On June 18th, two days before the Convention met, he read a statement to a large number of newspaper correspondents in which, after expressing his appreciation of the attitude of his many friends, he said:

"I feel most deeply that the field of my best usefulness to the public and the party is in New York State; and if the party should see fit to re-nominate me for Governor, I can in that position help the national ticket as in no other way. I very earnestly ask that every friend of mine in the Convention respect my wish and my judgment in this matter."<sup>48</sup>

Nevertheless, when the Convention met on June 20th, the talk was all for Roosevelt. The proceedings on the first day were purely formal, with no evidence of excitement. The applause given to the speeches was decorous but not enthusiastic. On the following day, the Committee reported a platform which was speedily adopted. It praised the record of the Administration, and renewed the allegiance of the party to the gold standard and to the policy of protection and reciprocity. It advocated subsidies to the American merchant marine, and a more effective restriction of pauper immigration. It commended the reform of the Civil Service and "a liberal pension policy," and put forth the usual number of popular generalities. In order to prevent the Democrats from m

<sup>48</sup> Report in the *New York Sun*, June 19, 1900.

ing a distinct issue of the Trust question, it denounced "conspiracies and combinations to restrict business." On June 22nd, the third day of the Convention, Senator Foraker presented Mr. McKinley's name for the nomination, and was seconded by Mr. Roosevelt. When the roll was called it showed that every delegate had voted for Mr. McKinley, who received 930 ballots. The applause following upon the announcement was hearty but not uproarious, since there had been no contest to stir men's blood. Instead, the delegates indulged in various forms of horseplay; while a mock elephant, the popular symbol of the party, moved clumsily around the hall amid cheers and laughter.

At one o'clock on the same day, Governor Roosevelt was put in nomination for the Vice-Presidency by an Iowa delegate, who was followed by other speakers, among them Mr. Depew of New York who spoke of "William McKinley, a Western man with Eastern ideas; and Theodore Roosevelt, an Eastern man with Western characteristics." The noise and clamour and shouting which had hitherto been lacking, now broke forth in a tempest which was renewed and prolonged when the announcement was made that Mr. Roosevelt had received 925 votes—every one, in fact, except his own and those of four delegates who were absent from the hall. Mr. Roosevelt signified his acceptance of the nomination, yielding, as he said, to the will of his party.

The Democratic National Convention met in Kansas City on July 4th, in the midst of the noise and excitement attending the celebration of the national holiday. The Convention was more disposed to join in that celebration than to proceed at once to business. It listened to the

reading of the Declaration of Independence, to patriotic orations, and to vocal music. In the evening, Governor Altgeld pronounced a eulogy on Mr. Bryan, and Senator Tillman read out with tremendous emphasis the platform which had been adopted by the Committee on Resolutions. This document denounced the so-called "colonial policy" of the Republican Administration; declared its opposition to militarism; attacked the Trusts and all private monopolies; and called the Dingley Tariff "a trust-breeding measure." The vital paragraph, however, was that which indicated the party's intention to make "imperialism" the supreme question to be discussed before the people.

"The burning issue of imperialism growing out of the Spanish War involves the very existence of the Republic and the destruction of our free institutions. We regard it as the paramount issue of the campaign."

Another paragraph reaffirmed and endorsed "the principles of the National Democratic platform adopted at Chicago in 1896," and demanded once more "the immediate restoration of the free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold at the present legal ratio of 16 to 1 without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation."

The platform was received with tremendous cheering, many of the delegates seizing their State emblems and marching with them about the hall; and banners were displayed bearing such partisan inscriptions as "Lincoln abolished slavery; McKinley has restored it." The climax of this temporary frenzy was reached when there was suddenly swung from the iron-girdered roof a gigantic American flag more than seventy-five feet long, which streamed

over the heads of the mob, bearing the words "The Flag of the Republic forever, of an Empire never."<sup>49</sup>

On the following day, in the presence of 20,000 men and women, the Democratic platform was adopted amid tumultuous shouting which continued for more than twenty minutes, after which Mr. Bryan was nominated for the presidency, not by roll-call, but by acclamation. His nomination was seconded by Mr. Hill of New York, who could undoubtedly have been made the candidate for Vice-President had he been willing to accept the nomination. As he explicitly declined, the Convention nominated Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois who had been Vice-President from 1893 to 1897. The Convention then adjourned, having made it clear that the three issues of the campaign were the Trusts, free silver, and imperialism.

As to the Trusts, the Democratic party could not hope to make a very strenuous fight. The Republicans had also denounced these monopolistic combinations, and President McKinley in a recent message had devoted a paragraph to them, somewhat vaguely worded, but still with sufficient point to make his remarks available for campaign use. Moreover, the country still remembered how Democratic Senators had surrendered to the Sugar Trust in 1894. The revival of the free silver question was creditable to Mr. Bryan's sincerity and consistency, but it was exceedingly bad politics. The West was now prosperous. There was no longer an immense debtor class to whom the silver argument could appeal. Even Mr. Bryan's own following had lost interest in that cause and there was nothing to be gained by its further advocacy. Imperialism, as an issue, was a most amorphous nondescript. The word was one of those party cries which have the

<sup>49</sup> *New York Tribune*, July 5, 1900.

exasperating characteristic of meaning anything and everything or nothing. For what was indicated by "imperialism" when the term was analysed impartially? The Democratic orators professed to think that the American Republic was in danger of being turned into an empire over night. Yet in reality, no one had the slightest fear of any such catastrophe. To talk of imperialism in such a sense as this was so ludicrous a thing as to make it quite impossible for Americans to take it seriously. The Democratic platform also identified imperialism with "militarism"; and in the campaign which followed, Mr. Bryan talked in a most portentous way about the fortresses which in imagination he already saw towering above every city in the land, bristling with cannon, and filled with a licentious soldiery prepared at a moment's notice to make the gutters run with blood. His followers professed a horror of what they called the growth of the military spirit in the United States, beginning so they said, in the war with Spain. But as that war had been declared by the unanimous vote of all parties in Congress, the war spirit was scarcely fraught with peril to American independence.

Mr. Bryan should have known this, because at the time he himself had felt the war spirit, and it had caused him to volunteer and to get himself appointed colonel of a regiment. Did he and his regiment resemble a licentious soldiery? He would hardly have admitted it; yet his command was typical of all American regiments; and hence, his vivid picture of frowning forts and blood-bespattered streets failed lamentably in its appeal to the common sense of the American people.

The campaign, therefore, opened with slight enthusiasm; and though Mr. Bryan repeated his spectacular can-

vass of 1896, and though there was an immense amount of oratory indulged in by the hired speakers of both parties, the issue was never doubtful. During the summer, in fact, attention was largely diverted from domestic politics to a series of dramatic incidents that were taking place in China. The Chinese had been greatly irritated by the aggressions made upon their territory by France and Germany and Russia. In May of 1900, rumours began to spread regarding a powerful secret organisation in the province of Shan-tung. The organisation was spoken of as "the Boxers," this being a very free translation of the native name. Its object was originally to defend the country against foreign intrigues. Finally, however, it fell under the direction of ignorant fanatics whose watchword was "Exterminate the foreigners!" Sporadic acts of violence were followed by demonstrations so serious that the legations in Peking finally called upon their respective governments for military protection. Small bodies of marines were sent by various nations in response to this request; but presently the Boxers, who were now joined by a portion of the Chinese army, gained possession of Peking, cut off its communications with the outer world, murdered the German Ambassador, and besieged the foreigners who had gathered in the grounds of the British legation, fortified with skill and defended with splendid courage against overwhelming numbers. But for a time, the fate of the beleaguered band was utterly unknown, and the most startling stories were accepted as being true. It was reported that the wife of the Russian Ambassador had been boiled in oil, that the Christians in the legation had been butchered after being put to torture, and that Peking had been the scene of indescribable outrages. There were cabled to Europe and the

United States, specific and most alarming details of which the following are an example:

“In their final attempt to cut their way through, the legationers formed a square with the women and children in the centre. When the Boxers realised that they were being attacked, they became like wild beasts and shot each other in the darkness. The foreigners went mad and killed all their women and children with revolvers. Heavy guns bombarded all night until the buildings were demolished and in flames. Many foreigners were roasted in the ruins. The Boxers rushed upon them and hacked and stabbed both dead and wounded, cutting off their heads and carrying these through the streets on their rifles shouting furiously. They then attacked the native Christian quarters, massacring all who refused to join them, ill-treating the women and braining the children. Hundreds of mission buildings were burned. All China is now menaced. In the provinces of Hupe and Hunan thousands of native Christians have been mutilated and tortured, the women being first assaulted and then massacred.”<sup>50</sup>

Meanwhile, the United States and Europe were astir. Ships of war were sent to Chinese waters, and on June 10th a body of some 2,000 marines and sailors—British, American, Japanese and French—attempted to march upon Peking under the command of Vice-Admiral Seymour of the British Navy. This attempt would not have been made had not the American naval representative, Captain McCalla, declared at a council of war: “The Minister of my country is in danger, and I have been ordered to rescue him. I shall march even if I have to do so with none but my own men.” The attempt was unavailing, however, for the hostile Chinese swarmed by thousands. They were well armed and had cannon of the latest models. On June 17th, the allied ships bombarded the

<sup>50</sup> Despatch in the *New York World*, July 16, 1900.

Chinese forts at Taku, and then carried them by storm. The result was simply to infuriate the Chinese, who massed an army at Tien-Tsin. Upon this place an attack was made by a force of Japanese, Russians, British, Americans, and French, and after much fierce fighting it was taken. Then an allied force of 18,000 troops pushed on to Peking. The march began on August 4th; and, after almost continuous fighting, Peking was reached, its walls were battered open by artillery, and the legations were relieved. British soldiers had the honour of first entering the beleaguered compound; but the American flag was the first foreign standard to be hoisted on the walls of the Chinese capital.<sup>51</sup>

Throughout this period, diplomacy had been active. Of all the Foreign Offices, the American State Department was the only one which had thoroughly kept its head. Since Mr. McKinley's inauguration, several changes had taken place in this important Cabinet place. Mr. John Sherman, who was greatly enfeebled when he became Secretary, had broken down completely under the strain of the Spanish War. He lost his memory and remained only nominally at his post until his resignation in 1898, when he was succeeded by Judge William R. Day of Ohio, whom President McKinley characterised as having "a genius for common-sense." Judge Day held office for a few months only, resigning in order to head the American peace envoys at the Congress of Paris. His successor was Mr. John Hay, who soon proved himself to be one of the ablest statesmen of his time. As a very young man he had been private secretary to President Lincoln, and then for several years a member of the diplomatic service in Paris, in Vienna, and in Madrid. Under President Hayes

<sup>51</sup> Savage-Landor, *China and the Allies*, ii, p. 178 (London, 1901).



he had been First Assistant Secretary of State; and in 1897, President McKinley had made him Ambassador to Great Britain. Mr. Hay was a gentleman of unusual breadth, intelligence, and tact. His social gifts were very marked. He was an accomplished man of letters, and his experience had given him a comprehensive knowledge of men and of great affairs. When the Chinese crisis became acute, Mr. Hay took and maintained a consistent attitude, and by his skill and judgment won the assent to it of the great Powers of Europe. He chose to regard the Boxer outbreak as a rebellion against the Chinese Imperial Government, and he maintained the fiction that for its excesses that Government was not responsible. During the dark period of the march upon Peking, the American Secretary was almost alone in believing that the legations were still safe. In the meantime, he laboured to avoid the dismemberment of China,<sup>52</sup> and he both asked and secured from other nations written pledges that the "open door" for trade should be maintained after the suppression of the Boxers. In the negotiations of September and October of the same year, the United States through Mr. Hay did much to soften the harshness of the terms imposed by the allies upon China, and he secured the preservation of what he called the "administrative entity" of that country.<sup>53</sup>

The last few weeks before the presidential election were

<sup>52</sup> Circular note to the Powers under date of July 3, 1900.

<sup>53</sup> See Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, pp. 414-434; and for fuller accounts of the Boxer Rebellion and its causes, Krausse, *The Story of the Chinese Crisis* (London, 1900); Parker, *China* (London, 1901); Martin, *The Siege of Peking* (New York, 1900); Thompson, *China and the Powers* (London, 1902); Ireland, *China and the Powers* (Boston, 1902); and also Savage-Landor, *op. cit.*

full of bustle, but only the most optimistic Democrats felt any real hope of Mr. Bryan's success. On Saturday, November 3rd, the great "Sound Money" parade of 1896 was duplicated in New York. More than 100,000 voters marched in the pouring rain. This demonstration is to be remembered chiefly because of the tactlessness of the Democratic managers who hung across the line of march banners bearing the legend: "McKinley's badge is on my coat, but Bryan is near my heart, God bless him!") This insult to the sincerity and courage of the Republican paraders gave so great offense as undoubtedly to lose thousands of votes to the cause which Mr. Bryan represented. Nothing, however, in that year could have been done to turn the tide away from President McKinley. In the popular vote he received a majority over Mr. Bryan of some 850,000 ballots, and in the Electoral College he had 292 votes against Mr. Bryan's 155. Mr. Bryan, in fact, failed to carry his own State, his own city, and even his own polling precinct; and he received the electoral votes of only Idaho, Colorado, Montana and Nevada, in addition to those of the Southern States. The Neo-Republicanism was everywhere triumphant.

President McKinley's second inauguration resembled his first, though it was still more imposing. His new administration began with the best omens. No perplexing problems existed to burden his mind or to stimulate a purely factional opposition. His personal popularity had become very great. In the early spring of 1901, he made, in company with his wife, a journey westward to California, passing through the Southern States. Everywhere he was received with the utmost cordiality and respect. He spoke to the multitudes that greeted him, not as the

President of a party, but as the chosen ruler of a united nation. These days recalled to students of history the second administration of President Monroe which has become memorable as the Era of Good Feeling. The President himself had really risen above the plane of partisanship. The wider field of interest which the United States now occupied had undoubtedly broadened and elevated President McKinley's statesmanship. He gave striking evidence of this in a remarkable speech which he delivered on September 5th, in the city of Buffalo, before a gathering of fifty thousand people. In that speech he showed plainly that he was no longer fettered by the dogmas of a narrow protectionism. He spoke words which ten years before would have seemed to him heretical. But they were words of genuine statesmanship, and they should be remembered and inscribed in golden letters upon the temple of American economics:

“Comparison of ideas is always educational; and as such it instructs the brain and hand of man. Friendly rivalry follows which is the spur of industrial improvement, the inspiration to useful invention and to high endeavour in all departments of human activity. . . . The quest for trade is an incentive to men of business to devise, invent, improve and economise in the course of production. Business life, whether among ourselves or with other people, is ever a sharp struggle for success. It will be none the less so in the future. But, though commercial competitors we are, commercial enemies we must not be. The wisdom and energy of all the nations are none too great for the world's work. The success of art, science, industry and invention is an international asset and a crowning glory.

“Isolation is no longer possible or desirable. God and man have linked the nations together. No nation can longer be indifferent to any other. . . . Only a broad and enlightened

policy will keep what we have. No other policy will get more. By the sensible trade arrangements which will not interrupt our home production we shall extend the outlets for our increasing surplus.

“A system which provides a mutual exchange of commodities is manifestly essential to the continued healthful growth of our export trade. We must not repose in fancied security that we can forever sell everything and buy little or nothing. If such a thing were possible, it would not be best for us or for those with whom we have to deal. We should take from our customers such of their products as we can use without harm to our industries and labour.

“Reciprocity is the natural growth of our wonderful industrial development under the domestic policy now firmly established. What we produce beyond our domestic consumption must have a vent abroad. The excess must be relieved through a foreign outlet and we should sell everywhere we can, and buy wherever the buying will enlarge our sales and productions, and thereby make a greater demand for home labour.

“The period of exclusiveness is past. The expansion of our trade and commerce is the pressing problem. Commercial wars are unprofitable. A policy of good will and friendly trade relations will prevent reprisals. Reciprocity treaties are in harmony with the spirit of the times; measures of retaliation are not.

“If, perchance, some of our tariffs are no longer needed for revenue or to encourage and protect our industries at home, why should they not be employed to extend and promote our markets abroad?

“Gentlemen, let us ever remember that our interest is in concord, not conflict, and that our real eminence rests in the victories of peace and not in those of war. We hope that all who are represented here may be moved to higher and nobler effort for their own and the world's good, and that out of this city may come not only greater commerce and trade for us all, but more essential than these, relations of mutual respect, confidence and friendship, which will deepen and endure.

“Our earnest prayer is that God will graciously vouchsafe prosperity, happiness and peace to all our neighbours, and like blessings to all the peoples and the powers of the earth.”<sup>54</sup>

President McKinley had visited Buffalo for the purpose of inspecting the so-called Pan-American Exposition. On the day after his public speech, he held a reception in the Temple of Music, giving a personal greeting to all who wished to meet him. Among these was a young man having the appearance of a respectable mechanic, whose right hand was apparently covered with a bandage. As he approached the President, he rapidly uncovered a revolver, and before he could be prevented, he had fired two bullets into the body of the President. Ere he had fired a third time, he was seized and hurled to the ground. Mr. McKinley stood for a moment as though dazed, and then swayed backward into the arms of his attendants. The first words that he spoke were to his private secretary: “Cortelyou, be careful; tell Mrs. McKinley gently.” Then, observing the attempt of the maddened people to tear his assailant to pieces, the President said in a feeble voice, “Let no one hurt him.”

The assassin was rescued by the police. He proved to be a German Pole named Leon Franz Czolgosz, by occupation a blacksmith in Detroit. He was an unintelligent, dull young man whose brain had been inflamed by listening to the oratory of foreign anarchists, among them particularly a woman named Emma Goldman, who had long been conspicuous as an agitator. In 1893, she had spent ten months in prison for inciting to riot and her views were revolutionary even beyond those of ordinary anarchists. Short in figure, hard featured and frowsy in ap-

<sup>54</sup> Text in Halstead, *Life of William McKinley*, pp. 225-227 (Cincinnati, 1901).

pearance, she hated women and spent her life chiefly among men. At one time she had been the mistress of Johann Most, though later she had quarrelled with him and had assaulted him at an anarchistic meeting.<sup>55</sup> It was from her more than from any other that Czolgosz received the impulse which led him to commit the crime for which presently he suffered death (October 29th).

President McKinley lingered for a few days; and the favourable reports which were given out by his physicians led the country to hope that he might recover. This hope proved to be baseless, and he died on the morning of Saturday, September 14th. His remains lay in state in Buffalo and afterwards in the rotunda of the Capitol at Washington, where they were received with impressive ceremonies. His body was interred in the cemetery at Canton.

To President McKinley there was accorded a spontaneous tribute of universal grief such as no one in our history, since Washington, had ever yet received. Americans sorrowed both for the ruler and for the man; and their sorrow was the more poignant because of the false hope which had been given them by the premature and quite unjustifiable optimism of his physicians. In it all there was nothing official, nothing studied or insincere. Its most impressive feature was found in its quiet intensity, the intensity of a feeling too sacred and too profound for utterance in mere words. At the hour when the simple ceremonial in Canton was proceeding, a great hush came over every city and hamlet in the land. The streets were deserted. The activities of seventy millions of people ceased. Men and women of every type and class felt the shadow touch for a moment their own lives, and they let their sorrow find supreme expression in the solemnity of

<sup>55</sup> New York *World*, September 11, 1901.

a reverent silence. It was very human and it was very wonderful.

As a man, Mr. McKinley belonged to the older school of American statesmen whom he recalled in his personal appearance, in his smooth-shaven face, his customary garb of black, and the suavity of his address. He would have been at home in the society of Clay and Cass and Benton, and he will undoubtedly stand as the last President of that particular type. He possessed also the personal dignity of the older days, with the advantage of a change in public sentiment which allowed him to maintain that dignity without offense to the people. The time had gone by when Americans took delight in an assumption of roughness and rudeness in their Chief Magistrate. The orgy which disgraced Jackson's first inauguration would have been impossible in 1901; and Americans no longer expected their Presidents to appear, so to speak, in their shirt-sleeves. Mr. McKinley always managed to keep his purely personal affairs and his domestic life from being vulgarised by the peculiar sort of publicity which the newspapers gave to many of his predecessors. He maintained, indeed, outside of his public appearances, the quiet dignity and reserve that befit a private gentleman, and that are still more to be desired in the ruler of a mighty nation. It is remarkable, indeed, that Mr. McKinley should have been so thoroughly successful in this particular thing; for his early environment was one of the most democratic simplicity; while before 1896, his political associates were by no means sticklers for niceties of form. Probably Mr. McKinley was fortunate in his advisers and at the same time quick to take a hint. At any rate, the fact remains that with the single exception of Mr. Arthur,

no President since the pre-Jacksonian days had made things "go off" so well as did President McKinley. And as Americans had begun to learn some needed lessons from older countries, they heartily commended the refined simplicity which pervaded the White House from 1896 to 1901. This satisfaction was heightened by the knowledge that the President's private life and character were not only spotless but exceptionally beautiful.

Intellectually, Mr. McKinley is probably to be compared with Millard Fillmore, to whom he bore some likeness. Not in any sense endowed with originality, he possessed good judgment, shrewdness, tact, and a willingness to listen to advice from any quarter. He was not a reader of books, and the only quotation that one recalls as made by him in public was from some obscure newspaper poet of the West—a woman. He knew men, however, and he was a close student of political events. As a speaker, he had a pleasant manner and at times could be sententious; but he never made a speech that was at all remarkable for its eloquence. Mr. McKinley, indeed, in oratory, as in his other gifts and attributes represented the Horatian *aurea mediocritas*. He was neither bloodless and cold, like Calhoun; nor, on the other hand, did he possess the compelling magnetism which made Clay and Blaine so wonderful as political leaders. Yet, if he could not rouse great masses of men to a frenzy of enthusiasm, he could always win a hearing. If men would not die for him, as they would for Clay, they would at any rate vote for him; which, after all, was much more to the point. He lacked magnetism, but he possessed a rare benevolence, a genuine kindness, which made it utterly impossible for even a political enemy to be anything but a personal friend. And kindness such as this must have been ab-



solutely genuine, or the insincerity of it would have been sometimes felt; whereas the popular belief in Mr. McKinley's good intentions grew firmer with every year. In the early days of his incumbency there were many who thought that they detected in his phraseology something which savoured of cant; but they forgot that he was a member of a religious body which makes a freer use of certain semi-religious expressions than is common; and that Mr. McKinley's way of expressing himself was the way in which he had been taught to speak, and was, indeed, a mere *façon de parler*. That he was no bigot, that he exercised a self-respecting independence of thought and action in such matters, was seen in the fact that, in spite of a bitter outcry from the most extreme of his coreligionists, he stood out firmly for the retention of the army canteen, that he set wine upon his table at diplomatic dinners, and that he was rather immoderately fond of very black and very strong cigars. All these things serve to characterise the man—sincere, kind-hearted, firm and sensible, not brilliant, to be sure, but eminently safe—the sort of man who does in general go farther than any but the very greatest genius.

As a statesman, any discussion of Mr. McKinley must centre around the assertion so often made to the effect that he always "held his ear close to the ground." This was for a long while flung at him by his political opponents as a taunt; but in time it was taken up by his supporters and set forth as embodying the highest possible compliment to his sagacity. Yes, they said, Mr. McKinley always has his ear close to the ground so that he may catch the earliest echoes of popular opinion. This shows his statesmanship; for in the American Republic, the President is the servant of the people, elected to do their bid-

ding; and it is by "holding his ear close to the ground" that he learns just what it is that they desire. The best example of this sort of statesmanship, they said, is found in Lincoln, who, like McKinley, also held his ear close to the ground, and this is why Lincoln always had the people with him rather than against him.

There is much truth in this; yet the comparison with Lincoln challenges inquiry and justifies dissent. It is undoubtedly true that a President is elected for the purpose of translating into action the political aspirations of the nation over which he rules. But a distinction must be made between a well-considered policy that has been discussed perhaps for years, and the hasty impulse of the moment. When a sudden wave of excitement surges over the country and sweeps away all sober judgment, is the Chief Executive to ask himself only whether this is what the people want? Or is he to consider whether it is what they will approve when the passions of the moment have died away? Is he to be a reed shaken by the wind, or a rock standing four-square to all the winds that blow, defying obloquy and misrepresentation, when his own brain and conscience tell him that the thing should not be done? Had Washington in 1793 simply held his ear close to the ground he would have found the nation eager for a second war with England. He would have meekly submitted to the insolence of Genet; and the poor little fledgeling of a Republic would have perished in the train of France, then drunken and delirious with the madness of revolution. In 1861, when Captain Wilkes forcibly took the Confederate envoys, Mason and Slidell, from the British steamer *Trent*, had Lincoln merely held his ear to the ground he would have heard the people of the North demanding loudly that the envoys should be kept and that the nation

should face a war with England. It was hard for Washington to ignore the clamour of the Jacobins; but he did so at the cost of vile aspersions on his character, which made him say in the bitterness of his soul, "I would rather be in my grave than in the presidency." It was hard for Lincoln to ignore the momentary passion of the North and to comply with the peremptory and arrogant demand of Lord John Russell; but he did so, and was charged with having humiliated and dishonoured his country. Both Washington and Lincoln, knew, however, that the supreme mandate which had been given them was in the one case to build up, and in the other to preserve, the State; and they both stood firm against the people's will in order that the people might be saved from its own madness. A true statesman holds his ear close to the ground; but he does not do so for the purpose of catching every murmur that is audible, but rather to detect that deeper note which tells him that the time is ripe for the consummation of far-reaching plans long cherished and long since decided upon. One may admit that the President is the people's servant, but one should not admit that (to use a rather vulgar phrase of Mr. Bryan's), he is the people's "hired man." He is, no doubt, an officer. He is not a lackey.

President McKinley's response to every popular impulse explains the apparent inconsistencies of his political career. These inconsistencies lay in his action, but not in his fundamental theory. He wished to serve the people; and if the people chose to veer from one view to another, then the people and not he was answerable for it all. This was a consistent theory; but the fact that he held it takes him out of the category of high statesmanship. For a statesman of the first rank makes up his mind upon cer-

tain questions once for all; and having done so, he remains true to his convictions. He may tack and seem at times to take another course, but one will always find him in the end still sweeping toward the goal. Thus, President Garfield was by study and conviction a Free Trader, and in 1880 he was for the time the leader of the party of Protection. Yet he had not changed. He never once retracted his ringing assertion, made years before in the House of Representatives, "I am for the kind of Protection which in the end leads to Free Trade." He believed in the ultimate triumph of Free Trade, and he looked upon Protection as at the most a mere expedient. But with Mr. McKinley the case was different. He was a high protectionist for many years because his constituents and his party favoured high protection. In 1901, he advocated a limited Free Trade because the people had begun to veer around in that direction. The passages already quoted from his speech at Buffalo prove his readiness to adapt his opinions to the opinions of the great majority.

It must be confessed that Mr. McKinley clung to his advocacy of silver for a remarkably long time. From 1890 to 1896, he probably did a great deal that indirectly helped to strengthen Mr. Bryan's cause. The main difference between the two men at this time was that Mr. Bryan came out boldly as an advocate of free silver, while Mr. McKinley used the more discreet yet substantially identical phrase "bimetallism"; just as in the Buffalo speech he veiled his partial conversion to a species of Free Trade by giving it the tactful name of "reciprocity." It is perfectly well known that even after Mr. McKinley had been nominated in 1896 he shrank from declaring that "honest money" was understood by him to mean gold monometallism. He hoped to fight the campaign of that

year upon the single question of the tariff; and it was only when the issue had been absolutely forced upon him that at last he gave up his "bimetallism," and took the stand which President Cleveland had taken long before.

These facts by no means indicate that Mr. McKinley was weak or inconsistent. They simply mean that his fundamental position was one of compliance with whatever seemed to him to be the popular will. He changed his views whenever he became convinced that the opinion of the majority had changed; for he regarded this as the duty of a statesman. It was not a very lofty view, but it was at least an intelligible one; and it explains his whole political career. It is strange that he was so often and so absurdly misunderstood. The failure to understand him was responsible for a singular incongruity in many of the estimates formed by otherwise intelligent men regarding his character. The opposition press, for instance, used to speak of him at one time as "gelatinous," and at another as unfeeling and implacable. In a single issue of an influential newspaper there once appeared a column devoted to ridicule of Mr. McKinley for being a mere puppet in the hands of his advisers, and another column devoted to denunciation of him as a sort of political ogre, relentlessly crushing out the liberties of an innocent people in seas of blood. Now it is sufficiently obvious that he could not very well have been at once a puppet and a stern dictator; and it is clear enough that he was really neither. He was not a weak man; nor, on the other hand, was he a man of iron. He could be very firm in matters upon which his mind had been made up. Witness his manly independence in retaining an upright Commissioner in the Pension Office<sup>56</sup> despite the venal clamouring of innumerable "old soldiers." But in the main, and in matters of

<sup>56</sup> Mr. H. C. Evans.

high policy, he conscientiously believed that he must shape his action in accordance with his party's needs and wishes; and this, in fact, he did. For the rest, his statesmanship was often far from brilliant. A more sagacious President, for instance, would not have allowed himself to say that it was "our plain duty" to give to Puerto Rico unrestricted privileges of trade with the United States; or else, having said so, he should have made his Congress say so too. A stronger party leader would not have negotiated an important treaty<sup>57</sup> only to see it almost contemptuously rejected by a Senate of which his own party had entire control.

Such, then, was President McKinley as a man and as a statesman. His place in history will be greater than that of greater men, because it was his fortune to hold office at a time when the events occurred which made his presidency epoch-making. For the war with Spain Mr. McKinley deserves neither praise nor blame. The conflict had been inevitable ever since the Cubans rose in 1868 against the tyranny of Spain, and since Spanish soldiers shot down the crew of the *Virginius* at Santiago. From that moment, Spain and the United States were like two railway engines heading toward each other upon a single track. A collision between them could not be avoided. The moment of the crash was one to be determined by pure chance. But because that moment came when President McKinley was in power, and because the consequences of it were so far-reaching as to transform the whole genius of our government, the years of his administration must always be a subject of the deepest interest to the student of American history.

<sup>57</sup> The so-called Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1900, to repeal the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1852. See p. 700.

He died at an hour that was friendly to his fame. A foreign war had ended in the triumph of the American arms. The Republic of the West had at last assumed its place among the greatest nations of the earth. Political bitterness had spent itself in the electoral contest of the preceding year, and there had succeeded a lull which brought with it good will and tolerance. Extraordinary material prosperity had enriched the nation, so that men might at some future day look back upon those years as to a Golden Age. And finally, the tragic ending of a useful, honourable life stirred all the chords of human sympathy, and seemed to cast upon that life itself the pathos and the splendour of a consecration.

## CHAPTER XV

### PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

ON the afternoon of September 13th, Vice-President Roosevelt was at Lake Colton near the summit of Mount Marcy in the Adirondacks, beyond the reach of telegraphic or telephonic communication. He had left Buffalo upon the assurance of President McKinley's physicians that their patient was in no immediate danger. Mr. Roosevelt's own family were on Mount Marcy, and the illness of his children had called him thither. He was in the heart of the unbroken forest in the company of several friends, when a mountain guide, making his way through the black tangle of the woods, brought a message from Buffalo to the effect that the President was sinking fast. Two hours were consumed in returning to the house from which Mr. Roosevelt had started upon his long tramp. Another delay of four hours was necessary before any further messages could be carried up the mountain. When they arrived, they made it evident that President McKinley had but a short time to live. Just before midnight, a light mountain wagon drawn by two black horses was procured; and amid inky darkness and in a misty rain the long and perilous journey from the mountain peak to the nearest line of railway was begun. More than thirty miles of trail and broken road were covered before morning in this nightmare of a drive, among huge boulders and massive stumps of trees, the horses plunging through the darkness where a single lurch might mean instant death



at the bottom of a ravine.<sup>1</sup> Toward daybreak the driver drew rein at a little railway station where a special train was waiting with steam up. As Mr. Roosevelt leaped from the mud-splashed wagon and entered the railway carriage, a despatch was put into his hands informing him that the President was dead.

Arriving in Buffalo, he found the Cabinet assembled in a private house where presently the oath of office was administered, and Theodore Roosevelt became the twenty-fifth President of the United States. Having taken the oath, he said:

“In this hour of deep and terrible national bereavement, I wish to state that it shall be my intention and endeavour to continue, absolutely unbroken, the policy of President McKinley, for the peace and prosperity and honour of our beloved country.”

Soon after, in Washington, he requested each member of the Cabinet to remain in office, saying: “I need your advice and counsel. I tender you the office in the same manner that I would tender it if I were entering upon the discharge of my duties as the result of an election by the people,—with this distinction, that I can not accept a declination.”

These words of the new President did much to allay a feeling of apprehension which the news of President McKinley's death had aroused in many minds. In the campaign of the preceding autumn, many conservative persons had found their one objection to the Republican nominations in the fact that in case of President McKinley's death, his successor would be a man so young, so impulsive, and so little sobered by the responsibilities of high

<sup>1</sup> Correspondence of the *New York Herald*, September 15, 1901. See Halstead, *Life of Theodore Roosevelt*, pp. 234-243 (Chicago, 1902).

office as Mr. Roosevelt appeared to be. His declared intention to follow out the policies of President McKinley, and the serious and dignified manner in which he entered upon the presidency were distinctly reassuring. Senator Hanna voiced the general opinion when he said a few weeks later:

“Mr. Roosevelt is an entirely different man to-day from what he was a few weeks since. He has now acquired all that is needed to round out his character—equipoise and conservatism. The new and great responsibilities so suddenly thrust upon him have brought about this change.”<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Roosevelt was, in truth, the youngest of the Presidents. When he took the oath of office in Buffalo, he was in the forty-third year of his age. There can be no doubt that some apprehension was justified, both from a knowledge of his temperament and from a recollection of his previous career. Mr. Hanna's remark which has just been quoted, was on the whole an optimistic one. It represented an ultimate truth, but it was rather in the nature of prophecy than of existing fact. At that time Mr. Roosevelt had not yet been tried out in the fire of supreme responsibility. He was even younger than his years. His character was still unformed. It may be said, indeed, that its defects, while far less numerous than its virtues, were, perhaps, more obvious and more likely to attract the notice of a superficial observer.

Mr. Roosevelt was the descendant of a line of respected merchants of Dutch extraction. He had had advantages which few of the later Presidents possessed. Educated at Harvard University, his early associations

<sup>2</sup> Despatch from Cleveland, Ohio, in the *New York World*, September 25, 1901.

had been with men and women of cultivation and refinement. In his own family, it had been his misfortune to be regarded as something of a prodigy. Whatever he did or said or wrote was viewed with unstinted admiration. He was praised and flattered so habitually that a weaker nature would have been wholly spoiled. It was to Mr. Roosevelt's credit that he was not spoiled; yet it is also true that there was developed in him a certain egoism which throughout his early career took the form of an extreme self-consciousness. This accounts for the circumstance that, however fine might be the things which he accomplished, he never seemed to do them simply, or without an eye to approbation. Whether he wrote a book, or made a speech, or felled a tree, or broke a bronco, or championed a measure of reform, or charged a Spanish fort—he always did it *more Gallico*, with a certain instinct for theatrical effect, while his appetite for praise was quite insatiable. He was fond of talking of himself; and in talking of himself he almost invariably monopolised the conversation. He had the professional reformer's love of sermonising, and a restless desire to make any and every subject a text for a dogmatic harangue. "Theodore," said Ex-Speaker Reed to him, on one occasion, "if there is one thing more than another for which I admire you, it is for your original discovery of the Ten Commandments."<sup>3</sup> An eminent English historian, after visiting the White House, was asked by a compatriot what he thought of the new American President. "Why," said he after reflecting for a moment, "he seems to be an interesting combination of Saint Paul and Saint Vitus."

In writing one of his earlier books he used the personal

<sup>3</sup> Leupp, *The Man Roosevelt*, p. 292 (New York, 1904).

pronoun "I" so frequently that his publishers were compelled to order from a type-foundry a fresh supply of that particular letter. Sufficiently robust to endure public criticism, he was as sensitive as a girl to any shadow of disparagement that came to him in private life. After he had read over one of his early messages as President to a group of three or four intimate friends, Secretary Hay in answer to a request for criticism, suggested that the word "big" occurred somewhat too frequently. Mr. Roosevelt took instant umbrage. With a snap of his teeth he answered: "'Big' is a good strong Saxon word! I like to use such words as that,"—a remark which revealed at once his thinness of skin and his utter misunderstanding of Mr. Hay's objection. During the presidential campaign of 1900, Mr. Roosevelt was in Chicago where he made several speeches. On entering his hotel one Sunday morning, a number of little blackguard newsboys jeered at him for having, as they said, shot a Spaniard in the back. This taunt from such a source, to which most men would have given barely a moment's thought, wounded Mr. Roosevelt to the quick; and it was some time before he recovered his composure.

The President's self-esteem sometimes led him to make light of the self-respect of others. He gave great offense in the early months of his administration by the manner in which he treated men much older than himself,—men who had grown gray in the public service and who were accustomed, if not to deference, at least to courtesy from others. Toward these men, Mr. Roosevelt bore himself as toward inferiors, slapping them on the back, calling them by nicknames and inspiring in them an uncomfortable sense of personal humiliation. Even Senator Hanna, bluff and unconventional though he was, took umbrage at

this off-hand treatment. Mr. Lincoln Steffens is responsible for a story<sup>4</sup> which illustrates the assertion. It is repeated because contemporaneous anecdotes, while often apocryphal, do unquestionably represent contemporaneous opinions and impressions. During President McKinley's funeral ceremonies, Mr. Roosevelt and Senator Hanna were seated side by side. Mr. Hanna was moved by sincere grief at the loss of his lifelong friend. Tears ran down his cheeks and he made no effort to control his feelings. Mr. Roosevelt, on the other hand, with questionable taste, was at that very moment thinking of his own political future. Turning to the Senator he said: "I hope, old man, that you will be to me all that you have been to him." "Yes," returned Mr. Hanna, still choking with emotion, "I will—I will—only, d—n it, don't call me 'old man'!" The German Ambassador, Baron Speck von Sternburg, was on terms of some intimacy with President Roosevelt, who nicknamed him "Specky." This was all very well in their private intercourse; but the President was not always careful to use in public a more formal mode of address; so that great irritation was aroused in Germany over what was thought to be a personal indignity offered to the representative of the German Empire. The President was likewise reckless in his speech, often expressing his private opinion of his associates most freely, and at times in the vocabulary of the cowboy. Such things as these were bruited about, and quite unnecessarily did harm in stirring up bad feeling and resentment. A very notable instance of the President's lack of consideration for others was found in his treatment of Sir Thomas Lipton, the Irish yachtsman, who had visited the United States in order to race his yacht for the America Cup. The President had entertained him at the White House

<sup>4</sup> In *McClure's Magazine* for July, 1905.

and had shown him much civility. A little later a yacht club gave a dinner in honour of Sir Thomas, and asked the President also to be its guest. This, of course, was a breach of etiquette for which primarily the ignorance of the Club's committee was responsible. The President of the United States can not attend a dinner at which any other person is the chief guest of honour. What Mr. Roosevelt ought to have done was to decline the invitation on some conventional plea. Instead of that, he both declined and let it be known that he would not attend any dinner to which Sir Thomas Lipton was especially invited. Now Sir Thomas Lipton was not a person to be taken very seriously. Many thought his interest in yachting to be not that of a sportsman, but of an advertiser who was concerned in calling attention to the teas in which he dealt at home. Yet he was a stranger, and he had been the President's guest; so that the open affront then put upon him was deplorable both in its lack of feeling and in its breach of ordinary civility. Many persons laid the blame upon the President's private secretary; but his intimate friends denied that this was so, and reported that Mr. Roosevelt was alone responsible and that he regarded the whole thing as a tremendous joke, forgetting that the President of the United States should be the last person in the land to forego the self-respecting courtesy which marks a high-bred gentleman.

His self-consciousness appeared in many other ways. When he first became President, his friends, bearing in mind the fate of President McKinley, urged him not to go about the streets alone and unprotected. "I am amply able to protect myself," remarked the President with a glance at his two fists; and the listening reporters telegraphed this characteristic speech from one end of the

country to the other. Yet before many weeks had passed, and in fact, throughout his presidency, Mr. Roosevelt caused himself to be more closely guarded, and made approach to him more difficult, than had been the case with any of his predecessors. Secret-service men swarmed about his person; and once when he visited New York to attend the funeral of a relative, a thousand policemen were detailed to safeguard him as he passed along the streets. While visiting a fair in Syracuse he was hemmed in on every side by cavalry. Now it was a courageous thing to declare that he could amply protect himself; and it was a very sensible thing for him to guard against assassination. But to have declared that he could protect himself, and then to seek or even to permit the sort of protection which a Czar of Russia might require, was not only inconsistent but somewhat ludicrous. The explanation of it is to be found in the workings of his ego. He doubtless came to believe that his own person was sacrosanct beyond that of any other President; and so he passed from a state of recklessness to one which seemed to indicate timidity. When President Grant was most unpopular, when he was maintaining "carpet-bag" government at the South by Federal bayonets, and when thousands of newspapers were denouncing him as a tyrant and a military dictator, he used to stroll along the streets of Washington wholly unattended, pausing to gaze into the shop windows, and moving about as freely as any private citizen. This was the highest type of courage—the courage which is quite unconscious of itself and which does not even think of danger. Mr. Roosevelt could scarcely have attained the same degree of imperturbability. His courage, in fact, was of the French, rather than of the Anglo-Saxon, type. It was allied with

a certain nervousness which could perform the most daring deeds if they were deeds of action, but which became restive and almost uncontrollable when patience and grim endurance were demanded.

Mr. Roosevelt's physical courage was, however, beyond all question. As to his moral courage, opinions were divided, and this division of opinion was justifiable. Bold in the utterance of his convictions and in asserting the fixity of his purposes, he nevertheless, in the face of strong opposition, was sometimes known to yield. His actions often failed to square with his spoken words. He was amenable to pressure. His mercurial nature led him frequently to take the line of least resistance, rather than to fight doggedly against a stubborn opposition. In this respect his conduct compared at times unfavourably with that of President McKinley, whom Mr. Roosevelt himself had spoken of as having no "backbone." An illustration of this fact was early afforded. President McKinley had in 1897 appointed Mr. H. C. Evans of Tennessee to the office of Pensions Commissioner. Mr. Evans administered that difficult office with the strictest integrity, reforming abuses, exposing frauds, and thereby incurring the bitter enmity of pension lawyers and of the swarms of persons who presented dishonest claims. The office had seldom known so clean and upright an administration. But the Grand Army of the Republic sided against the Commissioner and demanded of the President his removal from office. Enormous political pressure was brought to bear in order to secure this end; but President McKinley resisted it like a man. He could not be moved, and he gave unflinching support to Mr. Evans despite the clamour of venal claimants and malingerers. The same pressure was applied to President Roosevelt. He withstood it for



a time, but in the end he yielded. He feared to risk his popularity and incur the danger of losing what was called "the soldier vote." Mr. Evans was ostensibly advanced to another and more lucrative office; but it was perfectly obvious that this was only an indirect fashion of getting him quietly out of the way. It is but fair to add, however, that the gentleman whom the President appointed in the place of Mr. Evans was no less honest and capable than his predecessor.

A very characteristic glimpse of Mr. Roosevelt's mental processes was afforded by another incident. Not long after he had become President, he received at the White House, Mr. Booker T. Washington. Mr. Washington was a mulatto who had successfully established a school for the training of negroes at Tuskegee in Alabama. By his sound sense and tact in teaching his people not to ask for social recognition from the whites, he had won the good will of Southerners and seemed to be in a fair way to solve the negro problem at the South. After he had talked with the President for some time, the latter invited him to be his guest at luncheon, and Mr. Washington accepted. Now Mr. Roosevelt in his private capacity had undoubtedly the right to entertain at luncheon whomsoever he might please. The President of the nation also had the right to make any one his guest. But in doing so, it could be only with a full understanding that even the simplest action of the President of the United States can never be the action of a private individual or free from consequences. In this particular instance the consequences were lamentable. The President had offered social recognition and Mr. Washington had accepted it. At once all the good feeling which had existed in the South toward the experiment at Tuskegee vanished; and a great part of

the excellent work which Mr. Washington had labouriously accomplished was undone in half an hour. The President is said subsequently to have given an account of the affair to a political friend in the following words:

“When luncheon-time came around, my first thought was to invite him to stay and lunch with me. Immediately it flashed across my mind that this would make no end of trouble. But I asked myself: ‘Are you afraid to do it?’ and I answered, ‘No!’ And so I invited him to come in to luncheon.”

Now at first sight this may seem rather fine; but when analysed it shows a certain lack of moral courage. Although the President knew that his invitation, defensible enough in itself, would do serious harm to a really noble cause, he lacked the courage to refrain from giving it. In other words, he was afraid of being thought afraid.

It was partly from this lack of firmness and of loyalty to his own ideals, and partly from his love of approbation, that the President often fell short of what men felt they had a right to expect of him. In generalities no one was ever more energetic in denouncing the sinister influence of politicians who made public office a means of private gain. Yet in practice, when some of Mr. Roosevelt's own supporters and associates crossed the line which divides right from wrong, he dealt with them most tenderly and allowed his thunderbolts to sleep. A congressman named Littauer, who was shown to have used his official influence to foist upon the War Department the wares which he produced as a private manufacturer, was still made welcome at the President's table, though he had escaped indictment only by a legal technicality. When the notorious Quay died, President Roosevelt sent a telegram of effusive sympathy on the loss of his “loyal

friend." Many times he made it plain that he had one ethical standard for strangers and quite a different one for those who had, as it were, been sanctified by their intimacy with himself.

Of more far-reaching importance was a widely spread belief that President Roosevelt was "unsafe." He was certainly impulsive in his mental processes, impatient of restraint, and had little respect for ordinary conventionalities when these stood in the way of his desires. His recklessness of speech was thought to indicate an equal recklessness in action; and his youth was cited as affording still another reason for distrusting him. On several occasions, indeed, his precipitancy led him into blunders, as when he once sent a message to Congress urging the passage of a bill which in fact had become law several days before; and as when he nominated for a judgeship a gentleman who was constitutionally ineligible for that office. His talk was often couched in hyperbole. He was fond of sonorous adjectives, and he garnished his speeches with eulogies of war and of the warlike virtues. For these reasons there were many who described the new President as having "a lawless mind."

One enumerates these defects in an interesting character, not because they were in themselves transcendently important, but because they explain the feeling of opposition which President Roosevelt often roused in the minds of the conservative. On the other hand, it is probably quite true that these same defects did much to make him popular. They were very largely defects which he shared with a vast number of his countrymen; so that they proved him, as it were, to be a typical American. The self-consciousness, the touch of swagger, the love of applause and of publicity, the occasional lapses from offi-

cial dignity, even the reckless speech, the unnecessary frankness, and the disregard of form, were traits that in a sense were national. That he stood by his friends, even when his friends were not only wrong but reprehensible, was counted as a virtue. On the whole, then, Mr. Roosevelt's failings were held by most Americans to be quite as worthy of admiration as were his finer qualities.

Of finer qualities there was assuredly no lack. All the natural impulses of the man were sound and right and true. His whole training and the influences to which he had been subjected from childhood, tended to make him generous and high-minded. He had an instinctive scorn of whatever was cowardly and hypocritical. In the best sense of the word he was democratic, respecting men not for their pretensions or for their station or for their wealth, but for what they were as men. Popular opinion, groping about for the most appropriate adjective, asserted that the President was "square"; and this homely description was absolutely true. However often personal prejudice or mistaken beliefs may have made him inconsistent with his own professions and ideals, he was fundamentally sound, and his purposes were those which all good citizens could unreservedly commend. He was the first President who had been born to something like wealth; and this fact had freed him throughout his career from the need of considering public office in the light of a financial necessity. His income, while modest enough according to the standards of the time, sufficed at any rate to make him personally independent. This was an enormous advantage to him, since he was not obliged to curry favour with mercenary politicians. He was free to disregard them or to fight them as he chose. Hence, as an Assemblyman in New York State, as Civil Service Commissioner, and

as Police Commissioner, he was regarded less as a Republican than as an Independent. He was, theoretically, at least, a believer in free trade. He coöperated freely with Mr. Cleveland when the latter was Governor of New York, and he opposed the nomination of Mr. Blaine in 1884. Caricatures of that period represent him as a Mugwump, grouping him with George William Curtis and Carl Schurz. Yet none the less he was essentially a party man; and after Mr. Blaine had received the party nomination, Mr. Roosevelt supported him. His own explanation of his attitude at that time was interesting and wholly logical. He said:

“I intend to vote the Republican presidential ticket. A man cannot act both without and within the party. He can do either, but he cannot possibly do both. . . . It is impossible to combine the functions of a guerrilla chief with those of a colonel in the regular army. The one has greater independence of action, the other is able to make what action he does take vastly more effective. . . . I am by inheritance and by education a Republican. Whatever good I have been able to accomplish in public has been accomplished through the Republican party. I have acted with it in the past, and wish to act with it in the future.”<sup>5</sup>

When he came to the presidency, Mr. Roosevelt kept the same argument clearly before his mind. He must often have reflected that the partial failure of President Cleveland's administration was due to the open breach between that statesman and the other leaders of his own party. Mr. Roosevelt's purpose was to work through his party for the modification of its policies. But from the very first he found it difficult to tolerate many things to which the Republican party was committed. Still more difficult was it for him to receive with real cordiality some of the men who in Congress figured as the party's chiefs.

<sup>5</sup> Leupp, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

Unlike President McKinley, Mr. Roosevelt had never sat in Congress. He was not imbued with the traditions of the place. His ethical sense had not been dulled by long familiarity with the ways of Washington. He brought in, as it were, a stream of fresh, pure, bracing air from the mountains, to clear the fetid atmosphere of the national capital.

He did not, as most Presidents have done, restrict his official and social intercourse to the company of politicians or of men who could be directly useful in the sphere of politics. Mr. Roosevelt had come in contact with many sides of life, and his range of interest was much broader than that of any President since Jefferson. His early years had been spent as a member of the wealthy and cultivated class. He had been a ranchman and knew well the people of the West. His service in the Spanish war opened to him still another field of new experience. In his life he had tried his hand at many undertakings. He had written books. He had advocated social and political reforms. He had herded cattle on the great ranges of Dakota. He had directed the police of the American metropolis. He had helped equip the navy for the war with Spain. He had fought in the Cuban swamps. He had governed the most populous State of the Union. He had presided over the Senate of the United States. A caustic English critic once said of Mr. Gladstone that statesmen believed him to be a scholar, while scholars were under the mistaken belief that he was a statesman. Something of the same sort might have been said at this time with regard to Mr. Roosevelt; for in all his pursuits he exhibited something of the naïveté of the amateur; yet with the incompleteness of technical knowledge which marks the amateur, he had also the amateur's enthusiasm

and sincerity.<sup>6</sup> His intellectual curiosity was a marked feature of his character. He wished to know all sides of life, to learn all shades of opinion, and to keep himself informed of all that was going on in the world of thought and action. It was his custom to send notes from time to time to the Librarian of Congress saying: "Let me have a batch of the latest books on all kinds of subjects"; and presently there would be delivered at the White House a miscellaneous assortment of volumes comprising works on psychology, engineering, chemistry, medicine, horticulture, and sociology, besides novels, poems, essays—everything, in fact, which represented contemporary thought. These books Mr. Roosevelt would devour eagerly, storing away the essential facts in his retentive memory. As with books, so it was with men. He gathered about his dinner-table guests from every section of the country—scholars, lawyers, men of letters, men of business, manufacturers, ranchmen, Adirondack guides, journalists, and members of his old Rough Rider regiment. Whoever had done anything or said anything or written anything that was at all notable, eventually found his way to the White House at the President's invitation. To the talk of all these men he listened most attentively, and thus he gained a first-hand knowledge of what the people as a whole were interested in, of what were their prejudices and preferences, and also of what were their complaints and grievances. He knew his countrymen; and with his keen sense of justice and his wide range of sympathy, he gradually became more and more, in the true sense of the words, the people's President.

<sup>6</sup> An amusing instance of Mr. Roosevelt's combination of zeal and inexperience while Assistant Secretary of the Navy, is given in Long, *The New American Navy* (ii. p. 174), New York, 1904.

All this was by no means pleasing to the veteran politicians who sat in Congress and who were jealous of their own assumed prerogatives as keepers of the presidential conscience. Between them and Mr. Roosevelt there existed, and there could exist, but little sympathy. The sleek, sly senators who dabbled in stocks on the basis of their official knowledge of coming legislation, who took large fees from corporations in return for legal "opinions" which were never read or heeded by the persons who paid for them, the men who owed their senatorial seats to the favour of protected interests—these had an instinctive distrust of a President who looked them squarely in the eye and knew their baseness. They disliked him from the outset, and they spoke of him contemptuously among themselves as "this young man,"—using the term which his opponents applied to the younger Pitt, and which Bismarck, when dismissed from office, growled out to characterise his Emperor. And they had good reason for their apprehension. From every quarter of the land there came to the President's knowledge facts, convincingly substantiated, that there existed many evils which could be corrected only by a strong hand and a fearless heart in Washington.

In the early months of 1902 there was beginning to be felt a distinct reaction against that glorification of materialism which had been so wide-spread and for a time so thoroughly acceptable. The country was still as prosperous as ever; yet it was impossible to close men's eyes to the fact that in the train of this prosperity had come great wrongs. The worship of wealth had bred corruption both social, municipal, and national. The words of Horace—*quocunq̄ue modo rem*—had apparently been



taken as a text by thousands of unscrupulous men who were practising the myriad forms of knavery now characterised by the collective name of "graft"—a word appropriately borrowed from the *argot* of common thieves. The cities of the country, great and small, had been looted by franchise-grabbers, who in securing invaluable concessions without rendering an equivalent, had found it necessary to corrupt the municipal officials and to maintain a swarm of hired lobbyists in the legislatures of the different States.<sup>7</sup> Some of the greatest fiduciary institutions of the country, notably the life insurance companies, had developed a complex system by which they misused the funds entrusted to them.<sup>8</sup> With these things, however, and others like them, the national Executive had not the constitutional power to deal. There were, however, two far-reaching abuses from which the entire country suffered and against which the statutes of the United States had armed the Federal Government with a measure of power. These abuses were first, the discriminations by railways against shippers; and second, the oppressive domination of the Trusts. The two evils were closely related, since many of the Trusts, such as the Standard Oil Company, the Sugar Trust and the Beef Trust, owed much of their supremacy to the secret and unlawful favours which they had extorted from the railroads. Early in 1902, the price of meat had so advanced as to direct general attention to the methods of the six great packing houses which together constituted what was popularly called the Beef Trust.<sup>9</sup> Investigation showed that these meat-packers

<sup>7</sup> See Steffens, *The Shame of the Cities* (New York, 1905).

<sup>8</sup> See the report of the Armstrong committee of the New York Legislature (Albany, 1906).

<sup>9</sup> See Russell, *The Greatest Trust in the World* (New York, 1906).

had agreed not to compete against one another, that they had divided the cattle-country into districts, in each of which only a single branch of the Trust should buy, and that the practice had been established of bidding up the price of cattle from time to time so as to induce large shipments, and then of ceasing to bid when the shipments reached their destination. It was discovered also that railways in the Middle West had granted to certain purchasers of grain, rates which were lower than those charged to the smaller buyers; so that in practice there was but one buyer in each system, who was thus enabled to destroy competition and to fix at will the price to the producer.<sup>10</sup> A like injustice was inflicted in the same way upon cotton growers in the South. Finally, in 1901, the Northern Pacific and Great Northern Railways, by purchasing a third railway system, had effected a "merger" of the three in what was known as the Northern Securities Company, which thus became a combination able to monopolise the entire transportation facilities of the Northwest.

All these acts were not only contrary to public policy but they were in violation of two statutes which have already been described—the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890.<sup>11</sup> Until the present time, however, these laws had, to all intents and purposes, remained a dead letter. The Interstate Commerce Commission had been practically deprived of any effective power to curb the railways, owing to the fact that its decisions were subject to review by the Federal courts, which were jealous of any assumption of judicial

<sup>10</sup> See the Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission for 1902; and Montague, *Trusts of To-day*, pp. 149, 150 (New York, 1904).

<sup>11</sup> See pp. 140, 141 and 220-222.

authority by the Commission. Small shippers who appealed to the Commission against the railways were compelled to follow up a long and tedious course of litigation in which after many years, no substantial results were reached, and of which the loss involved in the delay was sufficient to beggar men of ordinary means. The railways had at their disposal the ablest legal talent in the country; and against this a private person, however great his injuries, was absolutely helpless. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act was also difficult of enforcement, partly because its phraseology was so sweeping as apparently to condemn both lawful and unlawful business enterprises, and also because the Trusts were protean in their character. Chartered by individual States, when attacked by Federal law they pretended to be only local corporations. When prosecuted by the State officials, they claimed exemption from such prosecution on the ground that they were engaged in commerce between the States. It was plain enough that these powerful and lawless combinations could not be effectively assailed either by individuals or by the States, but that only the strong hand of the national Government could take them by the throat and force them from their attitude of insolent defiance.

The wilful violations of law from which all sections of the country were suffering aroused the indignation of the President; while the difficulty of suppressing them against the opposition of united capital, appealed to his fighting spirit. By his direction, therefore, the Attorney-General moved against the most obnoxious of the Trusts. This officer was Mr. Philander C. Knox of Pennsylvania, who had been appointed late in President McKinley's administration to succeed Mr. J. W. Griggs. Mr. Knox was a lawyer of very great ability. He had for years been

counsel for several large corporations, among them the Carnegie Steel Company. He knew their methods well and could search out all the crevices in their armour. Until this time, however, he had remained inactive. The press had urged him to prosecute the Trusts; and because he had not done so he had received the popular nickname of "Sleepy Phil." He was, however, merely waiting for instructions; and no sooner did the President speak the word, than Mr. Knox revealed himself to be a highly trained and powerful prosecutor whose client was the nation. He secured an injunction against the Beef Trust, restraining it from raising and lowering prices in collusion, and from other practices which had become notorious. Again, at the direction of the President, he attacked the Northern Securities "merger," asking for an injunction to prevent this railway combination from controlling the companies involved in it. The motion was made before the United States district court in Minnesota under the Anti-Trust Law of 1890. Vigorous measures such as this stirred all the corporate interests to anger. They and their journalistic mouthpieces began to speak of the President in terms of mingled hatred and contempt. After the easy-going tolerance of Mr. McKinley, the energetic purpose of President Roosevelt gave them an unpleasant shock. They had come to regard themselves as almost divinely commissioned to disregard the laws which were made for other citizens, and to look upon themselves as above and beyond restraint from any source. Their feelings were not assuaged by some very pointed utterances of the President, made during a journey through New England in the summer of 1902, and in a visit to the Middle West in September of the same year. These utterances expressed only the most elemental principles of justice and right

reason; yet the lawless financiers and the editors whose living depended on financial favours viewed many sentences which Mr. Roosevelt spoke as being revolutionary if not anarchical. Thus in Providence,<sup>12</sup> the President said:

“The great corporations which we have grown to speak of rather loosely as Trusts are the creatures of the State, and the State not only has the right to control them, but it is in duty bound to control them wherever the need of such control is shown. . . . It is idle to say that there is no need for such supervision. There is; and a sufficient warrant for it is to be found in any one of the admitted evils appertaining to them. . . . The immediate necessity in dealing with Trusts is to place them under the real and not the nominal control of some sovereign to which, as its creatures, the Trusts shall owe allegiance and in whose courts the sovereign’s orders may be enforced.”

Again, at Boston,<sup>13</sup> the President declared:

“So far as the anti-trust laws go, they will be enforced. No suit will be undertaken for the sake of seeming to undertake it. Every suit that is undertaken will be begun because the great lawyer and upright man whom we are fortunate enough to have as Attorney-General, Mr. Knox, believes that there is a violation of the law which we can get at; and when the suit is undertaken it will not be compromised except upon the basis that the Government wins.”

And at Cincinnati,<sup>14</sup> he said:

“In dealing with the big corporations which we call Trusts, we must resolutely purpose to proceed by evolution and not revolution. . . . The evils attendant upon over-capitalisation alone, are in my judgment sufficient to warrant a far closer supervision

<sup>12</sup> August 23, 1902.

<sup>13</sup> August 25, 1902.

<sup>14</sup> September 20, 1902.

and control than now exists over the great corporations. . . . We do not wish to destroy corporations; but we do wish to make them subserve the public good. All individuals, rich or poor, private or corporate, must be subject to the law of the land; and the Government will hold them to a rigid obedience. The biggest corporation, like the humblest private citizen, must be held to strict compliance with the will of the people as expressed in the fundamental law. The rich man who does not see that this is in his interest is, indeed, short-sighted. When we make him obey the law, we insure for him the absolute protection of the law."<sup>15</sup>

These strong, frank, manly sentences struck a responsive chord throughout the nation. They seemed to clear the air which had become clogged and gross with the miasma of materialism. But they were read with resentment by the men who for years had thought of the law of the land merely as something which their hired lawyers could artfully circumvent. Mr. Roosevelt's popularity and a certain fear which he had already inspired, prevented open attacks upon him by members of his own party; but from this moment there was instituted in the venal press and through the myriad agencies which lawless wealth controlled, an underhanded campaign to discredit him and to prevent, if possible, his nomination for a second term of office. Meanwhile, however, the country was receiving a vivid object-lesson as to the evils of monopoly. Until now it was the people of the West who had suffered most and whose complaints had been both loud and bitter; but in 1902, the people of the East in their turn were made to know that corporate greed could strike unerringly and unpitifully at the welfare of every section.

<sup>15</sup> The text of these quotations follows that in *Addresses and Presidential Messages of Theodore Roosevelt*, with Introduction by H. C. Lodge (New York, 1904).

It has already been explained in the course of this narrative<sup>16</sup> how the coal-carrying-railways of Pennsylvania had, in violation of their charters and of the fundamental law, secured possession of practically all the anthracite coal mines of that district which, indeed, furnished the hard coal supply of the entire country. Early in 1902, a dispute arose between the mine-owners—that is to say the officials of the railways—and the miners in their employ. The latter had formed an organisation known as the United Mine Workers of America, at the head of which was Mr. John Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell was a man who had once worked in the coal mines, but who had educated himself by close study in his spare hours, and who had found time to read law and to investigate economic questions and labour conditions in the United States. He was a man of great intelligence, of superior organising ability, and of inflexible integrity. He had gained the confidence of the miners, and his heart had been wrung by the hardships which they had experienced and which he himself at one time had shared. The mine-owners compelled the men in their employ to purchase their supplies at the company's stores, to employ the company's doctors, and to live in the houses which the company furnished them,—all at the company's own price.<sup>17</sup> These and other grievances led the miners to ask for an increase of wages and for a recognition of the union. On February 14th, Mr. Mitchell addressed a letter to the railway presidents

<sup>16</sup> See p. 313; and Brooks, *History of the Anthracite Coal Mining Industry*.

<sup>17</sup> Mitchell, *Organised Labour*, p. 358. "Often a man, together with his children, would work for months without receiving a dollar of money; and not infrequently he would find at the end of the month, nothing in his envelope but a statement that his indebtedness to the company had increased by so many dollars."

requesting a joint conference. This request was curtly refused. Again on May 8th, it was proposed to Mr. George F. Baer, President of the Reading Coal and Iron Company, to submit the miners' claims to arbitration. Mr. Baer replied contemptuously that "anthracite mining is a business, and not a religious, sentimental, or academic proposition." Therefore on May 12th, a strike was ordered, and 150,000 miners at once ceased work. Throughout the summer the strike continued, the mine-owners endeavouring with no success to replace the men who had gone out. There was, as is always the case, some violence on the part of individual strikers; and these sporadic acts the corporation-ridden portions of the press exaggerated, so as to make them seem indicative of a reign of terror. On the whole, however, the strikers were orderly, and showed far more respect for law than did the railway presidents whose very ownership of the coal mines was prohibited by the Constitution of the State. As the months dragged on, the country's available coal supply began to be depleted, and a coal famine was obviously impending with the advent of the winter. In early September, the retail price of hard coal which was normally about \$5 per ton, advanced to \$12, and within a few days to \$14. The poor, who purchased it by the pailful, were obliged to pay something like one cent a pound. By September 24th, no coal-yard in the city of New York had on hand more than two hundred tons of coal, whereas a year before, the average stock had been at least two thousand tons. Many dealers began to refuse all but their regular customers, and to these they doled out only a small supply of fuel at prices which kept increasing every day. Gas-stoves and coke and kerosene were substituted for coal in many families; but the price of gas



advanced, the coke supply was quite inadequate, and kerosene was manifestly unsuited for heating purposes when the weather should become extremely cold. On September 26th, several schools in New York were closed and the pupils were sent home in order that the fuel on hand might be saved for the winter months.<sup>18</sup> Kindling wood was practically unattainable. On September 30th, hard coal brought \$20 a ton; and by October 1st, as much as \$28 and \$30 was demanded.

The widespread distress caused by the coal famine led to innumerable appeals to the Governor of Pennsylvania, and at last to the President of the United States. Apart from the merits of the strike, it was plain to everyone that a few selfish men, having secured a complete monopoly of one of the necessities of life, were abusing their power with a stolid indifference both to public opinion and to the health and comfort of the people. It was noted with indignation that long lines of cars laden with coal blocked the lines of the coal-carrying railways in New Jersey, at a time when even so much as a bucketful could with difficulty be procured to warm the dwellings of the poor. The mine-owners had thousands upon thousands of tons within easy reach of the market; yet they refused to sell, hoping that the general suffering would react against the State or national troops would be struck. But their schemes proved fruitless. Detestation of them became general and a general sympathy was given to the strikers. It was proposed in many States that the Government should take over the coal mines and work them in the public domain. Even the least radical

*ald for September 26th and 27th, 1902.*

suggestion looked to some exercise of the President's power to save the country from the horrors of the famine. In the city of New York a coal-riot was dreaded. The Mayor, Mr. Seth Low, telegraphed to the President:

"The welfare of a large section of the country imperatively demands the immediate resumption of anthracite coal-mining. In the name of the city of New York I desire to protest through you, against the continuance of the existing situation, which, if prolonged, involves, at the very least, the certainty of great suffering and heavy loss to the inhabitants of this city, in common with many others."

The Governor of Massachusetts hurried to Washington to beg the President in some manner to find a way out of the existing crisis which was becoming more acute each week. On the other hand, the representatives of capital assumed a threatening attitude and evidently meant to end the President's political career if he should dare to intervene. Oddly enough, the people of the West felt little interest in the outcome of the strike. They used soft coal instead of anthracite; and though the price of this had also steadily advanced, they experienced no such pinch as did the Eastern cities. Hence the Western press and the political leaders of that section advised the President not to interfere.

Of course, in his official capacity he had no power to act. The coal-strike, though national in its consequences, was local in its origin and progress. If he moved at all, it must be as a private citizen, though whatever action he might take would be made significant by the dignity of the great office which he held. It was a position of extreme embarrassment. The Secretary of the Navy afterwards described just how a decision was ultimately reached. He said:

“ I remember the President sitting, with his injured leg in a chair while the doctors dressed it.<sup>19</sup> It hurt, and now and then he would wince a bit, while he discussed the strike and the appeals for help that grew more urgent with every passing hour. The outlook was grave; it seemed as if the cost of interference might be political death. I saw how it tugged at him, just when he saw chances of serving his country which he had longed for all the years, to meet—this. It was human nature to halt. He halted long enough to hear it all out: the story of the suffering in the big coast-cities, of schools closing, hospitals without fuel, of the poor shivering in their homes. Then he set his face grimly and said:

“ ‘ Yes, I will do it. I suppose that ends me; but it is right, and I will do it.’ ”<sup>20</sup>

Having come to this decision, the President telegraphed to the railway presidents, to the presidents of the anthracite district unions, and to Mr. John Mitchell, asking them to meet him in Washington on October 3rd. On the day appointed, these persons accordingly assembled. The mine owners were headed by Mr. George F. Baer, and the labour representatives by Mr. Mitchell. There were present also the Attorney-General of the United States, the Commissioner of Labour, and the President's private secretary. The meeting began with an embarrassing silence. The opposing delegates sat eyeing each other with looks of evident hostility. Then the President read to them a statement in which he said that he spoke neither for the mine owners nor for the miners, but for the American people.

“ I disclaim any right or duty to intervene in this way upon

<sup>19</sup> The President, while coaching in Massachusetts, had met with an accident which injured the bone of one leg.

<sup>20</sup> Quoted in Riis, *Theodore Roosevelt the Citizen*, pp. 375-376 (New York, 1904).

legal grounds or upon any official relation that I bear to the situation; but the urgency and the terrible nature of the catastrophe impending over a large portion of our people in the shape of a winter fuel-famine impel me after much anxious thought to believe that my duty requires me to use whatever influence I personally can bring, to end a situation which has become literally intolerable. . . . In my judgment, the situation imperatively requires that you meet upon the common plane of the necessities of the public. With all the earnestness there is in me I ask that there be an immediate resumption of operations in the coal mines, in some such way as will, without a day's unnecessary delay, meet the crying needs of the people. I do not invite a discussion of your respective claims and positions. I appeal to your patriotism, to the spirit that sinks personal considerations and makes individual sacrifices for the general good." <sup>21</sup>

No sooner had the President finished reading this carefully prepared address, than Mr. Mitchell leaped to his feet and said in a loud, clear voice:

"I am much pleased, Mr. President, with what you say. We are willing that you shall name a tribunal which shall determine the issues that have resulted in the strike; and if the gentlemen representing the operators will accept the award or decision of such a tribunal, the miners will willingly accept it, even if it be against our claims."

Mr. Baer's face flushed red, and he and his associates were obviously disconcerted. But after a moment's pause they emphatically rejected Mr. Mitchell's proposal. Mr. Baer offered on his side to submit any special grievance to the decision of the Court of Common Pleas in the districts where the mines were situated. This offer was declined by Mr. Mitchell. The President then asked his visitors to retire for consultation, and to return in the

<sup>21</sup> See the *New York Times* for October 4, 1902.

afternoon. At this second meeting the operators read, one after another, long statements which had evidently been prepared for them by their legal advisers. Their tone throughout was one of studied insolence toward the President himself, and of hatred toward the striking miners. They intimated that Mr. Roosevelt had failed in his duty; that he should long since have broken the strike by the employment of the regular army; and that the responsibility for the existing situation rested largely upon him. They called the Government "a contemptible failure if it can secure the lives and property and comfort of the people only by compromising with the violators of law and the instigators of violence and crime." The counsel for the Delaware and Hudson Company, David B. Wilcox, addressed the President in a most arbitrary fashion, and demanded of him that he do his duty. The operators evidently intended to rouse the President to an outburst of anger and thereby to put him in the wrong; but he kept his temper perfectly,<sup>22</sup> as did also the labour leaders; and the conference presently adjourned, having, as it seemed, accomplished no result.<sup>23</sup>

Such, however, was not the case. The indignation of the whole country was aroused by the refusal of the operators to accept the arbitration of the President of the United States. Mr. Baer was widely quoted as having in a letter to a friend, spoken of himself and his associates as "those Christian men to whom God in his infinite

<sup>22</sup> One account, however, says that the President spoke very sharply to the operators. He is quoted as having remarked to a friend afterwards: "There was only one person there who bore himself like a gentleman, and it wasn't I!" The exception is supposed to have been Mr. Mitchell.

<sup>23</sup> See the Washington correspondence of the *New York World and Herald* for October 4, 1902; and Mitchell, *Organized Labour*, pp. 362-390 (Philadelphia, 1903).

wisdom has entrusted the property interests of this country." That Mr. Baer ever wrote these words was denied, and there is no good reason for ascribing them to him; yet at the time they were accepted as authentic and they served to suffuse the public anger with a deep disgust. Mr. Roosevelt had now the entire nation behind him; and whatever he might do was certain to receive the approval of his countrymen.

There was in New York at that time a financier whose name was known throughout the civilised world for the power which he exercised over other capitalists and especially over the railway owners. In 1900, an earlier coal strike had begun. It was near the time of the presidential election, and a labour outbreak then would have jeopardised the success of the Republican candidates. This gentleman at that period had by his own personal influence forced the mine-owners to make concessions to the miners whereby the strike was for a while averted. In yielding to him the operators had told him:

"We concede this now; but you must promise never again to ask it of us."

And he had promised.

There is an interesting story which seems to rest upon good authority and which may be repeated here, though with due reserve. It tells how this gentleman was in a private yacht then lying in the North River. To him it is said that in the evening there came from Washington the Secretary of War, Mr. Elihu Root, a personal acquaintance, and one of the ablest lawyers in the United States. In the sumptuous cabin of the yacht, Mr. Root went over the whole situation and urged with all his eloquence that the great financier should once more use his influence to end the strike. To the request, made many

times and in many ways, a cold refusal was returned. Then the Secretary changed his tone.

“ I have given you a chance to do this of your own free will, but you have refused. I am now instructed to inform you that the President will appoint a commission to inquire very strictly into the legality of the connection between the railways and the mines, and that this commission will publish the exact truth so that the whole country may know it. At the head of this commission the President will place a gentleman, not of his own party, but one in whose word and in whose courage the people will place implicit confidence.”

The financier shot a keen look from his steely eyes.

“ Who is this person? ” he asked, with an accent partly of defiance and partly of curiosity.

“ His name,” said Secretary Root, “ is Grover Cleveland. And I may add that, as the result of such a report, the persons who shall be found to have violated the law and who are thereby responsible for the existing distress will be criminally indicted by a Federal Grand Jury.”<sup>24</sup>

The interview terminated late that night; and on October 13th, the operators made a formal offer to the President to submit all matters in dispute to a commission<sup>25</sup> of five men to be appointed by the President. The offer was accepted by Mr. Mitchell on behalf of the miners; and on October 23rd, work was resumed and the great coal strike was broken. It had continued for five months, and it was estimated to have entailed a loss of more than

<sup>24</sup> This story here told is given for what it is worth. It tallies, however, with several facts which are matters of record.

<sup>25</sup> The commission subsequently appointed by the President was headed by Judge Gray of Delaware, and it arranged a compromise, after taking a vast amount of testimony which was published by the Government (Washington, 1903). For a synopsis, see Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pp. 391-396.

\$100,000,000. Because of what the President had done he received the unstinted praise of a great majority of Americans; while in Europe his name was spoken with sincere respect as of one who "had done a very big thing and an entirely new thing."<sup>26</sup> Only the representatives of predatory capital were incensed, but for the time they took refuge in a sullen silence. Among themselves, however, they had marked the President down for political destruction.

The succeeding year passed quietly enough, save for a few slight ripples on the surface of international relations. In January, much feeling was excited among the American people by a joint naval expedition sent by Great Britain, Italy, and Germany into Venezuelan waters for the purpose of enforcing certain pecuniary claims and of redressing grievances. The German ships shelled several Venezuelan forts and sank a few insignificant Venezuelan ships, besides blockading the most important harbours. The United States was not directly interested; for the three foreign powers had disclaimed any desire for territorial acquisitions in Venezuela. Nevertheless, perhaps because Germany was involved, there existed some uneasiness. The President studiously declined to interfere. He was invited to act as arbitrator, but wisely refused to do so. He sent a fleet into West Indian waters, and used his influence to secure a settlement of the affair. This was arranged at Washington, and the three European powers made easy terms with Venezuela. On the surface, the affair was but a momentary incident, yet it afforded a new proof of American influence in world politics. Foreign comment was decidedly significant. The *Allgemeine Zeitung* of

<sup>26</sup> London *Times*, October 24, 1902.



Vienna declared resentfully that the United States had gained the hegemony of the whole Western Hemisphere. Continuing its comment, it said:

“ Europe has displayed a nervous anxiety to appease American diplomacy. The interested powers looked on enviously. Europe was united on one point only—the desire not to rouse the antipathy of the American people. Even the allies wished to shake each other off. The close of the Venezuelan dispute is equivalent to a victory of America over Europe.”<sup>27</sup>

Subsequently, the German Kaiser, seeing the futility of a policy of irritation, made frank overtures of friendship toward the United States and of personal good will to the American President. He ordered a yacht to be built for himself at an American shipyard, and requested the President's daughter, Miss Alice Roosevelt, to christen it at the launching. Not to do things by half, he also despatched his brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, as his personal representative to visit the United States on the occasion of the launching. Prince Henry came, accompanied by a retinue of keen observers, who were instructed to make minutely careful notes of everything they saw. During the few weeks of their stay in the United States, they visited the largest cities as far West as St. Louis, inspecting libraries, universities, manufactories, navy-yards, and battlefields, and being overwhelmed with an excessive hospitality. Prince Henry, by his easy democratic manners, did much to obliterate the memory of his tactlessness at Hong Kong in 1898; and Americans had an opportunity to show how far they had acquired the

<sup>27</sup> *Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 15, 1903. For the French view, see Petin, *La Doctrine de Monroë* (Paris, 1900); and Barral-Montferrat, *De Monroë à Roosevelt* (Paris, 1905).

art of entertaining royal guests. It can not be said that their achievements in this respect were very creditable. The ultra-rich displayed an effusive snobbishness which was fatuous and fulsome. The rabble, on the other hand, showed little of the decorum which marks the multitude in European countries on ceremonious occasions. Prince Henry, while in New York, was greeted through a megaphone with the words: "Hullo, Henry! How's your brother Bill?" On another occasion, when the Prince's Pullman coach was sidetracked at a little country station for the night, a band of yokels surrounded it, and beating on its sides with sticks, cried out: "Wake up, Hen! Wake up, Hen!" for half an hour at a time. But the Prince took all these things with a good grace and they doubtless gave a piquant flavour to the report which he carried back to his imperial brother in Berlin.

Foreign observers had said that the United States now possessed the hegemony of the entire Western hemisphere. In 1903, a series of events occurred which emphasised the truth of this assertion. For half a century, the project of uniting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by a ship-canal across the Central American Isthmus had received the attention of Great Britain, France, and the United States. Such a canal would decrease the distance by sea from New York to San Francisco by some 8,500 miles and from New York to Australia by nearly 4,000 miles. The so-called Clayton-Bulwer Treaty between the United States and Great Britain, signed in 1850, had contemplated the opening of such a canal. From time to time the subject had been revived, and in 1870, two expeditions had reported upon the subject. In 1881, a French company had been organised to cut the Isthmus of Panama, and the carry-

ing out of the plan was entrusted to M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, who had successfully united the Red Sea with the Mediterranean. The attempt, however, resulted in an engineering failure, and in a great financial scandal; for out of the 700,000,000 francs subscribed, only about 90,000,000 francs were actually expended upon the engineering works, the rest having been squandered in bribery, or lost through speculation. In the United States, the best scientific opinion had favoured a canal through Nicaragua, and this route was examined by a commission appointed in 1897. Meanwhile, the French project had collapsed (1889) and the French company had offered to sell its rights to the United States. Various commissions made surveys and reports; but finally on January 20, 1902, President Roosevelt sent to Congress a message, recommending the construction of a canal at Panama, and the purchase of the French rights for \$40,000,000. Congress responded by appropriating \$170,000,000 for the realisation of the plan; and, in case it were not possible to secure the consent of the United States of Colombia, directing the President to have the canal constructed by the Nicaragua route at a cost not to exceed \$180,000,000. A treaty was then negotiated between Secretary Hay and the Colombian Minister, Señor Herran, by which Colombia was to grant the desired privilege in return for the sum of \$10,000,000 to be paid outright, and an annual rental of \$250,000. This treaty was ratified by the United States Senate in extra session (March 17, 1903), and then went to the Senate of Colombia. That body, strangely enough, rejected the treaty by a unanimous vote (August 17th). The Government of Colombia let it be known a little later that a new treaty would be ratified if the United States would pay the sum of \$25,000,000

instead of the \$10,000,000 provided for in the Hay-Herran agreement. It was obvious that Colombia was "holding up" the North American Republic and that the whole question turned upon the payment of money.

At this juncture the State of Panama, incensed by the sacrifice of its commercial interests, seceded from Colombia and established a provisional government of its own, appealing to the United States for recognition. President Roosevelt within three days acknowledged the independence of the Republic of Panama. Physical conditions prevented Colombia from sending troops to Panama by land to coerce the seceding State; and American vessels of war at once appeared in Central American waters and began to cruise up and down the coast. Marines were landed on the Isthmus, and the Colombian Government was informed that the United States would permit no fighting there. France and England almost at once gave their recognition to the new Republic. Colombia then, when it was too late, offered every possible concession, but the offer was rejected. M. Bunau-Varilla, a Franco-Spanish engineer, was by cable accredited as Panama's representative at Washington; and on November 18th, he and Secretary Hay signed a treaty by which the Republic of Panama granted to the United States the privilege of constructing a canal, in return for \$10,000,000, and a guarantee of Panama's independence. To the United States was also given control of a belt of land ten miles wide through which the canal was to be cut. The provisional government of Panama ratified this treaty on December 2d, and it was approved by the United States Senate<sup>28</sup> on February 23, 1904, only fourteen votes being cast against it.

<sup>28</sup> See the special message of President Roosevelt, January 4, 1904.

Public opinion favoured the action of the Government, though with some reservations. In the presence of a *fait accompli* there was no possibility of retreat. Moreover, the mercenary conduct of the Colombians had deprived them of much of the sympathy which might otherwise have been given to them. It was proved also that the United States had in no way instigated the revolt of Panama—a State which had revolted before, and which had for years been hostile to the central Government. Finally, the gain to the whole world from the construction of a canal across the Isthmus was obvious to all.

Nevertheless, the transaction was not one of which Americans could be proud. It violated the principles of international comity and morality. The alleged baseness of the Colombian Senate did not justify the spoliation of Colombia by a professedly friendly power. The indecent haste with which Panama's independence had been recognised was repugnant to many Americans. When the President received the new Panamanian Minister, he very unwisely compared his own recognition of Panama to President Monroe's recognition of the South American States after their revolt from Spain. Yet he must have known that President Monroe took that step only after waiting more years than President Roosevelt had waited days.

It was plain, too, that the President had acted toward a feeble State like Colombia as he would not have dared to act toward a great and warlike Power. His conduct in this affair, therefore, savoured too strongly of bullying to be admirable. Morally, the acquisition of the canal zone was as reprehensible as the partition of Poland, and it was effected with every possible circumstance that could give offense. The New York *Evening Post* ex-

pressed, though rather infelicitously, a wide-spread feeling when it remarked: <sup>29</sup>

“The same result could have been reached with some regard for appearances. The booty could have been bagged just the same, yet the burglar could have looked, to the casual eye, more like a church member.”

The wrong involved in this affair was destined to bring in part its own revenge. President Roosevelt in his sanguine, off-hand way, declared that the canal must be commenced at once; that he would begin immediately to “make the dirt fly.” He could not then foresee the long delays, the shocking waste, the crass incompetence, and the noisome scandals that were to dog and defer the work upon which he had entered with so light a heart. Here, as oftentimes before in his career, he displayed the hopeful inexperience of an amateur; and that which he lightly fancied the achievement of a few years, dragged wearily along until even the most optimistic of Americans perceived that it was destined to remain the despair of distant decades.<sup>30</sup>

The President, however, was satisfied with the result of his action and proceeded to display his self-complacency in a piece of phrase-making which became famous. His notion of a foreign policy, he said, was “to speak softly but to carry a big stick.” What really gave him serious anxiety at this time was the question of his election in 1904, or rather, the question as to whether his own party would nominate him for the Presidency. There were good reasons for his doubt. On April 9th, 1903, the suit

<sup>29</sup> *Evening Post*, December 3, 1903.

<sup>30</sup> See Forbes-Lindsay, *Panama: the Isthmus and the Canal* (New York, 1906).

of Attorney-General Knox for the dissolution of the Northern Securities "merger" had been decided in favour of the Government and against the railway magnates.<sup>31</sup> A decree ordering the dissolution of the merger was filed in accordance with this decision. The independent press of the country rejoiced at so effective a check to the march of monopoly. Thus the Portland *Oregonian* declared:

"It is a blow at anarchy. Disregard and violation of law come to the same thing whether held at the corner of Broad and Wall Streets, in private palace cars and along Fifth Avenue, or by the ragged beggar stealing a loaf from a baker's wagon."

The Cincinnati *Times-Star* remarked:

"Wall Street, from its short-sighted standpoint of pecuniary gain in the immediate future, may regard the Northern Securities decision as a great evil; those Americans who are more deeply and unselfishly interested in the industrial and political future of their country, however, can scarcely fail to take a diametrically opposite position and regard the decision as fraught with much of practical benefit and promise for the future of the Republic."

But of course, the decision of the Court enraged the representatives of capital as much as it alarmed them. It renewed their purpose to prevent the nomination of Mr. Roosevelt. Beginning with the early autumn of 1903, all their insidious agencies were set to work to discredit him and to make his nomination seem impossible. The country beheld a wonderful exhibition of the power of

<sup>31</sup> The Decision of the Circuit Court was written by Judge Thayer, his three associates concurring. It was afterwards, on appeal, sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States.

this Third Estate. Its newspapers were filled with studied sneers, with slanderous hints, and with expressions of veiled contempt. Chief among the *condottieri* of this veiled opposition was the New York *Sun*, which since the death of Mr. Dana in 1897 had suffered various vicissitudes, but which was now believed to be controlled by Mr. Pierpont Morgan. The *Sun* displayed an ingenuity and a malice worthy of the great editor who was gone. It quoted with relish an offensive phrase which described the friends of Mr. Roosevelt as "bugs on the White House doormat." It ridiculed his military record, and with solemn irony strove to sap the foundations of his popularity.<sup>32</sup> At first, the real drift of all this criticism was not apparent; but the secret was let out in an editorial which the *Sun* published on December 14, 1903, in commenting on the election in Ohio which had resulted in a great Republican majority. Quoth the *Sun*:

"We see the Hon. Marcus A. Hanna crowned with the laurels of that mighty November majority. Victorious as he is, the 'bugs on the White House door-mat,' to use a coarse phrase worthy of that low and practical view of politics that obtains among the Buckeyes, are biting him sharply. On the other hand, the mighty majority is crowding in on him, seeking to force him away from the stake to which he has bound himself, a monument of self-denial. There is every indication that at the present time Senator Hanna is holding himself in restraint, but only showing the stoicism of a martyr at the stake. His patience is remarkable, his endurance marvellous. Yet the air around him is charged with electricity. The 'pie-counter brigade,' or sycophants for office, and the 'bugs on the White House door-mat,' as the members of Roosevelt's immediate circle at Washington are known, have been

<sup>32</sup> See the editorial columns of the *Sun* from November, 1903, to June, 1904.



assiduously at work, nibbling and gnawing at his ankles. Never a day goes by but he must suppress anger that would cause most men to break loose and hurl defiance at the headsman.

"This situation must be distressing, not so much perhaps to the martyr himself as to one deeply interested soul, the object of this drama of abnegation. Between the 'bugs' and the majority, will the stake hold?"

From this moment, Mr. Hanna was everywhere regarded as a rival of Mr. Roosevelt for the Republican nomination. The movement in his favour was carried on all over the country with infinite skill and through all the channels of the business world. Bankers told their customers that a continuance of Mr. Roosevelt in office would lead to hard times and would compel a curtailment of discounts. Manufacturers and great business houses let it be known to their employés that their prosperity in the future was imperilled by "the unsafe man" in the White House. This feeling spread from man to man until, in January, 1904, it really seemed as though the conspiracy would be successful.

A knowledge of these facts seriously disturbed the President. He frankly sought a nomination, and was not ashamed to say so. He had enjoyed the experiences of his office with a keen relish. Often, writing to friends, and dictating his letters to a stenographer, he would speak of the burdens of the presidency. Yet before the letter was sent he sometimes scrawled with his own hand at the bottom of the page the words: "But I like it!" He was tired of having it said that he was only "an accidental President." He wished such an endorsement of his policies and of himself as an election by the people would imply. His anxiety was very obvious. Mr. Hanna's popularity gave him many perplexing hours. Mr. Hanna

himself once remarked laughingly: "Whenever I call at the White House, the President thinks it necessary to swear me in again." Whether the Senator was seriously hoping for his own election, it is difficult to say. It is certain, however, that he began to seek the favour of the labour element which had long been hostile to him. He helped organise the National Civic Federation, and became its president. He also set his business affairs in order, withdrawing from various enterprises in which he had been interested, thereby making it possible to assume any new duty which might be imposed upon him. For the moment, the party was divided and the President seemed to be daily losing ground.

A sudden change in the aspect of affairs was caused by Mr. Hanna's death in February, 1904. Without him, the opposition within the party had no head. Dislike of Mr. Roosevelt among the capitalists had not decreased, yet there was no one available to oppose him. Then ensued a period of uncertainty. As was said by a Republican adversary of the President: "Everybody is for Roosevelt, but nobody wants him." Yet this remark was utterly untrue. The country was decidedly for Mr. Roosevelt, and it also wanted him. Now that Mr. Hanna was removed, there came a great surge of favour which in a month or two gave to the President the absolute mastery of his party. When the Republican Convention met at Chicago on June 21st, it met as a mere machine to register the presidential wishes. Every speech had been submitted to him and had been revised by him. The platform was practically of his own composition. The great hall of the Coliseum which covered five acres of ground, contained a body of delegates who felt that there could be no interest in a gathering where no initiative was

allowed. Enthusiasm was lacking, and one cynical delegate remarked: "The only live thing about the Convention to-day was the picture of the dead Hanna." On the second day, the platform was read and adopted. It contained in essence little more than formal endorsement of the Administration. On the third day, Mr. Roosevelt was formally nominated by Ex-Governor Frank S. Black of New York, who succeeded in rousing the Convention for the first time to something like enthusiasm. His speech was, in fact, a superb piece of rhetoric, of which at least one passage may be quoted here:

"There is no regret so keen in man or country as that which follows an opportunity unembraced. Fortune soars with high and rapid wing, and whosoever brings it down must shoot with accuracy and speed. Only the man with steady eye and nerve and the courage to pull the trigger, brings the largest opportunities to the ground. He does not always listen while all the sages speak, but every nightfall beholds some record which, if not complete, has been at least pursued with conscience and intrepid resolution.

"The fate of nations is still decided by their wars. You may talk of orderly tribunals and learned referees; you may sing in your schools the gentle praises of the quiet life; you may strike from your books the last note of every martial anthem; and yet out in the smoke and thunder will always be the tramp of horses and the silent, rigid, upturned face. Men may prophesy and women pray; but peace will come here to abide forever on this earth only when the dreams of childhood are the accepted charts to guide the destinies of men."<sup>33</sup>

Mr. Roosevelt was nominated by acclamation, and Mr. Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana was made his associate as a candidate for the Vice-Presidency. Mr. Fairbanks was a gentleman of conservative views whose rather cold

<sup>33</sup> New York *Tribune* for June 24, 1904.

and formal manners presently gained for him the popular nickname of "Icebanks." The Convention adjourned with as little enthusiasm as had marked its gathering. Yet in spite of this unprecedented absence of emotion, or perhaps because of it, there was something grimly suggestive and impressive about the whole affair. One seemed to see here no shouting mob of volunteers, but rather an army highly organised and disciplined, trained to obey implicitly the orders of a single chief, and with the prestige of past victory upon its banners. The soldiers in the ranks might have their private hesitations and dislikes; but these were not to count when in the presence of the enemy, nor to alter, however slightly, an unflinching determination to win the coming battle.

Much keener interest was felt in the action of the Democratic Convention which had been called for July 6th in St. Louis. The Democracy was in a mood to revert to its earlier conservatism rather than to experiment once more with the policies of Mr. Bryan. This conservatism was the more clearly indicated, because radicalism had now been approved by the Republicans and was embodied in the personality of their chief. Hence, the name most often heard as that of the possible Democratic candidate was the name of Alton B. Parker, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. Judge Parker had been bred to the profession of the law, and his first thought in public life was of rule and precedent. He had all the jurist's dread of innovation; and, while his courage was undoubted, it was always manifested in a quiet fashion. He recalled the American public men of other days—the Adamses, the Jays, and the Marshalls,—statesmen and jurists who gave form and definite cohesion to the Federal Government in its early years. Personally he had the

human qualities in abundant measure—the kindness and courtesy of one who is always genuine and sincere, with just a touch of that elusive rusticity which carries a wholesome suggestion of a purely natural environment. As the weeks passed on, Judge Parker seemed more and more likely to receive the Democratic nomination.

His chief rival was Mr. William Randolph Hearst of New York. Mr. Hearst was a young man, the son of Senator Hearst of California; and he had inherited from his father a large fortune with which he had established newspapers of a sensational character in New York, in Boston, in Chicago, in San Francisco, and in Los Angeles. Mr. Hearst was more radical even than Mr. Bryan. He was a State Socialist, who had formerly advocated free silver, and in his newspapers had never wearied of denouncing the abuses of capitalism. He was seriously regarded in many portions of the country as a great tribune of the people who would, if he had the power, destroy the lawless corporations, give over the railways and the telegraphs to the Government, and in general bring about a sort of socialistic millennium. This belief and an abundant use of money in his preliminary canvass, with perhaps the secret support of Mr. Bryan, secured for Mr. Hearst not only delegations from several of the so-called Silver States, but those of such great commonwealths as Illinois, Iowa, and California.

When the Convention met, it was obviously dominated by the conservative element. Mr. Cleveland's name was received with thunders of applause, and it was said that now at last the Democracy would show itself to be both "safe and sane." The first day was devoted to speech-making; but on the second day, the Convention displayed its temper in a test vote as to the seating of certain Illinois

delegates. Mr. Bryan advocated their admission; but by a vote of 647 to 299 his proposal was defeated, and he left the hall in a state of evident dejection. Nevertheless, in committee he was able by the force of his personality to exclude from the platform any reference to the money question.

On the evening of July 8th, the candidates were put in nomination; and Judge Parker received 658 ballots as against the 204 that were cast for Mr. Hearst. Men wondered, however, in what light the Judge would view a nomination given him after the adoption of a platform so negative in character. They had not long to wait. On the next day, a telegram was received and read, of which the text was as follows:

“I regard the gold standard as firmly and irrevocably established, and shall act accordingly if the action of the Convention to-day shall be ratified by the people. As the platform is silent on the subject, my views should be made known to the Convention, and if they prove to be unsatisfactory to the majority, I request you to decline the nomination for me at once, so that another may be nominated before adjournment.

“ALTON B. PARKER.”

To this telegram, after a hasty consultation among the leaders, a reply was sent in these words:

“The platform adopted by this Convention is silent on the question of the monetary standard, because it is not regarded by us as a possible issue in this campaign, and only campaign issues were mentioned in the platform. Therefore there is nothing in the views expressed by you in the telegram just received which would preclude a man entertaining them from accepting a nomination on said platform.”

The terms of this reply were bitterly assailed by Mr. Bryan, who rose from a sick-bed, pale and shaking with fever, to utter a last plea for the cause with which his name was linked. His passionate eloquence never was more splendid than in this hour of momentary defeat. He thrilled all who heard him, yet he failed to shake the set purpose of the majority.

The Convention then adjourned after nominating for the Vice-Presidency Mr. Henry G. Davis of West Virginia, a wealthy octogenarian. The most conservative Democrats all over the country lauded the courage of their chief candidate. The supporters of Mr. Bryan, however, and the friends of Mr. Hearst, were thoroughly discontented, and throughout the campaign which followed they exhibited not only apathy but unfriendliness. Mr. Bryan himself, though deeply disappointed, displayed unshaken loyalty to his party's choice.

At first it seemed as though the conservative elements of the country might be rallied to Judge Parker's support. Mr. Cleveland emerged from his seclusion to speak in behalf of his party's candidate. The moneyed interests hesitated for a few weeks. But in the end, they accepted Mr. Roosevelt, in the belief that he was certain to be elected; and that, while they might not be able to control his policies, they could at least succeed in blocking them or in accomplishing their defeat. Moreover, some of the men who were most conspicuous in their advocacy of Judge Parker's election failed to inspire general confidence. Again, Judge Parker's utterances were too sedate and too conservative for a people which had grown accustomed to more stirring words. Moreover, Mr. Roosevelt was fortunate in having Mr. John Hay as his chief Cabinet adviser. Many conservative Republicans were wont to

remark: "Well, after all, a vote for Roosevelt is really a vote for Hay." As the summer advanced, the tide set in with increasing force in favour of the President, and the Democrats were obviously losing ground. One thing alone gave a shock to the moral sense of the country. At the head of the Republican National Committee was placed Mr. George B. Cortelyou, who had resigned a seat in the Cabinet to act as campaign manager. It was intimated that in case the President should be elected, Mr. Cortelyou would be made Postmaster General. There was a certain impropriety in all this. Mr. Cortelyou had been Secretary of Commerce and Labour, and in that office he had learned the secrets of the great corporations. His demands upon them for pecuniary contributions would therefore be especially effective; while the chance of his being the future head of the Post Office Department made every postmaster in the country a political agent through dread of possible removal. Judge Parker called attention to these circumstances in a speech to which the President wrote a reply couched in hot words of anger and ending with the following notable passage:

"The statements made by Mr. Parker are unqualifiedly and atrociously false. As Mr. Cortelyou has said to me more than once during this campaign, if elected I shall go into the presidency unhampered by any pledge, promise or understanding of any kind, sort or description, save my promise, made openly to the American people, that so far as in my power lies, I shall see to it that every man has a square deal, no less and no more."

This for the moment silenced public criticism. Of course, no one had supposed that Mr. Roosevelt was personally aware of any bargaining. Indeed, it was not



necessary to assume that any open or explicit bargaining had been made. But in the following year it became known that large sums had been improperly, if not dishonestly, paid into the Republican campaign fund by the great insurance companies of New York, and that in one instance the company's books had been falsified to conceal the evidence of this illegal use of a trust fund. It was plain that such contributions would hardly have been made without a confident expectation of receiving valuable favours in return. Judge Parker's charges were, therefore, in essence justified.

At the election, however, Mr. Roosevelt was so overwhelmingly successful as to make the result certain within two hours after the polls had closed. In the popular vote he had a majority of nearly 2,000,000, while in the Electoral College he had 336 votes as against 140 given to Judge Parker. Yet when analysed, it was apparent that his great success was due largely to the defection at the polls of the Hearst and Bryan voters. The total number of ballots cast in the country was less by nearly half a million than those which had been cast in 1900, in spite of the growth in population. It was not, then, so much an increase in the Republican vote as a decrease in the Democratic, that brought about a result which on the face of it seemed cataclysmic. No sooner had the news of his success been carried to the President, than he gave out a written statement from the White House to the effect that under no circumstances would he be a candidate for another nomination.<sup>34</sup>

President Roosevelt entered upon his second term in March, 1905, under happy auspices and with a great majority of his own party in control of Congress. What

<sup>34</sup> Text in New York *Times*, November 9, 1904.

he might actually do thereafter was uncertain. How far his efforts in behalf of honesty and equal justice might be effectual in the face of sinister and reactionary influences, none could say. But he had at least, by speech and act, committed the powerful organisation of which he was the head to a new and truer policy and one consistent with the ideals of its founders,—a policy from which thereafter it would be not only difficult but base to swerve.

## CHAPTER XVI

### THE TRANSFORMED REPUBLIC

IN the twenty years which followed the first inauguration of President Cleveland, the philosophic observer finds a multiplicity of tendencies and of achieved results, among the maze of which it is often difficult to disentangle those that possess supreme significance. No period in the whole history of the Republic had been so fraught with the consummation of changes long impending. It was a period of precipitation. In it a score of influences which for many years had been almost imperceptibly at work, now with a rapid rush wrought out results so swiftly and so surely as to daze the purblind and confound the calculations of conservative students of political and social history.

The central fact which dominates these twenty years of evolution is the fact that in them the United States at last attained a genuine national unity. Whatever orators and political theorists may have said and written during the preceding century, no dispassionate analyst of American conditions could blink the truth that the Federal Republic throughout that century had been, not one nation, but several nations, held together, so to speak, mechanically, rather than blended chemically in a complete identity of sentiment and interest. The fact might well seem odd to those who took a purely superficial view and constructed a theoretical argument. Here was a people mainly of English stock, occupying a continuous territory, speak-

ing the same language, and possessing the same racial, governmental, and social traditions. In the War of Independence, the colonies had resisted a common enemy in defence of a common principle, and had won a victory of which the glory was a common heritage. They had voluntarily accepted the rule of a central government in which the rights of each constituent part were carefully safeguarded. In all this there was to be detected the presence of influences making for a more perfect unification. How came it, then, that actual unity was not attained until more than a century had elapsed? What was the cause which kept the centrifugal and the centripetal forces so nearly balanced as to make it often doubtful which would finally prevail?

The anomaly was the more interesting because, from the very outset, the drift toward a true nationalisation of the Republic had been clearly indicated. Although the Revolution itself was succeeded by an ebbing of national energy, this merely evidenced the lassitude of a reaction. It was swiftly followed by a vigorous impulse which came from the South and from the West, and which was personified in the two great leaders, Calhoun and Clay. While Federalist New England was sulking in sterile criticism or impotently muttering treason, these two ardent souls were urging a boldly aggressive policy the adoption of which would inevitably bind the States together. They spurned the timid temporising of their elders, and flung the gauntlet of defiance in the face of Britain. Calhoun's early statesmanship urged the construction of "great permanent roads for defence . . . connecting more closely the interests of various sections of this great country." Clay personified the spirit of the West, its impatience of traditional restraints, its thirst for expansion even at the cost of

conquest, and its conviction that the Government at Washington should give the vivifying impulse which the individual States withheld. In the early years of the nineteenth century it really seemed as though the barriers between one section and another were soon to be demolished. Canals were cut and other waterways were opened. Steamboats began to ply between the growing cities. Great roads were built across the mountains. Meanwhile, the constructive jurist, Chief Justice Marshall, a native of Virginia, was strengthening the authority of the central government by holding the Supreme Court to his broad views of constitutional interpretation. It appeared at that time as though, within a few decades, facility of intercourse, commercial interests, and a growing pride in material and moral progress would link the States so closely and so surely as to give the natural ties of race and language their full effect.

It was of course the blight of slavery which deferred this consummation—not because of any moral taint associated with that institution, but because of the economic clash which it made inevitable. It not merely kept the South a purely agricultural community without the varied industries which flourished in the North, but it erected the breeding of slaves into a highly profitable occupation.<sup>1</sup> This special interest caused in the South a reaction against the centralising, unifying tendency which had earlier been noticeable. It paralysed the larger patriotism of Calhoun and his able followers and forced them into a narrow particularism and the exaltation of the State above the Nation. Their political genius was thenceforth devoted to the undoing of what they had before accomplished and to the stifling of a sentiment which was beginning to prevail. For many years thereafter, the

<sup>1</sup> See Reed, *The Brothers' War* (Boston, 1906).

narrowness of the New England abolitionist was matched by the narrowness of the Southern slave-owner; and the bitter strife between the two set back the birth of a true nationalism for three-quarters of a century.

The period of the Civil War, when the vigorous West threw its sword into the scale and determined the issue of the contest, settled the question of slavery forever. Yet the United States could not at once become a real political entity. The bitterness of the war itself would soon have passed away; but the horrors of Reconstruction sank deeper into the soul of the South than even the memory of devastated lands and of cities laid in ashes. It is painful now to dwell upon the folly and fanaticism which made that period the darkest in all American history. The wise and conciliatory plans of Lincoln were forgotten by the Northern Radicals. To disfranchise the best and ablest citizens of the South was bad enough. The incredible scheme of granting immediate suffrage to the half-brutish blacks and of thrusting them into the supreme control of civilised communities was the high-water mark of political insanity. Unprincipled white men from other sections of the country flocked into the Southern States and exploited the ignorance of the negroes. There was seen the spectacle of Governors of States carrying with them to low orgies bundles of State bonds, of which they filled in the amounts according as they needed the money for debauchery. Legislative halls which had been honoured by the presence of learned jurists and distinguished law-givers were filled with a rabble of plantation-hands who yelled and jabbered like so many apes, while drunken wenches sprawled upon the dais before the Speaker's rostrum. Public debts of every sort were piled up mountain high; and whole communities, already impoverished by

war, were crushed under new and even more appalling burdens.<sup>2</sup>

But the reconstruction period and negro domination passed away after the inauguration of President Hayes in 1877. Slowly but surely the South began to get upon its feet once more. Yet so long as it was excluded from any leading share in the Federal Government, a sentiment of nationality could not, in the nature of things, be fostered in the Southern States. So long as Northern orators and statesmen filled their speeches with allusions to "rebel brigadiers" and pointed to the "Solid South" as a menace to the nation's welfare, for just so long the South responded by a show of sullen anger and defiance. In a word, so long as the Democratic party was kept out of power for the sole reason that one wing of it was composed of Southern voters, the Republic still remained fundamentally divided. It was this fact which gave to the election of Mr. Cleveland in 1884 so profound a significance. Whatever one may think of his two administrations, they certainly demonstrated not merely that the bugbear of the Solid South was nothing but a bugbear, but also that the nation could ill afford to reject the services of the able men whom the South bred up, and of whom Lamar and Herbert and Carlisle and Francis were conspicuous examples. Political recognition in the executive departments of the Government did much to soften the harshness of Southern feeling.

Meanwhile, the South was recovering with astonishing

<sup>2</sup> See H. A. Herbert and others, *Why the Solid South?* (Baltimore, 1890); Reynolds, *Reconstruction in South Carolina* (Columbia, 1905); Fleming, *Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama*, pp. 730-782 (New York, 1905); and, in general, Dunning, *Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction* (New York, 1898).

celerity the material wealth which it had lost. Manufactures were established very successfully at many points, and notably in Georgia and Alabama. Mines began to be worked. Capital was attracted from the North and from Europe. Between 1895 and 1905, the economic development of the Southern States was one of the most remarkable in the whole history of the modern industrial world.<sup>3</sup> The distribution of wealth, the new activities, and the wider outlook which resulted from them, meant more than a shifting of the industrial centre of gravity at the South. It meant a transformation in the political relations of the South with reference to the nation as a whole. As one expressed it at the time, the Southern people were too busily engaged in providing for a prosperous future to waste valuable time in brooding over a melancholy past. Hence, after 1890, we find a new South, hopeful, vigorous, and alert, forming each year new ties to hold it fast as an integral part of the great Republic, whose foundations had been laid by the genius and patriotism of Southern men. The one thing necessary to make this clearly evident was the impulse given by the war with Spain. It was then that the South itself learned

<sup>3</sup> See Murphy, *The Present South*, pp. 97-102 (New York, 1904). In 1870, the assessed value of property in New York and Pennsylvania was greater than that of the entire South. In the same year the assessed property of Rhode Island and New Jersey exceeded in value that of South Carolina by nearly \$700,000,000. In 1880, the manufactured products of the South were less by \$200,000,000 than that of her agricultural products. In 1900, however, Southern manufactures, including mining interests, surpassed in value all Southern agricultural products by nearly \$300,000,000. The products of Southern factories in the last named year reached a total of \$1,563,000,000, an increase since 1880 of more than 220 per cent. "To realise the deep and far-reaching significance of such figures, one must be able to see through them the vast industrial and social changes which they represent."



how far it had emerged from its old seclusion. Its volunteers flocked with enthusiasm to the recruiting offices; and they fought shoulder to shoulder with their fellow-countrymen of the North and West for the same flag and the same country. It was a superb instance of political tact when President McKinley gave commissions in the army to Fitzhugh Lee and Joseph Wheeler—two ex-Confederate commanders. This single act intensified the warmth of patriotic feeling which the South displayed throughout that war and afterwards. President Roosevelt, himself of Southern ancestry on his mother's side, succeeded in increasing this good feeling in spite of the temporary excitement aroused by the Booker Washington affair. Some of his utterances appealed directly to Southern sentiment.<sup>4</sup> His Secretary of War, Mr. Elihu Root, in an address delivered before the Union League Club in New York City, frankly confessed that the Republican party had been guilty of a grave error after the Civil War, in bestowing the unrestricted franchise upon the negroes. These things and others like them made Mr. Roosevelt so popular in the Southern States, that at the time of the election of 1904, an eminent Southern Democrat, answering a question put to him in private conversation, said:

“In the South we are going to vote for Parker, but we are all praying hard for Roosevelt.”

As a matter of fact, this election actually broke the ranks of the long Solid South; for the States of West Virginia and Missouri then cast their electoral votes for a Republican President.

With the consummation of true national unity it came

<sup>4</sup> See his speech before the Republican Club at Philadelphia, on February 13th, 1905.—New York *Times*, February 14th.

about that the political and social phenomena which the United States exhibited after 1895 were no longer sectional. The problems which they involved confronted the people of the entire country. These phenomena and these problems, when analysed philosophically, related first to the astonishing growth of material prosperity and the distribution of wealth; and second and partly consequent upon the first, to a strong and rapid drift toward something like State Socialism. All the other important questions that arose during the period under consideration will be found to have sprung from one or the other of these two causes. Sufficient has been already said in the course of this narrative concerning the exploitation of the country's natural resources and the diffusion of wealth. The economic history of the United States had, on the whole, been the history of material success broken only now and then by financial crises which at times retarded, but could not long prevent, the accelerated enrichment of the nation. From 1846 to 1860, industrial activity of every sort was very marked. The Civil War for a moment brought panic and financial depression; but it soon proved a stimulus not merely to speculation but to legitimate enterprise as well. From that time the record varied, until at the beginning of the McKinley administration, the country reached a pitch of material well-being, such as had never before been known. It was not, however, so much the growth of wealth as the manner of its distribution which now became significant,—not the riches of the nation, but the riches of individuals. Until 1860-65, the national wealth had been widely diffused. After 1865 it began to be gathered into great fortunes. The first, and for a long while the only American millionaire, had been George Washington, who achieved wealth

by the judicious purchase of Western lands. For many years after his time there were, in the words of Mr. James Bryce, "no great fortunes in America, few large fortunes, and no poverty." The same careful observer contrasted this condition with that which prevailed about 1890. He then wrote:

"Now there is some poverty, many large fortunes, and a greater number of gigantic fortunes than in any other country of the world."<sup>5</sup>

The much-lauded "era of consolidation" exhibited the truth of this assertion and revealed a growing tendency to increase still more the concentration of wealth in the hands of a comparatively few. No statement on this subject professing to be exact can be accepted literally; yet the results of some careful investigations represent at least an approximate truth. Thus, it was computed in 1896 that one-eighth of the families in the United States possessed at least seven-eighths of all the country's wealth.<sup>6</sup> The assertion was also made in 1903 that the twenty-four men who then composed the directorate of the United States Steel Corporation controlled at least one-twelfth of the total wealth of the United States. A New York lawyer, one of Jay Gould's counsel, Mr. Thomas G. Shearman, had said eleven years earlier that the United States was practically owned by less than 250,000 persons, and that within thirty years from that time it would be controlled by fewer than 50,000 persons.<sup>7</sup>

Merely as an interesting fact, therefore, it would be

<sup>5</sup> Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, ii. p. 616 (New York, 1895).

<sup>6</sup> Spahr, *The Present Distribution of Wealth in the United States*, p. 69 (New York, 1896).

<sup>7</sup> In the *Forum*, for November, 1889. Quoted in George, *The Menace of Privilege*, pp. 1-13 (New York, 1905).

worth recording that the rapidity with which wealth had grown was balanced by the startling inequality of its distribution. To a very large extent this inequality represented a natural inequality in the brain-power which exists among individuals. It was a tribute, in part, to efficiency of organisation and to that superior ability which in the world of finance is comparable to a like ability in the sphere of military affairs. The military analogy is, indeed, a very apt one. Translate the strategic maxims of Napoleon into the language of finance, and there is formulated a system quite as axiomatic as was his, because it expresses fundamental truths. Napoleon's battles were won by a tenacious adherence to a few simple principles. "Always have your forces so distributed," said the Emperor, "as to make it possible for you to direct all of them at once upon the weak point in the enemy's position." This implies singleness of command, clearness of design, and concentration of power. When, therefore, immensity of force is directed by supreme ability centred in one dominant mind, there is effected a combination which is practically irresistible. And the same thing is true with regard to money. When millions are united and massed, and when their concentrated power is wielded by one far-seeing brain, they will draw to themselves swiftly and surely other millions and will justify the proverb which declares that wealth breeds wealth. An anecdote current in 1902 elucidates one of the causes of American success in financial management.

Not long ago, the head of an American corporation walked into the London offices of a great concern which represented similar interests in England. The American came unknown and unannounced. After waiting for half an hour in an ante-room he was

admitted to the presence of the manager, and came at once to business, with an unconcern of manner in striking contrast to English ways.

"Now see here," he began, without any preliminary talk: "I've looked into your concern and know all about it, and just what it's worth, and I've come here to buy you out."

The Englishman gasped and stared at what appeared to him the extreme assurance and even insolence of his visitor.

"Yes," continued the American, swinging his leg easily over the arm of the chair; "I know all about your business. It isn't worth a million pounds, but I'm prepared to offer you that, if you'll close the thing right here."

"And when would you be ready to pay over the million pounds?" asked the Englishman, with what he regarded as elaborate irony.

The American looked at his watch.

"Well," he said, "it's rather late to-day; but if you'll have the papers drawn, I'll turn the million over to you to-morrow afternoon."<sup>8</sup>

When men by temper and training come to possess the ability to do large things in this direct and simple way, they have an immense advantage over those who can act only in committees, or boards, or companies, and they will inevitably dominate them and use them quite at will. Hence it was that the concentration of wealth in the United States between 1885 and 1905, being directed in a swift, effective and overwhelming fashion, seemed to promise the commercial and financial conquest of the world. It was this which dazzled for a while the imagination of the American people. They had begun to make other nations pay tribute to the Republic. They confidently looked forward to a time when, as a certain Senator somewhat extravagantly phrased it, both the Atlantic and the Pa-

<sup>8</sup> *The Independent*, May 1, 1902.

cific Oceans would commercially become "American lakes," traversed by American fleets and washing no shores that were not tributary to the United States.

In many respects the possession of great fortunes by individuals was a direct advantage to the nation as a whole. The new millionaires differed greatly from their predecessors of the period immediately following the Civil War. That war had created the American millionaire. From 1865 to 1875 the most striking figure in American life was that of the *nouveau riche*. He was, to instructed minds, a most pathetic sight,—so grossly conscious of his wealth, so anxious to spend it in an impressive way, to do something princely, something really "big," while still so hopelessly ignorant of how to do it. He purchased urban dwellings with "brown-stone fronts" and plate-glass windows. He procured horses and carriages, and stocked his cellars with champagne. In the country, he built for himself enormous wooden mansions in many colours, surmounted by wooden cupolas and towers and battlements, and adorned with a maze of wooden pillars representing what someone cleverly styled "the jigsaw renaissance," while his lawn was dotted with cast-iron statuary painted to resemble bronze. Many of these war-made millionaires ultimately lost their money as quickly as they made it. Some of them left it to be squandered by their sons. The wealth of those days was seldom perpetuated; and this fact was crystallised in a popular proverb to the effect that "There are only three generations from shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves."

The representatives of the still newer wealth bore slight resemblance to the shoddy millionaire. They lived in the age that had discovered Europe, where they had travelled and observed and learned; for at this time Europe be-

came a mighty educator of the American people. It led them to the appreciation and encouragement of art and architecture and landscape gardening, and to a knowledge of the true refinements of civilised existence. There began to be laid in the United States the basis for something which resembled an aristocracy, founded in the first instance upon wealth, but in its higher forms deserving a better name than that of mere plutocracy. An aristocracy must always ultimately rest upon either power or service, and more often upon a combination of these two. In bygone centuries, power in its last analysis meant physical force; and hence the founders of the older aristocracies of Europe had been warriors, often soldiers of fortune who, by the edge of the sword, carved out for themselves a permanent place in the kingdoms of the Old World. In the nineteenth century, the greatest source of power was wealth; and, therefore, upon it and upon that service to the people which it was enabled to perform, a new aristocracy rapidly arose in the United States. It was easy to sneer at the source as being vulgar; yet power, when it is so great as this, is never vulgar, even though the wielders of it are. In the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, only the early stages of this evolution could be seen. Its frequent crudities and inanities everyone could detect and mock at; for there had so far been reached only the period of imitation and display. Yet already the possession of great wealth had exercised a sobering influence and had begun to create a sense of civic responsibility in many of its possessors. Foreign observers had been wont to say that in America, public office was held only by the representatives of the ignorant, and that men of light and leading held themselves aloof from politics. This criticism lost its point in the years

from 1890 to 1905. More and more did it become usual for young men of cultivation and intelligence to enter public life. At the time of the Spanish War, such men were eager to receive commissions in the army, or failing that, to fight even in the ranks. The nobility of service was beginning to be understood. President Roosevelt himself was an admirable example of this new tendency to sacrifice the delights of cultivated ease to the welfare of the nation.

The indirect value to the country at large of the concentration of wealth was also undeniable. Many of the latter-day millionaires—in fact, an ever increasing number of them—even in the pursuit of their own pleasures and the gratification of their own tastes, conferred a benefit upon the entire people. Following, sometimes unintelligently, but, as time went on, with a truer comprehension, the English models, they set a fashion that in many things was admirable. The open-air life, the love of country homes, and the practice of outdoor amusements, of riding and hunting and of healthful sports, all tended to improve the physical and moral tone of Americans. The great estates of the wealthy, the splendid country-houses on Long Island, in the Berkshires, in Maine, and in other picturesque localities, the country clubs, the golf-links, no less than the sumptuous hospitality offered by the rich to their friends, all set a standard of living which little by little added to the refinement of American life and did much to smooth away the crudities which had marked an earlier stage of American civilisation. Still more important was the generosity which gave with lavish hand to educational endowments, and to create and maintain libraries, picture galleries and museums. American purchasers brought to their native land masterpieces of art from the



choicest collections of Europe; and they patronised, often with great discrimination, the artists and architects of their own country. In this sphere, the new wealth and the growth of an aristocracy primarily founded upon wealth, were beginning to make the cities of the United States what the great merchant princes of Northern Italy made their cities at the time of the Renaissance.

There were many who deplored the inevitable growth of social distinctions which resulted from the state of things that has just been described; yet these critics ignored the fact that social distinctions had always existed in the Republic, and that they sprang, not from external circumstances, but from the inborn social habits of the race. That the multi-millionaire should think of himself as in a class apart from the man of moderate means was no more absurd than the fact that the great merchant should look down upon the petty tradesman, that the clerk should feel himself to be above the mechanic, or that the shop-girl should exclude from her society the domestic servant. The Anglo-Saxon cherishes an intolerance of social equality as intense and as ineradicable as is his championship of equality before the law.

That the rapid growth of wealth and its unequal distribution were known in many cases to be the result of inequality before the law, explains the discontent which throve among the American people during the years with which this narrative has to do. Americans are singularly free from envy. That some men should grow rich while others remained poor was not in itself a cause of dissatisfaction. Great fortunes honestly acquired were rightly held to be an honour to their possessors, because they were the concrete evidence of ability, economy, and persever-

ance. But, on the other hand, the fortunes that had been gained through illicit favour, in defiance of the law and by the debauchery of those who had been chosen to make and to administer the law—these roused a widespread and steadily deepening resentment.<sup>9</sup> Conspicuous instances of this lawless wealth have already in these pages been sufficiently pointed out in discussing the growth of Trusts, and the discrimination by railways in the making of their rates and in the stifling of competition by other means in flagrant violation of both the statutes and the common law of the land. For twenty years the courts had been practically impotent to check and to destroy the power of monopoly. Americans began to feel that the orderly processes of the law were unavailing. Petty criminals, underlings, and agents were sometimes punished; yet no great criminal of the wealthy class had ever been sent to prison, but was at most permitted to escape on the payment of a fine which was to him of no more consequence than the copper coin which one tosses to an urchin in the streets. State after State adopted legislation intended to be remedial or punitive, yet this practically accomplished nothing; and some of these very States, notably New Jersey, most inconsistently framed their corporation laws in such a way as actually to encourage the increase of oppressive combinations. The feeling of helpless rage which spread through the West in 1892 had permeated the entire country in 1905, and had prepared the minds of the people for measures far more drastic than any which had hitherto been known in the Republic.

It is thus that one may account for the rapid development of State Socialism in the United States. The germs of this movement were perhaps sown by the German immigrants who came to America at the time of the political

<sup>9</sup> See Brooks, *The Social Unrest*, pp. 68-106 (New York, 1904).

disorders of 1848, and who were imbued with the doctrines of Karl Marx. For a long while the organisations which these men formed remained apart from the current of American political life. The name "socialist" was little understood by the people at large, and was vaguely held to be synonymous with "communist" and "anarchist." In time, however, the social unrest which was aroused by the growing inequality of conditions began to stir the native section of the people. The various labour organisations which have elsewhere been mentioned,<sup>10</sup> early showed the drift toward Socialism, and looked to the central government for the rectification of what they held to be deep-seated social wrongs. An epoch in the history of this movement was marked by the publication in 1880 of a work entitled *Progress and Poverty*, written by Mr. Henry George. Henry George was a native of Philadelphia. He was born to poverty, so that at the age of fourteen he was obliged to leave school in order to earn a living for himself. Shipping, as a deck-hand on a merchant vessel bound for Australia, he ultimately found his way to California (1858) where he learned the printer's trade. For years he suffered great privations, drifting from one employment to another and proving unsuccessful in them all. With some of his fellow-printers he established a small newspaper, and this also failed; yet the venture influenced his subsequent career, since it led him to try writing for the press. His earliest productions show that he had already begun to study political and social questions and to urge his fellows "to check the tendency of society to resolve itself into classes that have either too much or too little." Presently he became chief of staff on the San Francisco *Times*, and thenceforward he devoted himself to a propaganda directed against the in-

<sup>10</sup> See pp. 131, 132.

equalities of society as it existed. As early as 1866, he exposed the illegal practices of the Western railways; and in 1877, after long reflection, he began to write the book which ultimately made him famous. The first edition was a small one, the author himself setting a part of the type, and for a while it attracted slight attention. Within a few years, however, it was taken up in England and widely reviewed as being a remarkable contribution to the literature of sociology. With the exception of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, no American book had ever been so widely read. It was translated into all the languages of Europe. Cheap editions were published in England and the United States, and it is estimated that between 1880 and 1905 no less than two million copies of it were sold and circulated.<sup>11</sup> Mr. George's thesis was that the entire burden of taxation should be levied upon land, irrespective of all improvements upon it, thus confiscating the economic rent, freeing industry from taxation, and affording equal opportunity to all men by destroying the unfair advantage which the possession of land gives to monopoly. Closely allied to his theory of the "single tax," as it was called, was his doctrine that the labourer is really paid, not out of capital, but out of value which he himself creates. In 1886, Henry George was a candidate for the mayoralty of New York City, receiving 68,000 votes. He failed of election; yet the ballots cast for him exceeded the number of those cast for Mr. Roosevelt, who was his Republican competitor.<sup>12</sup>

This display of popular strength gave an enormous impulse to State Socialism. Of great importance also was

<sup>11</sup> See George, *The Life of Henry George* (New York, 1900); and the Introduction by Henry George, Jr., to the anniversary edition of *Progress and Poverty* (New York, 1905).

<sup>12</sup> See p. 131.

the publication in 1888 of a widely read socialistic novel by Edward Bellamy, entitled *Looking Backward*. This book attracted the attention of many who had never before given any thought to social problems. Bellamy Clubs, as they were called, became fashionable. The study of sociology spread, and men and women belonging to the highly educated classes now joined hands with the representatives of labour. As was written at the time: "Bellamy's book brought Socialism up from the workshops and the beer-gardens into the libraries and the drawing-rooms." A third writer, whose influence can not be ignored, was Mr. Henry Demarest Lloyd, a lecturer on political economy, who later became a practising lawyer. After a long investigation, carried on with scientific thoroughness, he published his memorable volume, *Wealth Against Commonwealth*.<sup>13</sup> In it he exposed, with a mass of documentary evidence, the methods of the Standard Oil Company, and incidentally those of other Trusts, the drift of his conclusions being in favour of the public ownership or control of natural monopolies, such as water, coal, oil, and natural gas. From this time, the doctrine of the municipal ownership of public utilities rapidly won favour with the people. It seemed to embody a practical means of restraining some, at least, of the aggressions of capital. It involved no rash experiment, since it had been already tried with great success in several of the cities of Great Britain and the Continent, and it presented no formidable difficulties in the way of its realisation. The coal strike of 1902 had brought out very glaringly the dangers of the private ownership of one of the necessities of life; and in the autumn of that year, the platform of the Democratic State Convention in New York advocated the acquisition of the coal fields by the national Government.

<sup>13</sup> New York, 1894.

The argument in favour of municipal and national ownership was extremely plausible. The Government already owned and operated with efficiency the Post Office. Why not also the railways, the telegraphs, the telephones, and the express companies? Some American cities already supplied their citizens with water. Why should they not also supply them with gas? Why should they not manage the local means of transportation—the ferries, the street railways and the elevated roads? It was answered that private companies could do this with greater economy than could either State or city; but the reply was instantly made that such economies as private control effected went into the pockets of individuals and in nowise benefited the public. Moreover, bitter experience had taught the American people that for the abuses of private ownership there was practically no penalty; while a like abuse of public ownership could be punished at the polls. Overcrowded, unventilated, and ill-heated cars, excessive fares and general discomfort usually went with private ownership; and against these things complaints were unavailing, while the law afforded no redress. A legislative investigation in 1905 showed that the gas companies in the city of New York made enormous profits through a regulation of the flow of gas, whereby at will they could manipulate the meters and increase the consumers' bills to whatever sum they wished. Moreover, private ownership selfishly refused to employ inventions and improvements, because at the outset these would entail an additional expense for their installation.<sup>14</sup> A remarkable invention in long-distance telephoning was purchased by a corporation, not for the purpose of putting it into use, but in order to suppress it. For twenty years the New York Central and Hudson River Railway refused to employ electricity as a motor

<sup>14</sup> See Ely, *Monopolies and Trusts*, p. 79 (New York, 1900).

power in the long tunnel leading out of New York City; although the use of steam had twice caused shocking accidents in which many lives were lost and in which men and women were frightfully scalded and maimed for life. Governmental ownership, it was argued, could not possibly be worse than this. It must almost inevitably be more conducive to the public welfare.<sup>15</sup>

It is not surprising, then, that the question of a governmental regulation of railway rates and the municipal ownership of public utilities became a very vital one in the minds of the American people in 1905. It marked an end of the old individualism and a triumph of what was still called Socialism, but what, in Mr. Bellamy's phrase, was more truly to be described as Nationalism. For many decades, Americans had held that corporations were possessed of the same natural rights as persons. That belief was now shattered, and it was clearly seen that corporations had no natural rights whatever, but only such privileges as the people might choose to grant them; that they were the creatures of the State; and that their activities might be restricted or even, if necessary, destroyed, when they should cease to serve the public interests. By the end of 1905, more than half the cities and towns of the United States had acquired the ownership of their waterworks. Many were successfully operating their own gas-plants. Chicago had elected a mayor who was pledged to secure to that city the ownership of its street railway system. In New York, Mr. W. R. Hearst, the candidate of the party of Municipal Ownership, polled 225,000 votes, failing of election by the narrowest of margins. More important than all, President Roosevelt was urging upon

<sup>15</sup> See the papers collected in Bemis, *Municipal Monopolies* (New York, 1900); and also Spargo, *Socialism* (New York, 1906).

Congress the passage of a bill giving the United States Government power to regulate the rates imposed by railways upon shippers and thus to prevent the unjust discriminations which had made possible the Beef Trust, the Sugar Trust, and the Standard Oil Company.

Both the great political parties had, in fact, without really knowing it, become permeated with the fundamental principles of State Socialism. The Republican party had been essentially socialistic from the outset; since it had looked to the national Government to destroy slavery, even though slavery was protected by the Constitution. Later, when in control of the Government, that party had used the Federal power through tariff legislation to foster special interests and to enrich particular classes of individuals. Later still, it had given bounties to sugar growers and had proposed the subsidising of the merchant marine. The Democratic party, on the other hand, which in the early nineteenth century was very jealous of Federal authority, desiring to limit it as much as possible, had, in 1892, under the leadership of Mr. Bryan, become frankly socialistic, advocating Federal action to help men pay their debts and to diffuse prosperity among the agricultural population. The general recognition of these facts marked a new era in American political history. Henceforth, most Americans looked to the nation and not to the several States for the righting of all wrongs and for the encouragement of favourable conditions not only commercial and industrial, but likewise social. This meant a severing of old traditions, the establishment of new theories of government, and in consequence the transformation of the American Republic.

Centralisation of power, however, took on a more definite form than any vague enlargement of Federal author-



ity in the various departments of the Government. It tended specifically to make the President a supreme arbiter, with prerogatives transcending those of the legislative and judicial branches. Just as Congress was a more efficient, conspicuous, and responsible body than the legislatures of the separate States, so the President was a more efficient, conspicuous, and responsible agent than Congress. Americans were eager for results; and results could apparently be achieved with less delay if their accomplishment were entrusted to an individual. As in finance, so in politics, the one-man power was acclaimed. There lurked somewhere, perhaps, in the national consciousness, a love of the monarchical principle, provided only that it were blended with a democratic element. The Tory Democracy of England in the early eighties found its analogue in the Imperialistic Republicanism of the United States in the late nineties. The whole history of the nation had been, indeed, a history of the gradual strengthening of the presidential power. Jefferson's unauthorised purchase of the Louisiana Territory, Jackson's struggle with Congress over the Bank, Polk's practical declaration of war against Mexico in assuming that a state of war existed, Lincoln's use of the "war power," his trials by military commission, and his edict of emancipation, Johnson's refusal to enforce the reconstruction acts, Grant's military government in the Southern States, and Cleveland's rejection of the demand which Congress made upon him to surrender the documents relating to suspensions from office, were all indicative of the tendency that has here been mentioned. It is by a process of easy transition, therefore, that one finds President McKinley invested with absolute discretion in expending the money voted by Congress to prepare for war with Spain; and, after that war, there was little pro-

test when the same President ruled, without any legislative check upon his authority, the conquered Philippines and Cuba and Puerto Rico.

President Roosevelt's first administration was likewise marked by instances of personal government. He was, in fact, by temperament no less than by the accumulated precedents of a century, bound to magnify the prerogatives of his office. Under him the Executive function assumed almost the form of a frank paternalism. His interference in the coal strike, his personal direction to the Attorney-General to prosecute the Trusts, and his hasty action in recognising the Republic of Panama, were no more indicative of this fact than was his share in almost every other matter of public concern, from what he called "race suicide" to college football. And behind him stood the people, not only consenting to his exercise of authority, but eagerly applauding it. They liked his way of seeking tangible results; and their endorsement of him at the election of 1904 set the seal of their approval upon Executive supremacy. A member of the New York Bar, after analysing both the expressed and implied powers of the President under the Constitution, and after tracing the course of then recent historical events, concluded his study with the following words:

"He [the President] had claimed practically all their executive and magisterial sovereignties and unlimited discretion to exercise them; and 7,600,000 electors, representing 46,000,000 citizens, voted that he was right and peremptorily commanded him to use them.

"That is my conception of the election of 1904. After one hundred and eighteen years it made the President in fact, as in theory, the head of the nation and the dominating force in the Republic. . . . It was a remarkable popular interpretation

of the Constitution. . . . Thus, my ideal of the President coincides with the ideal of the people—a majestic, constitutional figure, uncontrolled by Congress, unrestrained by the courts, vested with plenary constitutional power and absolute constitutional discretion—a sovereign over eighty million people and the servant of eighty million sovereigns, whose soul-inspiring purpose is to serve his fellow-citizens, guard their liberties, and make this nation the freest, most enlightened, and most powerful sovereignty ever organised among men.”<sup>16</sup>

Without going so far as this interpreter, one may, nevertheless, reasonably hold that in the twenty years intervening between 1885 and 1905, the President of the United States did become in essence a sovereign, upon whose acts there existed no effectual restraint save that which lay in the right of Congress to impeach him and depose him. Yet the case of President Johnson shows that the successful impeachment of a President is practically impossible. If his partisans in the Senate should number only one more than a third of that body, the impeachment would fail, and it would be wholly impossible if he were supported by a majority in the House. Even the power of the purse would not avail to hamper him; since most appropriations made by Congress are not annual, but continuing, and extend over a term of years. It may be said, therefore, that at the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States had evolved an elective monarchy resembling very closely the ideal of Napoleon III. Precisely as in the French system, so in the American, the ruler was in great crises, absolute, the more truly so, because he derived his powers directly from the people through a *plébiscite*. The American presidency

<sup>16</sup> Gardiner, *The Constitutional Powers of the President* (New York, 1905).

differed from its Napoleonic prototype mainly in the single fact that the sovereign's term was limited to a brief period and that another *plébiscite* was necessary at the end of each four years. Here then, was established a union of two definite principles—the principle of popular selection and the principle of an independent and practically uncontrolled Executive.

The growth of Socialism in the United States had important developments other than those which have already been described. It gave a distinct impetus to the agitation for woman's suffrage and full political rights. This agitation began historically in America in colonial days, when Margaret Brent, as the executrix of Lord Baltimore, demanded the right to sit in the Assembly of Maryland. When the Federal Constitution was under consideration, Abigail Adams and Mary Warren asked for a recognition of women in the national charter. In 1845 and immediately thereafter, Lucy Stone and Abby Kelley kept the discussion alive; and the Anti-Slavery movement, of which the women of the North were strong partisans, had been favourable to the cause. Two leading abolitionists, William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips, gave it their energetic support. In 1848, the first woman's suffrage convention was held at Seneca Falls, New York, under the direction of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucretia Mott, and Martha C. Wright. From this time, in spite of strong opposition and every form of ridicule and obloquy, many women laboured persistently to secure the franchise, forming associations all over the country, until in 1869 there were organised in New York the National Woman's Suffrage Association, headed by Susan B. Anthony and Mrs. Stanton, and in Ohio, the American Woman's Suffrage

Association directed by Lucy Stone, Julia Ward Howe, and George F. Hoar. In 1892, the two associations were merged into the American Woman's Suffrage Association, of which the first two presidents were Miss Anthony and Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt.

The great political parties looked askance at this movement, without, however, directly antagonising it. At the Republican National Convention in 1876, the delegates listened to an address from a woman; and at the Democratic Conventions of 1876 and 1880, women were among the speakers. At the Democratic Convention of 1900, a woman delegate from Utah seconded the nomination of Mr. Bryan; yet even the Populists declined to give their official approval to the doctrine of woman's suffrage. On the other hand, the Prohibition party, the Greenback, Labour and Socialist parties, favoured the right of women to vote; and the various labour organisations, especially the Knights of Labour, admitted women to membership. In some of the newer States, women succeeded in obtaining the franchise. Thus, prior to 1905, the full suffrage was given them in Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and Idaho; while in many States they obtained the right of municipal suffrage, school suffrage, and suffrage upon questions of taxation. In the older States their efforts were unsuccessful; for there their petitions were met by counter petitions signed by women who believed the grant of suffrage to their sex to be politically and socially inexpedient.<sup>17</sup>

Far more important in its ultimate results than any

<sup>17</sup> See Anthony, *A History of Woman's Suffrage*, 4 vols. (New York, 1881-1904); Jacobi, *Common Sense Applied to Woman's Suffrage* (New York, 1894); and Stanton, *Eighty Years and More* (New York, 1898). For an unfavourable view of woman's suffrage, set forth by an American woman who had carefully observed its workings, see McCracken, *The American Woman* (New York, 1905).

attempt to secure political equality, was a very widespread and persistent propaganda intended vaguely to give women an exceptional prominence in the national life. The most concrete evidence of this was found in the formation in the States and Territories of women's clubs, not established with any one particular object, or at least with no object specifically defined, but all tending to push women to the front and to lay stress upon the potentialities of the sex. Many of these clubs were literary in character; others were interested in education; still others in local improvements; and a few in politics and legislation. "The club movement," as one woman wrote, "represents a tendency to associated effort . . . The club is the post-graduate [school] for the individual woman." One of the first of these organisations was Sorosis, established in 1868, by Miss Kate Field, Mrs. Botta, and others. By the end of 1905, these clubs and "federations" had become so numerous and so influential as to constitute a distinct and very striking social phenomenon.<sup>18</sup> The agitation for suffrage and the attempted participation by women in every sphere of effort was but another remarkable sign of the social unrest which permeated the United States toward the end of the nineteenth century. It assumed various forms; but it meant in the end a profoundly important change in the relation of American women to the American social system. It represented an emancipation less from political restraint than from the social conventions which had prevailed for centuries. Like all far-reaching changes, it was fraught with both good and evil.

The underlying tendencies of the woman movement

<sup>18</sup> See Croly, *The History of the Woman's Club Movement in America* (New York, 1898). In 1903, there were enrolled in women's clubs, 211,763 women.

were perhaps best set forth by one of its leaders, Mrs. Charlotte Stetson Gilman.<sup>19</sup> Mrs. Gilman's thesis was so interesting as to deserve serious attention; and it explains many important facts in the social history of the United States from 1885 to 1905. Two sentences of hers may be cited as representing her viewpoint and that of her followers:

“ We have kept half humanity tied to the starting post while the other half ran. We have trained and bred one kind of qualities into one-half of the species, and another kind into the other half.”

In other words, according to Mrs. Gilman, everything in the past had been done to make men brave and socially important, and also strong and intellectually creative. On the other hand, women were held by her to have been trained to become moral cowards and to develop in themselves only the minor virtues of personal usefulness. The sex-relation had been exaggerated, and the place of woman in society had been based entirely upon it, thus restricting her physical activities and dwarfing her power to think and to judge for herself. Throughout the centuries she had never had that moral freedom which would come to her from being mistress of her own actions and from learning what was right and what was wrong through the observation of consequences. Hence, woman, either as daughter or as wife, had been kept in a state of dependence upon man, while her power of choosing the man most fitted for her had been limited by convention. Freedom of association, such as men enjoyed, had been restricted. Sentiment and emotion had been abnormally developed in her. The whole existence of woman had been made to centre around those functions which had to do, either

<sup>19</sup> See Stetson (Gilman) *Women and Economics* (Boston, 1898).

directly or collaterally, with the sex relation; so that at the best she was a plaything, and at the worst a drudge.

Mrs. Gilman, therefore, advocated and, it must be said, with remarkable ability, what she called economic independence for women, teaching that woman should be so trained as to subordinate the sex instinct, to acquire the courage to stand alone against the world, to face life as men have always faced it, and to reject all thought of turning to another for comfort and protection. Should she marry, she should do so from practical considerations, and in order to perpetuate the race. In marriage her affairs should be independent of her husband's, and her partnership with him should be governed by considerations having no reference to sentiment.

Without pausing to consider the soundness of these views, it may be said that they represented a feeling which more and more began to sway the minds and actions of American women. A desire for economic independence and an impatience of conventional restraint led to fundamental changes in the position of the women of the United States. Such stereotyped phrases as "We must live our own lives," became common. Young women from remote parts of the country left the farm and village home, where before they had been well cared for and contented, and flocked to the cities with a curious willingness to regard the excitements of urban life as a compensation for hardships, for affronts, and for the diminished respect with which they were now regarded. Many of them unhappily cherished ambitions far beyond the range of their abilities, and these, after bitter disappointments, dropped into the ranks of humble workers, or were forced to lead a life of shame. Those who followed, whether consciously or unconsciously, the teachings of Mrs. Gilman,



received the nicknames of "New Women," and "Bachelor Girls." The great majority of them entered occupations in which they were obliged to compete with men; and because of their physical inferiority, they were forced to do so for a smaller compensation than men received. In spite of all discouragement, however, there was a steady influx of woman workers into almost every occupation, including even the professions. The census of 1900 showed that 5,329,807 women were in that year engaged in self-supporting pursuits.<sup>20</sup>

The ultimate effect upon the community of this revolutionary change in the position of women, could not, of course, be fitly estimated at the end of a short period of time. Opinions, therefore, were divided. Many observers held that, on the whole, women themselves and society at large had gained because of the moral training imparted by self-support to so many thousands who had hitherto occupied a position of dependence. It was asserted that women also as a sex profited by an extension of social, in place of personal, relations, and by the development of special abilities and technical skill.

On the other hand, there were many who regarded the change as both economically and morally detrimental. It was economically detrimental because woman, owing

<sup>20</sup> In round numbers 2,000,000 women were employed in domestic service, 665,000 as agricultural labourers, 1,300,000 in manufactures, 340,000 as dressmakers, 335,000 as laundresses, 150,000 as saleswomen, and about 400,000 as stenographers, clerks, and telegraph and telephone operators. As a matter of interest it may be mentioned that some 1,200 women were bank officials, 2,000 were saloon keepers, 1,900 were stock-raisers, 5,500 were barbers, 440 were bartenders, 879 were watchmen and policemen. In the practice of law and medicine and the other professions no fewer than 430,000 women were engaged. See Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Classes* (New York, 1899); and Campbell, *Women Wage Earners' Bibliography* (Boston, 1893).

to the expectation of marriage, was as a rule inadequately equipped for self-support; and by reason of her loss of time through illness, her competition with men was carried on under inevitable disadvantages. Hence, she must usually receive a lower rate of compensation. In most occupations the labour of women was but another form of cheap labour, and its introduction involved a lowering of the scale of wages for the man as well as for the woman. As was said: "The female competitor brings the earnings down to a point where the man is too poor to marry her." Students of social phenomena declared that in consequence of this fact, marriage was growing more infrequent, and that the decline of marriage necessarily meant the spread of immorality. Again, the circumstance that women now worked with men and, as in shops and factories, in complete subordination to men, was a cause of incessant temptation and a menace to chastity.<sup>21</sup>

Another and a less tangible ground of objection was noted in the sphere of education. In the primary schools the teaching was given more and more into the hands of women, and even in the high schools they formed a large majority of the teaching staff. The result was said to be a gradual feminisation of American mental training, which was enhanced by the entrance of women into the sphere of the higher education. An acute investigator of German nationality, who had spent many years in the United States, wrote the following suggestive words with regard to this phase of the woman movement in America:

"If we keep up an artificial equality through the higher development of the present day, American intellectual work will be kept

<sup>21</sup> Startling facts on this subject are collected in Lydston, *Diseases of Society* (Philadelphia, 1905).

down by the women, and will never become a world power. How differently, when compared with that of men of the same class, the female mind works, we see daily around us when we turn our eyes from the educated level down toward the half-educated multitude. Here we are confronted with the woman who antagonises serious medicine through her belief in patent medicines and quackery, the woman who undermines moral philosophy through her rushing into spiritualism and every superstition of the day, the woman who injures the progress of thought and reform by running with hysterical zeal after every new fad and fashion introduced with a catchy phrase. A lack of respect for really strenuous thought characterises woman in general. Dilettantism is the keynote. The half-educated man is much more inclined to show an instinctive respect for trained thought, and to abstain from opinions where he is ignorant. But the half-educated woman can not discriminate between the superficial and the profound; and, without the slightest hesitation, she effuses, like a bit of gossip, her views on Greek art or on Darwinism or on the human soul, between two spoonfuls of ice cream. Even that is almost refreshing as a softening supplement to the manly work of civilisation; but it would be a misfortune if such a spirit were to gain the controlling influence.”<sup>22</sup>

In the period under discussion, the United States exhibited a remarkable advance in the development of education. Americans had always shown a high regard for mental training. Both the individual States and the National Government had been extremely generous to educational institutions of every grade, making large gifts of public lands and grants of public money to maintain them on a liberal scale. The diffusion of wealth led many private citizens to supplement these grants by the most lavish benefactions and endowments. Hence, on the

<sup>22</sup> Münsterberg, *American Traits*, pp. 163-4 (Boston, 1901). See also the same author's more elaborate work, *The Americans*, pp. 558-589 (New York, 1905).

material side, from 1885 to 1905, the cause of education was markedly advanced. For the first time, the United States came to possess great universities, which in the magnificence of their buildings and in the completeness of their equipment, were comparable to the historic universities of Europe. The unstinted generosity which supplied their needs was, indeed, the marvel and despair of foreign visitors. The Stanford University, founded in California by Senator Stanford and his wife in 1885, was endowed with the enormous sum of \$30,000,000. Mr. John D. Rockefeller made gifts to the University of Chicago, amounting to more than \$12,000,000; while to Yale University he presented a million dollars in a single gift. A stream of benefactions from individuals made possible a steady growth of the other universities, such as Harvard, Princeton, Columbia, and Cornell. Many of the State universities, notably the University of Michigan, the University of California, the University of Illinois, and the University of Wisconsin, were enabled to develop their activities so rapidly as to take rank with the oldest of their sister institutions. The colleges, also, were not forgotten.

It was natural, given the practical characteristics of the American people and the materialising influences of this period, that the higher education, while making an immense advance, should still have been retarded and to some extent injured by the conditions of the time; that it should often have subordinated to mere size and numbers and display, the fine idealism of earlier years. Great stress was laid upon the more utilitarian branches of study, while those of a humanistic character were, for a while, at least, less highly valued. There was a disposition to lessen the time demanded for those pursuits which make for general

culture, and to devise short cuts by which the ambitious student could earlier begin preparing directly for a professional career. This tendency was most noticeable in the greater universities where, not unnaturally, the work of the graduate schools was stimulated at the expense of the undergraduate life. The prosecution of original research was fostered and encouraged in every possible way; and American specialists began to win deserved distinction, some of them being called to chairs in foreign universities. A very significant proof of a growing appreciation of highly scientific work was seen in the noble gift by Mr. Andrew Carnegie for the foundation of the Carnegie Institution in Washington, which he endowed with the sum of \$10,000,000 for the encouragement of original investigation in any and every department of science. It seemed likely, however, that the dissemination of liberal culture must more and more become the peculiar mission of the smaller institutions, which wisely refrained from styling themselves universities, and which still preserved the old traditions of broad culture and intellectual discipline as an end entirely apart from an intense specialisation.<sup>23</sup>

In the sphere of secondary and technical education, the United States displayed an extraordinary development surpassing that of its whole previous history. Not merely was the number of common schools multiplied; not merely did high schools and normal schools, and colleges for the training of teachers spring up on every hand; but great attention was paid to educational methods, and to the application of psychology to teaching. Manual train-

<sup>23</sup> See, for a philosophical treatment of the higher education in America, Burgess, *The American University* (Boston, 1894); Thwing, *The American Colleges and American Life* (New York, 1897); and Butler, *Education in the United States* (Albany, 1900).

ing took its place in the educational scheme, and a large number of technical schools were established. University extension courses were carried on in every part of the country. Many of the great universities opened their laboratories and lecture-rooms during the summer months. Nowhere in the world was so full and so free an opportunity given to the young for instruction ranging from the most elementary subjects to those which involved the most advanced and scientific methods of research.<sup>24</sup>

If we turn to the field of American literature during the period under consideration, its most significant feature will be found in the fact that it exhibits very strikingly the nationalising tendency. Until the year 1880, while the United States had certainly produced many writers of great merit and of real distinction, and while their themes had often been American, still their spirit and especially their technique reflected unmistakably the influence of Europe and above all of England. Only a very few of them, notably Mr. Clemens (Mark Twain) and Bret Harte, had exhibited a wholly new and national inspiration. But after the year that has been mentioned, American literature (using the word in its broadest sense) became truly and undeniably American. One finds this exemplified first of all in the growing interest which was then shown in the study of American history and of American historical, political, and social problems. History had always been a subject to attract the attention of native authors and investigators; yet many of these had followed Old World models and, like Prescott and Motley, had found their subjects in the field of European his-

<sup>24</sup> See the reports of the United States Commissioner of Education from 1895 to 1905; and Brown, *History of Secondary Education in the United States* (New York, 1902).

tory. Now, however, material was drawn from sources less remote. Contemporaneous events, or those that were nearly contemporaneous, were seized upon with enthusiasm; while the phenomena of American life itself were regarded as worthy of the most painstaking study. In 1883, there appeared the first volume of Professor John Bach McMaster's *History of the People of the United States*, intended by its author to cover the period beginning with 1783, and to end with the outbreak of the Civil War. Professor McMaster, in his treatment of his theme, derived from Lord Macaulay through John Richard Green; and his style possessed many of the defects and not a few of the merits of both those widely read historians. His work is a mine of information, drawn from sources not easily accessible, and exhibiting every evidence of elaborate investigation. Still more remarkable was the great *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to 1877*, by Mr. James Ford Rhodes—the most important and interesting analytical narrative yet written of the events of that momentous period. The first two volumes appeared in 1898, and the fifth, which reached the period of Reconstruction, in 1904. No treatise on American history had ever been so richly documented, as none was ever so temperate and impartial in its treatment of events regarding which contemporary feeling was still stirred by prejudice and political passion. In the exposition of constitutional history, chiefly that of the United States, Professor John W. Burgess published treatises which became classics in the lifetime of their author.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law* (New York, 1890); *The Middle Period of United States History* (New York, 1897); *The Civil War and the Constitution*, 2 vols. (New York, 1901); and *Reconstruction and the Constitution* (New York, 1902).

Other names which made this period memorable in the annals of historical and political research are those of Hart, Fiske, Schouler, Henry Adams, Dunning, Foster, and Mahan. Nor would any enumeration be complete which failed to mention Professor William Milligan Sloane, who won for his country the honour of having produced the definitive life of Napoleon, an enduring monument of profound research and of philosophical analysis.<sup>26</sup>

Political economy was enriched during the same period by many notable contributions. Popular attention had been fixed upon economic questions so eagerly as to make this inevitable. Therefore, the work of such men as F. A. Walker, W. G. Sumner, and Horace White, of the older generation, was ably supplemented by that of others who dealt with still newer problems,—Clark and Ely, for instance, with the Trusts, Taussig with the tariff, Seligman with taxation, Wright and Mayo-Smith with statistics, Laughlin with finance, and Bemis with municipal ownership.

In literature of a less serious character there appears the same unmistakable preoccupation with subjects distinctly national. In fiction, after the year 1890, American books delineating American life banished from popular favour the novel of English manners. Historical romances relating to the colonial period enjoyed a remarkable vogue; but of more significance were the works of those authors who depicted with artistic fidelity the peculiar conditions of contemporary America. Thus, just as Bret Harte had drawn the California of 1849, so with a far more realistic pen, did Mr. Hamlin Garland reveal the life of the Northwest, while Miss Mary Wilkins etched with exquisite art the New England hamlets. Mr. Harold Frederic's novels were studies in the village life of

<sup>26</sup> *Napoleon Bonaparte*, 4 vols. (New York, 1895-97).



Central New York; Mr. Cable told sympathetically of Creole Louisiana. Mr. Robert Grant wrote one book, *Unleavened Bread*, which is a masterpiece in drawing to the very life a peculiarly American type of woman—hard, crude, and ignorantly pretentious. Cowboy life in the West, already vanishing before the march of civilisation, was caught and fixed in the pages of Owen Wister. The rough and lawless existence of the gold-hunters of Alaska was described in a no less rough and lawless style by Mr. London. The subjects which stirred the interest of the American people at this time were turned to the purposes of fiction by a hundred writers, who found material in the Trusts, in municipal corruption, in the New Wealth, and in the slum life of American cities. The sybaritic luxury of the new American aristocracy, its manners and its morals, were drawn with delicate art and a sophisticated psychology by Mrs. Edith Wharton, whose style attained a preciousness unlike that of any other American writer. American literature found a singularly acute and discriminating historian in Professor Barrett Wendell of Harvard University.<sup>27</sup>

The one representative of belles-lettres, whose importance was more than literary, was Mr. William Dean Howells, by far the most eminent of American novelists at that time. As an essayist and poet, his writings were characterised by a too intense individualism; but as a portrayer of the American life of his generation, and of contemporary types, he had so far been unequalled. With a keen eye for what was striking in individuals or in life, with a wonderful photographic instinct for detail, with a shrewd insight into human motives, with a pervasive sense of humour and a subtle gift of language, he possessed an experience so broad as to be national

<sup>27</sup> Wendell, *A Literary History of America* (New York, 1900).

rather than sectional, with the advantages of an international point of view. He gave to American literature a series of books which constitute what may be called a national portrait gallery, thus providing for future generations a clue to American civilisation while in a state of flux. The social conditions which he depicted were those which to a foreigner were quite inexplicable and which will ultimately present almost equal difficulties to Americans of the future. In this way his novels have a distinct historical value and, taken together, may be not unreasonably compared with Balzac's *Comédie Humaine*. It was in 1885 that he published *The Rise of Silas Lapham*, which embodies a piece of portraiture attaining to the proportions of a broadly national type. The self-made man, who works his way up to material prosperity, was never more convincingly depicted; and the portrait is one that is true of the native American everywhere, in the East as well as in the West. Rooted in the soil of the farm, this homely figure, with its heaviness and gentleness, its simplicity and shrewdness, its rugged honesty and worldly wisdom, its uncouthness and native humour, its quaint conceit and innocent pride tempered always with a hesitating self-depreciation, its eye to the main chance, and its haunting and un pitying conscientiousness—one finds them all in this amusing yet profoundly touching creation, which is as vital as anything that human art has ever limned. This book, together with *A Modern Instance*, *The Lady of the Aroostook*, *April Hopes*, and *The Kentons*, contains invaluable human documents over which the student of American conditions will hereafter linger with delight and gratitude.

During this period the United States produced nothing of lasting importance in other departments of literature.

Many Americans had acquired a facile technique, and the level of literary excellence was a high one. Nevertheless, there arose no poet of real distinction, no great essayist, and no constructive philosopher. Stimulated, however, by the demands of education, an immense deal of interesting experimentation was carried on in psychological laboratories; and at least one psychologist, Professor William James of Harvard, left a mark upon the records of that science.

A survey of literature would be incomplete without some notice of American journalism, since, even when regarded in a narrow way, journalism and literature are intimately associated. The influence of the press in the United States had always been extremely great. Toward the close of the nineteenth century, however, that influence may be said to have declined to some extent owing to the changes wrought in the conditions under which journalism was carried on. Until about 1885, the great newspaper had been the mouthpiece of some single dominant personality, well known instances of which are to be found in the New York *Tribune* under Greeley, the New York *Times* under Raymond, the New York *Sun* under Dana, and the New York *Evening Post* under Godkin. Right or wrong, these men lent each a powerful individuality to the newspapers whose policies they swayed; and each of them practically compelled the adhesion of his readers to the causes which he advocated. Presently, however, many newspapers became great properties purchased by wealthy men and used by them to further their own interests, political, financial, or social. The editorial page then represented not a single personality, but a syndicate, the members of which were unknown to the public and were simply employés who wrote as they were directed to write, and

who came and went at the pleasure of the owner. In this way the newspaper staff lost its *esprit de corps*, and so far as the editorial page was concerned, its influence.<sup>28</sup> In 1905 there remained only one editor of national renown, to continue for a time the old traditions of personality in journalism,—Mr. Henry Watterson, of the *Louisville Courier-Journal*. In place, however, of the kind of journalism which he typified, and side by side with the somewhat colourless journalism of the syndicate, there arose a third class of newspapers which succeeded to much of the power that had been wielded by the great journalists of former years.

In 1883, Mr. Joseph Pulitzer, a Hungarian by birth, but long resident in the United States, purchased the *New York World*, a paper which had for years been dwindling in circulation. Mr. Pulitzer, in his conduct of the *World*, introduced methods and policies which were not altogether new, since they had been foreshadowed long before by the Bennetts, but which were now carried out upon so startling a scale as to command general attention. Sensational journalism was not a new thing. Mr. Pulitzer's development of it was. In his hands the newspaper not merely sought to procure news, but to create it. A reporter would be instructed to feign insanity in order to gain access to an asylum and there secure material for vivid exploitation in the columns of the paper. A young woman was sent off at an hour's notice to make a circuit of the world, with instructions to accomplish it in less than the eighty days required by Jules Verne's hero. Every stage of her journey across the continent was made in a special train, decorated with banners, and received at various

<sup>28</sup> See an article by R. W. Kemp entitled "The Policy of the Paper" in *The Bookman* for December, 1904, pp. 310-316.

points with music and the cheers of the multitude. Anything and everything that could startle and cause talk was eagerly caught at by what presently came to be known as Yellow Journalism.<sup>29</sup> The example set by Mr. Pulitzer was followed with even greater energy and unrestraint by Mr. W. R. Hearst, who, in 1895, bought the *New York Journal* from Mr. Albert Pulitzer, and soon after issued an evening edition of the same paper. The methods of Mr. Hearst were mainly those of Mr. Pulitzer, but they were exemplified upon a still larger and more striking scale. Mr. Hearst, however, added the force of personality to that of the spectacular when he secured, as his principal editorial writer, Mr. Arthur Brisbane. Mr. Brisbane possessed a style of wonderful effectiveness. Short, pithy sentences and a strong Saxon vocabulary won him readers everywhere. Mr. Hearst founded other newspapers in various parts of the country, and in all of them the Brisbane editorials appeared. Finally, Mr. Hearst's six organs came to be read every day in the year by more than a million voters, most of whom read no other papers. It became impossible to ignore the power which was thus exerted, especially as Mr. Hearst and Mr. Brisbane advocated the socialistic doctrines that were everywhere permeating the masses of the people. So marked became this influence that many persons actually

<sup>29</sup> The origin of this name is as follows: A periodical entitled *The Yellow Book*, devoted to rather questionable literature was appearing in London, and gave an unpleasant connotation to the term "yellow." At about this time the *World* happened to publish a series of rude cartoons in colour depicting the adventures of an urchin described as "The Yellow Kid." The public linked the two notions together and thus arose the combination "Yellow Journalism." See a paper by Miss E. L. Banks entitled "American Yellow Journalism" in the *Nineteenth Century* for August, 1898.

believed the Spanish War to have been brought on by the so-called "Yellow Press." On this point *The Nation* said:

"Our cheap press to-day speaks in tones never before heard outside of Paris. It urges upon ignorant people schemes more savage, disregard of either policy, or justice, or experience more complete, than the modern world has witnessed since the French Revolution. It is true it addresses the multitude mainly or only. The wise and learned and the pious and industrious do not read it. But it is the multitude, and not the wise and learned and industrious, who now set fleets and armies in motion, who impose silence and acquiescence on all as soon as the word 'war' is mentioned, and insist successfully that they shall not be interfered with, by either voice or vote, until they have had their fill of fighting. They have already established a régime in which a . . . boy with several millions of dollars at his disposal has more influence on the use a great nation may make of its credit, of its army and navy, of its name and traditions than all the statesmen and philosophers and professors in the country."<sup>30</sup>

These words are savage and bitter, but they concede so much in the way of fact as to constitute a reluctant tribute to undoubted power.

Summing up the underlying tendencies of these twenty years of the nation's life, it seems plain that they exhibited a change through which the civilisation of the United States was becoming rapidly assimilated to the civilisation of Europe. In place of an agglomeration of heterogeneous communities, having but few interests in common, and moved by no single dominant idea, there was emerging a compact and highly complex State, with all the characteristics of the Old World monarchies. Political power

<sup>30</sup> *The Nation*, May 5, 1898, p. 336.

was centralised. Social distinctions were accentuated. The lines between class and class were every year more rigorously drawn. Luxury and all the refinements that great wealth could give were seen on every side, as were also, at the other extreme, the squalors and the suffering of pauperism. The American Republic was, in fact, responding to the play of those powerful forces which have shaped the destinies and the character of all great nations. It was yielding to the inexorable law of evolution. Those who looked with a myopic eye upon the evils which accompanied this process, recoiled and prophesied a future full of woe. Corruption, defiance or evasion of the law, social selfishness, and a denial of the fundamental rights of man were everywhere to be detected. Yet far more significant than all these things was the fact, made clear by a thousand evidences, that the heart of the nation at its core was sound; that there still existed the capacity for strong indignation which springs from righteousness; that every evil raised up swift avengers; and that all the blots upon the escutcheon of the Republic failed utterly to dim its brightness. The hope of the future lay in the racial characteristics of the American himself—in his sense of justice, in his courage, his humour, his capacity for high achievement, and his invincible love of country. Such, therefore, as were not blighted and blinded by a querulous pessimism could still make their own the noble words of Lincoln, and could say with him:

“Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or any equal hope in the whole world?”





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